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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Ahmad, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeals arise from two suits for redemption instituted by the same plaintiffs based on two instruments that on their face were usufructuary mortgage deeds (dated 30 July 1904 and 22 January 1909). Both documents were executed by Megho Tanti. After Megho Tanti's death his heirs sold the equity of redemption (with other properties) by a sale-deed dated 19 April 1944 to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs tendered the mortgage-money to the transferee-defendants who refused to accept it; the plaintiffs therefore deposited the amount in court under section 83 of the Transfer of Property Act and then filed suits (nos. 169/133 of 1944/1946 and 170/77 of 1944/1946) seeking declaration of their right to redeem and a decree of redemption with mesne profits.

The main contesting defendants were the transferees under earlier sale-deeds dated 27 June 1921 who asserted that although the documents were in the form of usufructuary mortgages they in fact constituted absolute sale-deeds; they relied on mutations, receipts, and a body of other documents to support that contention. The trial court held the documents to be genuine usufructuary mortgages; the appellate court reversed that finding and held they were deeds of sale. The present judgment is the subsequent second appeal, in which Ahmad, J. reviews the findings of the courts below.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, between the parties to these transactions (or their successors-in-interest), parole (extrinsic) evidence is admissible to prove that instruments which on their face appear to be usufructuary mortgage deeds were in fact documents of absolute sale.
  2. Whether proviso (6) to section 92 of the Evidence Act (and related rules under sections 94 and 95) permits admission of parole evidence to show how the language of a document is related to existing facts in the circumstances of these cases — i.e., whether a latent ambiguity existed making parole evidence admissible.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' (Appellants') Arguments

  • The plaintiffs acted as purchasers of the equity of redemption from Megho Tanti's heirs and tenders of mortgage-money were refused by the defendants, necessitating redemption suits and a deposit under section 83.
  • They contended that the documents in dispute are on their face usufructuary mortgage deeds and that parole evidence should not have been relied upon to convert them into deeds of sale.
  • Relying on authorities (including Privy Council decisions such as Balkishen Das v. W.F. Legge and subsequent cases), they argued that proviso (6) to section 92 of the Evidence Act cannot be used to admit parole evidence where the document's language is plain and not ambiguous with respect to existing facts.

Defendants' (Contestants') Arguments

  • They asserted that although the instruments were in the form of usufructuary mortgages (sudbharna bonds), they were in substance absolute sale-deeds. They relied on local practice in the zamindari (where transfers often required landlord consent), a history of sudbharna bonds being used as a device to effect transfers, mutations of names in landlord records, rent receipts in their favor, and various sale-deeds and bonds (A, B, C, D, F1, G series) to show that the transactions were sales in disguise.
  • They invoked proviso (6) to section 92 of the Evidence Act and a body of case-law which, they submitted, allowed parole evidence to show in what manner the language of a document related to existing facts, thereby permitting proof that the mortgage-documents were really sales.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Balkishen Das v. W.F. Legge Interpretation of section 92; Privy Council rule that documents must be decided on their contents with such extrinsic circumstances as are required to show how language relates to facts. Cited as the leading authority establishing the proper scope for admitting surrounding circumstances under section 92; the Court relied on this to restrict admission of parole evidence where the language is plain and there is no latent ambiguity.
Achutaramaraju v. Subbdraju One of the authorities discussing admissibility of parole evidence under proviso (6) to section 92. Noted as part of a set of cases taking a different view historically; discussed as antecedent authority but superseded in principle by the Privy Council decisions relied upon.
Dattoo Valad Totaram v. Ram Chandra Totaram Case concerning interpretation of section 92 and admissibility of extrinsic evidence. Referred to among cases that considered broader admissibility of parole evidence; the Court observed conflicting authority but treated Privy Council precedent as authoritative.
Maung Kyin v. Ma Shwe La Privy Council decision cited on the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to relate a document's language to facts. Relied on as supporting the narrower interpretation of proviso (6); the Court treated this and Balkishen Das as closing controversy on the permissible scope of parole evidence.
K.S. Mian Feroz Shah v. Sohbat Khan One of several cases cited by appellants concerning section 92. Listed among authorities relied upon by appellants; the Court used the body of authorities to contextualize the rule but did not rely on this case specifically beyond listing it.
Baraboni Coal Concern, Ltd. v. Gokulananda Another case concerning interpretation of section 92 and evidence rules. Cited as one of several authorities on interpretation of section 92; used in the general argument that parole evidence is confined by the statutory rule.
Bishambhar Nath v. Muhammad Ubaidullah Khan and Sisir Kumar Mallik v. Naran Chandra Mallik Authority cited regarding onus of proof when claiming a document is other than it purports to be. Quoted to emphasize that the onus of proving by parole evidence that a document is not what it purports to be is heavy and falls on the party making the allegation.
Muhammad Qasim v. Sheo Ling Swami Jangam Authority for the proposition that onerous redemption conditions in a mortgage do not automatically convert it into a sale. Quoted to rebut the appellate court's inference that long periods of grace or heavy conditions by themselves convert a mortgage into a sale.
Tsang Chuen v. Li Po Kwal alias Li Kan Stated the general rule that where the words of an instrument are free from ambiguity and external circumstances do not create doubt, extrinsic evidence to alter the instrument is inadmissible. Used to support the proposition that plain instruments unaccompanied by ambiguating facts cannot be varied by parole evidence.
Babu v. Gokuldoss Govardhandoss; Babu alias Govindoss Krishnadoss v. Official Assignee, Madras; Gopal Ojha v. Ramadhar Singh Illustrative authorities on strict construction of written instruments under section 92. Cited to show the settled Indian rule that written transactions should be construed according to the statutory rule of evidence rather than broader equitable doctrines from foreign jurisdictions.
Lincoln v. Wright English/American equity principle (quoted) that fraud may justify admission of parole evidence to show a transaction was not what it purported to be. Noted as representing a broader equitable approach in English/American law, contrasted with the stricter statutory approach adopted in India under section 92.
Snyder v. Griswold American authority stating that where a deed and accompanying papers on their face constitute a mortgage, parole evidence cannot show the contrary. Relied upon as showing that even under American law parole evidence is sometimes held inadmissible when documents plainly constitute a mortgage.
North Eastern Railway Company v. Hastings; Higgine v. Dawson English cases cited for similar propositions about limits on parole evidence where documents are plain. Used to illustrate the English position aligned with the Court's view that clear written instruments are not to be varied by extrinsic evidence.
Shaw v. Foster (Lord Cairns) English case noting that where a document is accompanied by an actual written charge, one must refer to the terms of the written instrument. Quoted to support the proposition that a written instrument governing a transaction displaces equitable implications that might exist in the absence of writing.
Appa v. Kachai Bayyan Kutti Authority that the name given to a document is not conclusive as to its real nature and effect. Noted as a general proposition, but the Court found that in the present case the terms (not merely the name) conclusively showed a mortgage.
Sah Lal Chand v. Indarjit Authority that section 92 does not exclude oral evidence contradicting recitals in a contract where applicable. Mentioned to acknowledge limits to section 92, but the Court concluded those limits did not assist the defendants here because the documents were plain and unambiguous.
Preonath Shaha v. Madhu Sudan Bhuiya; Mohomed Ali Hossein v. Nazar Ali; Khankar Abdur Rahman v. Ali Hafez Calcutta High Court authorities illustrating a differing earlier view on admissibility of extrinsic evidence. Discussed as representing a conflicting body of authority that was, according to the Privy Council, superseded by the Balkishen Das line of authority.
Jhanda Singh v. Wahid-ud-Din Privy Council authority reaffirming the approach in Balkishen Das. Referred to as further support for the rule limiting admissibility of extrinsic evidence except to show how language relates to facts when needed.
Bhagwat Rai v. Ramasis Rai This Court's recent holding that parole evidence is not admissible between parties to construe a mortgage document as an instrument of sale. Relied upon as domestic precedent consistent with the Privy Council line; used to support the conclusion that parole evidence was improperly admitted below.
Ali Sheikh v. Imam Ali Sarkar Discusses admissibility of evidence of conduct to show a kot kobala (mortgage) was in reality a deed of sale; cited by defendants. Examined by the Court and found distinguishable and of no binding force here because the authority was condemned by the Privy Council and was decided on facts (relinquishment) not present in the instant case.
Baijnath Singh v. Jajee Vallay Mahomed Jajee Abba; Maung Bin v. Ma Hlaing; Dattoovalad Totaram v. Chandra Totaram; Abdul Goffur v. Sheikh Jamal; Narasingerji Jyanagerji v. Panuganti Parthasaradhi Rayanam Garu; Musammat Hanif-un-Nisa v. Chaudhrain Musammat Faiz-un-nisa; Amritram v. Dwarkkanath Various authorities concerning whether documents expressed as sale/mutual instruments were in fact mortgages or vice versa, and the scope of proviso (6) to section 92. Considered in survey: the Court analyzed these as largely inapplicable or distinguishable because in many of those cases the documents were on their face sales (not mortgages) or there existed facts creating latent ambiguity; they did not assist the defendants where the present documents were plainly mortgages without ambiguous relation to facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Ahmad, J. proceeded by (i) reviewing the factual findings of the trial court and the reversal by the appellate court, (ii) examining the documentary and oral evidence relied upon by the contesting defendants, and (iii) applying the statutory rule of evidence (section 92 of the Evidence Act) together with sections 94 and 95 and the governing precedents.

Key steps in the Court's analysis:

  • Review of evidence relied upon by defendants: sale-deeds (A series), sale-deeds of mortgagees to the contesting defendants (exhibits A and A/1 and certified copies), series of sudbharna bonds (B series), rent receipts (D series), village note and decree (exhibits F1 and G), and later sale-deeds (C series). The Court noted defects in this evidence: vendors or executants were not examined; delays in mutation (names entered in sherista years after the deeds); absence of proof of landlord consent or of any relinquishment/estoppel by the original mortgagor; and that some documentary inferences reached by the appellate court were speculative.
  • The Court found the appellate court erred in several respects: (a) relying on conjecture (e.g., suggesting tenants may have used sudbharna bonds as a device without documentary proof), (b) failing to require the necessary onus of proof on the party alleging that the mortgage was a sale, and (c) wrongly treating third-party sale-deeds and unproved declarations as conclusive evidence against the plaintiffs.
  • Legal analysis under section 92 (and proviso (6)) and sections 94–95: Ahmad, J. read proviso (6) narrowly and held it has application only where there is latent ambiguity — that is, where the language of the document, when considered with existing facts, becomes ambiguous or unmeaning and thus necessitates proof of how language relates to facts. Where the language is plain and consistent with facts, evidence under proviso (6) cannot be used to contradict or vary the written instrument.
  • On the facts, the Court concluded the instruments contained all the elements of usufructuary mortgages on their face and were plain and unambiguous in that respect. There was no sufficient factual foundation on the record to establish a latent ambiguity or otherwise to show that these particular documents were intended to operate as deeds of sale.
  • The Court emphasized the settled rule that the burden of proving by parole evidence that a document is other than it purports to be is heavy and lies on the person alleging the contrary; this onus became heavier because the challenge was made after a long time and the evidence offered in support was inadequate (vendors and executants not examined, delays unexplained, etc.).
  • Comparative law material (English/American cases) was discussed to show contrast: while equity in foreign jurisdictions might admit parole evidence to avoid fraud, the Court held that in India the statutory rule in section 92 governs and requires strict construction when the instrument is plain.
  • Consequently, Ahmad, J. held the court of appeal's reversal was perverse in part, grounded in conjecture and misapplication of law, and the parole evidence on the record could not support a conclusion that the mortgage deeds were in fact intended to operate as sale-deeds.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: APPEALS ALLOWED; THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IS RESTORED.

Direct consequences and practical implications as set out in the opinion:

  • The appellate court's finding that the disputed documents were sale-deeds is reversed as being partly based on conjecture and a wrong application of law; the trial court's conclusion that the instruments were genuine usufructuary mortgages is reinstated.
  • The Court held that parole evidence should not have been admitted to construe these plain mortgage deeds as deeds of sale because there was no latent ambiguity in the instruments; the onus remained on the defendants to prove otherwise and they failed to discharge it.
  • No order as to costs was made in the circumstances of the cases ("In the circumstances of the cases, no order for costs is passed.").
  • The decision emphasizes the limited scope of proviso (6) to section 92 of the Evidence Act: it applies where a latent ambiguity exists (language unmeaning with reference to facts), and does not permit varying or contradicting plain written instruments between the parties or their successors-in-interest.
  • The Court noted that the appellate finding was "perverse" and not of a character binding in second appeal, thereby affirming that second appeal review can set aside an order where the reversal below is unsupported by evidence or law as applied to the facts.

This summary is strictly confined to the information contained in the provided opinion and does not introduce any facts or conclusions beyond that text.

    Ram Narain v. Manki Singh

    Ahmad, J.:— These two appeals arise from two suits for redemption, both instituted by the same plaintiffs on the basis of two mortgage deeds.

    The main common point for decision in these two appeals is as to whether between the parties to the transactions parole evidence is admissible to prove that the documents, which on their face appear to be mortgage deeds, constitute documents of absolute sale.

    Of the two mortgage deeds, one is dated the 30th July, 1904, which is exhibit 1 on the record and is the basis of the action in suit no. 169/133 of 1944/1946 corresponding to Second Appeal no. 1255 of 1948, and the other is dated the 22nd January, 1909, which is exhibit 1(a) on the record and is the basis of action in suit no. 170/77 of 1944/1946 corresponding to Second Appeal no. 1258 of 1948. Both these documents were executed by the same person, namely, Megho Tanti. On his death, his heirs and successors, who were impleaded as defendants 3rd party in both the suits sold the equity of redemption along with some other properties for a sum of Rs. 500 to the common plaintiffs of the two suits by a sale-deed dated the 19th April, 1944 (exhibit 2).

    The first mortgage deed dated the 30th July, 1904, was executed in favour of two persons Kashi Singh, the ancestor of the defendants 1st party, and Ramsahay Singh, the ancestor of defendants 4th party, in suit no. 169/133. This document was executed for a sum of Rs. 150 and the property covered under the document was 1 bigha and 11 dinars of the tenancy land in plot no. 184 of khata no. 57. The period of grace given under that document was twenty-one years. The other mortgage deed was also executed in favour of two persons, Ramrup Kumar (defendant no. 11) and Manmohan Kumar, the ancestor of defendants 12 to 14, in suit no. 170/77 who all constituted the second party in that suit. That was for a sum of Rs. 99 and the property covered by it was 18 kathas and 2 dhurs of the tenancy land in plot no. 13 under the same khata no. 57. The period of grace stipulated in that document was thirty-five years. It is said that Ramsahay Singh, one of the two mortgagees under the mortgage deed, dated the 30th July, 1904, transferred his interest under that document for a sum of Rs. 100, and in the case of the, other mortgage deed dated the 22nd January, 1909, all the mortgagees thereunder transferred their interest under that document for a sum of Rs. 1,000 in favour of the common contesting defendants by two sale deeds of the same date, namely, the 27th June, 1921. The originals of the two sale-deeds have been exhibited as A and A/1 and their certified copies as 3 and 3(a).

    The tenancy holdings in plot nos. 184 and 13 are both situate in village Mohammadpur Mani bearing touzi no. 591, which were at the time of the execution of the two mortgage documents in the zamindari of Mahanth of Dularpur.

    The case of the plaintiffs is that on their purchase of the equity of redemption from the heirs and successors of Megho Tanti they tendered the mortgage money to the defendants but they did not accept it and, therefore, they deposited that amount in court on the 27th of April, 1944, under section 83 of the Transfer of Property Act in Miscellaneous Case no. 140 of 1944. On the service of the notices in that case the transferee defendants asserted that they were not sudbharnadars but purchasers of the properties and hence the plaintiffs instituted the two suits bearing nos. 169/133 and 170/77 for a declaration that they had a right to redeem the mortgage lands and prayed for a decree of redemption with mesne profits.

    The suits were substantially contested only by the common transferees under the two sale-deeds dated the 27th June, 1921, who were impleaded as defendants second party in suit no. 169/133 and as defendants first party in suit no. 170/77. No-appearance or written statement was filed in either of the suits on behalf of the defendants third party or on behalf of the defendants fourth party in suit no. 169/133 or even on behalf of defendants first party in suit no. 170/77. The defendants first party in suit no. 169/133, who are the successors of Kashi Singh, the other mortgagee under the documents dated the 30th July, 1904, did no doubt file written statement but subsequently they compromised the matter on the 16th of December, 1946, and therefore, they also had no interest left in the matter after the compromise.

    The defence put up by the main contesting defendants was that the mortgage deeds dated the 30th July, 1904, and the 22nd January, 1909, though in the form of usufructuary mortgages, were in fact documents of sale and that they have been in possession of the land as tenants on mutation of their names in the sherista of the zamindar and on payment of rents for which they received rent receipts in their names. The reasons given by them to explain as to why the documents were written in the form of usufructuary mortgages were that in those days in the zamindari of Mahanth of Dularpur there, was no custom of transferability of tenancy holding without the consent of the landlord and hence in order to circumvent that bar tenants selling their lands used to resort to the device of executing sale-deeds in the form of sudbharna deeds as a cloke to hide the real nature of the transactions. On these allegations the defendants pleaded that the suit should be dismissed.

    The trial court on a consideration of the evidence and other circumstances on the record came to the conclusion that—

    “……………though there are some circumstances in favour of defendants, but they are not so strong to support the case of defendant to prove that the transactions were sale deeds. Hence I hold that the bonds in suit are really sudbharna bonds and they did not operate as sale deeds.”

    In appeal the court did not agree with this finding and it held—

    “……………from the attending circumstances and the conduct of the parties I am thoroughly convinced that Exts. 1 and 1a were out and out sale deeds in garb of sudbharna bonds.”

    The contesting defendants in support of their case firstly relied on two documents, exhibits F1 and G, to prove that there was no custom of transferability of tenancy holdings at the relevant time in the zamindari of Mahanth of Dularpur. Exhibit F1 is a decree of a title suit whereby a document of sale was set aside on the ground that the transfer by sale was done without the consent of the landlord. Exhibit G is the certified copy of village note. The entry under heading IX in it reads:

    “Custom of sale without Malik's consent is not admitted. But mutations are generally allowed on receiving arrears due from the holding transferred plus Rs. 2-8-0 as salami (Rs. 2 to malik and 8 as to the patwari). About 30 years ago that there was once a registered deed of sale in village Balapur appertaining to the same tauzi as this village was set aside by the High Court, when any tenant wants to part with his holding but usually goes to the malik with the intending purchaser and gets the latter name substituted in the malik's sirista on payment of all arrears and salami as stated above.”

    About these documents the view of the trial court was and I think rightly that though they fully proved that the transfers which were not infrequent in those days and which could be secured by payment of salami could only be made with the consent of the landlord but that there was no indication in these documents that mortgage deeds used to be accepted as documents of absolute sale. The court of appeal, however, on a consideration of these two documents not only came to the conclusion that no transfer was possible in those days without the consent of the landlord, a fact which is not now in dispute, but further held—

    “It is, therefore, no wonder that raiyats with a view to escape the harassment of the maliks might have been getting only sudbharna bond executed even in cases where they intended for all practical purposes to take kebala of the land concerned.”

    This last finding, as it is apparent, is not based on any document but purely on conjecture, which, I need not point out, is not permissible in law.

    Next the contesting defendants relied upon a series of sudbharna bonds which are exhibits B series. The vendors of these bonds were not examined and therefore the trial court rightly came to the conclusion that those documents by themselves could not show that they were treated as deeds of sale. Contrary to it, the court of appeal, however, without giving any cogent reason for its view held “Exts. B to B4 are similar sudbharna bonds executed in appellants' favour”. I must confess that I have failed to understand as to what is meant by the word “similar”. Perhaps the court of appeal meant to say that they also though in the form of sudbharna bonds operated as sale-deeds for the simple reason that the period of grace in some of them was 51 years and 60 years and hence they, in its opinion, give support to the case of the defendants. If so, this as well, in my opinion, is based on conjecture and not on any evidence on the record.

    The third evidence relied upon by the defence was a batch of rent receipts (Exhibits D series). The case pleaded in the written statement is that the sudbharnadars in cases where they were in fact vendees used to get their names recorded in the sherista of the malik on payment of salami soon after the execution of the said sudbharna bonds. In the present case the documents in favour of the contesting defendants were executed in the year 1921 but the mutation of their names in the sherista of the landlord was made in 1336 Fasli, that is, near about 1929. This delay, in the opinion of the trial court was not consistent with the pleading made in the written statement nor was consistent with the conduct of a person who was anxious to show that the bond, though sudbharna in form, was in fact a sale deed, and, therefore, in its opinion this evidence did not support the defence case. As against that the court of appeal held, though it conceded that there was no evidence on the record to show that Meghu or his heirs were consenting party to the mutation of the names of the defendants in place of Meghu, that as there was nothing to show that they at any time thereafter objected to the landlord's action, the receipts' in the names of the defendants could not be brushed aside. This, in my opinion, is not a correct approach of the proposition. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge, who heard the matter in appeal, should have realised that the onus of proving by parole evidence—even when permissible in law—that the document is not what it purports to be is heavily on the person who makes that allegation and not on the other side and that onus becomes still heavier when the challenge is advanced after a long time: Bishambhar Nath v. Muhammad Ubaidullah Khan and Sisir Kumar Mallik v. Naran Chandra Mallik. As to the mere payment of rent to the landlord by the defendants, if considered independently of the fact as to who was the person in whose name he receipt was issued, the learned Additional Subordinate Judge should have realised that it was not at all of any importance in the circumstances of the present case. In this connection he was in fact misled by the non-consideration of the facts that in the case of the document dated the 22nd January, 1909, under its very terms the liability for the payment, of rent was on the mortgagees and they were, as stipulated therein, to get back the rent paid by them at the time of redemption and that in the case of the other document, though the contract was silent on the point of the liability of the payment of rent, yet in that case also the rent had to be paid by the mortgagees because of the provisions of law in section 76 of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, in either case, in one under the contract and in the other under law, rent had to be paid by the mortgagees for the lands given in mortgage.

    Fourthly the case of the defendants was that in those days the sudbharna mortgages used to be of two classes; one which in fact operated as genuine sudbharna bonds and the other which though in the form of sudbharna bonds used to operate as out and out sales. The differences in the two classes of sudbharna bonds, according to the defendants, were to be found in the fact that the period of grace used to be longer and consideration heavier in the case of those sudbharna bonds which operated as sales as compared with those which were genuine sudbharna bonds. On these allegations it was contended that the bonds in dispute in fact constituted sale-deeds as the periods of grace stipulated therein were comparatively long and considerations paid therefor were high. The trial court dismissed this part of the case on the ground that there was no reliable evidence in support of this contention. The defendants did not file any sudbharna bond which could be proved to have operated as a sale-deed. Neither there was any evidence on the record to prove as to what was the rate of price of the lands prevailing in that area at that time and as to what was the normal period of grace generally stipulated in genuine sudbharna bonds in that village in those days. In the absence of evidence on these points, the trial court concluded and I think rightly that no inference could be drawn from them in favour of the allegations set up by the defendants. In coming to this conclusion he was careful to take note of one more important fact—which has not been considered at all by the court of appeal—namely that in paragraph 9 of the written statement in suit no. 170/77 it was specifically stated that the ancestor of the defendants 3rd party had a necessity of taking loan and, therefore, the bond dated the 22nd January, 1909, was executed by him. This averment in the written statement, as held by the trial court, on the face of it completely negatives the defence case. In this connection reliance was also placed by the defence on the two sets of sale-deeds, exhibits A series and C series, all in their favour. Exhibits A series, as already stated above, relate to the property in dispute, and they have been cited to show that the considerations shown for the transaction covered by them are higher than the mortgage moneys under the documents dated the 30th July, 1904, and the 22nd January, 1909. The other set of sale-deeds, namely, exhibits C and C(1) are saledeeds executed by persons who, as it is stated in those documents, held those lands on the basis, of sudbharna bonds. They are of the year 1941. The trial court did not rely much on either of these sets of sale-deeds for the reasons, firstly, that they are documents wherein the executants of the bonds in dispute or their successors-in-interest are not a party to them. They, in its opinion, at best amounted to statement made by third persons for the benefit of the defendants who were the transferees under those documents. Secondly, the trial court thought that as none of the vendors of exhibits C series or of A series were examined in the present case, their statements in those documents are not of any evidentiary value against the plaintiffs. The court of appeal, however, thought that the statements made in the two sets of documents, exhibits A series and C series, were of evidentiary value even against the plaintiffs and that they were relevant for finding out the meaning of the documents in dispute though their executants were not examined to prove that the statements made therein were true. I must say that there also the approach made by the court of appeal was entirely wrong. These statements could not have been used in the circumstances of this case against the plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest. Apart from this, the court of appeal was not justified to hold that the documents in dispute operated as deeds of sale on the ground that the periods of grace stipulated therein were long and heavy. The mere fact that the conditions on which a mortgage can be redeemed are onerous would not be sufficient to justify a court in coming to the conclusion that the transaction which purported to be a mortgage was a sale as laid down in the case of Muhammad Qasim v. Sheo Ling Swami Jangam.

    This survey of the entire discussion on the evidence by the two courts clearly demonstrates that the court of appeal in reversing the conclusion arrived at by the trial court erred in many respects and the finding given by the court of appeal is partly based on conjecture and partly on a wrong application of law. It is as such perverse and not of a character which can be said to be binding on this Court in second appeal. I have myself carefully gone through the evidence and in my opinion the parole evidence on the record even if held to be admissible in law in the present case cannot lead to the conclusion that the parties to the two mortgage deeds in dispute intended them to operate as deeds of sale.

    The matter, however, does not end there. It has been strongly contended by Mr. Lal Narayan Sinha appearing for the appellants that the court was completely wrong in relying at all on parole evidence in this case to come to the conclusion that the documents in dispute, though on their face mortgage deeds, were in fact documents of sale. In support of this contention reliance was placed by him on a number of authorities laid down in the cases of Balkishen Das v. W.F Legge; Achutaramaraju v. Subbdraju; Dattoo Valad Totaram v. Ram Chandra Totaram; Maung Kyin v. Ma Shwe La; K.S Mian Feroz Shah v. Sohbat Khan; and Baraboni Coal Concern, Ltd. v. Gokulananda(4). All these cases turn on the interpretation of the rule of evidence laid down in section 92 of the Evidence Act. The main body of that section reads:

    “When the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved according to the last section, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from, its terms:”

    Along with it there are six provisos attached to it. The case of the defendants is that the term of proviso (6) is applicable to the facts of the present case and to give support to the argument following cases were cited on their behalf—(1) Musammat Hanif-un-Nisa v. Chaudhrain Musammat Faiz-un-nisa(5); (2) Baij nath Singh v. Jajee Vallay Mohomed Jajee Abbe(6); (3) Maung Kyin v. Ma Shwe La; (4) Abdul Goffur v. Sheikh Jamal(7); (5) Narasingerji Jyanagerji v. Panuganti Parthasaradhi Rayanam Garu(8); (6) Ali Sheikh v. Imam Ali Sarkar(9); and (7) Amritram v. Dwarkkanath(10), Proviso (6) reads:

    “Any fact may be proved which shows in what manner the language of a document is related to existing facts.”

    The other provisos are also mostly in the nature of exceptions to the main rule given in section 92, and it is admitted by the parties that they are not applicable to the circumstances of the present case. Proviso (6) is on the face of it couched in very wide terms and the meaning of it is not apparently confined to a defined scope. I, however, think that this proviso when read with sections 94 and 95 of the Evidence Act does convey certain defined scope of its meaning. Section 94 reads:

    “When language used in a document is plain in itself, and when it applies accurately to existing facts, evidence may not be given to show that it was not meant to apply to such facts.”

    Section 95 says:

    “When language used in a document is plain in itself, but is unmeaning in reference to existing facts, evidence may be given to show that it was used in a peculiar sense.”.

    These two sections when read with the main rule of law laid down in section 92, I think, clearly suggest that the proviso (6) comes into play only when there is a latent ambiguity in a document, that is, when the language of the document is not prima facie consistent with the existing facts, or, in other words, when there is a conflict in the plain meaning of the language used in the document and the facts existing or when they put together lead to an ambiguity. In case, therefore, when the language used in a document is plain and not anyway ambiguous in reference to facts existing, there is no scope for coming into play of the rule of interpretation laid down in proviso (6) to section 92 of the Evidence Act. In the case of Tsang Chuen v. Li Po Kwal alias Li Kan it has been laid down that the general rule is that where the words of the written instrument are free from ambiguity in themselves and where external circumstances do not create any doubt or difficulty, evidence de bora the instrument for the purpose of explaining it according to the surmised or alleged intention of the parties to the instrument is utterly inadmissible. On the same line is the principle of law laid down in the cases of Babu v. Gokuldoss Govardhandoss; Babu alias Govindoss Krishnadoss v. Official Assignee, Madras and Gopal Ojha v. Ramadhar Singh. By now it is also settled that the rule on this point in English and American laws are slightly different to what is laid down in section 92. In those laws the rule of equity has also its own say in construing a document, which, as laid down in the case of Lincoln v. Wright, says that “The principle of the Court is that the statute of Frauds was not made to cover fraud. If the real agreement in this case was that between plaintiff and Wright the transaction should be a mortgage transaction, it is, in the eye of this Court, fraud to insist on the conveyance as being absolute, and parole evidence must be admissible to prove the fraud”. Contrary to English and American laws in India the transaction reduced to writing as between the parties has to be construed strictly in accordance with the statutory rule of evidence given in section 92 and not also in accordance with the rule of equity (Balkishen Das v. W.F Leggee) . Notwithstanding, however, this difference and wider scope for the admissibility of parole evidence under those laws, it has been held even by the American Court in the case of Snyder v. Griswold that where the deed and accompanying papers on their face constitute a mortgage, parole evidence is not competent to show the contrary. To the similar effect are the principles laid down under English law in the cases of (1) The North Eastern Railway Company v. Hastings and (2) Higgine v. Dawson.

    In the present case it is admitted that the documents in dispute on their face are mortgage deeds. Further the terms stipulated in them, some of which I have already refered to above, clearly indicate that the properties covered by those documents were given in security for a debt and not transferred absolutely. It is, therefore, manifest that the two mortgage deeds do not, in the least, when read by themselves, indicate that they were documents other than mortgage deeds. All the elements necessary to constitute them mortgage deeds are on their face plainly and abundantly present without any scope for any ambiguity. There is no indication whatsoever in them that they were in fact intended to operate as documents of sale. Neither there is any fact existing which can be said anyway sufficient to give rise to any ambiguity in the language of the documents when related to that fact. Even according to the admitted case of the defendants, the usufructuary mortgages were then used to be of two kinds; one of which operated, according to them, as a document of sale and the other as a genuine usufructuary mortgage. Here there is no fact brought on the record, as already discussed by me above, which can prove that the present mortgage deeds were not of the class of genuine usufructuary mortgages but were of the class which used to operate as deeds of sale. I, therefore, hold for the reasons stated above that the documents are plain in themselves and apply accurately to facts existing and in that view of the matter parole evidence should not have been in law admitted for the interpretation of those documents. When parties have deliberately put their mutual engagements info writing in language which plainly and clearly imports a legal obligation, it is only reasonable to presume that they have introduced into the written instrument every material term and circumstance in the case of Shaw v. Foster Lord Cairns, though it was, it may be noted, a case under English law, observed:

    “…………although it is the well established rule of equity that a deposit of a document of title without more, without writing, or without word of mouth, will create in equity a charge upon the property, I apprehend that rule will not apply where you have the deposit accompanied with an actual written charge. In that case you must refer to the terms of the written document, and any implication that might be raised, supposing there was no document, is put out of the case, and reduced to silence by the document by which alone it must be governed.”

    It is true that the name given by the parties to a document is not conclusive as to its real nature and effect Appa v. Kachai Bayyan Kutti and there is nothing in section 92 of the Evidence Act to exclude oral evidence of an oral agreement which contradicts, varies, etc., not the terms of the contract, but some recitals in the contract itself (Sah Lal Chand v. Indarjit) , but in the present case, apart from the names given to them in their bodies, the terms stipulated thereunder also conclusively prove that they were intended to operate as usufructuary mortgage deeds. Accordingly, in my opinion, Mr. Lal Narayan Sinha is right in contending that in the circumstances of the present case the courts below should not have relied on the parole evidence brought on the record to prove that the mortgage deeds were in fact intended to operate as deeds of sale.

    The cases relied upon by the parties are mostly those wherein the language of the documents, though plain by themselves, was unmeaning in reference to existing facts and in that view of the matter facts were allowed to be proved which showed in what manner the language of these documents was related to existing facts. But in doing that the court was put to a question which it had to answer and that was what should be the scope and latitude of the parole evidence to be given in order to show in what manner the language of those documents was related to existing facts. On that point the Madras and Bombay High Courts at a point of time took one view which may be found illustrated in the case of the Madras High Court in the case of Achutaramaraju v. Subbaraju and in the case of the Bombay High Court in the case of Dattoo v. Ramchandra. The dominant view taken then by the Calcutta High Court was, however, different to it and that is to be found lucidly discussed in the Full Bench case of Preonath Shaha v. Madhu Sudan Bhuiya which was followed subsequently in the case of Mohomed Ali Hossein v. Nazar Ali and in the case of Khankar Abdur Rahman v. Ali Hafez. While the opinions on this point of law were in this conflicting state, in India the Privy Council in the leading case of Balkishen Das v. W.F Legge laid down:

    “The case must therefore be decided on a consideration of the contents of the documents themselves with such extrinsic evidence of surrounding circumstances as may be required to show in what manner the language of the document is related to existing facts.”

    Subsequently the Privy Council reiterated this view again in the case of Jhanda Singh v. Wahid-ud-Din and in the case of Maung Kyin v. Ma Shwe La. In the latter case their Lordships have observed:

    “Notwithstanding the decision of this Board, however, a certain conflict of authority on the subject still remains in India. But the respondents rightly refer to Achutaramaraju v. Subbaraju (I.L.R 25 Madras 7), Maung Bin v. Ma Hlaing (3 Lower Burma Rulings 100) and Dattoovalad Totaram v. Chandra Totaram (I.L.R 30, Bombay 119), and in particular to the judgment of Jenkins, C.J, in the last case. In these the judgment of the Board, as pronounced by Lord Davey, has been rightly followed and applied.”

    Referring in this decision to the cases reported in Preonath Shaha v. Madhu Sudan Bhuiyal, Khankar Abdur Rahman v. Ali Hafez and Mahomed Ali Hossein v. Nazar Ali their Lordships specifically observed therein that they ceased to be of binding authority after the judgment of the Board pronounced by Lord Davey in the case of Balkishen Das v. Legge. In the face of these decisions of the Privy Council there is now no scope left for any controversy even on the point of the extent to which parole evidence is admissible in law to show in what manner the language of a document is related to existing facts. Following these decisions of the Privy Council this Court recently held in the case of Bhagwat Rai v. Ramasis Rai that no parole evidence is admissible in law in between the parties to the transaction or their successors-in-interest to construe a mortgage document of a type in dispute to operate as a document of sale. This, therefore, fully supports the view stated above.

    Further it appears that the rule of construction given in proviso (6) to section 92 was originally relied on for construing wills though now it is applicable in other matters as well. Among those cases where apart from, wills it has been freely used are mostly those where the controversy between the parties has been as to whether a document in dispute is a mortgage or a document of absolute sale either with or without a contract for resale. The reason perhaps for this in India has been the fact that under Indian law, as given in section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, a mortgage may, in certain cases, be entered into in the form of ostensible sale. There is, however, no such provision in law for the converse, that is, for the execution of a deed of sale in the form of a mortgage. I, therefore, doubt whether proviso. (6) to section 92 is at all available to prove that what is on the face a mortgage document is in fact an absolute sale. The very terms of a mortgage deed in general are so different to those of a deed of sale that any attempt to construe such a mortgage deed as a deed of sale will inherently result in the variation and the contradiction of the terms of the mortgage deed. The case relied upon by Mr. De, which appears to be closest to the facts of the present case, is one to be found in the case of Ali Sheikh v. Imam Ali Sarkar. In that the issue to be decided was whether evidence of conduct was admissible to show that a document which was on the face of it a kot kobala (mortgage) was in reality a kobala (deed of sale). Therein Chatterjee and Newbould, JJ., observed:

    “There is some divergence of opinion in the different High Courts with regard to the question, whether evidence is admissible to prove that a document purporting to be a mortgage is really a sale. In our Court, however, there is a preponderance of authority on the point that evidence of conduct is admissible to show that what was on the face of it a mortgage, was in reality a kobala. We may refer to the case of Khankar Abdur Rahman v. Ali Hdfez.”

    I may point out here that the very authority, which has been relied upon in this case for the aforesaid view, has been condemned by the Privy Council in the case of Maung Kyin v. Ma Shwe La. Therefore, it has no binding force. Further that case was decided mostly on the question of relinquishment. It was proved therein that the executant of the kot kobala had put in an application before the landlord for mutation of the names of the mortgagees stating in that application that the creditor had paid the money and that the tenants had executed the deed of kot kobala and also that it was arranged between them that the creditor was to pay the arrears of rent and was to be the de facto tenant. It was in fact, I think, in view of those facts brought on the record that the learned Judges in that case held that the transaction was to operate as that of sale. In the present case the defendants have not pleaded any case of relinquishment or of estoppel nor there is any evidence in support thereof. I, therefore, think that case is of no avail to Mr. De. The other cases cited by him are, in my opinion, all the more remote from the point in controversy.

    In the case of Baijnath Singh v. Jajee Vallay Mahomed Jajee Abba the question was whether the transfer of certain shares in an Oil Company was by way of security or sale with a clause for repurchase. In the case of Maung Kyin v. Ma Shwe La the matter in controversy was as to whether a deed which was on the face of it a deed of sale operated as a deed of mortgage. In the case of Abdul Goffur v. Sheikh Jamal the point in dispute was as to whether a transaction was a mortgage or a deed of absolute sale with a clause for repurchase. In the case of Narasingerji Jyanagerji v. Panuganti Parthasaradhi Rayanam Garu the point to be decided was as to whether two deeds of the same date phrased as documents of ostensible sale with an agreement for a resale and repurchase were intended to operate as mortgages by conditional sale. In all these cases the documents on their face were to operate as deeds of sale, but the contesting party pleaded that they were intended to operate as mortgage deeds. Further in those cases there were existing facts found which when considered with the words of the documents made them unmeaning. In the case of Musammat Hanif-un-Nisa v. Chaudhrain Musammat Faiz-un-Nisa the principal questions for determination were: firstly, whether a deed of sale embodied a genuine transaction or was merely a fictitious deed; and secondly, whether or not the parties should be allowed to give parole evidence for the purpose of showing that the aforesaid deed, which purported to be and was a deed of sale on the face of it, was really a deed of gift. In this case what was in substance in controversy was the recital in the document and not its terms. In the case of Amritram v. Dwarkanath the question in issue was the construction of a sanad wherein the words ‘jagir dowami’ were used. The court had to decide whether the word ‘dowami’ meant life interest or also a heritable estate. That was a case, in my opinion, which was covered by section 98 of the Evidence Act.

    These cases, therefore, do not throw any light on the point as to whether a document, which on the face of it without any ambiguity is a pure and simple mortgage, can be allowed in between the parties to the transaction or their successors-in-interest to be proved by parole evidence to have been intended to operate as a deed of sale.

    For the reasons stated above, I think the appeals should be allowed and the judgment of the trial court should be restored. In the circumstances of the cases, no order for costs is passed.

    Choudhary, J.:— I agree.

    S.H
    Appeals allowed.

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    Ram Narain v. Manki Singh
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