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citation codes
Case Number
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  • Sub-section (2) of section 117 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • provisions of section 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • SECTION 256 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • provision of section 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
  • SECTION 110 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • SECTION 117 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • section 107, section 108, section 109 or section 110
  • section 117(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.I
  • section 110(f) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section, 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • SECTION 112 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • provisions of section 112 of the Code
  • clauses (d), (e) and (f) of section 110
  • clauses (e) and (f) of section 110
  • section 110 clauses (a), (b), (c), (d), (e)
  • sub-section (2) of section 117,
  • section 117(5), of the Code.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Sub-section (2) of section 117 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • provisions of section 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • SECTION 256 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • provision of section 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
  • SECTION 110 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • SECTION 117 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • section 107, section 108, section 109 or section 110
  • section 117(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.I
  • section 110(f) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section, 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • SECTION 112 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • provisions of section 112 of the Code
  • clauses (d), (e) and (f) of section 110
  • clauses (e) and (f) of section 110
  • section 110 clauses (a), (b), (c), (d), (e)
  • sub-section (2) of section 117,
  • section 117(5), of the Code.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Jamuar, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Four petitioners (Raghunath Singh of Kumarkhat; Sheikh Yusuf and Gonar Mian of Mangalwara; and Sheikh Akloo of Sarhad) were the subject of separate reports by the Sub-Inspector, Murliganj Police Station, dated 9 December 1949, leading to proceedings being drawn up under section 110, Criminal Procedure Code. On 24 January 1950 the Subdivisional Magistrate ordered notices under section 110 calling upon the petitioners to show cause why they should not be bound to execute bonds of Rs. 4,000 each with four sureties of Rs. 1,000 each for three years.

The cases were later amalgamated on 7 March 1950 after the prosecution petitioned for a joint trial alleging the four were members of the same gang. No objection to a joint trial was taken at that time. Evidence was taken (258 prosecution witnesses and 279 defence witnesses collectively); the defence examined 16 witnesses and then declined to examine further witnesses after being granted time. The Magistrate heard argument and on 30 May 1950 made orders under section 118, CrPC binding the petitioners as described; on reference the Assistant Sessions Judge confirmed and modified the orders as to which clauses applied and the amounts for some petitioners. The petitioners then brought the present application challenging the proceedings on several grounds.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Magistrate complied with section 112, CrPC in setting forth "the substance of the information received" in the notice under section 110, and if not, whether any non-compliance vitiates the proceedings.
  2. Whether, under sub-section (2) of section 117, the procedure for warrant-cases (including the consequence of section 256) should have been followed and whether the petitioners were entitled to further cross-examination of prosecution witnesses as in warrant trials.
  3. Whether the Magistrate was justified in ordering a joint trial under section 117(5) when clause (f) of section 110 (persons so desperate and dangerous that being at large is hazardous to the community) was invoked, and whether clause (f) precludes joint trials.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The notice under section 112 did not set forth the "substance of the information received" and instead merely reproduced the clauses of section 110; accordingly the proceedings are void.
  • Because the order required security for good behaviour, the enquiry should have been conducted as nearly as practicable in the manner prescribed for warrant-cases (section 117(2)), and thus they were entitled to the procedural protections of warrant trials (including further cross-examination under section 256); the Magistrate adopted a summons-case procedure and denied them that right.
  • The learned Magistrate should not have ordered a joint trial; in particular, clause (f) of section 110 cannot properly be the basis for a joint trial of multiple persons and, if joined, the trial is illegal.

Prosecution / Respondent-Position as Presented in the Record

  • The prosecution petitioned for amalgamation and joint trial on the ground that the four were members of the same gang and associates of each other.
  • Notwithstanding the form of the notice, the prosecution proceeded to examine witnesses, and no objection to the form or substance of the notice was taken by the petitioners during the proceedings.
  • Prosecution witnesses were examined and cross-examined in the manner actually adopted at the hearing; the defence did not request further cross-examination after the close of the prosecution case.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kalia Goundan v. Emperor (Madras cases cited) The words "substance of the information received" require an abstract of facts giving time/place/details so accused know what to meet (Madras view). Not followed by this Court; cited as representing the Madras view that notices must give particulars beyond reproduction of section clauses.
Kutti Goundan Notices under section 110 must contain more than reproduction of clauses; should show time/place of acts charged and sufficient details. Cited in support of the strict Madras approach; the Court contrasted this view with decisions of Calcutta High Court and preferred a narrower meaning of "substance".
In re: Krupasinadhu Naiko Notices must give sufficient indication of time/place and details enabling accused to know facts to meet (Madras view). Used to show existence of an approach requiring particulars; Court distinguished and declined to adopt this strict view wholesale.
Emperor v. Rajbansi (Allahabad) Notice under section 112 is like an indictment; must contain substantial particulars indicating grounds of information. Cited as representing a view that mere setting out of habit (e.g., habitual thief) is insufficient; Court noted this line of authority but applied a different approach.
Emperor v. Nihal (Allahabad) Similar to Rajbansi: notice must contain substantial particulars. Cited among High Court decisions adopting stricter requirements; Court contrasted these authorities with Calcutta decisions.
Chintamon Singh v. Emperor (Calcutta) Order under section 112 that reproduces the substance (as opposed to details) is sufficient; law does not require a list of witnesses or full particulars. Adopted as a guiding Calcutta view supporting sufficiency of a notice that states the gist rather than full particulars; Court relied on this reasoning for its conclusion.
Bhutnath Gosh v. The Emperor (Calcutta) "Substance" means substance as distinguished from details; notice need only indicate clause under section 110 or class of offender. Court explicitly adopted Suhrawardy, J.'s reasoning from this case and held that a mere repetition of section words should be avoided but is not necessarily illegal; sufficiency depends on the gist being given.
K. Ranga Reddi v. King Emperor (Madras) Held that accused must be informed of charges and nature of evidence to be rebutted; criticized by Calcutta view. Cited among authorities taking a stricter approach; Court declined to accept the stricter interpretation as mandatory in all cases.
Jaisingh v. Emperor (this Court) Omission to set forth substance may not prejudice accused; absence of objection during proceedings relevant; section 537 limits interference where no prejudice shown. Relied upon to support the proposition that non-compliance will not automatically vitiate proceedings absent shown prejudice; Court followed this reasoning.
Bengali Ahir v. Chaturbhuj Prasad (this Court) Proceedings may be quashed for defects but not after full enquiry unless prejudice or defect goes to jurisdiction. Applied to hold that because petitioners raised no earlier objection and showed no prejudice, proceedings should not be quashed.
Hari Telang v. Queen Joint trial under section 110 may be improper where association is not shown, particularly regarding clause (f); separate proceedings may be required. Cited as an instance where joint trial was quashed because association was insufficient; Court noted the case but distinguished it on facts where association was found in the present record.
In re: Kutti Goundan (Madras) Cases in which joint trial could not properly be held because inquiry was whether a person individually was a habitual offender. Cited among authorities denying joint trial where association absent; Court contrasted those facts with present case where association was alleged and found.
Krupasindhu Panigrahi v. Rex Followed the Madras approach limiting joint trials in certain section 110 cases. Cited as part of the line of decisions in which joint trials were disallowed when factual association was weak; used for comparison.
In re: K.S. Rathinam Pilley Similar view limiting joint trials under section 110. Cited among decisions where joint trials were held improper absent adequate proof of association.
Emperor v. Angnu Singh Another case where joint trial under section 110 was treated with caution and in some instances quashed. Cited with similar effect; Court noted the authority but applied a different conclusion on the facts before it.
In re Janti Veera Reddi (Madras) Upheld joint trial under clauses (e) and (f) where evidence showed association and joint trial was not prejudicial. Cited as authority supporting permissibility of joint trials where association and lack of prejudice exist; Court relied on this principle.
Parbaticharan Baishya v. Emperor (Calcutta, 1934) Joint trial under section 110(f) permissible where evidence indicates conspiracy or acting in concert. Quoted and relied upon by the Court to hold that clause (f) does not preclude joint trials when association/conspiracy is shown; applied to the facts here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed each principal contention in turn, applying statutory text and prior authorities as recorded in the proceedings:

  1. Section 112 compliance:
    • The Court examined the content of the notices served under section 112 and acknowledged that some High Courts (Madras, Allahabad) have required the notice to contain substantial particulars (time/place/details) beyond mere reproduction of section 110 clauses.
    • The Court reviewed the Calcutta decisions (Chintamon Singh; Bhutnath Gosh) which interpret "substance of the information" as meaning the gist or substance (not full details), and observed that the law does not require lists of witnesses or exhaustive particulars.
    • The Court adopted the reasoning in Bhutnath Gosh (Suhrawardy, J.) that "substance" is to be distinguished from "details or particulars" and that the notice must give the gist enabling the person to know under which clause of section 110 he is charged or to what class of offenders he is said to belong.
    • The Court noted that, in any event, the petitioners never objected to the contents of the notice at any earlier stage; lacking such objection and lacking any demonstration of prejudice, mere formal omission would not vitiate the proceedings.
  2. Procedure under section 117(2) and right to further cross-examination:
    • Section 117(2) prescribes that where security for good behaviour is required, the enquiry shall, as nearly as practicable, follow the manner for conducting trials in warrant-cases.
    • The Court observed that the record shows prosecution witnesses were cross-examined as they were examined in chief (as in summons-cases), but the petitioners did not ask for recall or further cross-examination under section 256 when the prosecution evidence closed.
    • Relying on Chintamon Singh, the Court held that the order under section 112 serves a role similar to a charge and that the accused in section 110 proceedings are not necessarily entitled to the second cross-examination provided by section 256 in warrant trials; the Legislature differentiated the procedures of summons and warrant cases.
    • Because the petitioners had full opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses during the stage they chose and made no request for further cross-examination, and because no prejudice was shown, the Court held there was no ground to set aside the order for failure to adopt warrant-case procedural formalities to the letter.
  3. Joint trial under section 117(5) and clause (f):
    • Section 117(5) gives the Magistrate discretion to try associated persons together or separately. The Court emphasized that this subsection does not exclude any particular clause of section 110.
    • The Court reviewed authorities where joint trials were disallowed (Hari Telang; Kutti Goundan and others) but explained these were cases where the evidence did not establish association and the inquiry was whether individuals were habitual offenders.
    • By contrast, the record in the present case contained allegations from the outset (police reports and the prosecution petition) that the petitioners were members of the same gang (Raghunath Singh's gang). The Magistrate found association and the finding was not challenged.
    • The Court relied on Calcutta authority (Parbaticharan Baishya) holding that joint trials under clause (f) are permissible where there is evidence of conspiracy or acting in concert, and concluded that a joint trial was justified here and did not cause prejudice because the Magistrate examined evidence against each petitioner separately.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The application is dismissed and the rule is discharged.

Implications:

  • The orders of the Subdivisional Magistrate (as confirmed or modified on reference by the Assistant Sessions Judge) stand; the petitioners have no successful ground to set aside the proceedings on the points argued.
  • The Court ruled that a notice under section 112 need contain the "gist" or substance of the information rather than exhaustive particulars; mere omission of fuller particulars will not void proceedings unless the accused shows prejudice or the defect goes to jurisdiction. The petitioners did not show such prejudice and made no timely objection.
  • The Court held that the procedural differences between summons and warrant trials (including the opportunity for further cross-examination under section 256) do not automatically entitle a person in a section 110 proceeding to a warrant-case style second cross-examination; absence of a timely request for recall and absence of demonstrated prejudice preclude setting aside the order on that ground.
  • The Court affirmed that joint trials under section 117(5) are permissible even where clause (f) is invoked, provided there is evidence of association, conspiracy, or acting in concert; a joint trial is inappropriate only where association is not established and prejudice results.
  • The opinion does not purport to establish a novel legal principle beyond applying and reconciling prior authorities; its practical effect is to uphold the orders as made and confirmed in the particular facts of this case.

Note: The summary above is strictly confined to the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences not present in the text.

Additional procedural note from the record: Ahmad, J. agreed with Jamuar, J.'s conclusions. The order states: "Rule discharged."

    Raghunath v. State

    Jamuar, J.:— This is an application by four, petitioners. By Judgment and order, dated the 30th May, 1950 the Subdivisional Magistrate of, Madhipura directed them, under section, 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to execute a bond of Rs. 4,000 each with four sureties of Rs. 1,000 each to be of good behaviour for a period of three years in a proceeding under section 110 clauses (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f), of the Code drawn up against them. On a reference made to the Sessions Judge of Bhagalpur for the confirmation of that order, the matter was heard by the Assistant Sessions Judge, Madhipura, who confirmed the order as against the petitioner Raghunath Singh in respect of clauses (a), (d) and (f) only but maintained the amount of the bond to be executed by him with the four sureties as directed by the Subdivisional Magistrate; and, with regard to the rest of the petitioners, he confirmed the order in respect of clauses (a) and (d) only, and reduced the amount of bond to be executed by them to Rs. 1,000 each with two sureties of Rs. 500 each.

    The facts relevant to the argument advanced in support of this application are these: On the 9th December, 1949, the Sub-Inspector of Murliganj Police-Station submitted four separate reports for taking action under section 110, Criminal Procedure, Code, against the four petitioners. One report was against the petitioner Raghunath Singh of village Kumarkhat: another was against the petitioner Sheikh Yusuf of village Mangalwara; the third was against the petitioner Gonar Mian also of village Mangalwara: and, the fourth was against the petitioner Sheikh Akloo of village Sarhad. As a result, on the 24th January, 1950, the Subdivisional Magistrate ordered for the drawing up of proceedings, under section 110. Criminal Procedure Code, and directed the petitioners to appear and show cause why they will not be ordered to execute bonds of Rs. 4,000 each with four sureties of Rs. 1,000 each to be of good behaviour for a period of three years. It appears that, consequent Upon this order, three notices were sent under section 110, Criminal Procedure Code; one to Raghunath Singh of village Kumarkhat another to Gonar Mian and Sheikh Yusuf together as both are of village Mangalwara, and the third to Sheikh Akloo of village Sarhad, The proceedings appear to have been kept separately against the three sets of petitioners as shown above and, for one reason or another, the proceedings could not commence till the 7th March, 1950. On this date, the Court Sub-Inspector, on behalf of the prosecution, filed the following petition before the Subdivisional Magistrate:

    “That the 4 accused persons, namely, Raghunath Singh, Akloo Mian, Gonar Mian and Yusuf Mian are members of the same gang, and are associates of each other.

    It is, therefore, prayed that they may kindly be placed on joint trial”;

    and the learned Subdivisional Magistrate ordered for the amalgamation of all the cases. All the four petitioners were present before the Subdivisional Magistrate on that date, and no objection was taken regarding their joint trial. The cases were taken up on that date, and the examination of witnesses commenced. As many as 258 witnesses were examined by the prosecution and 279 by the defence. The examination of all the witnesses came to an end on the 12th of May, 1950. It, however, appears from the order-sheet of that date that the defence, having examined 16 witnesses, filed a petition to examine some more witnesses, and time was allowed: but, when the proceedings were taken up on the 19th of May, 1950, the defence stated that they would not examine any more witnesses. The learned Magistrate heard the argument on the 23rd and the 24th of May, 1950, and passed orders, as stated above, on the 30th of May, 1950.

    The first point taken in support of this application was that the learned Magistrate did not comply with the provisions of section 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, with the result that the entire proceeding must be held to be bad in law and void. Section 112 is as follows:—

    “When a Magistrate acting under section 107, section 108, section 109 or section 110 deems it necessary to require any person to show cause under such section, he shall make an order in writing, setting forth the substance of the information received, the amount of the bond to be executed, the term for which it is to be in force, and the number, character and class of sureties (if any) required.”.

    This section requires that the order must include “the substance of the information received.” by the Magistrate, and it was contended that in the present case there has been a complete omission to set forth the substance of the information received by the Magistrate. In the present proceedings, the notices served upon the petitioners were in the following terms:—

    “Whereas it appears from the report of the S.I Police, Murliganj P.S, dated the 9th December 1949 that you are:—

    (a) by habit a robber, house-breaker and thief;

    (b) by habit a receiver of stolen property knowing the same to have been stolen;

    (c) habitually protect or harbour thieves and aid in the commission of offences of extortion, mischief, etc.;

    (d) habitually commit or attempt to commit or abet the commission of offences involving breach of the peace;

    (e) habitually aid in the concealment of stolen property; and

    (f) are so desperate and dangerous as to render you at large without security is hazardous to the community.

    In my opinion, It is better to draw up proceedings under section 110, Criminal Procedure Code against you.

    I, therefore, call upon you the abovenamed accused to appear before me on the 31st January 1950, and to show cause as to why you will not be ordered to execute a bond of Rs. 4,000 each with four sureties of Rs. 1,000 each to be of good behaviour for a period of three years.”

    It was Contended that this is a mere reproduction of the various clauses of section 110, Criminal Procedure Code, and as such the notices do not conform to the provisions of section 112 of the Code which requires that “the substance of the information received by the Magistrate” should be communicated. Some cases, mostly of the Madras High Court, were cited in support of this proposition. I may state at once that the Madras view supports the contention. In the case of Kalia Goundan v. Emperor; it was stated that the intention of the words “the substance of the information received” is to give in substance an abstract of the facts upon which the Magistrate charges the persons proceeded against so as to give them notice of what they have to meet and be prepared to meet it, and reliance was placed upon the case of Kutti Goundan. The decision in this case was also based upon an earlier Madras case. In re: Krupasinadhu Naiko; where it was said: “Notices under section 110, Criminal Procedure Code, must contain something more than a reproduction of the clauses of the section. There should be sufficient indication of the time and place of the acts charged and sufficient details which would enable the accused to know what facts he is to meet, though it is not necessary to give a list of witnesses.” Reference was also made in the same case to the case of K. Ranga Reddi v. King Emperor where it was stated that where “the accused is not informed of the charges, of the nature of the evidence that he is to rebut, the proceedings cannot be regarded as legal”. The Allahabad High Court also in the case of Emperor v. Rajbansi and in the case of Emperor v. Nihal has taken the view; that the proceeding provided by the issue of a notice under section 112 is something in the nature of an indictment or charge, and the notice must contain substantial particulars indicating the grounds upon which the police have given information to the Magistrate: a mere setting out that a man is a habitual thief or robber will not be a compliance of the section.

    The above cases do indicate that it is not sufficient to specify the section or the clauses of the section under, which the Magistrate proposes to proceed, and that the order should give the time and place of facts charged and sufficient details which, would enable the accused to know what he has to meet. The view is based on the principle that an order under this section is something in the nature of an indictment or charge, and that, therefore, it should contain substantial particulars indicating the grounds upon which the information to the Magistrate is, based.

    A contrary view, however, has been taken by the Calcutta High Court. In Chintamon Singh v. Emperor; the proceeding under section 110, Criminal Procedure Code, was in the following terms:—

    “Whereas I have received information from the Assistant Superintendent of Police, Araria, that Chintamon Singh of Matiari, thana Forbesganj, is by habit a robber, habitually protects and harbours datooits, etc., and habitually commits mischief and extortion and abets the same, and is so desperate and dangerous a character as to render his being at large without security hazardous to the community, I hereby under section 110 direct him to show cause on August 9th, 1904, why he should not be called upon to execute a bond for Rs. 500, with two sureties of Rs. 500 each, for his good behaviour for a period of three years.”

    Their Lordships (Rampini and Sarfuddin, JJ.) gave the following opinion on this point:—

    “We now proceed to discuss the points of law urged by Mr. Hill. The first is as to frhe want of the necessary materials in the order of the District Magistrate under section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Code. We consider that the order of the Magistrate gives all the necessary information required by the section. This section enacts that when a Magistrate acting under section 110, Criminal Procedure Code deems it necessary to require any person to show cause, he shall make an order in writhing setting forth (i) the substance of the information received, (ii) the amount of the bond to be executed, (iii) the term for which it is to be in force, and (iv) the number, character and class of the sureties required. All the above four matters are distinctly stated in the order in question. It has been contended that no list of witnesses is to be found either in the report to the Magistrate or in the order of the Magistrate under section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The law nowhere requires that any list of witnesses should be so given.”

    Another case of the Calcutta High Court is Bhutnath Gosh v. The Emperor. It has been held there that the term “substance of the information” in section 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure means substance as distinguished from details or particulars, and a notice under section 112. Criminal Procedure Code, need contain so much of the information as would enable the party to know under what clause of section 110 he is charged or to what particular class of offenders he is said to belong. It was not contemplated that the notice should set out details in the manner of a charge drawn up of a trial. The Madras case of K. Ranga Reddi v. King Emperor and the Allahabad case of Emperor v. Nihal were expressly dissented from. In Bhutnath Gosh's case, the proceeding was under clause (a) of section 110, Criminal Procedure Code, and the notice served upon the man proceeded against was as follows:—

    “Whereas it appears from the report; dated the 28th February, 1928, submitted by the Sub-Inspector of police station Chandrakora that Bhutnath Gosh, son of………………….within the local limits of my jurisdiction is habit a thief, a robber and house breaker and is so desperate and dangerous as to render his being at large without security hazardous to the community……………”.

    As I have said, the proceeding was under clause (a) of section 110 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and all that appeared in the notice was merely a reproduction of that clause. The accused in that case was found not guilty of the charge of being a, desperate and dangerous character, but he was bound over only under clause (a). As in the present case, so in that case, the argument advanced was that the notice merely repeated the words of the section and did not give the substance of the information upon which the Magistrate acted as required by section 112 of the Code, and the cases of K. Ranga Reddi v. King Emperor and Emperor v. Nihal were cited in support of that argument. Suhrawardy, J. said:—

    “With great respect, to the learned Judges who decided those cases, I am unable to agree with the interpretation there put on the words ‘substance of the information’ in section 112. The learned Judges require that the notice should contain such details of information as to enable the accused to know in what cases he has been suspected and the names of the witnesses to prove the charges against him. This, to my mind, is not ‘substance of the information’, but details of information, which may, in some cases, be not only very inconvenient, but almost impracticable to put in the notice.”

    I would with respect adopt the reasoning of Suhrawardy, J. The words “substance of the information” means such or so much of the information as would enable the party to know under what clause of section 110 he is charged or to what particular class of offenders he is said to belong. A man may be suspected in a hundred cases, and there may be five hundred witnesses, as observed Suhrawardy, J., to prove such suspicion and general repute. Does a the law require that all this information must be convened to the accused? I must, nevertheless, say that a mere repetition of the words of the various clauses of section 110 ought to be avoided; but it may not be, possible to do so in every notice, and I would not lay it down as the law that, where a notice contains a mere repetition of the words of the various clauses of section 110, it is, on that, account alone, illegal. As Suhrawardy, J. pointed out:—

    “Though I hold that the law is satisfied if the notice contains the gist of the information and not a reference to cases and witnesses, proceedings under Chapter VIII should not be carried on, in such a way as to hamper the offender in his defence and place him in a worse position than if he were accused of a substantive offence. Before he defends himself by cross-examining the witnesses for the prosecution and examining his own, he must know definitely the case that he has been called upon to meet.”

    Graham, J., the other learned Judge who constituted the Division Bench, expressed agreement by saying: “As I understand the words (“substance of the information”), it means substance as distinguished from details or particulars, and I do not think that it was ever contemplated that the proceedings should set out details in the manner of a charge drawn up at the trial. The distinction between an enquiry of this nature and a trial should be borne in mind.”

    The order made under section 112, Criminal Procedure Code, was served upon the petitioners, and, if it did not contain any particulars which the petitioners wanted to know, they were entitled to complain and to ask to be furnished with such particulars; but, at no stage till now, did they take any exception to the contents of the notice served under section 112. If no exception is taken to the notice, and the person against whom it is made shows cause and is eventually bound over, he can scarcely have any legitimate ground for complaint on that score. I am of the opinion that, in the present case before us, the notice served upon the petitioners gives all the necessary information required by the section.

    Even if it were to be held that there was no sufficient compliance of section 112 of the Code, that would not be sufficient, in my opinion, to vitiate the entire proceedings. The petitioners must go further and show that they have been prejudiced in their defence by reason of such a non-compliance. In the case of Jaisingh v. Emperor, which is a case of this Court, the same point arose for consideration, namely, as to the effect of the omission to set forth the substance of the information received as provided by section 112, Criminal Procedure Code; but it was pointed out that no objection had ever, been taken from first to last before the Magistrate that the petitioners had been in any way hampered or embarrassed by reason of any defect in the notice. It was also observed:—

    “Even assuming, without deciding, that there was some defeat or irregularity in the form of the notice served, I am quite satisfied that, if that must be taken to have been so, it did not in any degree prejudice the appellants in putting forward their case before the Magistrate and under the provision of section 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code, I do not think that even if it were thought there had been some technical omission in the form of that notice, we have any power to reverse or alter the order made by the Magistrate in the present case.”

    A later decision of this Court in the case of Bengali Ahir v. Chaturbhuj Prasad relied upon the previous decision. It was observed that proceedings are liable to be quashed on such a ground but not after the whole matter has been enquired into unless there is a reasonable suggestion of possible prejudice or unless the defect goes to the jurisdiction. In the present case no objection as to prejudice on this account has been taken till the stage of the argument before us: it was not taken at the trial stage nor before the Assistant Sessions Judge nor in the grounds of the petition presented to this Court. From what has been stated in the earlier part of this judgment, it will be clear that, if the petitioners desired to show prejudice, they had ample opportunity to do so at the earlier stages of the case. In my judgment, the object of section 112 in requiring the substance of the information to be given, ill the notice is to afford reasonable opportunity to the accused to come prepared with what he has to meet. The failure to comply with the provisions of section 112, however, does not divest the Magistrate of his jurisdiction to deal with the proceeding; and, in the absence of prejudice, the subsequent proceedings ought not to be treated as being void ab initio.

    While I am on the point of prejudice, another argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners may be examined. It was argued that, according to sub-section (2) of section 117, the procedure prescribed for the conduct of trials in warrant cases should have been adopted in this proceeding; whereas the procedure adopted was that prescribed for conducting trials in summons cases. Sub-section (2) of section 117 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is as follows:—

    “Such enquiry shall be made, as nearly as may be practicable where the order requires security for keeping the peace, in the manner hereinafter prescribed for conducting trials and recording evidence in summons-cases; and where the order requires security for good behaviour in the manner hereinafter prescribed for conducting trials and recording evidence in warrant-cases, except that no charge need be framed.”

    It is to be noticed that where the order requires security for good behaviour, as in section 110 cases, the enquiry shall be made “as nearly as may be practicable” in the manner prescribed for conducting trials in warrant-cases. From a perusal of the, record in this case, it appears that the petitioners cross-examined each of the prosecution witnesses as they were examined in chief, as in summons-cases. At the close of the evidence for the prosecution, they could have taken advantage of the provisions of section 256 of the Criminal Procedure Code which is one of the provisions for the trial of warrant-cases; but they never did. At no stage did they ask for the re-summoning of any prosecution witness for further cross-examination. If the petitioners did not desire to cross-examine any of the prosecution witnesses further, they cannot now be heard to say that they have been prejudiced because the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses, as required under section 256, Criminal Procedure Code, was denied to them. It was, however argued that it was the duty of the Magistrate to proceed to apply the provisions of section 256, and to ask the petitioners if they wished further to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses. In the case of Chintamon Singh v. Emperor; which has been referred to once before, when dealing with this point the following observation was made:—

    “No doubt, under section 117 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the enquiry into bad livelihood cases Should be made as nearly as may be practicable in the manner prescribed for conducting trials and recording evidence in warrant cases. But we do not think that the provisions of section 256 of the Criminal Procedure Code indicate that the person called upon to show cause under section 110 of the Criminal Procedure Code has a right to further cross-examine the prosecution witnesses under section 256 of the Criminal Procedure Code, inasmuch as the provisions of this section relate to cases where a formal charge, as required by section 254, has been drawn up and the accused has been called upon to meet that charge. In cases under section 110 of the Criminal Procedure Code the order of the Magistrate under section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Code is equivalent to a charge. The object in giving the substance of the information in an order under section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Code is that the person called upon to show cause may clearly understand the matter that he has to meet in his defence, and a Magistrate has no power to go beyond the requirements of his order under, section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In warrant cases a charge sheet is prepared for similar purposes. In the above view the cross-examination of witnesses in a proceeding under section 110 of the Criminal Procedure Code is tantamount to their cross-examimation after charge. It cannot be contended that in the present instance the appellant had no information as to the matters which he would be required to meet. In trials of warrant cases it is when a charge sheet is drawn up that the accused is for the first time informed as to the offences that have appeared from the evidence against him to have been committed by him, and hence it is only right that the accused should in warrant cases be given an opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses after a charge has been framed. In summons cases the accused is informed in the summons as to the charges against him and hence the Legislature does not require the preparation of any formal charge, as in warrant cases, nor any second cross-examination. For the above reasons we think that the petitioner had no right to any further cross-examination, especially when the prosecution witnesses had already been cross-examined to a very unreasonable length.”

    In the present case before us, the prosecution witnesses had been fully cross-examined, and there is no complaint made that the petitioners had been denied the right to fully cross-examine these witnesses at the stage that they were cross-examined. Here, again, I cannot hold that the petitioners have been prejudiced. Had the petitioners asked the Magistrate to recall the prosecution witnesses for further, cross-examination under section 256, Criminal Procedure Code, and if that prayer had been refused, it might well have been argued with some show of force that the petitioners have, been prejudiced. I would, respectfully agree with the observations made, in Chitamon's case, and I cannot accede to the argument that, by reason of non-compliance of the provisions of section 256, Criminal Procedure Code, the order passed, against the petitioners should be set aside.

    There was another point taken in support of the application, and that was that the learned Magistrate ought not to have allowed a joint trial in these proceedings. Sub-section (5) of section 117, Criminal Procedure Code, gives the Magistrate discretion in this respect. It provides:—

    “Where two or more persons have been associated together in the matter under enquiry, they may be dealt with in the same or separate inquiries as the Magistrate shall think just.”

    If the Magistrate thinks it to be just to try each of the persons proceeded against separately, he has been given powers so to do. Where, however, there is an allegation of association between two or more persons in the matter under enquiry, the Magistrate is at liberty to order a joint proceeding. In the petition filed by the Court Sub-Inspector on the 7th March, 1950, quoted above, for a joint trial, it was alleged that all the four petitioners were members of the same gang, and were associates of each other. It was also stated in the reports submitted by the Sub-Inspector of Murliganj Police-Station against the four petitioners that the petitioners were members of a gang known as Raghunath Singh's gang, and that they were all his associates. In these circumstances, I do not think that the learned Magistrate had erred in ordering a joint trial. It was, however, argued that, at least so far as clause (f) of section 110 is concerned, there can be no joint trial of two or more persons under that clause, and that, if there is such a trial, it will be illegal, and reliance was placed on some cases in support of this argument. In the case of Hari Telang v. Queen, Proceedings under clauses (d), (e) and (f) of section 110 were drawn up separately against the petitioners; but the petitioners were tried jointly, and an objection to the joint trial was taken. It was held in that case that, even supposing that the Magistrate was right in considering that there was habitual association between the three persons in regard to the first and second points mentioned, there certainly, would be no such connection between them in regard to their character so as to make them dangerous persons, and thus to render then being at large without security hazardous to the community, and, therefore, it was ruled that the proceedings should have been separately taken against each of the petitioners. When considering the merits, however, their Lordships found that, on the evidence adduced in that case, section 110 was not applicable at all. The order passed, by the Magistrate binding over the petitioners was, in the circumstances, set aside. In re: Kutti Goundan, reliance was placed upon the Calcutta case just noticed, and in this case also their Lordships, on examining the evidence, came to the conclusion that the evidence as regards the association of the accused did not seem to be strong. The order passed by the Magistrate was, therefore, quashed. The case of Krupasindhu Panigrahi v. Rex followed the Madras case. A similar view was taken in In re: K.S Rathinam Pilley as also in the case of Emperor v. Angnu Singh. In another case of the Madras High Court, In re Janti Veera Reddi, however, an order passed against the petitioners who were bound over under clauses (e) and (f) of section 110 at a joint trial was upheld, and Horwill, J. observed: ‘In every case it has to be considered how far the evidence proves association and how far the various persons tried are Prejudiced by a joint trial. In the present case. I am satisfied that, the joint trial was desirable as well as permissible.”

    In a later case of the Calcutta. High Court in 1934 [Parbaticharan Baishya v. Emperor], it was ruled that a joint trial in a preceding under section 110(f) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is permissible where there is evidence in the nature of a conspiracy and acting in concert. The contention that a joint trial under clause (f) of section 110. Criminal Procedure Code, was illegal was also raised in that case, and reliance was placed upon the cases which I have just mentioned, namely the cases of Hari Telang, Kntti Goundan and, Emperor v. Angnu Singh. Their Lordships examined these cases, and proceeded as follows:—

    “On an examination of the decisions referred to above, it is abundantly clear that, on the facts and in the circumstances of those case, joint trials of persons under section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could not be supported. The cases cited before us were cases in which joint trials could not properly be held, inasmuch as the matter under enquiry was whether a person individually was or was not a habitual offender. There can, however, be no doubt that a joint trial could be held, and a joint trial was the proper procedure, in the case of persons acting in concert, persons who are associates and confederates, so as to call into operation the provision contained in section 117(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”

    I have indicated already that there had been, an allegation against the petitioners from the very beginning that they were members of Raghunath, Singh's gang, and are associates of each other. The Magistrate has found them to be so, and this finding is not challenged. I think, therefore, that the, Magistrate was fight in ordering a joint trial under section 117(5), of the Code. A joint trial in a case under section 110 is always permissible where there is evidence in the nature of a conspiracy or acting in concert. Indeed, it seems to me that to hold that there can never be a joint trial when clause (f) of section 110, Criminal Procedure Code is applied would be going against the statute. Sub-section (5) of section-117, under which a Magistrate is empowered to order a joint trial, does not exclude clause (f) of section 110. It is equally applicable to all the clauses of section 110. Moreover, the petitioner's cannot be said to have suffered any prejudice by their having been jointly tried, as I have noticed that the learned Magistrate has been careful enough to examine the evidence against each of the petitioners separately.

    For these reasons, I do not find that any miscarriage of justice has been caused in this case. I would, accordingly, dismiss the application, and discharge the rule.

    Ahmad, J.:— I agree.

    Rule discharged.
    K.D

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    Raghunath v. State
    (Sep 8, 1952)