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Case Number

A.F.O.O No. 264 of 1948

Advocates

Kailash Roy and B.K. Sharma
T.P. Sinha and B.N. Pd. Samayan

Judges

Sarjoo Prosad
C.P Sinha, JJ.

Acts

provisions contained in Order 32, Rule 7 of the Code.
Order 43, Rule 1, Sub-clause (m) of the Code.6.
provisions of Order 32, Rule 7 of the CPC
provisions of Section 462 of the Code,
Order 32, Rule T of the present Code,
Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code
Order 32, Rule 7 of the CPC

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (C.P. Sinha, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff (appellant) instituted a suit for recovery of about Rs. 513 based on a hand-note against respondents 1 and 2. At the time of the original suit, respondent No. 2 was a minor. The trial Court dismissed the suit with costs. The plaintiff appealed to the District Judge in Money Appeal No. 5 of 1947.

In the Court of first instance a pleader guardian (Babu Gajadhar Prasad) had been appointed for the minor. Notices of the appeal were served and the hearing was repeatedly postponed until a hearing date of 20 February 1948 was fixed. On 18 February 1948 parties filed a compromise petition; the then-respondent (respondent No. 2 in the original suit) also filed a petition to be appointed guardian of the minor, stating he had no interest adverse to the minor and was the karta of the family. The petitions were put up on the fixed date.

On 20 February 1948 the District Court cancelled the pleader guardian ad litem, appointed respondent No. 2 as guardian ad litem of the minor respondent No. 1, and recorded that the appeal was permitted to be compromised and was allowed in terms of the compromise.

The compromise provided that the appellant remitted Rs. 50 out of the costs and that the respondents were to pay the amount claimed by the plaintiff-appellant and the remaining costs within three months from the date of compromise (18 February 1948), failing which the plaintiff-appellant could execute the decree.

On 16 March 1948 Sitaram Kumhar (the present respondent No. 1, who had been respondent No. 2 in the money appeal) applied under Section 151 CPC in the money appeal to set aside the compromise decree alleging that the compromise had been obtained by fraud — specifically, that the plaintiff-appellant had procured the respondent's thumb impression on blank papers and a blank printed vakalatnama and used that for the compromise petition, and that the respondent only became aware of this on 26 February 1948 when threatened with execution. The plaintiff-appellant denied fraud and asserted the compromise was bona fide.

The lower Court (miscellaneous Case No. 21 of 1948 under Section 151 CPC) heard the parties, concluded that fraud had been committed and that the respondent had not consented to the compromise terms, set aside the 20 February 1948 order, rejected the petitions of 18 February 1948, and restored the money appeal to its original file and number. The plaintiff-appellant appealed to the Court whose opinion is summarized here.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether an appeal lies against an order passed under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (and, relatedly, whether the particular order impugned was appealable because it in effect refused to record a compromise under Order 23, Rule 3 of the CPC and therefore was appealable under Order 43, Rule 1, sub-clause (m)).
Whether the Court has jurisdiction under Section 151 (its inherent powers) to set aside an order obtained by fraud and, if so, whether that jurisdiction was properly exercised here.
Whether the compromise was invalid because the requirements of Order 32, Rule 7 of the CPC (leave of the Court for compromise on behalf of a minor and consideration of the minor's benefit) were not complied with.
Whether the acceptance of the compromise by the karta or natural guardian could bind the minor notwithstanding the procedural safeguards for minors under Order 32, Rule 7.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

No appeal lies against an order passed under Section 151 CPC; the order below was therefore not appealable.
The effect of the order under appeal was not to set aside a compromise but merely an order made under Section 151, and the appellant's counsel contended that the order was appealable under Order 43, Rule 1, sub-clause (m) because the Court below had refused to record the compromise.
The compromise was bona fide and no fraud had been committed by the plaintiff-appellant.
The provisions of Section 151 did not entitle the Court to set aside the 20 February 1948 order and that the respondents should have availed themselves of other remedies.
It was submitted that, if the karta (natural guardian) accepted the compromise, that acceptance would bind the minor.

Respondents' Arguments

The respondent (Sitaram Kumhar) alleged that the compromise decree had been obtained by fraud: that the plaintiff procured his thumb impression on blank papers and a blank printed vakalatnama and used those to file the compromise petition.
The respondents relied upon the Court's duty to protect minors and contended that the requirements of Order 32, Rule 7 of the CPC had not been complied with when the compromise was recorded.
The respondents maintained that the order of 20 February 1948 should be set aside and that the money appeal should be restored for hearing.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Sadho Saran Rai v. Anant Rai, 2 Pat 731	Supports the proposition that courts have jurisdiction under their inherent powers (and Section 151) to set aside orders obtained by fraud.	The Court relied on this authority to hold that its inherent powers empowered the lower Court to set aside the 20 February 1948 order obtained by fraud.
Chutur Prasad v. Mt. Bishuni Kuer, AIR (30) 1943 Pat 13	Same legal proposition as above: inherent jurisdiction to set aside fraudulent orders.	Cited alongside Sadho Saran Rai to demonstrate that the point is settled law and to support the conclusion that Section 151/inherent powers could be invoked.
Manohar Lal v. Jadu Nath Singh, 33 Ind App 128	Duty of the Court when sanctioning compromise involving a minor: the court's attention must be directly called to the minor's presence and the order should show leave of the Court was obtained.	Quoted (Lord MacNaghten) to explain that the Court must show in its order that leave was obtained and that the minor's benefit was considered; used to criticise the 20 February 1948 order for failing to show such consideration.
Subramanian Chettiar v. Raja Rajeshwar Dorai, 39 Mad 115	Approves the observation in Manohar Lal and stresses the importance of Court leave for compromises affecting minors.	Used to reinforce the principle that safeguarding a minor's interest requires clear judicial sanction and scrutiny before recording compromise.
Govindaswami v. Alagiri Sami, 29 Mad 104	Holds that, when sanctioning a compromise on behalf of minors, the order should expressly state that the question of benefit to the minors was considered.	Applied to show that the 20 February 1948 order did not meet this requirement and therefore failed to protect the minor's interests.
Sri Narayan Singh v. Posan Singh, 23 Pat L.T 602	Holds that the Court cannot give effect to a compromise entered into by a guardian of minors without its previous sanction.	Relied on to support the conclusion that leave/sanction must precede the compromise's binding effect on minors.
Awadhesh Prasad v. Widow of Tribeni Prasad, 22 Pat LT 223	Holds a guardian-ad-litem cannot enter into a compromise without the leave of the Court; such leave must be expressly recorded and the Court must consider terms before agreement.	Invoked to argue that the requirements of Order 32, Rule 7 were not complied with and that merely asking the Court to approve an already entered compromise is insufficient.
Dharnidhar Roy v. Phul Kumari Debi, AIR (32) 1945 Pat 391	Considered the Awadhesh Prasad view and observed that the Code does not insist on leave to negotiate; leave before recording may substantially comply with R.7.	The Court discussed this case to explain nuances in the timing of leave: while negotiation need not be pre-authorised, leave must be granted before the compromise is recorded so the Court can consider the minor's benefit.
Ganesha Row v. Tuljaram Row, 36 Mad 295	Interpreting provisions corresponding to Order 32, Rule 7/Section 462: a natural guardian appointed guardian-ad-litem is nevertheless controlled by those provisions and cannot, without leave, do acts as guardian which he is debarred from doing as guardian-ad-litem.	Applied to reject the submission that the karta's acceptance could bind the minor where the statutory safeguards for minors were not complied with.
Vijaya Ramayya v. Venkatasubba Rao, 39 Mad 853	Illustrates that a father (natural guardian) could not enter into a compromise binding on his son where the son was represented by another guardian-ad-litem.	Invoked to support the position that the powers of natural guardians are constrained when a guardian-ad-litem represents the minor and that proper leave is required.
Gurmallappa Mallappa v. Mallappa Martandappa, 44 Bom 574	Affirms the same principle that a guardian or father cannot enter into compromise binding on a minor where statutory procedure for the guardian-ad-litem has not been followed.	Cited to reinforce the conclusion that the compromise was not binding on the minor for failure to comply with Order 32, Rule 7.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded first with the preliminary question of appealability. It recognized the general rule that an order under Section 151 CPC is not ordinarily appealable. However, the Court looked at the substance of the order under challenge: the lower Court had rejected petitions filed on 18 February 1948, and one of those petitions embodied the terms of the compromise and asked for a decree in terms of the compromise. By rejecting that petition the lower Court had, in effect, refused to record the compromise under Order 23, Rule 3 of the CPC. The Court therefore concluded the order was appealable under Order 43, Rule 1, sub-clause (m).

On the merits, the Court accepted the lower Court's factual finding that fraud had been perpetrated in obtaining the 20 February 1948 order. The appellate opinion explains that the respondents had previously secured a decree for costs and had no apparent reason to forgo those rights voluntarily. The Court recited the allegations in the respondent's petition (thumb impression and blank vakalatnama used to obtain the compromise petition) and stated that, on the facts and circumstances, it had no hesitation in holding that the respondent had given no consent to the compromise terms and that fraud had been committed upon the respondent and the Court.

Addressing the contention that Section 151 did not entitle the Court to set aside the 20 February order, the Court held that when fraud has misled a court into passing orders which it otherwise would not have passed, the fraud amounts to a fraud on the Court. Under its inherent powers (exercisable via Section 151) the Court is not only entitled but bound to set aside such orders. The Court treated this position as settled by the precedents cited.

The Court then examined compliance with Order 32, Rule 7 of the CPC (provisions protecting minors when compromises are proposed). It observed that the minor had been represented by a guardian-ad-litem appointed in the court of first instance and that although a petition was filed on 18 February 1948 seeking change of guardian, the 20 February 1948 order did not expressly grant permission to the guardian-ad-litem to enter into the proposed compromise nor did it show that the Court considered whether the compromise was for the minor's benefit. The opinion relied on authorities (including Manohar Lal and others) establishing that the Court must show that it was conscious of its duty to protect a minor's interest and must indicate on the order-sheet that the question of benefit to the minor was considered.

Applying those principles, the Court concluded that the 20 February 1948 order signally failed to comply with the letter and spirit of Order 32, Rule 7, and that in the peculiar and suspicious circumstances of the case the lower Court should have scrutinised the terms of the compromise and heard parties and the guardian-ad-litem on whether the terms were for the minor's benefit. Because these procedural safeguards were not observed, the compromise could not be treated as binding on the minor.

The Court also addressed and rejected the submission that the karta's acceptance of the compromise bound the minor, citing authorities to show that a natural guardian appointed as guardian-ad-litem is nevertheless governed by the statutory provisions and cannot, without the Court's leave, do those acts which are debarred to the guardian-ad-litem.

Finally, the Court noted that even if the non-compliance with Order 32, Rule 7 had only affected the minor's position and not the other respondent, the finding of fraud rendered any question of binding effect on other respondents moot.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court below (which set aside the 20 February 1948 order, rejected the petitions of 18 February 1948 and restored Money Appeal No. 5 of 1947 to its original file and number) is affirmed. Money Appeal No. 5 of 1947 must proceed to hearing.

Implications:

The compromise recorded on 20 February 1948 was set aside on two independent bases accepted by the Court: (a) it was obtained by fraud, and (b) the requirements of Order 32, Rule 7 of the CPC for protecting the interests of a minor had not been complied with. As a result, the compromise is not binding on the minor and has been rejected by the Court.
The Court reaffirmed that when an order has been procured by fraud the Court has the inherent jurisdiction (exercisable under Section 151 CPC) to set aside that order; the opinion treated this as a settled point of law as established by precedent.
Because the lower Court refused to record the compromise petition, the appellate tribunal held the order to be appealable under Order 43, Rule 1, sub-clause (m).
Direct consequence for the parties: the appellant's attempt to obtain a compromise decree is defeated, the earlier order has been set aside, costs were awarded against the appellant (the appeal was dismissed with costs), and the underlying money appeal is restored for hearing.
No novel legal principle was laid down; the Court relied upon and applied established authorities concerning fraud on the Court and the special protections required where compromises affect minors.

Additional notation from the opinion: a separate concurring note by Sarjoo Prosad, J. expressed doubt as to the competence of the appeal but otherwise agreed with the result. The formal result recorded in the opinion is "Appeal dismissed."

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Sheosagar Singh v. Sitaram Kumhar And Another

C.P Sinha, J.:— This is an appeal by the plaintiff who had brought a suit for recovery of Rs. 513/- and odd on the basis of a hand-note against respondents 1 and 2, respondent No. 2, brother of respondent No. 1, was a minor then. The trial Court dismissed the suit with costs and the appellant (the plaintiff) preferred an appeal to the District Judge which was numbered as Money Appeal No. 5 of 1947. Respondent No. 2, who was respondent No. 1 in the said money appeal, was described in the memorandum of appeal as being under the guardianship of one Babu Gajadhar Prasad, Pleader guardian appointed by Court. It appears that this guardian was appointed in the Court of first instance. Notices/of the appeal were served upon the respondents and the hearing of the appeal was postponed from time to time and ultimately the 20th of February 1948, was fixed for the hearing of the appeal. On the 18th of February, 1948, however, the order-sheet records the following order:

“Parties have put in a compromise petition. Respondent No. 2, has put in a petition praying that he may be appointed guardian of minor respondent No. 1. It is stated in the petition that he has no interest adverse to the minor and that he is the karta of the family. Another petition for permission to compromise has also been put in.

2. Put up on the date fixed.” On the 20th of February 1948, the order of the Court runs thus:

“Petition of compromise and other petitions filed on 18-2-1948, are put up.

Heard appellant's lawyer. The appointment of the Pleader Guardian ad litem is cancelled. The respondent No. 2, is appointed G.A litem of the respondent No. 1. The appeal is permitted to be compromised. The appeal is allowed in terms of the compromise that be recorded.”

3. The compromise was to the effect that the appellant had remitted Rs. 50/- out of the costs and that the respondents were to pay the amount claimed by the plaintiff-appellant and the remaining costs within three months from the late of the compromise, that is, the 18th of February 1948,.failing which the plaintiff-appellant was to realise the same by execution.

4. On the 16th of March 1948, the present respondent No. 1, Sitaram Kumhar, who was respondent No. 2, in the said money appeal, filed an application under Section 151 of the CPC in the money appeal for setting aside the compromise decree, which, according to him had been obtained by fraud. It is alleged in his petition that the plaintiff-appellant had represented to him that he would withdraw the appeal, provided the respondent remitted his costs, and that the plaintiff-appellant had obtained his thumb impression on blank papers and blank printed Vakalatnama saying that the petition for withdrawing the appeal had to be filed through another Pleader. It was asserted by the respondent No. 1 that the blank paper bearing his thumb mark was itilised for the compromise petition, leading to the consent decree. It was further alleged that the respondent No. 1, came to know of this fact on the 26th February, 1948, when the appellant threatened him with realisation of the decree in the money suit. The plaintiff-appellant objected to the decree being set aside and alleged that the compromise was a “bona fide” one and there was no fraud committed by him. The Court below started miscellaneous Case No. 21 of 1948, under Section 151 of the CPC and after hearing the parties came to the conclusion that fraud had been perpetrated in the matter of compromise and that the respondent No. 1 had never consented and could not have consented to the terms embodied in the petition of compromise. In that view of the matter, the Court below allowed the application under Section 151 of the Code, set aside the order of that Court, dated the 20th of February 1948, rejected the petitions filed on the 18th of February, 1948, and has restored the money appeal to its original file and number. The plaintiff-appellant having felt aggrieved has filed the present appeal.

5. A preliminary point has been raised that no appeal lay against an order passed under Section 151 of the CPC. The learned Counsel for the appellant has argued that the effect of the order under appeal is that the Court below has refused to record the compromise and as such an appeal is competent under O. 43, R. 1, Sub-clause (m) of the CPC. The right of appeal is given by statute and it is obvious that an order passed under Section 151 of the CPC is not appealable. The order appealed against however, shows that the petitions filed on the 18th of February 1948, have been rejected and one of these petitions was the petition filed by the parties embodying the terms of the compromise with a prayer that a decree be passed in favour of the plaintiff-appellant and that the appeal be allowed in terms of the compromise. By rejecting that petition, the Court below has refused to record the compromise under Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code and, therefore, in that view of the matter the order is appealable under Order 43, Rule 1, Sub-clause (m) of the Code.

6. Coming to the merits, I feel no doubt that fraud has been committed upon the respondents and upon the Court in obtaining the order of the 20th of February 1948. The respondents had obtained a decree for costs against the plaintiff-appellant and the plaintiff's claim had been entirely dismissed and I see no earthly reason why the respondents would be anxious to forego their valuable rights under the decree of the first Court. It has been contended that the Court below was not justified in coming to the conclusion that a fraud had been perpetrated by the plaintiff-appellant. (After discussing the evidence the judgment proceeds:) On the facts and circumstances mentioned above, I feel no hesitation in holding that the respondent had given no consent to the terms of the compromise as mentioned in Ex. A and that a fraud was committed upon him and the Court when, on false allegations, an order was obtained from the Court recording that compromise.

7. It has been contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the provisions of Section 151 of the CPC did not entitle the Court to set aside the order passed on the 20th of February 1948, and it is suggested that the respondents should have taken recourse to some other remedy open to them in law. I find absolutely no merit in this contention. If fraud has been committed upon the party and as a result of that fraud the Court has been misled into passing certain orders which otherwise it would not have pissed, then it is a fraud upon the Court itself. In such a case, under its inherent powers, the Court is not only entitled to, but it must, set aside any order or orders which may have been passed by it upon a false representation. In that view of the matter, I must hold that the Court below had ample jurisdiction to set aside its order under Section 151 of the Code; and this position in law is settled beyond dispute as will appear from the cases of this Court in ‘Sadho Saran Rai v. Anant Rai*’, 2 Pat 731 and ‘Chutur Prasad v. Mt. Bishuni Kuer’, AIR (30) 1943 Pat 13.

8. The learned Counsel for the respondents has contended that the order of the 20th of February 1948, is liable to be set aside on the ground that the provisions of Order 32, Rule 7 of the CPC have not been complied with. Minor respondent No. 2 in this appeal was respondent No. 1 in the aforesaid money appeal and he was represented by a guardian-ad-litem appointed in the Court of first instance. He continued to be the guardian of the minor until the 20th of February, 1948. On the 18th of February 1948, a petition was filed by the respondent No. 1, Sitaram for the change of guardian and some of the grounds given were that the Pleader guardian-ad-litem had not taken any steps till then though he had received notice long ago and that he was not looking after the interest of the minor respondent and further that respondent No. 2 was the karta of the family and he looked after the interest of the minor respondent No. 1. This petition was ordered to be put up on the 20th of February and the order passed on that date has already been quoted, in that order no express permission was given to the guardian-ad-litem to enter into the proposed compromise. All that the order on this point says is that the appeal is permitted to be compromised and the Court does not consider whether the compromise is for the benefit of the minor, in the leading case of ‘Manohar Lal v. Jadu Nath Singh’, 33 Ind App 128, Lord MacNaghten has made the following observation with reference to the duties of a Court in sanctioning compromise in which a minor is concerned:

“There ought to be evidence that the attention of the Court was directly called to the fact that a minor was a party to the compromise, and it ought to be shewn, by an order on petition, or in some way not open to doubt, that the leave of the Court was obtained.”

9. In ‘Subramanian Chettiar v. Raja Rajeshwar Dorai’, 39 Mad 115, their Lordships of the privy Council quoted with approval the aforesaid observation of Lord MacNaghten in ‘Manohar Lal's case’ and pointed out that the provisions relating to the leave of the Court in permitting compromise on behalf of minors are of great importance for the protection of the interest of a minor. It is now a well-established principle of law that it is the duty of the Court to see that the interests of minors are adequately protected and where a compromise affecting the minor is proposed to be effected, it is of very great importance that the conscience of the Court should be satisfied that the compromise is really in the interest of the minor and that in ordinary circumstances when the Court records an order to that effect it may be assumed, unless there be indication to the contrary, that the Court-has exercised its judicial discretion. But in cases in which the circumstances, however, are peculiar or suspicious — as they are in the present case — it is clear that a heavy responsibility lies upon the Court to scrutinise with care the terms of the proposed compromise and the circumstances connected therewith in order that the conscience of the Court may be satisfied that the compromise is really for the benefit of the minor. In ‘Govindaswami v. Alagiri Sami’, 29 Mad 104, it has been held that in sanctioning compromise on behalf of minors the order should state in terms that the question that the compromise was for the benefit of the minors was considered. In ‘Sri Narayan Singh v. Posan Singh’, 23 Pat L.T 602, it was held that:

“the Court cannot give effect to a compromise which has' been entered into by the guardian of the minors without its previous sanction.”

10. It is true that no particular formula is required to be used by the Court in granting leave to a guardian-ad-litem to compromise a suit on behalf of a minor, but the order itself must show that leave has been expressly granted to the guardian and that the question of the benefit of the minor was before the Court and had been considered by it. In ‘Awadhesh, Prasad v. Widow of Tribeni Prasad’, 22 Pat LT 223, a Bench of this Court held that a guardian-ad-litem cannot enter into a compromise without the leave of the Court, and such leave must be expressly recorded by the Court and that the terms of Order 32, Rule 7 of the CPC are not complied with by merely asking the Court to approve of a compromise which has actually been entered into. The Court must consider the proposed terms before they are agreed to by the parties. This case was considered later by another Bench of this Court in the case of Dharnidhar Roy v. Phul Kumari Debi’, AIR (32) 1945 Pat 391, and the observation made therein to-the effect that leave to enter into agreement must, be obtained before the-agreement is entered into appears to have been modified. Sinha, J., with, whom Chatterji, J., concurred, made the following; observations:

“In my opinion, the Code of Civil Procedure does not insist upon the guardian-ad-litem first obtaining the leave of the Court to negotiate the; terms of the compromise. It is only when negotiation has reached the stage of settlement that the guardian-ad-litem would be in a position to know the exact terms on which the contending, parties would agree to settle their differences. Only when that stage has been reached, it impossible for the guardian-ad-litem to obtain the necessary sanction of the Court. Hence, in my opinion, if the leave of the Court is granted to-the guardian-ad-litem before the compromise is actually recorded, the terms of R. 7, of O. 32 of the Code would be substantially complied with, because, until the compromise has been-recorded it does not become operative between the parties, so far as the pending litigation is concerned.”

11. In my view, in the present case the Court did not consider the effect of the compromise so far as the minor was concerned. The order of the 20th of February 1948, does not show if the Court was at all conscious of its responsibility under Order 32, Rule 7 of the CPC at the-time of making the order although the terms of the compromise were on their very face against the minor. The provision in the Code for obtaining leave of the Court by the guardian or next friend for entering into compromise on behalf of the minor is a very salutary provision for the protection of the interest of the minor and before granting leave it must appear from the order-sheet itself that the Court did consider the interest of the minor. In the present case, the Court has signally failed to carry out the letter and spirit of the provisions contained in Order 32, Rule 7 of the Code. In a case like this, on the: very face of it, suspicion of the Court below should have been aroused and it should have heard the parties and the guardian-ad-litem upon the terms, of the compromise whether they could be said to-be for the benefit of the minor. If the Court had done its duty, so much time of the Court should not have been wasted and the parties should have been saved the costs and harassment of this subsequent litigation.

12. It was faintly argued that respondent No. 1, to this appeal was the karta of the joint family-consisting of himself and of the minor and, therefore, the karta having accepted the terms of the compromise, the compromise was binding upon the minor himself. In ‘Ganesha Row v. Tuljaram Row’ 36 Mad 295, their Lordships of the Privy Council, while considering the provisions of Section 462 of the Code, which corresponds to Order 32, Rule T of the present Code, had ruled that the powers of a natural guardian who was appointed a guardian-ad-litem by a Court were controlled by the provisions of Section 462 of the Code and that, he could not, without leave of the Court, do any act in his capacity of father, or managing member of the joint family, which he was debarred from doing as guardian-ad-litem. If a father or other natural guardian is appointed to act as a guardian-ad-litem, he is as well bound by the provisions of O. 32, R. 7 of the Code as any other guardian or next friend. This point of view was made clear by a decision of the Madras High Court in ‘Vijaya Ramayya v. Venkatasubba Rao’, 39 Mad 853. In that case the father had entered into a compromise on behalf of himself and his minor son though the latter was represented by his brother as guardian-ad-litem. It was held by their Lordships that the father could not enter into compromise binding on his son where he was represented by a different person as guardian-ad-litem and the same view was taken in ‘Gurmallappa Mallappa v. Mallappa Martandappa’, 44 Bom 574. This view has also been held by this Court in ‘Awadhesh Prasad Missir's case’ 22 Pat LT 223. I would, therefore, hold that the compromise is also bad on the ground that the provisions of Order 32, Rule 7 of the CPC have not been complied with and that the same is not binding on the minor respondent No. 2.

13. It was also contended by the learned ??? for the appellant that although the compromise may not be binding upon the minor, the same may be held binding against the other respondent (respondent No. 1) who was major at the time of the compromise. In view of the finding that fraud was practised upon the party and upon the Court also, this question does not arise for consideration.

14. In the result, I would dismiss the appeal with costs and affirm the decision of the Court below. Money Appeal No. 5 of 1947 must now proceed to hearing.

15. Sarjoo Prosad, J.:— I am doubtful if this appeal is competent; otherwise I entirely agree.

K.S

16. Appeal dismissed.

Sheosagar Singh v. Sitaram Kumhar And Another

Structured Summary of the Opinion (C.P. Sinha, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Respondents' Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Sheosagar Singh v. Sitaram Kumhar And Another

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