A. Pasayat, J.:— In this appeal under section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (in short the ‘Act’) order of learned Judge, Family Court, Cuttack rejecting an application for restoration of petition under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, the ‘Code’) is assailed.

2. A brief reference to the factual aspects is necessary for disposal of the appeal which involves a ticklish question of law, fact situation as described by the appellant runs as follows:

The appellant filed an application under section 125 of the Code claiming maintenance on the ground that she is the legally married wife of respondent who has sufficient means to maintain her, she is unable to maintain her, the respondent has neglected and refused to maintain her and she is not disqualified under any of the provisions enumerated in section 125 of the Code. There appears to be long drawn series of litigations between parties, with which we are not presently concerned. On 26-11-1990 appellant filed an application under section 125 of the Code before learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Sadar, Cuttack. Subsequently it was transferred to the family Court on 30-3-1991, and interim maintenance was allowed by the said Court on being moved by the appellant. Against the said order, respondent preferred Civil Revision No. 555 of 1991 in this Court. After hearing the parties, this Court was pleased to remand the matter to the Family Court for fresh adjudication. Learned Judge, Family Court directed payment of Rs. 200/- per month as interim maintenance from the date of application. The matter was posted to 4-11-1991 for payment of arrear maintenance and hearing. On that day, appellant could not attend the Court as she had gone to Puri earlier for religious ceremonies. She also could not intimate her counsel regarding her absence, as she had left on 29-10-1991. The case was dismissed for default on the ground of non-appearance of the applicant. A memorandum had been filed on that date that arrear maintenance as directed had not been paid. An application was filed for restoration of the case. Though the same was styled as under section 126(2) of the Code, it is accepted that the petition was really for restoration and provisions of section 126(2) of the Code have no application to the case.

3. The application was resisted by respondent on the ground that reasons indicated for non-appearance are not factually correct. Learned Judge, Family Court rejected the application though he hold that he bad power to restore the petition by exercise of inherent powers. Reliance was placed for such view on a decision of this Court in Rekha Jena v. Manoranjan Jena, I.L.R 1965 Cutt. 556. Learned counsel for appellant in support of appeal has submitted that the approach of learned Judge, family Court is erroneous. Considering the fact that appellant has been ventilating her grievances since about two decades, the inference that there was no justifiable reason for her absence or that she was not vigilant is not tenable in law. Learned counsel for respondent however, submitted that learned Judge, Family Court had no power of restoration and be was not correct in his conclusion that he bad power to restore. It is however, submitted that rejection has been rightly done.

4. We shall first deal with the contention relating to the power of learned Judge, family Court to restore an application under section 125 of the Code, which has been dismissed for default. As indicated above, learned Judge, Family Court held that he had power to do so relying on the decision in Rekha Jena's case (supra). In that decision conclusion was to the effect that though there is no provision similar to order 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short, the ‘C.P.C ‘), yet principles embodied therein are applicable and the Court has inherent jurisdiction to remedy wrong under certain circumstances. It was held that there is no provision to deal with the case of default under section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (in short, the ‘Old Code. ‘). It was within the powers of Magistrate to restore an application which has been dismissed for default. In essence, it was held that by exercise of inherent power the Court could direct restoration. In Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. Kali Singh., (1977) 1 SCC 57 : A.I.R 1977 S.C 2432, it was observed by the apex Court that there is no provision in the Code empowering a Magistrate to review and recall an order passed by him and the Code did not contain a provision for exercise of inherent powers by lower Courts which section 561-A of the Old Code similar to section 482, conferred on the High Court alone. In State of Orissa v. Ram Chandra Agarwala, (1979) 2 SCC 305 : A.I.R 1979 S.C 87, It was held that sections 369 and 424 of the Old Code did not restrict prohibition contained under section 369 to the trial Court alone, it applied even to the High Court and the said Court could not invoke the provisions of section 561-A of the Old Code for exercising a power which has been specifically prohibited by the Code. This Court had the occasion to consider whether the original Court dealing with an application under section 125 of the Code has inherent powers. In Srimati Sabita Sahoo v. Captain Khirod Kumar Sahoo, (1990) 3 O.C.R 315. 71 (1991) C.L.T (Notes-2) 1 and Dr. Dr. P.P Wilson… v. K. Sundaramma & Another…Opp. Parties., (1991) 4 O.C.R 324: 72(1991) C.L.T 359, it was held that no Court except High Court can exercise inherent powers. The first case related to an application for amendment and the second case related to an application for stay during pendency of an application under section 126(2) of the Code. In the aforesaid premises, the inevitable conclusion is that no Court other than the High Court has inherent powers. Observations in Rekha Jena's case (supra) to the contrary are not correct. Question however, arises whether the Family Court could exercise its ancillary or incidental powers for restoration. There is no specific power for dismissed of an application for non-prosecution. Obviously, the Court in exercise of its implies powers can direct dismissed for nonprosecution. It is a firmly established rule that an express grant of statutory power carries with it by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective, (Suthorland's Statutory Construction, third edition, articles 5401 and 5402). In Domat's Civil Law (Cushing's Edition) Volums 1 at page 88, it has been stated:

“It is the duty of the Judges to apply the laws, not only to what appears to be regulated by their express dispositions, but to all the cases where a just application of them may be made, and which appear to be comprehended either within the consequences that may be gathered from it.”

5. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, eleventh adition, contains a statement at page 350 that where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are necessary to its execution. A somewhat similar situations in a proceeding under Orissa House Rant Control Act, 1967 came under scrutiny in Kandula Prabhakar Rao v. Tumulu Lakshmanamurty, 64(1987) C.L.T 713 : 1987(II) O L.R 498. It was held that notwithstanding absence of inherent powers, restoration can be directed by exercise of implied powers. Therefore, it stands to reason that the Court in exercise of ancillary and incidental powers can direct restoration even though there is no specific provision in the Code. The situation may be viewed in the background of section 126(2) which permits a husband to seek setting aside of an ex parte order against him.

6. Keeping in view the benign provisions in section 125 enacted to ameliorate economic condition of neglected wife and discarded divorces and to save enumerated persons from vagrancy and destitution, welfare laws must be so read as to be effective delivery systems of salutary objects sought to be served by the Legislature. When beneficiaries are weaker sections like destitution woman, spirit of Article 15(3) of the Constitution must be light meaning of section 125 and its sister clauses and provisions must receive compassionate expansion of sense that the words used permit. Similar sentiment was expressed by the appex Court in Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussein Fiasalli Chothia (1979) 2 SCC 316 : A.I.R 1979 S.C 362.

7. Coming to the factual backgrounds, we find that two decades of litigation has not been sufficient to weaken the spirit with which parties have been litigating. The fact that interim maintenance was granted by the learned Judge, Family Court, shows existence of prima facie material regarding entitlement of the appellant during pendency of the proceeding. The reason advanced by the appellant to justify her non-appearance does not appear to be so absurd and unreasonable as to warrant outright rejection. A party does not gain by not attending the Court on the date fixed. Unless a callous and negligent attitude is borns out from record, a liberal attitude has to be adopted when a party shows cause for non-appearance. A rigidistic approach while dealing with cause of non-appearance in a case for maintenance under section 125 of the Code is likely to frustrate the very purpose for which the provision was enacted. Any hair splitting of facts situation would not further ends of justice. True it is, the Court has to be satisfied about justifiable reason for non-appearance. But such matters cannot be weighed in golden scales. On the scales of justice and equity, the balance lean heavily in favour of the appellant. Therefore, we set aside the order of learned Judge, Family Court rejecting the application for restoration. There is substance in the submission of the learned counsel for appellant that a proceeding under section 125 of the Code needs expeditious disposal. We direct that parties shall appear before learned Judge, Family Court without any further notice on 17-9-1992 when matter shall either be taken up by him or be adjourned to such date as deemed fit and expedient. He would however do well to dispose of the proceeding as expeditiously as practicable before 1993 acts in.

8. The appeal is allowed.

D.M Patnaik, J.:— I agree.

Appeal allowed.