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  • 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
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  • 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The claimant (about 15 years old and studying in Class X) was injured when a bus struck her while she was standing near her house, resulting in the amputation of her left arm. She claimed Rs. 70,000 as compensation under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The 2nd Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Cuttack awarded the claimed amount of Rs. 70,000. Of that award, Rs. 50,000 was made liable to be paid by the insurer of the vehicle and the balance by the owner. An appeal was preferred (noted in the opinion as being by the owner), and the matter eventually required consideration by a larger Bench because a learned single Judge had reservations about the correct interpretation of Section 95(2)(b)(i) of the Act and referred to a conflicting single-Judge decision (National Insurance Co. v. Krushna Chandra Das).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 95(2)(b)(i) of the Motor Vehicles Act limits the insurer's liability in respect of persons "other than passengers carried for hire or reward" (including pedestrians) to the statutory monetary limit specified in that sub-clause.
  2. Whether a comprehensive insurance policy (or payment of higher premium) can render the insurer liable beyond the statutory limit prescribed by Section 95(2)(b)(i).
  3. Whether incomplete filing of the insurance policy (or omission of endorsements/clauses) justifies drawing an adverse inference against the insurer and thereby holding the insurer liable for the entire awarded amount.
  4. Whether the Tribunal's award of Rs. 70,000 for amputation of a limb is excessive and should be reduced (for example to Rs. 50,000), having regard to other High Court decisions on quantum.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant / Insurer (as presented in the opinion — Mr. Basu and Mr. Ray)

  • Reliance on the single-Judge decision in National Insurance Co. v. Krushna Chandra Das which held that, in the circumstances of a bus accident, the insurer's liability qua a pedestrian was not confined to the sum mentioned in S.95(2)(b)(i).
  • Reference to the Full Bench decision in Abdul Shahid v. Naraini (Rajasthan) and to the Madras decision in Oriental Fire & Genl. Ins. Co. v. V. Ganapathi Ramalingam to support an argument that a comprehensive policy may attract liability beyond the statutory limit.
  • Mr. Ray (for the insurer) contended that the two exhibits filed (Exts. A and B) contained the material portion of the policy and thus should be regarded as the complete policy (i.e., no adverse inference should be drawn from missing documents).
  • For reduction of quantum, Mr. Basu cited multiple High Court decisions awarding various sums for amputation injuries and urged reduction of the Rs. 70,000 award to Rs. 50,000.

Claimant (as presented in the opinion — Mr. Mohanty)

  • Supported the view in Krushna Chandra Das (i.e., that insurer's liability may not be confined to the statutory limit) and relied on the Rajasthan Full Bench decision (Abdul Shahid v. Naraini) which held that a comprehensive policy could render the insurer liable for the entire awarded amount.
  • Contended that the insurer had not placed the complete policy on record (only Exts. A and B were filed and the endorsements referenced in the policy were missing), and therefore an adverse inference should be drawn against the insurer — leading to a requirement that the insurer pay the entire award.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
National Insurance Co. v. Krushna Chandra Das, (1989) 2 OLR 120 Held (by a learned single Judge) that insurer's liability qua a pedestrian was not confined to the limit in S.95(2)(b)(i). The Court rejected this view as not sustainable in light of binding Supreme Court decisions and held the statutory limit in S.95(2)(b)(i) governs insurer liability in the present type of case.
Abdul Shahid v. Naraini, 1988 ACJ 887 (Rajasthan Full Bench) Held that where the policy is comprehensive the insurer was liable to indemnify the entire award even if it exceeded the statutory limit. The Court discussed this decision but declined to accept it as correctly stating the law in the face of Supreme Court authority; nevertheless, it considered the decision on the separate question of missing policy endorsements.
British Indian General Insurance Co. v. Maya Banerjee, 1986 ACJ 946 (AIR 1986 SC 2110) Interpreted the statutory provision (then limiting insurer liability to Rs.20,000) to mean the insurer's liability to third parties knocked down by a bus could not exceed the statutory limit. Applied as binding authority establishing that the statute limits insurer liability to the sum specified in the relevant sub-clause; the Court applied the same principle to the present statutory limit under S.95(2)(b)(i).
National Insurance Co. v. Jugal Kishore, 1988 ACJ 270 (AIR 1988 SC 719) Held that on the plain language of S.95(2)(b)(i) insurer liability could not exceed the statutory limit; comprehensive insurance or higher premium does not by itself increase that limit unless a specific agreement and separate premium exist. Relied upon as controlling precedent: the Court held the statutory limit governed insurer liability and that comprehensive policies do not automatically oust the statutory cap; further, the Court emphasized the need to place the policy on record when relying on a defence of statutory-limited liability.
Oriental Fire & Genl. Ins. Co. v. V. Ganapathi Ramalingam, 1982 ACJ (Supp) 106 (Madras) Held that a comprehensive policy could render insurer liable for amounts beyond the statutory limit. The Court noted this decision but did not accept it as correctly stating the law in view of subsequent Supreme Court authority (Jugal Kishore).
Lakhpat Rai v. United India Fire & Genl. Ins. Co., 1988 ACJ 466 (Punj & Har) Because an incomplete copy of the policy was placed on record, the court held insurer's liability was not limited to statutory provision. Relied on to support the principle that failure to place the complete policy on record can lead to the insurer being treated as liable beyond the statutory limit; the present Court drew on this approach when endorsements were missing from Exts. A and B.
Rangachari Laxmi v. Prakash Chandra, 1 (1987) ACC 197 A single Judge drew an adverse inference against an insurer for not filing the complete policy and held insurer liable for the full award. Used to support the proposition that absence of the complete policy may justify an adverse inference; the Court followed this reasoning in ordering the insurer to pay the entire award because endorsements were not produced.
Assorted High Court decisions on quantum (examples cited) Various High Court awards (Assam, Orissa, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Kerala, etc.) reflecting sums awarded for limb amputations ranging from approx. Rs. 23,000 to Rs. 56,500. Referred to by the appellant in urging reduction of the award. The Court observed that these decisions did not reduce Tribunal awards and therefore did not justify reducing the present Tribunal award of Rs. 70,000.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court structured its analysis around three principal questions: (1) the interpretation of Section 95(2)(b)(i) as to insurer liability for persons other than passengers, (2) whether a comprehensive policy can extend insurer liability beyond the statutory limit, and (3) whether missing policy endorsements justified an adverse inference.

1. Interpretation of S.95(2)(b)(i): The Court quoted S.95(2)(b)(i) which, for vehicles in which passengers are carried for hire or reward, provides "in respect of persons other than passengers carried for hire or reward, limit of fifty thousand rupees in all." The Court observed that the single-Judge decision in Krushna Chandra Das construed sub-clause (i) as referring only to persons in the vehicle who were not fare-paying passengers and held that a pedestrian was not covered by the limit. The Court rejected that approach because it ran counter to Supreme Court decisions (Maya Banerjee and Jugal Kishore) which interpreted the statutory provision to limit the insurer's liability in respect of third parties (persons other than passengers) to the statutory sum; applying the same principle to the current statutory text, the Court concluded that S.95(2)(b)(i) governs the insurer's statutory liability in cases of this nature.

2. Effect of a comprehensive policy: The Court examined the contention that a comprehensive policy or payment of higher premium would make the insurer liable beyond the statutory limit. It noted Full Bench and Madras High Court decisions taking the contrary view, but held that such decisions are inconsistent with the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Jugal Kishore. According to Jugal Kishore, comprehensive insurance and payment of higher premium do not, by themselves, increase the statutory ceiling; for a higher liability to be enforceable a specific agreement is required between owner and insurer with a separate premium for the higher indemnity. Therefore the Court declined to accept the view that a comprehensive policy alone abolishes the statutory limit.

3. Missing endorsements and adverse inference: The insurer had placed two copies of the policy (Exts. A and B) on record. The Court examined these exhibits and observed that the policy expressly stated it was "Subject to Clause MVC and Endorsement Nos. 23, 26, 21, 16, 13, 57(H)". Those endorsements were not placed before the Court, so it could not determine whether the policy contained an undertaking to indemnify in excess of the statutory limit. The Court emphasized the principle (derived from Jugal Kishore and prior High Court decisions) that when an insurer asserts its liability is limited to the statutory sum, it should file the relevant policy documents. Given the absence of the endorsements, the Court concluded it could not be satisfied that Exts. A and B constituted the complete policy and — following the approach in Lakhpat Rai and Rangachari Laxmi — drew the necessary adverse inference, ordering the insurer to pay the entire awarded amount.

4. Quantum of compensation: The appellant urged reduction of the Rs. 70,000 award to Rs. 50,000 by reference to a number of High Court authorities awarding lower sums for amputations. The Court reviewed the cited authorities and observed that in those cases the High Courts had not reduced Tribunal awards; they had either upheld or enhanced the awards. The Court further stated that assessment of compensation for injuries such as amputations depends on the facts of each case and that no rigid rule prescribes a fixed maximum for such injuries. Because the Tribunal had evaluated the evidence and fixed Rs. 70,000, the Court declined to reduce the award.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed in part by directing that the insurer shall pay the entire amount awarded by the Claims Tribunal.

Core Ruling: The insurer is ordered to pay the full award of Rs. 70,000 (to be paid within two months from the date of the order).

Implications (as explicitly discussed in the opinion):

  • The Court affirmed that the statutory ceiling in S.95(2)(b)(i) governs insurer liability for persons other than passengers (applying the reasoning of binding Supreme Court decisions), i.e., the insurer's liability is limited by the statutory provision unless there is a specific contractual undertaking to the contrary.
  • The Court held that a comprehensive policy or payment of higher premium does not automatically raise or remove the statutory cap; to establish liability beyond the statutory limit, a specific agreement by the insurer (with separate premium) is required.
  • The Court stressed that when an insurer contends its liability is limited to the statutory amount, it must place the full insurance policy (including relevant clauses and endorsements) on the record; failure to produce the complete policy may attract an adverse inference and result in the insurer being held liable for the entire award, as happened in this case.
  • With respect to quantum, the Court reiterated that assessment is case-specific; it did not reduce the Tribunal's compensation award and thus did not lay down any fixed maxima for amputation injuries beyond endorsing fact-specific assessment.

Note: This summary reflects only the matters and reasoning that appear in the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond the text of that opinion.

    Akhaya Kumar Sahoo v. Chhabirani Seth And Another

    Hansaria, C.J:— A sum of Rupees 70,000/- was claimed as compensation u/S. 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (shortly, ‘the Act’). Following the accident in which the claimant was injured by a bus while standing near her house, her left arm had to be amputated. When the accident occurred, the claimant was aged about 15 years and was prosecuting her studies in class X. She had thus a bright prospect in life but due to the accident her expectation even of marriage got belied and she became invalid for life.

    2. The learned 2nd. Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Cuttack, on being satisfied about the justifiability of the amount as claimed awarded the same. Out of the awarded amount, a sum of Rs. 50,000/- was made liable to be paid by the insurer of the vehicle and as to the remaining amount, the owner was made liable. Feeling aggrieved, the owner has preferred this appeal.

    3. When the appeal was heard by a learned single Judge of this Court, the question which was substantially urged was relating to the liability of the insurer. Reliance was placed by Mr. Basu appearing for the appellant National Insurance Co. v. Krushna Chandra Das, (1989) 2 OLR 120, in which a learned single Judge of this Court held that in a case of the present nature where the accident was caused by a bus, the liability of the insurer qua a pedestrian was not confined to a sum of Rs. 50,000/- of which reference has been made in S. 95(2)(b)(i) of the Act. The learned Judge who heard this appeal could not persuade himself to agree with the aforesaid view and, because of this, desired that the matter may be examined by a larger Bench. It is for this reason that the appeal is before us.

    4. As we are concerned with the interpretation of S. 95(2)(b)(i) of the Act, we may quote the same:—

    “95(2). Subject to the proviso to sub-s. (1), a policy of insurance shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any one accident upto the following limits, namely:—

    (a)……………

    (b) where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment,—

    (i) in respect of persons other than passengers carried for hire or reward, limit of fifty thousand rupees in all;”

    The learned single Judge who decided the case in Krushna Chandra Das (supra) held that the limit of liability dealt by sub-cl. (i) refers to other categories of persons moving in the vehicle except those who are passengers carried for hire or reward. It was observed that S. 95(2)(b) deals with vehicles in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, out of whom, sub-cl. (i) takes care of persons who are in the vehicle but who are not passengers carried for hire or reward. It was stated that a pedestrian is not such a person, and that the language of sub-s. (2) being one for limiting the broad liability of the insurer in sub-s. (1), the same has to be rigidly construed; and the benevolent provision in S. 95 must be construed in a manner so that a large number of claimants get the benefit. The question for consideration is whether the aforesaid view can be upheld.

    5. Mr. Basu appearing for the appellant and Mr. Mohanty appearing for the claimant submit that the view expressed in Krushna Chandra Das merits our acceptance. In this connection we have been referred, inter alia, to a Full Bench decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Abdul Shahid v. Naraini, 1988 ACJ 887. Reference to this decision shows that the insurer was fastened with higher liability than fixed by S. 95(2)(b)(i) not because this clause does not apply to pedestrians but because the insurance in the case being of comprehensive nature, it was held that the insurer was liable to indemnify the entire awarded amount which was Rupees 1,20,000/-. As to the correctness of this view, we shall advert a little later; but it may be pointed out here that the stand taken by the learned single Judge in Krushna Chandra Das runs counter at least to two Supreme Court decisions, namely, British Indian General Insurance Co. v. Maya Banerjee, 1986 ACJ 946 : (AIR 1986 SC 2110) and National Insurance Co. v. Jugal Kishore, 1988 ACJ 270 : (AIR 1988 SC 719).

    6. In Maya Banerjee, what had happened was that the deceased was knocked down by a bus while riding a cycle. The High Court fixed the liability of the insurer at Rs. 30,000/-. It was canvassed before the Supreme Court that the insurer's liability did not extend beyond a sum of Rs. 20,000/- and had been provided in S. 95(2)(b)(i) of the Act at the relevant time. The Apex Court observed that this provision had confined the liability of the insurer to a sum of Rs. 20,000/- in respect of persons other than passengers carried for hire or reward and the deceased being admittedly a third party having been knocked down while riding a cycle, it was held that the liability of the insurer could not be in excess of the statutory limit.

    7. In Jugal Kishore (supra) also which had dealt with the insurer's liability in respect of injuries sustained by a person driving a scooter having been knocked down by a bus, it was stated that on the plain language of S. 95(2)(b)(i) the liability could not be in excess of Rs. 20,000/-.

    8. This being the state of law, we are not in a position to accept the view expressed in Krushna Chandra Das, and it has to be held that the statutory liability of the insurer in a case of the present nature would be governed by the provision contained in S. 95(2)(b)(i) of the Act.

    9. The next question is whether in view of the comprehensive policy taken out in the present case, higher liability can be fastened on the insurer. The aforesaid Full Bench decision of the Rajasthan High Court is relevant on this aspect of the case; and as already noted, according to this decision, in a case where the policy is comprehensive the insurer is liable to pay the entire amount awarded in a case though the same may be beyond the limit visualized by S. 95(2)(b)(i) of the Act. Same view was taken in Oriental Fire & Genl. Ins. Co. v. V. Ganapathi Ramalingam, 1982 ACJ (Supp) 106, by the Madras High Court. As to these cases, it is enough to point out that the same runs counter to the view expressed in Jugal Kishore, (AIR 1988 SC 719) (supra) inasmuch as it was held in that case that comprehensive insurance of the vehicle and payment of higher premium on this score did not mean that the limit of the liability in regard to third party became unlimited or higher than the statutory liability fixed u/S. 95(2) of the Act. The Court further observed that for this purpose a specific agreement has to be arrived at between the owner and the insurance company and separate premium has to be paid on the amount of liability undertaken on this behalf. On examining the terms of the policy of that case, it was, however, found that the insurer had not undertaken to foot the bill of higher liability though the policy was comprehensive in nature. The view expressed in the aforesaid two cases cannot, therefore, be accepted to have laid down the correct law.

    10. Mr. Mohanty, however, urges that the policy in the present case would show that the insurer had not limited its liability to the statutory limit. This contention is advanced on the basis that though the insurer had filed two copies of the policy in question, which had been marked as Exts. A and B, the same are not complete copies of the policy and as such it is not known if the insurer had not agreed to indemnify the insured in excess of the statutory liability.

    11. Before examining the soundness of the aforesaid submission, we may point cut that in view of what has been stated in Jugal Kishore (AIR 1988 SC 719) (supra), in all cases where the insurer takes a defence that its liability is not in excess of the statutory liability, it should file a copy of the insurance policy to help the court in doing justice in the case. We may then refer to Lakhpat Rai v. United India Fire & Genl. Ins. Co., 1988 ACJ 466: (Punj & Har) wherein, because of an incomplete copy of the policy being placed on record, it was held that the liability of the insurer's company was not limited to what has been provided in the statute. A learned single Judge of this Court in Rangachari Laxmi v. Prakash Chandra, 1 (1987) ACC 197, drew an adverse inference against the insurer for not filing the complete policy and held that in case the complete policy had not been filed, the same would have shown that the insurer was liable beyond the statutory limit, and being of this view, the insurer was asked to pay the entire amount awarded which was Rupees 15,000/- as against the statutory limit of Rs. 5,000/-.

    12. Let it be seen whether Exts. A and B which have been placed on record constitute the whole policy or are parts of the policy. Mr. Ray appearing for the insurer contends that Exts. A and B contain the material part of the information relating to the policy in question and as such have to be regarded as the complete policy. We are, however, unable to accept the submission inasmuch as a perusal of these exhibits shows that the policy in question was “Subject to Clause MVC and Endorsement Nos. 23, 26, 21, 16, 13, 57(H)”. These endorsements are not before the Court. We are, therefore, neither in a position to hold that these exhibits are true copies of the whole policy, nor are we in a position to know as to the contents of the aforesaid endorsements; and therefore, by relying on the aforesaid two decisions, order the insurer to pay the entire awarded amount of Rs. 70,000/-.

    13. It is finally urged by that the award of Rs. 70,000/- in the present case must be regarded as excessive and we should reduce the award to a sum of Rs. 50,000/-. To persuade us to do so, Mr. Basu refers to various decisions to wit, Assam State Road Trans. Corpn. v. Halaluddin Ahmed, 1988 ACJ 711 (Gau), Braja Kishore Mohanty v. M.C Shyamsundar, AIR 1989 Ori 237, Jagabandhu Mohanty v. Hadibandhu Swain, 1986 ACJ 770 (Ori) Govind Nayak v. Shyam Sundar Soni, 1988 ACJ 39, Aximulla Khan v. Shanti Devi, 1986 ACJ 761 : (AIR 1986 Raj 5), Rajendra Kumar v. M.P State Road Trans. Corpn. 1986 ACJ 1054 (Madh Pra), Tejpal Singh v. Rajasthan State Road Trans. Corpn., 1986 ACJ 720 (Raj), and (8) United India Fire & Genl. Ins. Co. v. C.P Varghese, 1988 ACJ 152, (Ker) wherein different High Courts of the country including this Court had awarded sums varying from Rs. 23,000/- to Rs. 56,500/- for amputation of either right leg, left leg or right hand. As to these decisions, it may be pointed out that in none of these cases the High Court had reduced the quantum of compensation as fixed by the Claims Tribunal the High Court had either upheld the award of the Tribunal or enhanced the same. This apart, it may be stated that while computing compensation for injuries of the present nature, it is apparent that the just amount shall have to be decided keeping in view the facts of each case and no hard and fast rule can be laid down that where a leg or hand is amputated, the award is not to exceed Rs. 50,000/-. In the present case the learned Tribunal having gone into the evidence on record on the basis of which the quantum was fixed at Rs. 70,000/-, we are not inclined to reduce the same.

    14. In the result, the appeal is allowed by directing the insurer to pay the entire amount as awarded by the learned Tribunal. This would be done within two months from today.

    R.C Patnaik, J.:— 15. I agree.

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    Comments

    Akhaya Kumar Sahoo v. Chhabirani Seth And Another
    (Apr 6, 1990)