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AMICUS AI
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  • S. 91 of the Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1962 (for short the Act)
  • 141(3) of the Orissa Co-operative Societies Rules
  • provisions of clause (a), (b) or (c) of S. 94
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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Acts
  • S. 91 of the Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1962 (for short the Act)
  • 141(3) of the Orissa Co-operative Societies Rules
  • provisions of clause (a), (b) or (c) of S. 94
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner had mortgaged A. 10.50 of land to obtain two loans from the Land Development Bank, Aska (opposite party No. 2). After default, the Bank sold the land under S. 91 of the Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1962 on 11-6-1975; opposite party No. 1 bought it for Rs. 9,000/-. Opposite party No. 1 later paid Rs. 6,000/- to the Bank towards the petitioner's second loan and thereby made the land free from encumbrances arising from that loan.

The petitioner filed an application on 11-7-1975 under para 1(4) of the schedule to the Act to set aside the sale. The Principal Officer rejected that application and confirmed the sale on 8-10-1975. The petitioner's appeal to the Deputy Registrar failed. On revision, the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Orissa set aside the sale, finding that the statutory notice under S. 91(2) of the Act and the notice under R. 141(3) of the Orissa Co-operative Societies Rules had not been served; R. 141(5) had not been observed in conducting the sale; and the application to set aside the sale had been rejected without notice to the petitioner. The Registrar remanded the matter to the Principal Officer to proceed afresh. The auction purchaser obtained a revision before the State Government which allowed the revision and set aside the Registrar's order. The petitioner then filed the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking to quash the State Government's order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a sale under S. 91 of the Orissa Co-operative Societies Act conducted without serving the notice required by S. 91(2) is void.
  2. Whether S. 94 of the Act (which protects a purchaser's title where certain defects exist and confines remedy to damages) applies to non-service of the notice required by S. 91(2), thereby preventing the petitioner from challenging the purchaser's title.
  3. Whether the petitioner was required to seek relief only under para 1(1) of the schedule (by depositing specified sums) or could invoke para 1(4) (or other sub-paragraphs) to set aside the sale on grounds of irregularity, mistake or non-compliance.
  4. Whether the schedule to the Act (and its para 1 sub-paragraphs) applies only in relation to S. 103 execution proceedings or whether its sub-paragraphs provide alternative modes to set aside a sale effected under S. 91.
  5. Whether the mandatory procedural requirements of R. 141 (including service of notice under R. 141(3)) must be strictly complied with and whether noncompliance invalidates a sale conducted without court intervention.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The sale effected under S. 91 was void because the notice required by S. 91(2) was not served.
  • The sale should be set aside under the schedule (the petitioner invoked para 1(4) in his application dated 11-7-1975).

Opposite Parties' / State Government's Contentions

  • It was contended (by the auction purchaser/other respondents as reflected in the revisional decision) that the petitioner's application to set aside the sale under para 1(4) was not maintainable and that the petitioner should have proceeded only under para 1(1) of the schedule by depositing the specified amounts (including 5% of purchase money) as compensation and recovery toward the sale-proclamation sum.
  • It was further contended that even if notices under S. 91(2) were not served, S. 94 operates to protect the purchaser's title from being questioned and that the remedy for any non-compliance is confined to damages against the Bank; therefore the purchaser's title could not be impeached.
  • The State Government's revisional order expressed the view that only para 1(1) of the schedule applied to sales under S. 91 and other sub-paragraphs were not attracted (the opinion notes that the order apparently meant para 1(1) where it mentioned para 1 of the schedule).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
(1984) 57 Cut LT 77 — Ugramadhab Joshi v. Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Khariar Circle Held that compliance with the provisions of S. 91(2) are pre-conditions for a valid sale under S. 91(1); a sale in contravention of those provisions is a nullity and confers no rights on the purchaser. The Court applied and followed this Division Bench decision, holding that it fully applies to the present case and does not require reconsideration. The earlier decision supports the conclusion that non-service of S. 91(2) renders the sale void.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a stepwise statutory and textual analysis focusing on S. 91, S. 94 and the schedule to the Act, together with the Rules (R. 141).

1. Nature and function of S. 91: The Court noted that S. 91 authorises Land Development Banks to sell mortgaged property without court intervention, after hearing objections of the mortgagor, provided such power is in the mortgage deed. Sub-section (2) mandates that the Bank cannot exercise the summary power unless a written notice requiring payment of the mortgage money (or part of it) has been served on various categories of persons described in the subsection and there is thereafter a three-month default.

2. Construction of S. 94 vis-à-vis S. 91(2): The respondents relied on S. 94 (which protects a purchaser's title where a sale under S. 90 or S. 91 suffers certain defects and confines the aggrieved person's remedy to damages). The Court analysed the language of S. 94(b) which refers to "due notice of the sale" and distinguished it from the notice required by S. 91(2) (a notice demanding payment of mortgage money). The Court concluded these are distinct notices serving different purposes. Because S. 94(b) addresses notice of sale and not the preliminary statutory notice in S. 91(2) requiring payment, S. 94 does not apply to bar a challenge based on non-service of S. 91(2). Consequently, non-compliance with S. 91(2) renders a sale void and unable to confer title on the purchaser. The Court therefore held that the earlier Division Bench decision in Ugramadhab Joshi applies and need not be reconsidered.

3. Scope and operation of the schedule and para 1 sub-paragraphs: The Court examined the schedule (which is tied by S. 103(4) to execution proceedings) and rejected the State Government's view that only para 1(1) applied to a sale under S. 91. The Court reasoned that the sub-paragraphs (1) to (4) of para 1 are independent and provide alternative remedies depending on circumstances:

  • Sub-para (1) is mandatory: if the necessary deposit is made, the Registrar must set aside the sale.
  • Sub-para (2) permits the Registrar to set aside the sale if he concludes there was material irregularity, mistake or fraud in publishing or conducting the sale.
  • Sub-para (4) serves to bring to the Principal Officer's notice that mandatory provisions (such as S. 91(2)) have not been complied with and that the sale is void.
The Court held that the Registrar had ample revisional power to set aside the sale under these provisions and that the State Government erred in overturning the Registrar's order on the basis that an application under sub-para (4) did not lie.

4. Mandatory rules and R. 141: The Court analysed R. 141, which prescribes the procedure for application for sale and the manner of sale after expiration of the S. 91(2) notice period. R. 141 requires the Bank to wait three months from service of S. 91(2), consider any objections, make an application to the Principal Officer in a prescribed form containing specific particulars and a report of service of S. 91(2), and then the Principal Officer must give notice under R. 141(3) by registered post to persons named in the application regarding intention to sell. The Court emphasised that this procedure is mandatory, admits no exceptions, and must be strictly complied with where the sale is effected without court intervention. Failure at successive procedural stages invalidates the sale.

5. Application to facts: Applying the above analyses, the Court observed that notice under S. 91(2) and R. 141(3) had not been served on the petitioner. Given the mandatory nature of these provisions and the distinction between a S. 91(2) notice and a notice of sale referred to in S. 94(b), the sale was void. The Registrar's decision setting aside the sale was therefore legally justified and ought to be restored; the State Government's revisional order setting aside the Registrar's order was set aside by the Court.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court allowed the petition. It set aside the State Government's revisional order (Annexure-4) and restored the order of the Registrar. A writ of certiorari was directed to issue accordingly. The hearing fee was assessed at Rs. 200/-. (G.B. Patnaik, J. agreed; the judgment concludes "Petition allowed.")

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The sale effected on 11-6-1975 was declared void for non-compliance with the mandatory notice requirements (S. 91(2) and R. 141(3)), the Registrar's order setting aside the sale is restored, and the State Government's order overturning the Registrar was set aside.
  • The Court reaffirmed the principle (as in (1984) 57 Cut LT 77 — Ugramadhab Joshi) that non-service of the S. 91(2) notice renders a S. 91 sale a nullity and does not confer title on the purchaser; S. 94 does not protect a purchaser where the complaint is non-service of the S. 91(2) notice because S. 94(b) concerns notice of sale and not the preliminary notice requiring payment under S. 91(2).
  • The schedule's para 1 sub-paragraphs are alternative remedies and are not limited solely to para 1(1) for sales under S. 91; the Registrar has revisional power to set aside a sale under appropriate sub-paragraphs including sub-para (4) where mandatory pre-conditions were not complied with.
  • No statement in the opinion purports to create a new principle of law beyond applying and following the cited Division Bench decision; the judgment applies existing statutory interpretation and precedent to the facts of this case.

    Kela Gouda v. Krishna Panigrahi And Others

    L. Rath, J.:— The petitioner, whose properties have been sold at the instance of the opposite party No. 2, the Land Development Bank, Aska, on account of loans incurred by him, challenges the sale in this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India as being void. The petitioner availed two loans mortgaging his land measuring A. 10.50 of land. Since there was default in payment of loans, the opposite party No. 2 put the land to sale under S. 91 of the Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1962 (for short ‘the Act’) on 11-6-1975 which was purchased by the opposite party No. 1 for Rs. 9,000/-. Subsequently, the opposite party No. 1 paid Rs. 6,000/- to the Bank towards the second loan of the petitioner and thus made the land free from all encumbrances.

    2. A petition was filed on 11-7-1975 by the petitioner under para 1(4) of the schedule to the Act to set aside the sale. The application was rejected by the Principal Officer on 8-10-1975 on which date he also confirmed the sale. An appeal carried by the petitioner before the Deputy Registrar having failed, he preferred a revision before the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Orissa who set aside the sale since the notice under S. 91(2) of the Act had not been served before effecting the sale and notice under R. 141(3) had also not been served on the petitioner before the sale was conducted. He also found that the provision of R. 141(5) had not been observed in conducting the sale and that the application for setting aside the sale had been rejected without notice to the petitioner. On such findings, the sale as also the subsequent confirmation of it were set aside and the case was remanded to the Principal Officer to proceed afresh to conduct the sale. This order was challenged in a further revision before the State Government by the auction purchaser and the revision being allowed setting aside the order of the Registrar, the petitioner has moved this petition for quashing the order of the State Government.

    3. Admittedly, notice under S. 91(2) of the Act and under R. 141(3) of the Orissa Co-operative Societies Rules had not been served on the petitioner before conducting the sale as has been found in the order of the State Government the relief however has been denied to the petitioner since firstly, it was held that the application of the petitioner to set aside the sale under para 1(4) of the schedule was not maintainable and that he could have made the application only under para 1(1) of the Schedule by depositing a sum equal to 5% of the purchase money for payment as compensation to the purchaser and the sum specified in the proclamation for sale for the recovery of which the sale had been ordered together with interest thereon and the expenses of attachment and other costs due; and secondly, the illegality, if any, for non-compliance of S. 91(2) of the Act was not available to be pressed into service since under S. 94 of the Act such a grievance is to be remedied only in damages but however title of the purchaser cannot be questioned.

    4. The contentions raised require careful consideration. A Division Bench decision of this Court reported in (1984) 57 Cut LT 77 (Ugramadhab Joshi v. Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Khariar Circle) dealing with the question held that compliance with the provisions of S. 91(2) are pre-conditions to be complied with for a sale under S. 91(1) and the sale held in contravention of such provisions is a nullity for which the sale was declared void and as not conferring any rights on the purchasers. It is however urged that the decision was rendered without considering effects of S. 94 of the Act which prescribes that for defects of compliance with the provisions under S. 91, the title of the purchaser is not to be defeated and that remedy of the person aggrieved would only be in damages and that hence the decision of the Court requires a reconsideration.

    5. Section 91 of the Act is a specific provision for Land Development Banks authorising them to bring the mortgaged property to sale without intervention of the Court in case of default of payment of the mortgage money after hearing the objections, if any, of the mortgager, if such a power has been conferred upon them in the mortgage deed. Under sub-sec. (2) the summary power so vested cannot be exercised unless and until a notice in writing requiring payment of the mortgage money or any part thereof, as the case may be, has been served upon the different categories of persons enumerated therein including any person who had an interest in or charge upon the property mortgaged or upon the right to redeem the same and that after service of such notice a default has been made in payment of the mortgaged money or part thereof for three months. S. 94 of the Act may be quoted.

    “94. Title of purchaser not to be questioned. — Where any property is sold in exercise of a power of sale under S. 90 or 91, the title of the purchaser shall not be questioned on the ground that:—

    (a) the circumstances required for authorising the sale had not arisen;

    (b) due notice of the sale was not given;

    (c) the power of sale was otherwise improperly or irregularly exercised;

    but any person who has suffered any damage by an unauthorised, improper or irregular exercise of any such power shall have a remedy in damages against the State Land Development Bank or, as the case may be, the land development bank.”

    In terms of the section, the title of the purchaser is not to be questioned, when a sale is made either under S. 90 or 91, only if the provisions of clause (a), (b) or (c) of S. 94 apply to the facts of the case. It is urged that an objection that the notice under S. 91(2) was not given is covered by sub-cl. (b) of S. 94 and that hence an objection to the sale by the petitioner on such count does not lie.

    6. On a plain reading of the S. 94(b), the submission is wholly untenable. Whereas notice referred to under S. 94(b) is a notice of the sale, the notice under S. 91(2) is one which requires payment of the mortgage money or part thereof. The two notices are completely different from each other and hence it must be held that S. 94 has no application when a sale conducted under S. 91(1) is challenged on the ground of non-service of any notice under S. 91(2). The sale in the instant case admittedly having been held without serving the notice under S. 91(2), it is void and did not confer any right on the purchaser. The decision of this Court in (1984) 57 Cut LT 77 thus fully applies and does not require any reconsideration.

    7. Faced with such difficulty, a further contention is raised that even if the sale was held in contravention of S. 91(2), yet objection to it could be taken by the petitioner only in accordance with para 1(1) of the schedule by deposit of the required amounts as stated therein and that an application otherwise to set aside the sale on the ground of irregularity, mistake or fraud was not maintainable.

    8. The State Government in its revisional order was of the view that so far as the sale is effected under S. 91 of the Act, only para 1 of the schedule is attracted and not the other provisions of it which are applicable only when the Land Development Bank files a dispute and obtains an award and proceeds to execute the award by initiating action under S. 103 of the Act. The mention of para 1 of the schedule in the order is apparently a mistake for para 1(1) since all other relevant sub-paragraphs are also of para 1.

    9. There is no warrant for the view that a sale under S. 91 of the Act attracts only para 1(1) of the schedule and not the other sub-paragraphs. The schedule purportedly relates to S. 103(4) of the Act and deals with applications to set aside the sale, confirmation of sale and other matters. S. 103(4) provides that provisions contained in the schedule shall apply in respect of execution proceedings taken under S. 103(1)(c). S. 103 is the provision for execution of orders etc. and stipulates that every order made by the Registrar under Ss. 67(2), 102 and 108(1), every decision or award made under S. 70, every order made by the liquidator under S. 75 and every order made under Ss. 109, 111, 112, 113 and 114 shall be executed, amongst other methods, under S. 103(1)(c) which is as follows:—

    “(c) be executed by the Registrar or any other person subordinate to him empowered by the Registrar in this behalf by the attachment and sale or sale without attachment of any property of the person or a society against whom the order, decision or award has been obtained or passed.”

    While S. 103(a) and (b) provides for execution of orders, decisions or awards either as a decree of the Civil Court or as arrears of land revenue, sub-cl. (c) thereof provides for execution by attachment and sale or sale without attachment either by the Registrar or by any person subordinate to him and empowered by him in that behalf. The schedule to the Act makes elaborate provisions for setting aside the sale as also for its confirmation and other connected provisions. No doubt, S. 91 is only mentioned in para 1(1) of the schedule but however the application to set aside the sale under other provisions of the paragraph are not excluded. Sub-paragraphs (1) to (4) of para 1 to the schedule each provide alternative modes to get the sale set aside and can be invoked whenever circumstances so warrant. They contemplate different situations and depending upon the situation, the person aggrieved may take to them to have the sale set aside. So far as sub-para (1) is concerned, it is a mandatory provision in which there is no option in the Registrar but to set aside the sale once the necessary deposit is made. No decision making by him is involved at all. However so far as sub-para (2) is concerned, the sale is to be set aside only if the Registrar comes to the conclusion that there has been material irregularity or mistake or fraud in publishing or conducting the sale. Sub-para (5), which states that a person seeking to set aside the sale under sub-para (2) cannot file an application under sub-para (1) unless he withdraws his application under sub-para (2), gives a cue that the different sub-paragraphs (1) to (4) are independent and alternative modes. Thus an application under sub-para (4) is only to bring to the notice of the principal officer that the mandatory provisions of S. 91(2) have not been complied with and hence the sale is void. The Registrar had thus ample powers in his revisional capacity to set aside the sale and hence his decision could not be set aside by the State Government on the view that an application under sub-para (4) did not lie.

    10. Apart from the fact that the notice under S. 91(2) had not been served on the petitioner it has also been found that there was non-compliance of R. 141(3) of the Rules. R. 141 lays down the procedure for application for sale and manner of the sale after the notice period under S. 91(2) has expired. The Land Development Bank to which loan is due, is to wait for three months from the date of service of notice under S. 91(2) and after considering any objections received to such notice, is to make an application to the Principal Officer for sale of the mortgaged property. The application made to the Principal Officer is to be in the prescribed form and is to contain the particulars required in R. 141(2) as also contain a report regarding the manner of service of notice under S. 91(2) of the Act. On receipt of such application, the Principal Officer is to give notice under R. 141(3) by registered post to all the persons named in the application regarding his intention to sale the property unless the amount is paid within a time to be allowed by him. The entire procedure is mandatory and does not admit of any exception. Since the sale is without intervention of the Court it must be construed that all the provisions are to be rigorously complied with and that if the successive stages of the procedure are violated, the sale would be invalid.

    11. In the result, the writ application must succeed and the order of the State Government in Annexure-4 is set aside and the order of the Registrar is restored. A writ of certiorari be issued accordingly. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 200/-.

    G.B Patnaik, J.:— 12. I agree.

    Petition allowed.

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    Comments

    Kela Gouda v. Krishna Panigrahi And Others
    (Mar 13, 1987)