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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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Acts
  • 1971 Orissa 127 that S. 4 of the partition Act
  • S. 4 of the partition Act. Defendants 6 and 7
  • S. 4 of the Partition Act, 1893,
  • S. 4 of the Partition Act.
  • S. 4, Partition Act.6.
  • S. 44 of the T.P Act.
  • S. 4. Partition Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • 1971 Orissa 127 that S. 4 of the partition Act
  • S. 4 of the partition Act. Defendants 6 and 7
  • S. 4 of the Partition Act, 1893,
  • S. 4 of the Partition Act.
  • S. 4, Partition Act.6.
  • S. 44 of the T.P Act.
  • S. 4. Partition Act
Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion — Second Appeal Concerning Partition and Section 4, Partition Act

Factual and Procedural Background

This is the plaintiffs' second appeal against a reversing judgment of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Balasore, which had dismissed their suit for partition. The original suit (Title Suit No. 60 of 1975) was filed by the appellants (plaintiffs) seeking partition of properties described in schedule 'Kha' of the plaint, allotment of half share in their favour with the remaining half share to defendants 4 and 5, and a decree to buy out the undivided dwelling house on plots Nos. 790 and 791 under Section 4 of the Partition Act.

The pleaded genealogy and material facts (as set out in the plaint) were: Debei Jena had four sons — Kurup and Budh (who died issueless), and Denei and Rudra who became owners in possession of the undivided homestead comprising plots 791 and 790 and paddy lands under plots 723 and 788. These plots were jointly recorded in the names of Ananta (son of Denei) and Rudra. After Rudra's death his share devolved upon his sons Bhagirathi (plaintiff 1) and Ratnakar (plaintiff 2), widow Kuturi Bewa (defendant 6) and daughter Michhei Dei (defendant 7). Defendants 6 and 7 relinquished their interest in favour of the plaintiffs, who thus claimed entitlement to half share. Ananta's share, after his death, devolved on his son Parsuram (defendant 1), widow Parbati (defendant 2) and daughter Nandi Dei (defendant 3). The plaintiffs alleged that Ananta had been forced to leave the village and that the joint family homestead and house thereafter remained in plaintiffs' possession.

The plaintiffs alleged that Aparti Rout (defendant 4), a stranger to the family, had trespassed into the homestead and constructed a shed, claiming to have purchased Ananta's share. Plaintiffs sought amicable partition and asked defendant 4 to sell his portion, but failing agreement they filed the suit. Defendant 5 was impleaded as he claimed to have purchased Ananta's half share in certain plots; he did not contest and was set ex parte. Defendants 1–3 filed a joint written statement (adopted by defendant 4) asserting that the homestead plots 790 and 791 had long been divided into northern and southern halves and separately possessed, that Ananta had executed a sale deed in favour of defendant 4 (dated 22-9-1972), and that therefore Section 4 of the Partition Act did not apply.

At trial the court framed several issues, the critical one being Issue No. 3: "Has there been a partition of homestead amongst the co-sharers?" The trial court analyzed the evidence and concluded that the defendants' evidence did not justify a finding of partition by metes and bounds; it held that the homestead with the dwelling house constituted an undivided dwelling house within the meaning of Section 4 of the Partition Act, decreed partition in favour of the plaintiffs, directed division of certain plots by metes and bounds and directed defendant 4 to execute a registered sale deed in favour of plaintiffs for the extent purchased by him from Ananta (or for the court to execute it on their behalf if defendant 4 failed to do so).

On appeal, the lower appellate court reversed the trial court's decree and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit, holding that separate possession of portions of the homestead by the brothers meant the homestead was not undivided and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief under Section 4 because the stranger transferee had not filed the suit and all necessary parties/transferees had not joined the suit in the required manner.

The present opinion is from this second appeal challenging the lower appellate court's interpretation of Section 4 of the Partition Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether there has been a partition of the homestead amongst co‑sharers (i.e., whether the homestead and dwelling house had been divided by metes and bounds) — the trial court's framed Issue No. 3.
  2. Whether Section 4 of the Partition Act applies to a suit for partition by a member of an undivided family against a stranger transferee even where family members have been in separate possession of parts of the dwelling house, and notwithstanding that the transferee has not filed the suit (i.e., whether the lower appellate court erred in limiting the scope of S. 4 because the transferee was not plaintiff or had not specifically claimed a share).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' (Appellants') Arguments

  • The homestead and house constituted an undivided dwelling house as contemplated by Section 4 of the Partition Act and thus the plaintiffs were entitled to relief under that provision.
  • After the relevant deaths and relinquishments, the plaintiffs were entitled to half share; possession of the dwelling house and homestead remained with them.
  • They sought to exercise the right to buy out the stranger transferee (defendant 4) under Section 4.

Defendants' (Respondents') Arguments

  • Defendants 1–3 contended that after the deaths of Kurup and Budhi, Denei and Rudra divided plots 790 and 791 into two halves and possessed them separately — northern half to Denei (and his heirs) and southern half to Rudra (and his heirs); there was even a demarcating green fence.
  • Ananta (Denei's son) purportedly offered his northern portion for sale to the plaintiffs, who declined, and subsequently executed a registered sale deed (dated 22-9-1972) in favour of defendant 4, delivering possession.
  • On this basis they asserted that the disputed homestead had been properly partitioned and therefore Section 4 of the Partition Act did not apply.
  • Defendants also argued at the appellate stage that because the transferee had not filed the suit and not all transferees had joined as plaintiffs, relief under Section 4 was not available in the present suit brought by one co‑sharer.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Subasha Devi v. Ananda Panda, (1971) 1 Cut WR 171 Interpreted "undivided family" in relation to a dwelling house to mean a family not divided qua the dwelling house, notwithstanding separations in mess, worship or other properties; destruction of ancestral house does not necessarily remove the character of the homestead for S.4. The court relied on this decision to support the proposition that separation in other respects or even physical changes does not by itself deprive a property of the character of an undivided dwelling house for the purposes of Section 4.
Alekha Mantri v. Jagabandhu Mantri, AIR 1971 Orissa 127 Holds that Section 4 applies to a suit for partition by a member of an undivided family against a stranger transferee, and it is not necessary that the transferee should have filed the suit or that the transferee should have specifically claimed a share in the residential house. The court cited this authority to reject the lower appellate court's requirement that the transferee must have filed the suit or claimed a share for S.4 to be applicable; it applied this reasoning to allow the plaintiffs' claim under Section 4.
Tejpal Khandelwal v. Purnima Bai, AIR 1976 Orissa 62 States that relief under S.4(1) is available to a member of an undivided family in a partition suit and is not confined to Hindu Mitakshara families — it extends to other religious communities; family may be severed in other properties but still be undivided qua dwelling house unless divided by metes and bounds. The court used this decision to reinforce that S.4 applies broadly to protect the family's interest in a dwelling house even if there has been separation in respect of other properties or in family arrangements.
Gulamrasool Sarfuddin Malek v. Dulhanbibi, AIR 1980 Guj 110 (Full Bench) After reviewing authorities, concluded S.4 permits a member of an undivided family to compel a stranger transferee to sell his share at valuation; this right can be availed of by a family member suing in partition even if the transferee is arrayed as defendant and does not claim separation. The court cited the Full Bench to support the proposition that a suit by a family member can invoke S.4 against a stranger transferee who is a defendant and that the transferee need not independently claim separation for the remedy to be available.
Harendra Nath Mukharjee v. Shyam Sunder Kuer & Others, AIR 1973 Pat 142 Interpreted "share" to include ascertained and unascertained shares; held S.4 applies where a specific portion has been transferred; an application under S.4 can be made at any stage and the family remains undivided qua dwelling house until possession is delivered in execution of a final decree. The court relied on this authority to support availability of S.4 remedies even where shares are unascertained and to emphasize temporal scope (maintainable at any stage until delivery of possession to the transferee pursuant to decree execution).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the object of Section 4 of the Partition Act: to enable family members to buy out stranger transferees of a share in the dwelling house so as to avoid inconvenience in the enjoyment of the homestead. The court observed that Section 4 is intended as an extension of the privilege under Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act and that the section must be given a liberal construction, though not beyond its terms.

The court reviewed binding and persuasive authorities (as summarized above) which established the following propositions: (a) an "undivided family" for the purposes of S.4 is concerned with whether the family is undivided qua the dwelling house (not necessarily qua other matters); (b) S.4 applies to suits by members of an undivided family against stranger transferees even if the transferee has not filed the suit or claimed a partition of the dwelling house; (c) S.4's protection extends irrespective of religion; and (d) the concept of "share" under S.4 can include ascertained and unascertained shares and an application under S.4 may be made at any stage until possession is delivered under a final decree.

Applying these principles to the facts, the court rejected the lower appellate court's approach that separate possession of parts of the homestead by different family branches necessarily destroyed the character of the dwelling house as undivided for the purposes of Section 4. The court treated the lower appellate court's conclusion as a misconstruction of the scope and import of Section 4: specifically, the appellate court erred in holding that S.4 was inapplicable because the stranger-purchaser had not filed the suit or because the parties alleged separate possession.

Given the precedents and the statutory purpose of S.4, the court held that the lower appellate court's reasoning was unsupportable and that the trial court's conclusion — that the homestead and dwelling house constituted an undivided dwelling house within the meaning of Section 4 and that the plaintiffs were entitled to relief — was correct.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The second appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court dismissing the plaintiffs' suit are set aside and the decision of the trial court is confirmed. Both parties will bear their respective costs in this appeal. (The opinion concludes with the notation: "Appeal allowed.")

Implications:

  • The direct effect is restoration of the trial court's decree in favour of the plaintiffs: the plaintiffs' entitlement to half share was upheld, certain plots are to be divided by metes and bounds as directed by the trial court, and defendant 4 was directed to execute the registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs (or for the court to do so on receipt of determined consideration).
  • The court's reasoning reaffirms previously decided authorities on the scope of Section 4 of the Partition Act — namely, that S.4 protects family members' rights to buy out stranger transferees even where there is separate possession of parts of the homestead or where the transferee has not been the plaintiff. The opinion applies and follows established precedents rather than announcing a new legal principle; no novel precedent is stated to have been created by this decision.

This summary is prepared strictly on the basis of the provided opinion text and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

    Bhagirathi Jena And Another v. Parsuram Jena And Others

    1. This is a plaintiffs' second appeal against the reversing judgment of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Balasore dismissing their suit for partition.

    The appellants filed the suit (Title Suit No. 60 of 1975) for partition of property described in schedule ‘Kha’ to the plaint and for allotment of half share in their favour and the other half share to defendants 4 and 5. They also prayed for buying out the undivided dwelling house situated on plot Nos. 790 and 791 under S. 4 of the Partition Act. The genealogy showing the relationship between the parties as given in the plaint is reproduced hereinbelow:—

    Of the four sons of the common ancestor Debei Jena, Kurup and Budh died issueless. Denei and Rudra, the other two sons of Debei became the owners in possession of the undivided homestead with the family dwelling house appertaining to plot No. 791 and the adjoining plot No. 790 forming a part of the said homestead, as well as the paddy lands under plots Nos. 723 and 788. Accordingly, these plots were jointly recorded in the names of Ananta, son of Denei and Rudra in the settlement record of rights. After the death of Rudra his share in the suit property was inherited by his sons, Bhagirathi (plaintiff 1) and Ratnakar (plaintiff 2), widow Kuturi Bewa (defendant 6) and daughter Michhei Dei (defendant 7). The said defendants 6 and 7 having relinquished their interest in the suit properties in favour of the plaintiffs, the latter are entitled to half share therein. After the death of Ananta, about five years prior to the suit, his share in the suit property devolved upon his son Parsuram (defendant 1), widow, Parbati (defendant 2), and daughter Nandi Dei (defendant 3). Due to his objectionable activities Ananta had been forced to leave the village with defendants 1, 2 and 4 for his father-in-law's place. Thus, the joint family homestead and the house standing thereafter remained in possession of the plaintiffs.

    2. Taking advantage of the absence of the plaintiffs from the village, Aparti Rout (defendant 4) a stranger to the family illegally trespassed upon the suit homestead and constructed a shed (Chalia) thereon giving out that he had purchased from Ananta his share in the suit homestead. According to the plaintiffs they requested defendants 1 to 4 for amicable partition of the suit property and requested defendant 4 to sell his portion of the suit-homestead on acceptance of due consideration from them. Since their request was not heeded to by the said defendants they filed the suit. Dukhishyam Mohanty (defendant 5) was impleaded in the suit as he claimed to have purchased Ananta's half share in the suit plots 728 and 788.

    The defendants 1 to 3 filed a joint written statement which was adopted by defendants 4 also. The gist of their case is that after the death of Kurup and Budhi, the other two brothers, Denei and Rudra became the owners in possession of the suit plots. They equally divided the suit plots 790 and 791 into two halves and possessed the land separately. In that division Denei was allotted northern half of the homestead plots 790 and 791 and Rudra was allotted southern half of the said plots. There was a demarcating green fence running from East to West of the said land. After the death of Denei while his son Ananta was in possession of northern half of the homestead plots, he requested the plaintiffs to purchase the same on payment of due consideration. But the plaintiffs declined the offer. Thereafter he executed, the sale deed in favour of the defendant 4 on 22-9-1972 as suggested by the plaintiffs and delivered possession to the purchaser. The defendants contended that the disputed homestead having been divided long since, the plaintiffs are not entitled to relief under S. 4 of the Partition Act. Defendants 6 and 7 filed written statement supporting the plaintiffs. Defendant 5 did not contest the suit and was set ex parte.

    3. Though the trial court framed several issues the most important and relevant one issue No. 3, was to the following effect:—

    “Has there been a partition of homestead amongst the co-sharers?”

    On analysis of the evidence produced before him the trial court recorded his finding on this issue in the following manner:

    “The evidence thus, adduced by the defendants, as discussed above, cannot possibly justify the conclusion regarding the alleged division or partition of the suit homestead, and as such, the irresistible conclusion that the suit homestead with the dwelling house of defendant 4 vender Ananta and all the plaintiffs standing thereon, shall be construed as the undivided dwelling house as contemplated under S. 4 of the partition Act, shall prevail.”

    Thus, he rejected the defendants' plea that there was a partition of the homestead and the dwelling house standing thereon by metes and bounds. Accordingly, the trial court decreed the suit preliminarily against the defendants. The plaintiffs were held to be entitled to half share in the suit property. Plots Nos. 723 and 788 were to be divided into two equal shares by metes and bounds, one half to be allotted to the plaintiffs and other half to the defendant 5. Defendant No. 4 was directed to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs in respect of the extent of land purchased by him from Ananta Jena under the registered sale deed dt. 22-9-1972 (Ext. A) on receipt of such consideration, as would be determined by the Civil Court Commissioner, failing which, the plaintiffs were to get such sale deed executed by the court in their favour. The entire suit homestead appertaining to plots 790 and 791 was directed to be allotted to the plaintiffs after execution of the sale deed.

    4. On appeal by Aparti (defendant 4) the lower appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the suit, holding that since the brothers were in separate possession of the homestead and the house standing therein, it could not be taken as the undivided family property and hence the suit for partition is not maintainable. The appellate court further held that as the suit has neither been filed by the transferees nor all the defendants in the suit filed by one of the co-sharers seek reliefs under S. 4, Partition Act, the plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief under the said provision in the present suit. Accordingly, the lower appellate court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit.

    5. The decision of the lower appellate court is challenged as being passed on misconception of the scope and import of S. 4, Partition Act.

    6. The object of S. 4, Partition Act is to enable members of a family to buy out stranger transferees from one of the members, who seeks partition of dwelling house. The legislative intention is to avoid inconvenience to members of family in enjoyment of homestead. The provision is only an extension of the privilege given under S. 44 of the T.P Act. The courts have consistently taken the view that the section has to be liberally construed, of course, not to an extent as to sacrifice its terms. The provision applies to every dwelling house share of which has been transferred to a person who is not a member of the undivided family to which the house belongs and is sought to be partitioned.

    This Court in the case of Subasha Devi v. Ananda Panda (1971) 1 Cut WR, 171, interpreted the expression “undivided family” to mean a family not divided qua the dwelling house irrespective of their having separated in mess and worship or even separated in respect of other properties. In the said decision it was further held that where the ancestral dwelling house was burnt down at some point of time and different huts were built by different branches on different portions of their homestead, the property still continues to possess the character and comes within the ambit of the expression “dwelling house”. The destruction of the ancestral house by itself was held not to be sufficient to detract from the homestead still continuing to possess the character of a dwelling house for the purpose of S. 4 of the Act.

    The Division Bench of this Court held in the case of Alekha Mantri v. Jagabandhu Mantri, AIR 1971 Orissa 127 that S. 4 of the partition Act applies to a suit for partition by a member of undivided family against stranger transferee and it is not necessary that the transferee should have filed the suit or being the defendant he should have specifically claimed share in residential house.

    This position was reiterated in the case of Tejpal Khandelwal v. Purnima Bai AIR 1976 Orissa 62 where a Division Bench of this court held that the relief under S. 4(1) of the Act is not restricted to suit by stranger transferee and is available to be claimed by plaintiff in a suit for partition by a member of undivided family. The Court further held that applicability of S. 4 is not confined to a Hindu Mitakshara family. It extends to Mahommodan, Christian and other families as well. The family members might have divided their other properties by metes and bounds or there might be severance of joint status amongst them, but the family would still be treated as undivided in respect of the dwelling house if the same has not been divided amongst them by metes and bounds.

    A similar view has be taken by a Full Bench of the Gujarat High court in the case of Gulamrasool Sarfuddin Malek v. Dulhanbibi AIR 1980 Guj 110 wherein after discussing various authorities on the point including the case of Alekha Mantri v. Jagabandhu Mantri, AIR 1971 Orissa 127 (Supra) the Court summed up its conclusion as follows:—

    “On a true interpretation of S. 4 of the partition Act, 1893, we hold that the right conferred thereunder to compel a transferee of a share of a member of an undivided family in a dwelling house when such a transferee is not himself a member of the family, to sell his share at a valuation, can be availed of by a member of the undivided family having a share in the said dwelling house irrespective of whether the suit has been instituted by such transferee as a plaintiff. The right can be availed of even if the suit has been instituted by a member of the undivided family as plaintiff and the stranger transferee is arrayed as a defendant, and even if such stranger transferee does not in terms claim the separation of his share in the property.”

    The Patna High Court in the case of Harendra Nath Mukharjee… v. Shyam Sunder Kuer & Others… AIR 1973 Pat 142 interpreted the term “share” to include both ascertained and unascertained share and held that S. 4 applies also to a case where specific portion of a dwelling house has been transferred to a stranger. The court further held that an application under S. 4 can be made at any stage of the suit and the family continues to be undivided qua dwelling house till possession is delivered to the members of the family in execution of the final decree for partition and as such, the application under S. 4 is maintainable after passing of the final decree and before the possession of the dwelling house in question is delivered to the stranger transferee.

    7. In view of the principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions it cannot but be held that the lower appellate court erred in taking the view that since the parties have come with a case that the members of the family have been in possession of separate portions of the dwelling house and since the stranger-purchaser has neither filed the suit nor claimed a share therein though impleaded as a defendant, S. 4. Partition Act has no application to the case. As such the decision of the lower appellate court is unsupportable and has to be vacated.

    8. In the result, the second appeal succeeds and the same is allowed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court dismissing the plaintiff's suit is set aside and the decision of the trial court is confirmed. Both parties will bear their respective costs in this appeal.

    Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    Bhagirathi Jena And Another v. Parsuram Jena And Others
    (Oct 22, 1984)