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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs are the heirs of one Gokarla Kamaya, the admitted owner of the suit property. It is pleaded that in or about 1942 Kamaya mortgaged 37 decimals (37 cents) of land to defendant No. 1 to secure a loan of Rs. 100 by way of an alleged usufructuary mortgage and that possession of the mortgaged land was delivered to defendant No. 1. The arrangement was said to permit the mortgagee to enjoy the usufructs until the loan was repaid, and the mortgagee alone was to pay land revenue.

In 1962 plaintiff No. 1 purportedly offered repayment and demanded release of the land and delivery of possession; the demand was refused and the present suit for redemption of the mortgage and for mesne profits was filed. Defendant No. 1 alone contested, denying the mortgage and pleading that the land had been sold by Kamaya roughly 25 years earlier by an oral sale and that the defendant had been in possession as owner. Defendant No. 2 did not appear and was ex parte.

The learned Subordinate Judge, Berhampur, found that a mortgage had been created and further held that, because defendant No. 1 had remained in possession for more than 15 years, Section 17 of the Orissa Money Lenders Act operated to discharge the possessory mortgage; accordingly the trial court decreed the suit. The lower Appellate Court affirmed the decree on reassessment. Defendant No. 1 appealed to the court in the present opinion. The appeal was allowed, the judgments below were vacated, and the suit was dismissed with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a suit for redemption of a mortgage for Rs. 100 or upwards is maintainable when the alleged mortgage is oral and there is no registered instrument as required by Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  2. Whether Section 17 of the Orissa Money Lenders Act, which deems possessory mortgages discharged after fifteen years from the date of the mortgage, can be applied to an oral (unregistered) usufructuary mortgage where no written execution (signed and attested instrument) exists.
  3. Whether, on the facts, the defendant's possession was that of a purchaser asserting title (as pleaded by the defendant) or only that of a usufructuary mortgagee (as alleged by the plaintiffs), and the legal consequences of that factual determination for relief of redemption or possession by the plaintiffs.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant No. 1 (Appellant) — Mr. Murty

  • Primary contention: Because the principal money secured was Rs. 100, Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act required the mortgage (other than a deposit of title deeds) to be effected by a registered instrument signed by the mortgagor and attested by at least two witnesses; no such registered instrument ever existed, so a suit for redemption is not maintainable.
  • Contended that the courts below erred in applying Section 17 of the Orissa Money Lenders Act. Emphasis was placed on the word “executed” in Section 17: where the mortgage is oral there is no execution (i.e., the signing and attesting culminating in a completed mortgage deed), and therefore s. 17 cannot apply to an oral mortgage.
  • Factually, defendant No. 1 pleaded that the land was sold (an oral sale) to defendant's father 25 years prior, and that the family have been in open enjoyment as purchasers and not as mortgagees.

P laintiffs (Respondents) — Mr. Rath

  • Contended that even if the alleged mortgage might be illegal (or unregistered), the plaintiffs were nevertheless entitled to seek redemption because defendant No. 1's possession was that of a mortgagee; relied on the decision of this Court in Purusottam Das v. S.M. Desouza (ILR (1950) Cut 50 : AIR 1950 Orissa 213) to support the proposition that a mortgagee in possession may be treated as such for purposes of relief.
  • Pleadings averred an oral usufructuary mortgage from 1942 whereby possession was delivered to defendant No. 1 and usufructs were to be applied to liquidation of the loan.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ma Htwe v. Maung Lun, AIR 1917 Low Bur 128 (Full Bench) Authority holding that when statute (Transfer of Property Act) requires written/registered form for mortgages above Rs.100, oral evidence cannot establish such a mortgage for purposes of redemption. Quoted as earliest comparable authority supporting the proposition that redemption cannot be granted on the basis of an oral mortgage where registration is statutorily required.
Maung San Min v. Maung Po Hlaing, AIR 1925 Rang 291 (Full Bench) Held that oral evidence is not admissible to prove a mortgage of Rs.100 or upwards where the Transfer of Property Act prescribes registration; contrasted with sale where different principles apply. Relied on to reinforce the view that different rules govern proof of sale and proof of mortgage and that oral proof of a mortgage barred by statute is inadmissible.
Ma Kvi v. Maung Thon, AIR 1935 Rang 230 (Full Bench) Addressed whether owner can recover possession without payment when usufructuary mortgage invalid for want of registered document. Cited for the proposition (affirming previous authorities) that relief cannot be given to a plaintiff seeking redemption where the mortgage is invalid for lack of registration.
Ariff's case, 58 Ind App 91 : AIR 1931 PC 79 (Privy Council) Principle that statutory requirements (for creation of interests in land) cannot be circumvented by applying equitable doctrines such as part-performance to create an interest the statute requires to be created by writing/registration. Quoted and applied to reject the contention that admissions or doctrines of part performance can validate an oral mortgage contrary to statutory requisites.
Maung Lu Pe v. Maung San Mya, AIR 1940 Rang 11 Further Rangoon High Court authority holding that a plaintiff suing to redeem on similar facts was bound to fail where mortgage unregistered. Used as further support for the consistent line of authority disallowing redemption based on oral mortgages where statute required registration.
Ningappa Awwappa v. Danappa Sharnanna, AIR 1947 Bom 206 Held that where usufructuary mortgage for more than Rs.100 is not registered, owner cannot sue for redemption; owner may treat mortgagee as trespasser and evict without repaying the loan. Referred to as Indian High Court authority in the same stream holding oral/unregistered mortgages cannot support redemption relief.
Bishun Singh v. Sheodhari Das, AIR 1947 Pat 110 Demonstrated that even when mortgagee in possession admits the transaction, admission alone does not create a mortgage contrary to the statutory requirement of registration (citing Privy Council authority). Cited for the proposition that admission by the defendant is insufficient to create a mortgage the statute prohibits; supports rejection of oral mortgage for redemption.
Kameswar Prasad Singh v. Meghan Garain, AIR 1951 Pat 137 (Full Bench) Held that a plaintiff should not be granted decree for redemption where defendants continued in possession asserting themselves as mortgagees for period required by statute (implying statutory limits and formalities govern). Quoted to show judicial reluctance to decree redemption where statutory formalities for mortgage creation are not complied with.
Sonua Kumhar v. Chamtu Pahan, AIR 1953 Pat 134 Considered oral usufructuary mortgage for sum above Rs.100 as void and held that mortgagee's possession was not legal; debtor's suit for recovery of possession was not tenable. Referred to as support for the conclusion that oral usufructuary mortgages above the statutory threshold are void for this purpose.
Purusottam Das v. S.M. Desouza, ILR (1950) Cut 50 : AIR 1950 Orissa 213 Division Bench decision holding that where defendants admitted they occupied by arrangement as mortgagees and unregistered documents were admissible to show nature of possession, different result followed from cases denying relief on oral mortgage. Discussed and distinguished by the court: plaintiffs relied on it, but the Court found its facts materially different because there defendants admitted mortgage and did not assert title other than as mortgagees.
Sk. Bhukhan Mian v. Smt. Radhika Kumari Debi, AIR 1938 Pat 479 Mentioned as authority that was disagreed with in Purusottam Das; concerned admissibility and effect of unregistered mortgage documents. Referenced as background to the Division Bench's approach in Purusottam Das, but the court in the present case distinguished Purusottam Das and did not adopt the contrary approach.
Sheobalak Misra v. Suraj Prasad, 18 Cut LT 362 : AIR 1953 Orissa 17 Interpreted the term “executed” in Section 17 of the Orissa Money Lenders Act to mean a mortgage completed by signing and attestation (i.e., written/registered form); held s. 17 applies only to usufructuary mortgages created by writing. Adopted by the court to hold that Section 17 of the Orissa Money Lenders Act does not apply to oral mortgages and therefore the lower courts erred in relying on s. 17 to decree redemption.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured way. It began by examining the pleadings: the plaint alleged an oral usufructuary mortgage of Rs.100 in 1942 with delivery of possession to the mortgagee; the written statement denied a mortgage and asserted an oral sale and title by purchase with long open enjoyment by defendant's family.

The Court identified the central legal precept in Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act which prescribes that where the principal money secured is Rs.100 or upwards, a mortgage (other than by deposit of title deeds) can be effected only by a registered instrument signed by the mortgagor and attested by at least two witnesses. The Court accepted the submission that where a statute prescribes a particular mode (registration and execution) for creation of a property interest, that requirement cannot be bypassed by oral proof or equitable doctrines.

The Court surveyed a body of authority—starting with Rangoon High Court Full Bench decisions (Ma Htwe, Maung San Min, Ma Kvi, Maung Lu Pe), the Privy Council decision in Ariff's case (58 Ind App 91 : AIR 1931 PC 79) and multiple Indian High Court decisions (including Bombay, Patna and Orissa decisions). These authorities consistently held that redemption cannot be granted on the basis of an oral usufructuary mortgage where the Transfer of Property Act requires a registered instrument, and that statutory formalities cannot be evaded by admissions or by invoking equitable doctrines such as part performance.

The Court examined the plaintiffs' reliance on the Orissa decision in Purusottam Das v. S.M. Desouza and explained that the facts there were materially different: in Desouza the defendants had admitted that their occupation was under an arrangement as alleged by the plaintiffs and had not asserted a title other than that of mortgagees; unregistered documents were relied upon to show the nature of possession. In contrast, in the present case defendant No. 1 pleaded title by purchase and open enjoyment as purchaser. On these facts the Court found Desouza inapplicable.

The Court further considered the application of Section 17 of the Orissa Money Lenders Act, which deems possessory mortgages discharged after fifteen years. The court relied on the Division Bench decision in Sheobalak Misra v. Suraj Prasad interpreting “executed” in Section 17 to mean a mortgage that has been properly completed by signing and attestation; on its plain reading Section 17 presupposes a written/constituted mortgage. Consequently the Court concluded that Section 17 cannot be invoked in respect of an oral (unregistered) mortgage.

Combining these points, the Court concluded: (a) a suit for redemption based on an oral usufructuary mortgage for Rs.100 or more is not maintainable because statutory formalities under Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act were not satisfied; and (b) Section 17 of the Orissa Money Lenders Act does not apply to oral mortgages and therefore the lower courts were wrong to treat the alleged mortgage as having been discharged under that provision after 15 years.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed. The judgments and decree of the courts below are vacated and the suit for redemption is dismissed with costs throughout.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiffs' suit for redemption fails; the decree of the trial court and the lower appellate court is set aside and the suit is dismissed with costs.
  • Statutory interpretation: The Court reaffirmed the principle that statutory formalities under Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act are mandatory for mortgages of Rs.100 or more and cannot be bypassed by oral evidence or admissions; and that the deeming provision in Section 17 of the Orissa Money Lenders Act applies only to mortgages that are “executed” (i.e., completed in the written and attested form contemplated by law), not to oral mortgages.
  • Precedential effect: The decision applies existing lines of authority to the facts of this case and distinguishes a contrary Orissa precedent on its facts; the opinion does not claim to create a new principle beyond applying and reconciling earlier authorities.

    Boddu Ramulu v. Gokarla Ramaswamy And Others

    1. The defendant No. 1 has come in appeal against a confirming judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge, Berhampur in a suit for redemption of mortgage and for mesne profits.

    2. One Kamaya was the admitted owner of the property in suit. The plaintiffs are his heirs. The genealogy appended below would show the relationship of the plaintiffs inter se and their relationship with Kamaya.

    3. In 1942 Kamaya is alleged to have mortgaged the suit property measuring 37 decimals, to defendant No. 1 to secure a loan of Rs. 100/-. The mortgage is said to be usufructuary and it was stipulated that the usufructs should be enjoyed for liquidation of the loan and the cist had to be paid out of it. It is alleged that in 1962, plaintiff No. 1 offered repayment of the loan and demanded release of the land and delivery of possession. It was refused and thereupon the suit has been filed. The defendant No. 1 alone contested. According to him, the land was sold by Kamaya about 25 years back under an oral sale and possession was conveyed. Plaintiffs have absolutely no interest and the defendant No. 1 has been in possession as full owner for about 25 years. The defendant No. 2 did not enter appearance and became ex parte.

    4. The learned trial Judge found that the suit property was mortgaged by Kamaya to defendant No. 1 and he further found that as the defendant No. 1 was in possession for more than 15 years, under the provisions of Section 17 of the Orissa Money Lenders Act, the mortgage must be taken to have been satisfied. He therefore, decreed the suit.

    5. The lower Appellate Court on a reassessment of the materials, affirmed the decree. It is against this concurrent judgment of the lower Appellate Court that the second appeal has now been filed.

    6. Mr. Murty, learned counsel for the defendant No. 1-appellant, raises one single question, namely, that the principal money accrued being Rs. 100/-, the mortgage would have been effected only by a registered instrument signed by the mortgagor and attested at least by two witnesses and since no such document has never been executed, a suit for redemption is not maintainable.

    7. Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act prescribes:—

    “Where the principal money secured is one hundred rupees or upwards, a mortgage other than a mortgage by deposit of title deeds can be effected only by a registered instrument signed by the mortgagor and attested by at least two witnesses.

    Where the principal money secured is less than one hundred rupees, a mortgage may be effected either by a registered instrument signed and attested as aforesaid, or (except in case of a simple mortgage) by delivery of the property.”

    8. The contention raised by Mr. Murty is to the effect that if a statute prescribed a particular act to be done in a specified way, that act cannot be done in any other way and yet avail in law. Before examining the legal aspect, it would be proper to refer to the respective cases made out in the pleadings. In paragraph 2 of the plaint, it is averred as follows:

    “(2) Late Gokarla Kamayya had acquired some landed properties during his lifetime and he was in khas possession of the same for some period. That in or about 1942, the said Kamayya had mortgaged with possession about 37 cents of his land to the Defendant No. 1 for a sum of Rs. 100/- and delivered possession of the mortgaged property to him.

    (3) The understanding between late Gokarla Kamayya and the defendant No. 1 was that the latter should enjoy the usufruct of the suit property till the principal amount of Rs. 100/- is paid back and that the latter alone should pay the rent that is land revenue, due to the then Zamindar of Parlakimedi.”

    9. The defendant No. 1 in his written statement stated:

    3. The recitals in para 3 of the plaint are wholly incorrect and false. It is not true to say that late Kamayya mortgaged the land with possession to this defendant; the lands were sold to this defendant's father by late Gokarla Kamayya for himself and his sons more than 25 years ago, since the lands are in enjoyment of the family of the defendant No. 1 in their own right. The 1st defendant's family thus remained in open enjoyment as purchasers and not as mortgagees; the lands are dry lands; field ridges were erected by this defendant's father and mother, the assessment for these lands is paid by this defendant and his father before him in their right as purchasers and not as mortgagees. These lands were selling for at Rs. 2/- to Rs. 3/- per cent then; the money paid was the sale price. The plaintiffs have now come forward with this false claim the value of the lands having risen up since.”

    10. The point for examination is as to whether in view of the legal provisions, it is open to the plaintiffs to sue for redemption on the basis of an oral? mortgage. Such a question has become the subject-matter of judicial consideration in several cases and as it appears, courts in this country have taken the view that redemption cannot be granted on the basis of an oral mortgage. The earliest case in point of time that could be noticed is the case of Ma Htwe v. Maung Lun, AIR 1917 Low Bur 128 (FB). The facts of the case as are available from the order of Reference of Fox, C.J, are almost similar to the facts of the present case. For convenience, I proceed to extract the facts of that case here:

    “This is one of numerous cases in which a plaintiff sues a defendant in possession seeking to redeem land on the ground of its having been mortgaged only and the defendant resists the suit on the ground that the land had been sold out right to him. The transaction took place long after Sections 54 and 59 of the Transfer of Property Act had been brought into force in lower Burma. The amount advanced on mortgage or according to the defendant's version of the transaction the price paid was Rs. 150/-. No instrument in writing embodying the terms of the transaction was executed and registered; consequently the plaintiff could not prove the mortgage nor could the defendant prove a sale to him.”

    11. Mr. Fox, C.J referred the following question to the Full Bench:

    “In a suit for redemption in which the defendant denies the mortgage alleged by the plaintiff and sets up a sale to him, can the plaintiff recover possession when by reason of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act the plaintiff cannot prove the mortgage sued on and the defendant cannot prove the sale relied on by him.”

    12. The Full Bench held that relief could not be given. The same point again came up for consideration before another Full Bench of the same High Court in the case of Maung San Min v. Maung Po Hlaing, AIR 1925 Rang 291. The question that the Full Bench was called upon to answer was:

    “When a plaintiff alleges that possession of immoveable property has been given to the defendant as security for a loan of Rs. 100/- or upwards, but without the execution of any registered instrument, is oral evidence admissible to prove the transaction.”

    13. While giving the answer to the said question, Robinson, C.J indicated:

    “The reason why different principles apply to the admissibility of evidence to prove a contract to mortgage and a contract to sell is that in the latter the defendant is entitled to claim specific performance and in former case, he is not the answer to the question referred is in the negative………”.

    14. A similar question again came before another Full Bench of the Rangoon High Court in the case of Ma Kvi v. Maung Thon, AIR 1935 Rang 230 (FB):

    “Where a person has been put into possession of land as usufructuary mortgagee, and the mortgage is invalid for want of a registered document, is the true owner of the land in a suit for possession entitled to recover possession without payment of the amount of the debt?”

    15. Page, C.J speaking for the Court quoted with approval Lord Russell in 58 Ind App 91 - (AIR 1931 PC 79):

    “……… an English equitable doctrine affecting the provisions of an English statute relating to the right to sue upon a contract, should be applied by analogy to such a statute as the Transfer of Property Act and with such a result as to create without any writing an interest which the statute says can only be created by means of a registered instrument, appears to their Lordships, in the absence of some binding authority to that effect to be impossible………”.

    16. And proceeded to conclude that relief could not be given to the plaintiff. It appears, this type of disputes have been frequent in Burma and a similar matter again came up for consideration before another Full Bench of the Rangoon High Court in the case of Maung Lu Pe v. Maung San Mya, AIR 1940 Rang 11. Roberts, C.J speaking for the Court held that the plaintiff who sued for redemption in similar circumstances was bound to lose.

    17. This question has also come up before many other High Courts in India. Mr. Justice Lokur, in the case of Ningappa Awwappa v. Danappa Sharnanna. AIR 1947 Bom 206 followed the cases of the Rangoon High Court referred to above and held that where a usufructuary mortgage for more than Rs. 100/- is not registered, the owners of the land cannot file a suit for redemption. But they may be entitled to treat the mortgagee as a trespasser and evict him without repaying the loans advanced by him.

    18. An interesting case came up before a single Judge of the Patna High Court in the case of Bishun Singh v. Sheodhari Das, AIR 1947 Pat 110. That was a case where the mortgagee in possession under an oral mortgage for a consideration of over Rs. 100/- as the defendant in the suit admitted the transaction. Yet Agarwala, J. held:

    “The suit is in effect one to redeem the oral mortgage. It is necessary, therefore, for the plaintiffs to establish that they are mortgagors and that they are entitled to redeem ……… If an admission is sufficient to create a mortgage then this admission must have that result. But since the decision of the Privy Council in Ariff's case, 58 Ind App 91 : (AIR 1931 PC 79) that the requirements of a statute cannot be got over by application of the doctrine of part performance, it is idle to contend that the requirements of Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act, can be evaded in this way. Section 59 declares that a mortgage for a consideration of Rs. 100/- or more must be by a registered instrument. Admittedly, in this case, there was no instrument either registered or otherwise. There could, therefore, be no mortgage and the defendant's admission is insufficient to create what the statute prevents………”.

    19. In the case of Kameswar Prasad Singh v. Meghan Garain, AIR 1951 Pat 137 (FB), Mr. Ramaswami, J. (as he then was), speaking for the Court held:

    “……. I am of opinion that the plaintiff in the present case ought not to be granted a decree for redemption on the ground that the defendants continued in possession of the land asserting themselves to be mortgagees for the period required by the statute………”.

    20. Chief Justice Jha, in the case of Sonua Kumhar v. Chamtu Pahan. AIR 1953 Pat 134 considered a case of an oral usufructuary mortgage for a sum of above Rs. 100/- as void and possession of the creditor was held not to be legal and the mortgagee was not given the relief of redemption on the basis that a debtor's suit for recovery of possession was not tenable.

    21. The weight of authority seems to be in support of the proposition that on the basis of an oral mortgage, a suit for redemption is not maintainable.

    22. Mr. Rath, learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents contends that even on the footing that the mortgage is illegal the plaintiffs are entitled to ask for redemption as the possession of the defendant No. 1 would be only that of a mortgagee. He seeks support for his proposition from the decision of this Court in the case of Purusottam Das v. S.M Desouza, ILR (1950) Cut 50 : (AIR 1950 Orissa 213). The Division Bench of this Court in the said decision did not agree with the principle laid down in the case of Sk. Bhukhan Mian v. Smt. Radhika Kumari Debi, AIR 1938 Pat 479 and held that in that case the creditor who was in possession of the property given as security prescribed only a limited interest of a mortgagee after lapse of 12 years as in the absence of registration the mortgage bond was not admissible and the mortgage document did not create any interest in immoveable property.

    23. The facts of that case, however, are very different from the present case. In the reported decision, the mortgagee-defendant accepted the plaintiffs (mortgagor's) plea of possession having been parted with under a mortgage. At several places in the judgment, this aspect was emphasised. For instance, it was indicated:

    “The case of the defendants is that between the years 1927 and 1930, the father of plaintiffs Nos. 2 to 4 borrowed from time to time various sums of money aggregating to Rs. 1,061-12-0 from defendant No. 2 on the security of the suit lands; that the plaintiffs are fully aware of the said mortgages and of the possession of the defendants for over twelve years………”.

    “There can be no doubt on these pleadings that the defendants themselves have admitted that they have got into occupation by an arrangement as alleged by the plaintiffs in their plaint, and that they set out the details of that arrangement as alleged by the plaintiffs in their plaint in paragraph 3 of their written statement by referring to the borrowing from 1927 to 1930 on security — the mortgages, exhibits 2 to 2-E being of dates ranging from 1927 to 1930………… Exhibits 2 to 2-E though unregistered, are admissible to show the nature of the possession and there is no evidence at all to show that the defendants were at any time asserting that they were holding possession on any title other than as mortgagees.”

    24. In the present case, however, as has already been indicated earlier, the defence plea was categorically the case of purchase and possession on the basis of title. To the facts of such a case now under examination, the principle in Desouza's case, ILR (1950) Cut 50 : (AIR 1950 Orissa 213) cannot be applied and on the facts, it is difficult to uphold the contention of Mr. Rath that the defendant No. 1 prescribed an interest of a usufructuary mortgagee only. I would, therefore, hold that a suit for redemption on the basis of an oral mortgage is not maintainable and in the facts of the present case, it cannot be held that the defendant No. 1 prescribed to the limited interest of a mortgagee. The plaintiffs are therefore, not entitled either to redemption nor could they have been entitled to the relief of possession on the basis of their anterior title in view of the fact that the suit has been brought more than 12 years after possession was parted in favour of the defendant No. 1.

    25. Mr. Murty contends that the provisions of Section 17 of the Orissa Money Lenders Act cannot be applied to the facts of the present case as has been done by the courts below and relief for redemption should not have been granted merely on the basis that 15 years from the date of mortgage had already elapsed. Section 17 of the Orissa Money Lenders Act reads thus:—

    “17. Discharge of possessory mortgages: (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or anything having the force of law or in any contract, any possessory mortgage, which is executed either before or after the commencement of this Act, shall, unless discharged previously, be deemed to stand discharged after the expiration of fifteen years from the date of the mortgage and the mortgagee shall deliver up to the mortgagor all documents in his possession or power relating to the mortgaged property and shall, if so required, retransfer the property to the mortgagor at his cost free from the mortgage and from all encumbrances created by him or those claiming under him and shall put the mortgagor in possession of the property.”

    26. Emphasis is laid on the word “executed” and Mr. Murty contends that in the present case where the mortgage is said to be oral there is no execution of any mortgage and therefore, sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Orissa Money Lenders Act cannot be applied. Such a matter came up for decision before this Court in the case of Sheobalak Misra v. Suraj Prasad, 18 Cut LT 362 : (AIR 1953 Orissa 17) Panigrahi, J. (as he then was), speaking for the Division Bench stated:

    “That takes us to the question as to whether such a mortgage could be created orally, as seems to have happened in the case before us, and yet would be governed by the provisions of the Orissa Money Lenders Act. Section 17 of the Act expressly makes reference to a mortgage which is ‘executed’. “Execute” in legal parlance means to go through the forms necessary for the validity of a mortgage. It assumes that the mortgage should have been properly signed and attested. “Executed” literally means “completed” and in reference to a mortgage includes the act or series of acts culminating in the completion of the signing, attesting and delivery of the mortgage deed.

    Now, Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that where the principal money secured is Rs. 100/- or upwards, a mortgage can be effected only by a registered document signed by the mortgagor and attested by at least two witnesses. As soon as the signing by the mortgagor and the attesting by the witnesses is completed, the mortgage may be said to have been “executed”. It presupposes that the person who derives a benefit or incurs an obligation under the instrument should have signed or caused his signature to be put on it…………… On a plain reading of Sec. 17, therefore, I am inclined to hold that it applies only to cases of usufructuary mortgage created by writing.”

    27. As such on the aforesaid authority, it would necessarily follow that the benefit of Section 17 of the Money Lenders Act cannot be given in the case of an oral mortgage.

    28. On the aforesaid analysis I would hold that the plaintiff's suit for redemption was not maintainable and the courts below acted contrary to law in decreeing the suit for redemption on the basis that the defendant No. 1 had been put in possession in 1942 under a usufructuary mortgage. I would add that provisions of Section 17 of the Orissa, Money Lenders Act also did not apply to an oral mortgage.

    29. The appeal is allowed.

    30. The Judgment and decree of the courts below are vacated and the suit is ordered to be dismissed with costs throughout.

    31. Appeal allowed.

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    Boddu Ramulu v. Gokarla Ramaswamy And Others
    (Dec 3, 1969)