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  • provisions in section 2(2) and section 97. O. 20 R. 18(2)
  • Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. XIV of 1882)
  • Section 396 (equal to O. 26, Rr. 13 and 14.)
  • section 151 and O. 1. R. 10 of the CPC
  • section 2(2) of the present Code (Act
  • decree.7. Section 2(2) of the CPC
  • parties.9. Section 32
  • INDIAN STAMP ACT
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions in section 2(2) and section 97. O. 20 R. 18(2)
  • Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. XIV of 1882)
  • Section 396 (equal to O. 26, Rr. 13 and 14.)
  • section 151 and O. 1. R. 10 of the CPC
  • section 2(2) of the present Code (Act
  • decree.7. Section 2(2) of the CPC
  • parties.9. Section 32
  • INDIAN STAMP ACT
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from Civil Revision challenging an order of the trial court refusing to implead certain persons as parties to a partition suit. Title Suit No. 197 of 1956 was filed by the plaintiff in the Court of the Munsif, Second Court, Cuttack on 5-10-1956 for partition. The plaintiff's title was said to be based on a purchase of an eight-pies interest of Madhusudhan Das on 5-10-1955 and a court auction on 7-5-1956 involving Surendranath Sur and others (defendants 19(a) to (f)).

A preliminary decree in the suit was passed ex parte on 4-11-1958. The petitioners (nos. 1–3) claimed specific shares (two annas eleven pies and one Biswa) in the suit properties under three registered sale deeds executed in favour of the deceased wife of petitioner No. 1 dated 30-5-1947, 1-1-1949 and 3-1-1949. Because the tenure vested in the State of Orissa, there was a dispute about compensation. The petitioners' sale deeds and the preliminary decree were produced before the Compensation Officer; the Board of Revenue passed an order on 17-8-1963 upholding the petitioners' claim to compensation (but the plaintiff obtained compensation only in respect of seven pies interest).

On 6-4-1964 the plaintiff and the defendants filed a compromise petition in the suit. On 28-4-1964 the petitioners filed an application under section 151 and Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) praying to be impleaded as parties. That application was rejected by the trial court on 15-5-1964. The present Civil Revision challenges the rejection. Counsel for the petitioners (Mr. Misra) contended that the trial court failed to exercise jurisdiction or exercised it illegally and with material irregularity in refusing to allow impleadment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the presence of the petitioners is necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit.
  2. If the petitioners are necessary parties, whether they can be impleaded as defendants after the preliminary decree has been passed.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
ILR 32 Cal 483 (Jotindra Mohan Tagore v. Bejoy Chand Mahatap) Authority for allowing impleadment under Order I Rule 10 even after certain interlocutory orders, on the basis that the suit has not terminated until the decree is engrossed and signed; reliance on the breadth of power to add parties "at any time." The Court held this decision was correctly decided under the Old Code but observed it was inapplicable to situations governed by the New Code where preliminary decrees now have finality for the rights they determine. The Calcutta decision was therefore wrongly applied to cases after preliminary decrees under the present Code.
AIR 1942 Pat 185 Cited (as following ILR 32 Cal 483) for the proposition that parties may be added under Order I Rule 10 after interlocutory orders. The Court said this Patna decision had followed the Calcutta view but concluded it was wrongly decided when applied to cases governed by the New Code's provisions on preliminary decrees.
AIR 1964 Andhra Pradesh 260 Followed the Calcutta reasoning permitting addition after interlocutory orders/preliminary stages. The Court held this decision (along with AIR 1942 Pat 185) had failed to keep in view the changes of the New Code and was contrary to the correct legal position as expressed under the present Code and later authority.
ILR 25 Mad 244 (277) (Full Bench) Explains position under the Old Code: there was no provision for a preliminary decree in partition suits; the usual practice was an interlocutory order and then a single final decree. Used to illustrate that ILR 32 Cal 483 was correct under the Old Code facts, because under the Old Code those interlocutory orders were not "preliminary decrees" as conceived under the New Code.
AIR 1923 Mad 147 Reinforces that under the Old Code interlocutory orders ascertaining rights were treated in practice as decrees but were not "preliminary decrees" in the modern sense. Invoked to show that the Calcutta decision was consistent with Old Code practice, but that historical position does not control under the New Code.
AIR 1916 Nag 120 Held that the power under Order I Rule 10 ordinarily can be exercised only in proceedings not concluded by a decree unless the person to be added is a subsequent transferee. Identified by the Court as representing the correct view under the present Code: addition after a preliminary decree is ordinarily impermissible except for certain exceptions (e.g., subsequent transferees or heirs).
AIR 1924 Oudh 33 Same principle as AIR 1916 Nag 120 regarding limitation on addition of parties after decree. Relied upon as part of a line of authority supporting the proposition that preliminary decrees cannot ordinarily be reopened to add parties.
AIR 1935 Nag 64 Affirmed the position that preliminary decrees should not be reopened to add parties, except in limited circumstances. Counted among decisions taking the "correct view" that additions after preliminary decree are generally impermissible.
AIR 1963 SC 992 Supreme Court authority on the effect and finality of a preliminary decree under the New Code: a preliminary decree is conclusive in respect of the matters dealt with and has finality attached to it. The Court treated this decision as authoritative and dispositive of the legal position under the New Code, supporting the conclusion that preliminary decrees are final in respect of the rights they adjudicate and therefore cannot be reopened to add parties save in exceptional circumstances.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured fashion:

  1. Necessity of petitioners as parties: The petitioners claim specific shares in the disputed property as co-sharers under three registered sale deeds. The Court found that, because they claim an interest which could be affected by the suit's outcome and would not be bound by the result unless made parties, their presence is necessary to enable the Court to effectually and completely adjudicate the issues of share and partition.
  2. Legal scope of Order I Rule 10(2): The Court acknowledged that Order I Rule 10(2) gives wide power to add parties "at any stage" where necessary to adjudicate all questions involved in the suit. The pivotal issue was whether "any stage" includes a stage after a preliminary decree has been passed.
  3. Statutory definitions and legislative changes: The judgment examined the New Code's additions — notably section 2(2) (defining "decree" and introducing the concept of preliminary and final decrees), section 97 (precluding contest of an unappealed preliminary decree in the final decree appeal), and the new Order XX Rule 18(2) (permitting preliminary decrees in certain partition cases). These statutory changes placed greater finality on rights declared by a preliminary decree than existed under the Old Code.
  4. Distinction from Old Code authorities: The Court analyzed earlier decisions (notably ILR 32 Cal 483 and related cases) that permitted additions in circumstances that, under the Old Code, were interlocutory and not final. The Court explained that those precedents were correct when Old Code law applied but cannot be ported wholesale to cases governed by the New Code because of the express legislative changes conferring finality on preliminary decrees.
  5. Review of contemporaneous and later case law: The Court surveyed later decisions and concluded that some authorities which applied the Old Code rationale to New Code situations (e.g., AIR 1942 Pat 185 and AIR 1964 Andh Pra 260) were wrongly decided. It identified a line of decisions (AIR 1916 Nag 120; AIR 1924 Oudh 33; AIR 1935 Nag 64) and the Supreme Court decision in AIR 1963 SC 992 as correctly stating that preliminary decrees under the New Code carry finality on the matters they determine.
  6. Exceptions and limited circumstances: The Court recognized narrow exceptions permitting addition after a preliminary decree, such as impleading a subsequent transferee or heirs of a deceased person whose rights were fixed by the preliminary decree; these exceptions do not disturb the rights as declared by the preliminary decree but permit adjustment related to succession or transfer.
  7. Application to the present case: Because a preliminary decree had already been passed in the suit and the petitioners' claimed rights would, if accepted, require reopening or altering the shares as determined by that decree, the Court concluded that the petitioners could not be added under Order I Rule 10(2). Allowing the application would impermissibly affect rights already finally declared by the preliminary decree. Consequently, the application to implead was liable to be rejected.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Civil Revision challenging the trial court's refusal to implead the petitioners was dismissed. The Court's operative conclusion was that, notwithstanding the wide language of Order I Rule 10(2), an application to add parties cannot be allowed after a preliminary decree has been passed except in limited and exceptional circumstances (for example, where a subsequent transferee or heirs of a deceased party are to be substituted).

REVISION DISMISSED

Direct consequences for the parties

  • The petitioners' application to be impleaded as parties to Title Suit No. 197 of 1956 was rejected and the Civil Revision failed.
  • The Court noted that the petitioners' proper remedy is to bring a fresh suit for partition impleading the plaintiff and defendants; the present decision does not operate as res judicata against the petitioners (the judgment expressly states the decision in the present litigation would not constitute res judicata against them).

Broader legal implication acknowledged by the Court

The Court emphasized that statutory changes in the New Code (section 2(2), section 97, and Order XX Rule 18(2)) attach finality to rights determined by a preliminary decree and thereby limit the circumstances in which parties can be added after such a decree. The Court also observed that some earlier decisions that did not account for these changes were wrongly decided when applied to New Code cases.

    Baman Chandra Acharya And Others v. Balaram Acharya And Others Opposite Parties.

    1. Petitioners 2 and 3 are respectively the son and daughter of petitioner No. 1. Title suit No. 197 of 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the suit) was filed by opp party (Plaintiff) in the Court of the Munsif, Second Court, Cuttack on 5-10-56 for partition Plaintiff's title is based on purchase of eight pies interest of Madhusudhan Das on 5-10-55 in court auction on 7-5-1956 of Surendi anath Sur and others (defendants 19(a) to (f)) According to the plaintiff, his vendors defendants 19(a) to (f) had purchased the property and obtained delivery of possession in 1936 A preliminary decree was passed ex parte on 4-11-58. The petitioners claimed two annas eleven pies and 1 Biswa interest in the suit properties on the strength of three registered sale deeds executed in favour of the deceased wife of petitioner 1 on 30-5-47, 1-1-49 and 3-1-49. As the tenure vested in the State of Orissa, there was dispute between the plaintiff and the petitioners regarding payment of compensation Order dated 19-1-62 of the Compensation Officer, Tenure Section, in Compensation Case No. 470 of 1960, shows that the three sale deeds of the petitioners and the preliminary decree in the suit were produced lie fore that officer. This compensation matter was carried to the Board of Revenue and the plaintiff got compensation only in respect of seven pies interest in the entire tenure. The order of the Board of Revenue was passed on 17-8-63 upholding claim of the petitioners to compensation. On 6-4-64 plaintiff and the defendants filed a compromise petition in the suit. On 28-4-1904 the petitioners filed an application under section 151 and O. 1. R. 10 of the CPC praying that they should be impleaded as parties to the suit. On 15-5-1964 the application was rejected. Against the order rejecting the application of the petitioners to add them as parties to the suit the Civil Revision has been filed. Mr. Misra contends that the trial Court failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it, or, at any rate, acted in exercise of it jurisdiction illegally and with material irregularity in not allowing the application of the petitioners to implead them as parties. This contention requires careful examination.

    2. O. 1 R. 10(2) of the CPC may be quoted—

    3. The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added

    4. Thus two questions arise for consideration:

    (i) Whether the presence of the petitioners is necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit; and

    (ii) if the petitioners are necessary parties, can they be impleaded as defendants after the preliminary decree?

    5. The petitioners claim two annas eleven pies and one Biswa interest in the disputed properties under three sale deeds. On the fooling of these documents their claim for compensation has been allowed in respect of their interest in the tenure which vested in the State and that has become final it may be that ultimately the claim of the petitioners may he negatived in the suit. The position is however clear that they claim interest as co-sharers. They would not be bound by the result of the suit if the are not made parties it is open to them to file a fresh suit for partition impleading the plaintiff and the defendants as parties thereto. If their claim succeeds. The effect of the decree in the present suit would wholly disappear Petitioners are therefore, necessary parties and in their absence the determination of various shares of different cosharers cannot be effectually and completely made.

    6. The expression that “the Court may at any stage of the proceedings add the name of any person, as plaintiff or defendant, who ought to have been joined, is very wide Until the decree is drawn up parties can be added or struck out if other conditions in the Rule are satisfied Each case is to be determined on its own facts and circumstances. The question for consideration is whether “any stage” would cover a stage after the passing of the decree.

    7. Section 2(2) of the CPC defines “decree” as the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. There is no dispute that in all suits where only one decree is passed completely disposing of the suits, there cannot be any addition of parties under O. 1 R. 10 of the CPC subsequent to the decree. The ??? arises with respect to cases where both a preliminary and final decree are passed.

    8. It is contended by Mr. Misra on the basis of ILR 32 Cal 483, Jotindra Mohan Tagore v. Bejoy Chand Mahatap that parties can be impleaded under O. 1 R. 10 of the CPC even after preliminary decree. Reliance is placed on the following observations:

    “A decree to be operative must, under the Indian Stamp Act, be engrossed on paper as required by that Act, and, until the Judge signs the decree so engrossed, it cannot be said that the suit has terminated. The order confirming the Commissioner's report in this case must be taken to be an interlocutory order made in the course of the suit and preparatory in the order that might determine finally the rights of the parties.

    9. Section 32 authorises the Court to add a party “at any time” in order to enable it effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. This must, however, be done before the “effectual and complete” adjudication and settlement of the question raised.”

    10. This decision has been followed in AIR 1942 Pat 185 (2) and AIR 1964 Andh Pra 260.

    11. It is necessary to examine the correctness of these decisions.

    12. In the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. XIV of 1882) ‘decree’ had been defined thus— (only relevant portions quoted):

    “Decree “means the formal expression of an adjudication upon any right claimed, or defence set up, in a Civil Court, when such adjudication, so far as regards the Court expressing it decides the suit (or appeal).

    13. The explanation in section 2(2) of the present Code (Act No. V of 1908) has been newly added and so also the provision in the main definition that a decree may be either preliminary or final

    14. Section 97 was enacted for the first time in the present Code. It lays down that where any party aggrieved by a preliminary decree passed after the commencement of this Code does not appeal from such decree, he shall be precluded from disputing its correctness in any appeal which may be preferred from the final decree. Under the old Code, objections to a preliminary decree would be raised in appeal against final decree.

    15. Consistent with the new provisions in section 2(2) and section 97. O. 20 R. 18(2) was newly introduced. It prescribes that where the Court passes a decree for partition of properly or for the separate possession of a share therein then, if and in so far as such decree relates to any other immoveable property or to movable property. The Court may, if the partition or separation cannot be conveniently made without further enquiry, pass a preliminary decree declaring the rights of the several parties interested in the property and giving such further directions as may be required.

    16. The aforesaid three provisions newly introduced for the first time in the present Code, bring into bold relief an important change that in a preliminary decree, certain rights are conclusively determined and unless the preliminary decree of a court is assailed in appeal. The rights so determined become final and conclusive and cannot be questioned in the final decree. In that limited sense the preliminary decree itself is a final decree so far as those rights are concerned.

    17. The distinction between the procedures of the Old and New Codes may be pointedly noticed. Under the Old Code, it was not necessary to pass a preliminary decree in the first instance and then a final decree in the partition suit. It was, however. The usual practice to pass an interlocutory order declaring the rights of the parties and then pass a final decree. The position under the Old Code was expressed in clear manner in ILR 25 Mad 244 (277) (FB) thus—

    “In the case of a suit for partition there is to be one decree, but before making that decree the Court may appoint a Commissioner to submit a scheme for effecting the partition under Section 396 (equal to O. 26, Rr. 13 and 14.) There is in the section no reference made to a preliminary decree. All that the section enjoins is that the Court after ascertaining the several parties interested in the property of which a partition is sought and their several rights therein, may issue a commission, etc.”

    18. In AIR 1923 Mad 147 on the authority of this decision. The following observation was made:

    “There was no such thing as a preliminary decree under the Old Code of Civil Procedure in a suit for partition, and, of course, no such tiling as a final decree. As a matter of practice. The order, ascertaining the several parties interested in the property to be divided and their several rights therein, used to be treated as itself a decree subject to appeal and as such an order does contain the adjudication as to the rights and shares and persons interested. The description of that order as a decree may not be considered inapt. But the description of that order as a preliminary decree and the description of the decree passed after the report of the Commissioner making the actual division as a final decree are not authorised by the Old Code of Civil Procedure.

    19. That order was not a preliminary, but an interlocutory order ascertaining the rights and shares with a view to pass the partition decree.

    20. This position under the Old Code explains the conclusion reached in ILR 32 Cal 483. It was correctly decided under the law, as it then stood. The application for addition of parties was made before the decree was passed and by that time there was no other decree excepting the interlocutory order. The application was rightly allowed as it would not reopen any decree previously passed declaring the rights of the parties.

    21. Though ILR 32 Cal 488 was correctly decided under the law, as it then stood. The aforesaid distinction in the laws under Old and New Codes was not kept in view and the Calcutta decision was wrongly applied to cases, where preliminary decree had already been passed, in AIR 1964 Andh Pra 260 and AIR 1942 Pat 185 (2). With respect, I must say that these two decisions have been wrongly decided.

    22. The correct view of law was taken in AIR 1916 Nag 120; AIR 1924 Oudh 33 and AIR 1935 Nag 64. In all those cases it was distinctly pointed out that the power under O. 1, R. 10 of the CPC can ordinarily be exercised only in proceeding not concluded by a decree unless the person to be added is a subsequent transferee. Some of these cases were in respect of preliminary decrees for partition or in mortgage suits. In both the cases. The principle is, however. The same. Such preliminary decrees cannot be set aside except in the modes provided by law.

    23. In AIR 1963 SC 992 the effect of a preliminary decree for partition was authoritatively pronounced. Their Lordships said—

    “Therefore, if the reason given by the High Court is accepted, it would mean that no finality attaches to decree at all that is not the law A decision is said to be final when, so far as the Court rendering it is concerned, it is unalterable except by resort to such provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as permit its reversal, modification or amendment. Similarly a final decision would mean a decision which would operate as res judicata between the parties if it is not sought to be modified or reversed by preferring an appeal or a revision or a review application as is permitted by the Code. A preliminary decree passed, whether it is in a mortgage suit or partition suit, is not a tentative decree, but must, in so far as the matters dealt with by it are concerned, be regarded as conclusive. No doubt, in suits which contemplate the making of two decrees, a preliminary decree and a final decree. The decree which would be executable would be the final decree. But the finality of a decree or a decision does not necessarily depend upon its being executable. The Legislature in its wisdom has thought that suits of certain types should be decided in stages and though the suit in such cases can be regarded as fully and completely decided only after a final decree is made. The decision of the Court arrived at the earlier stage also has a finality attached to it.”

    24. This decision clearly sets forth the effect of a preliminary decree under the new Code. AIR 1964 Andh Pra 260 and AIR 1942 Pat 185 (2) and other decisions on that line have not kept the aforesaid principles in view and are contrary to law.

    25. To sum up, even if other conditions under Or. 1, R. 10(2) are fulfilled, an application for addition of parties cannot be allowed after the preliminary decree is passed except in certain exceptional circumstances, such as, impletion of transferees subsequent to the preliminary decrees of death of parties whose rights were carved in the preliminary decree. For instance, a preliminary decree declares that X, Y and Z have one-third share each in the disputed property. Z dies leaving behind some heirs who are entitled to his share with varying interests such heirs can be added all the final decree stage in place of Z and on their desire their varying interests May be carved out all the final decree stage. In these exceptions. The heirs of (sic) the preliminary decree declaring rights, title and interest of the parties in a particular manner are not affected.

    26. Judged by the aforesaid tests. The application of the petitioners is liable to be rejected A preliminary decree had already been passed if the petitioners' rights are ad indicated upon all the final decree stage and the succeed. The right, title and interest of the different co-sharers as determined in the preliminary decree, must necessarily be affected. The preliminary decree has become final and it cannot be touched in that process. The only remedy of the petitioners is to file a suit impleading the plaintiff and the defendants as parties therein. The decision in present litigation would not constitute res judicata against the petitioners. In the result. The Civil Revision fails and dismissed in the circumslances parties to ??? their own costs throughout.

    LI/RSK/R.G.D

    27. Revision dismissed.

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    Comments

    Baman Chandra Acharya And Others v. Balaram Acharya And Others Opposite Parties.
    (Jul 30, 1965)