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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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Acts
  • Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules and Proviso (b) to clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution
  • provisions of Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules and Article 311(2) of the Constitution.
  • final.10. Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules
  • Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules
  • Orissa Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1962)
  • provisions of the Public Servants Inquiries Act, 1850,
  • provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution
  • provisions of Article 311(2)
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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Acts
  • Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules and Proviso (b) to clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution
  • provisions of Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules and Article 311(2) of the Constitution.
  • final.10. Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules
  • Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules
  • Orissa Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1962)
  • provisions of the Public Servants Inquiries Act, 1850,
  • provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution
  • provisions of Article 311(2)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Narasimham, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The State of Orissa appealed against a judgment of the Subordinate Judge of Berhampur which decreed the respondent-plaintiff's suit seeking a declaration that the Deputy Commissioner of Khondmals' order discharging him from service dated 15 March 1952 (Ext. F) was void and inoperative, together with consequential reliefs.

The respondent was a ministerial officer in the Deputy Commissioner's office at Phulbani. He went on leave on 14 April 1951 for survey training at Berhampur and thereafter did not rejoin duty, taking further leave from time to time. On 3 November 1951 the Deputy Commissioner framed charges against him (calling upon him to show cause within seven days) and sent a copy by registered post to the address "C/O Bharathi Cycle Stores, Berhampur"; the registered letter was returned with an endorsement "Absent."

The Deputy Commissioner then wrote to the Tahsildar of Berhampur (1 December 1951) requesting personal service; the Tahsildar's endorsements on the letter (dated 28-12-51, 4-1-52 and 18-1-52) recorded unsuccessful attempts and reports from the family that the addressee was away (references to Pentha and Visakhapatnam). The Tahsildar resubmitted the notice to the Deputy Commissioner on 29 January 1952; the Deputy Commissioner's office stamp shows receipt on 6 February 1952.

The Deputy Commissioner concluded that the plaintiff was deliberately avoiding service and, without obtaining the plaintiff's explanation, held all charges proved and discharged him from service by order dated 15 March 1952, with effect from 14 June 1951. The plaintiff sued; the lower court granted the declaration and arrears (subject to law and limitation). The State appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the mandatory protections of Article 311(2) of the Constitution (the requirement of giving a reasonable opportunity of showing cause before dismissal) were complied with in the impugned discharge order.
  2. Whether the authority's subjective satisfaction (that it was not reasonably practicable to give the delinquent an opportunity of showing cause) is justiciable by the courts and, if so, to what limited extent.
  3. Whether the procedural requirements of Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules (notice of charges, opportunity to defend, and the second notice regarding proposed punishment) were observed.
  4. Whether the Deputy Commissioner's exercise of discretion to dispense with personal service (or a second notice) was reasonable or amounted to gross negligence, "unreasonable readiness" or "culpable complacency."

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent-Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The mandatory provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution were not complied with; therefore the discharge order is void and inoperative.
  • The plaintiff stated he was always at Berhampur, never avoided service, and was unaware that the Tahsildar had been attempting to serve the charges on him.

State / Deputy Commissioner's Arguments

  • The Deputy Commissioner relied on attempts to serve by registered post and through the Tahsildar; he was satisfied that service was not reasonably practicable because the plaintiff was deliberately avoiding communication from the office.
  • Mr. Rath, for the Deputy Commissioner, contended that although Ext. F did not expressly show separate consideration of the second notice, a fair construction of the order would indicate the Deputy Commissioner believed the second notice could not be served either.
  • The defence evidence was limited — the only witness (D.W.1) lacked personal knowledge of how service was attempted.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Khemchand v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 300 Requirement that a delinquent public servant is entitled to a second notice regarding the tentative view on punishment and an opportunity to show cause against that punishment. The court relied on Khemchand to hold that the plaintiff was entitled to a second notice and that there is no indication the Deputy Commissioner attempted or applied his mind to issuing a second notice; this omission rendered the order constitutionally defective.
Privy Council (construing Regulation 62 of the Defence (Control of Textiles) Regulations, 1945 — Ceylon) When a statute or regulation requires an official to have "reasonable grounds" for a decision, those grounds must in fact exist and be known to the decision-maker; words of qualification are intended to limit arbitrary power. The court cited the Privy Council's reasoning to support the proposition that a requirement of "reasonable grounds" is not mere formalism and that the existence of such grounds is examinable to a limited extent by courts.
Liversidge v. Anderson, 1941-3 All ER 338 (cited in Privy Council reasoning) Discussed in connection with the meaning and limits of subjective satisfaction and reasonable grounds. Used as part of the authorities explaining that words conferring subjective satisfaction must be read as imposing a condition which can, in limited circumstances, be examined by courts.
Ridge v. Baldwin, 1963-2 WLR 935 (Lord Reid's observations cited) Authority for the proposition that where statute expressly requires reasonable grounds, courts should be able to review whether the official acted in breach of statutory obligation. Cited to show the House of Lords' reluctance to accept that finality clauses entirely preclude judicial review where there is a statutory requirement of reasonable grounds.
Ross-Clunis v. Papadopoullos, 1958-2 All ER 23 Recognition that if there were no grounds on which the decision-maker could honestly be satisfied, a court might infer dishonesty or failure to apply mind to relevant facts despite statutory finality. Applied to demonstrate that even when a statute declares the decision-maker's satisfaction final, courts can examine whether the satisfaction had any factual basis or whether the decision-maker failed to apply his mind.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a step-by-step analysis grounded on constitutional provision Article 311(2) (and clause (3) on finality), Rule 55 of the Civil Services Rules, and the authorities cited:

  1. Overlap of safeguards: The court noted overlap between the protections in Article 311(2) and Rule 55. While the authority's satisfaction about impracticability of service is subjective, both Rule 55 and Article 311(2)(b) require reasons to be recorded in writing, creating a limited jurisdiction for courts to examine whether such recorded reasons are legally adequate.
  2. Justiciability of subjective satisfaction: Relying on the Privy Council's exposition and later authorities (including Ridge v. Baldwin and Ross-Clunis), the court held that although clause (3) of Article 311 declares the authority's decision final, courts retain a limited power to ensure that the authority did not act with "unreasonable readiness", "culpable complacency", gross unreasonableness, or without applying its mind to relevant facts.
  3. Application to the facts: The court found the State failed to lead credible evidence that the plaintiff deliberately avoided service. The only defence witness lacked personal knowledge of service attempts. The registered post was returned "absent," and the Tahsildar's endorsements reported the plaintiff as not at home on three occasions, but those endorsements did not clearly show enquiries at the address "Bharathi Cycle Stores."
  4. Change of address: Crucially, on 29 December 1951 the Deputy Commissioner had received a letter (Ext. E) from the plaintiff providing a temporary new address ("Bharati Electronics Co., Berhampur"). The Deputy Commissioner did not issue a fresh notice to that new address by post or via the Tahsildar, yet later sent the final discharge order to that address on 15 March 1952 — indicating an inconsistent approach.
  5. Failure to issue the second notice: Following Khemchand, the court emphasized entitlement to a second notice about the tentative view on punishment. The impugned order (Ext. F) contained a composite ex parte finding and did not show consideration of a second notice or reasons for not issuing it. The Deputy Commissioner did not state that he had applied his mind to the necessity of a second notice or that it was impracticable to serve it.
  6. Conclusion on reasonableness: Given the foregoing omissions and the interval of nearly six weeks between the Tahsildar's report and the Deputy Commissioner's decision, the court concluded that the Deputy Commissioner's exercise of discretion was grossly unreasonable and amounted to culpable complacency or gross negligence. Therefore the discretionary dispensation with service and with the second notice could not bind the court.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED. The High Court dismissed the State's appeal with costs.

Direct effects on the parties:

  • The Deputy Commissioner's order of discharge dated 15 March 1952 was held void because the mandatory requirements of Article 311(2) (and the procedural safeguards embodied in Rule 55) were not complied with.
  • The lower court's decree in favour of the plaintiff (including the award of arrears of salary subject to law and limitation) was left undisturbed because that portion of the decree was not challenged before the High Court.

The opinion does not expressly state that a new legal precedent was established; the court applied existing constitutional and statutory principles and prior authorities to the facts and invalidated the impugned order on that basis.

Judgment delivered by Narasimham, C.J.; Das, J. concurred. Result: Appeal dismissed.

    State Of Orissa v. P. Krishnaswami Murty

    Narasimham, C.J:— This is an appeal by the State of Orissa against the judgment of the Subordinate Judge of Berhampur, decreeing the respondent-plaintiff's suit for a declaration that the order discharging him from service passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Khondmals on 15th March, 1952 (Ext. F) was, void and inoperative and for other consequential reliefs.

    2. The plaintiff was employed as a ministerial officer in the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Khondmals at Phulbani. He first went on leave on 14th April, 1951, for the purpose of undergoing survey training at Berhampur, but did not rejoin duty after completing the training and took leave from time to time on various grounds which need not be mentioned here. Ultimately, on 3-11-51 (see Ext. M/1) the Deputy Commissioner framed specific charges against the plaintiff for various acts of misconduct in the discharge of his duties and called upon him to show cause within seven days of the receipt of the charges as to “why he may not be dismissed or otherwise punished.” A copy of this order was sent to the plaintiff to the following address:

    “C/O Bharathi Cycle Stores, Berhampur (Ganjam).”

    by registered post acknowledgment due. But it was returned unserved with an endorsement on the registered envelop to the effect “Absent” (see Ext. B-3).

    3. Presumably that endorsement was made by the postal peon but he was not examined as a witness in this case. Not content with sending a registered notice, the Deputy Commissioner sent a letter to the Tahasildar of Berhampur (Ext. M) on the 1st December, 1951, requesting him to direct service of the charges on the plaintiff. In that letter he mentioned that “It has been learnt that be has been working in Bharahi Cycle Stores Berhampur”. The Tahsildar tried to effect service through his peon but was not successful. There are three endorsements on the letter Ex. M dated 28th December, 1951, 4-1-1952 and 18-1-1952, to the effect that the plaintiff could not be traced. English translations of three endorsements are given below:

    “1st Endorsement; On enquiry the addresses was found absent and reported to have gone to (torn) Pentha. The members of his family stated that it was not known as to when he would return

    Sd. Illegible (in Telugu) 28-12-51.

    2nd Endorsement. The process server reports that on enquiry the addressee was found absent in the village and was reported to have gone to Visakhapatnam. Further it was ascertained from the members of his family that he will be coming back within a week hence as appears from a letter received by them.

    Sd. Illegible.

    4-1-1952.

    3rd Endorsement. On enquiry in was ascertained from the members of his family that the addressee is coming from Visakhapatnam.

    Sd. Banchhanidhi Hatia (in Oriya)

    18-1-1952.”

    4. Then on 29th January, 1952 the Tahasildar resubmitted the notice, Ext. M. to the Deputy Commissioner, Khondmals with the following endorsement:

    “N Dis — Resubmitted with the endorsement made on the reverse of the proceeding”.

    5. This was received in the office of the Deputy Commissioner on the 6th February, 1952 as is clear from the stamp of his office on Ext. M-2.

    6. The Deputy Commissioner appears to have thought that the failure of the postal authorities to deliver the registered letter (Ext. B-3) to the plaintiff and the failure of the Tahasildar also to get the charges personally served on the plain tiff through his peon at the address given, namely C/O Bharathi Cycle Stores, Berhampur were sufficient to show that the plaintiff was untraced and that it was not reasonably practicable to serve the charges on him and to give him an opportunity to show cause against them — as in his opinion the plaintiff was deliberately avoiding service. Hence he passed impugned order of discharge from service by Ext. F dated 15th March, 1952. In that order he made the following observation:

    “As it was found difficult to communicate to him the above charges as evidently Sri P.K Swamy was deliberately avoiding to receive the communication from this office, a copy of the charges was sent to the Tahasildar, Berhampur, for service, as a last resort with a view to obtaining the explanation of Shri Swamy. But this time also, the charges were received back unserved from the Tahsildar with the remark that he was not at Berhampur. Since Sri Swamy has already been afforded maximum opportunity to explain the charges against him the proceeding against him is being disposed of without further reference to him on the basis of the available evidence.”

    7. There he held that all the charges were proved and after holding him guilty of gross misconduct and insubordination he discharged him from service with effect from 14th June, 1951.

    8. The plaintiffs main contention was that the mandatory provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution were not complied with and that consequently the order of discharge from service was void and inoperative. He further stared that he was always at Berhampur, that he never avoided service, and that he was not aware that the Tahasildar of Berhampur was trying his best to serve the charges on him.

    9. The relevant portion of Article 311 of the Constitution may now be quoted:

    “311(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him:

    Provided that this clause shall not apply—

    (b) Where an authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason to be recorded by the authority in writing it is not reasonably practicable to give to that person an opportunity of showing cause or

    (c) ***

    (3) If any question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to give any person an opportunity of showing cause under clause (2) the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank, as the case may be shall be final.”

    10. Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules (now replaced by the Orissa Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1962) may also be quoted in this connection:

    “55. Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants Inquiries Act, 1850, no order of dismissal, removal or reduction shall be passed on a member of a service (other than an order based on facts which have led to his conviction in a criminal Court or by a court Martial) unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it proposed to take action, and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges, which shall be communicated to the person charged to there with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and of any other circumstances which it is proposed to take into consideration in passing orders on the case. He shall be required, within a reasonable time, to put in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. If he so desire? or if the authority concerned so directs, an oral inquiry shall be held. At that inquiry oral evidence shall be heard as to such of the allegations as are not admitted, and the person charged shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses, to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish, provided that the officer conducting the inquiry may, for special and sufficient reason to be recorded in writing, refuse to call a witness. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and a statement of the findings and the grounds thereof.

    This rule shall not apply where the person concerned has absconded, or where it is for other reasons impracticable to communicate with him. All or any of the provisions of the rule may, in exceptional case, for special and sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing, be waived, where there is a difficulty in observing exactly the requirements of the rule and those requirements can be waived without injustice to the person charged.”

    11. It will be noticed that there is some overlapping between the provisions of Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules and Article 311(2) of the Constitution. In the well known case of Khemchand v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 300 their Lordships of the Supreme Court pointed out that the essential portions of ???

    satisfaction is the ‘subjective’ satisfaction of the superior authority holding the enquiry. But Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules and Proviso (b) to clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution requires that the reasons for such satisfaction should be recorded in writing, thereby giving some sort of limited jurisdiction to Court to examine whether they are good reasons, in law, or no reasons at all. It is also true that according to clause (3) of Article 311 of the Constitution the satisfacion of the authority concerned is final. But it is well settled that the finality conferred by such a statutory provision will not take away the limited jurisdiction of the Civil Courts.

    12. The next question for consideration is whether the exercise of discretionary power by the superior authority to dispense with the service of notice is justiciable, and if so, to what extent. In ???

    13. Privy Council while construing Regulation 62 of the Defence (Control of Textiles) Regulations, 1945 of Ceylon which empowered the Controlled of Textiles to do certain things where the Controller has “reasonable grounds” to believe that no dealer should be allowed to continue as a dealer, observed, while explaining the well known decision in Liversidge v. Anderson, 1941-3 All ER 338 at p. 77 (of 1951 AC).

    “After all, words such as these are commonly found when a legislature or law-making authority confers powers on a minister or official. However read, they must be intended to serve in some sense as a condition limiting the exercise of an otherwise arbitrary power. But if the question whether the condition has been satisfied is to be conclusively decided by the man who wields the power the value of the intended restraint is in effect nothing. No doubt he must exercise the power in bad faith but the field in which this kind of question arises is such that the reservation for the case of bad faith is hardly more than formality. Their Lordships therefore treat the words in reg. 62, “Where the Controller has reasonable grounds to believe that any dealer is unfit to be allowed to continue as a dealer” as imposing a condition that there must in fact exist such reasonable grounds, known to the Controller, before he can validly exercise the power of cancellation.” It is true that their Lordships went further and said that Controller's action was administrative and was not amenable to certiorari. But this portion of their judgment does not appear to have been wholly endorsed by the House of Lords in a recent judgment in Ridge v. Baldwin, 1963-2 WLR 935 at p. 950. Lord Reid pointed out:

    “Nothing short of a decision of this House directly in point would induce me to accept the position that, although an enactment expressly required an official to have reasonable grounds for his decision, our law is so defective that a subject cannot bring up such a decision for review however seriously he may be affected and however obvious it may be that the official acted in breach of his statutory obligation.”

    14. In Ross-Clunis v. Papadopoullos, 1958-2 All ER 23 (at p. 33) a similar question arose for considering while construing Regulation 5(2) of the Cyprus Emergency Powers (Collective Punishment) Regulations, 1955 which requires the commissioner to satisfy himself that the inhabitants of a particular area were given adequate opportunity of understanding the subject matter of the enquiry and making representations thereon. Regulation 13 gave finality to the orders made by the commissioner. Nevertheless the Privy Council observed at page 33 as follows, while noticing the argument that the satisfaction was a subjective satisfaction of the commissioner:

    “Their Lordships feel the force of this argument, but they think that if it could be shown that there were no grounds on which the appellant could be satisfied, a court might infer either that he did not honestly form that view or that in forming it, he could not have applied his mind to the relevant facts.”

    15. Thus there is abundant authority for the view that though for adequate grounds to be recorded in writing the superior authority may dispense with the service of notice (at both the stages) on the delinquent public servant if he is satisfied due to special circumstances that it will not be practicable to serve the notice on him and though by clause (3) of Article 311 his satisfaction is declared to be final, the courts have limited jurisdiction to examine the reasons given by him with a view to satisfy themselves that he did not act with “unreasonable readiness” or with “culpable complacency” or by not applying his mind to the relevant facts and thereby acted either with gross unreasonableness or without regard to relevant circumstances. To that extent his satisfaction though subjective is justiciable.

    16. Here though the plaintiff examined himself and stated that he was always at Berhampur and that he never avoided service of notice, the defendant has not cared to lead any evidence worth the name to show that the plaintiff was deliberately avoiding the receipt of the charges. The charges were sent to the old address, namely “Bharati Cycle Stores, Berhampur” first by registered post which was returned with an endorsement “absent”. Then the Tahasildar of Berhampur was directed to effect personal service, the same address was given. On three occasions, namely 28-12-51, 4-1-52 and 18-1-52 the process server reported that the delinquent public servant was not in his house. But it is not clear from the endorsements as to whether the process servers made enquiries at the address “Bharathi Cycle Stores.” Presumably this was done.

    17. There was also nothing on record to show that the Tahasildar got affixed a copy of the charges at the residence of the plaintiff. Exts. M, M(1) and M(2) are entirely silent on this point, and the only witness examined by the defendant (D.W 1) has obviously no personal knowledge as to how an attempt was made to serve a copy of the charges on the plaintiff. On 29th December, 1951 the Deputy Commissioner had received a letter Ext. E signed by the plaintiff where his address for a week was given as “Bharati Electronics Co., Berhampur” which seems different from the original address “Bharati Cycle Stores, Berhampur”. If these two addresses are identical, some evidence to that effect should have been given by the defendant. On receipt of Ext. E on 29th December, 1951 the Deputy Commissioner was in duty bound to issue a fresh notice of the charges to that new address either by post or personal service through the Tahasildar of Berhampur. No such effort was admittedly made. It is true that in Ext. E the plaintiff gave the new address only for a week. But the Deputy Commissioner appears to have assumed that the plaintiff would be there for some months thereafter, because he sent a copy of his final order of discharge Ext. F to the address on 15-3-52.

    18. Thus the factual position is that from 3-11-511 till 29-1-52 efforts were made to serve the charges on the plaintiff at his old address “Bharati Cycle Stores, Berhampur”. On 29th December, 1951, the Deputy Commissioner had already received an intimation from the plaintiff about the change of his address. This omission to get the charges served at the new address though the Deputy Commissioner was aware of that change of address must, in the circumstances be held to show gross negligence on his part. It would also come within the scope, of the expression “unreasonable readiness” or “culpabale complacency” on his part to assume that the plaintiff was delibarately avoiding to receive communication from his office. The Deputy Commissioner's exercise of his discretion conferred by the second part of Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules must therefore be held to be grossly unreasonable and as such not binding on this Court.

    19. The departmental proceedings against I the plaintiff suffer from another serious infirmity. As pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the Khemchand Case, AIR 1958 SC 300 the plaintiff was entitled to a second notice regarding the tentative view formed by the superior authority about the nature of the punishment to be proposed and then to be given an opportunity to show cause against that punishment. Here it does not appear that any effort was made to serve the second notice, and the Deputy Commissioners order Ext. F also does not show that he applied his mind to this aspect. He has written a composite order holding after an ex parte enquiry that the charges were proved and deciding that the plaintiff should be discharged from service. He has not stated anywhere that after holding the charges to foe proved the formed an opinion as to the punishment proposed and then further decided that the second notice also could not be served on the plaintiff as he was deliberately avoiding to receive communication and that consequently the Deputy Commissioner was compelled to exercise the discretion conferred on him by proviso (b) to Article 311(2).

    20. Mr. Rath, learned counsel for the Deputy Commissioner however contended that though the order of the deputy commissioner (Ex. F) does not expressly show that he considered the question of issuing second notice separately, nevertheless a fair construction of his order would show that he thought that the Second notice also could not be served on the plaintiff on account of his conduct. No such inference can however be fairly made from a perusal of the order of the Deputy Commissioner Ext. F. Moreover there was an interval of nearly six weeks from the date of the report of the Tahsildar Ext. M(2) (29-1-52) and the dace on which the Deputy Commissioner held the charges to be proved (15-3-52). Thte Deputy Commissioner could not therefore assume that if another effort was made to give the second notice, that effort would also prove futile. At any rate, his order does not show that he applied his mind to the question or gave reasons for holding that it was not reasonably practicable to serve the second notice on the plaintiff. It must therefore be held that the provisions of Article 311(2) have not been complied with and the removal of the plaintiff from service was unconstitutional. The lower court has decreed the plaintiffs claim for arrear of salary subject to law and limitation, and as this order of the lower court has not been challenged before this Court, there is no ground for interfering with this portion of the order also.

    21. The appeal is dismissed with costs.

    22. Das, J.:— I agree.

    JG/D.H.Z

    23. Appeal dismissed.

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    State Of Orissa v. P. Krishnaswami Murty
    (Aug 19, 1963)