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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, initially employed in the Deputy Commissioner, Sambalpur's office in a clerical capacity, was confirmed and on 4-7-47 appointed Inspector of Supplies (Enforcement) with retrospective effect from 24-3-47 by an order signed by an Assistant Secretary in the Orissa Supply and Transport Department. He was attached to the Supply Branch of the Deputy Commissioner's office. On 28-5-51 eight charges were framed against him and, without a regular enquiry, the Deputy Commissioner dismissed him by order dated 30-10-51.

The petitioner objected to procedural irregularity and sought reconsideration. He appealed to the State Government (Supply Department) on 30-4-52 which noticed irregularity and advised the Deputy Commissioner to regularize proceedings under departmental rules. Sometime after October 1953 the Deputy Commissioner modified the earlier dismissal order to suspension (order dated 20-10-53) and further to deem the petitioner absent from duty from 26-10-53 pending departmental proceedings (order dated 11-11-54). The Deputy Commissioner enclosed charges and an enquiry report by Mr. K.P. Dutta (Civil Supply Officer) on 30-11-53 and invited the petitioner to be heard.

Although exact dates and some details of Dutta's enquiry are not on the record, the enquiry report (filed by the petitioner) found 4 of the 8 charges proved. The Deputy Commissioner forwarded his findings to the petitioner on 22-12-54 and subsequently, after giving opportunity to show cause and a personal hearing, dismissed the petitioner from service by order dated 22-11-56 (effective 18-11-56). The petitioner then filed an application under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging that dismissal; his appeal to the State Government had been unsuccessful.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the requirements of natural justice and Article 311(2) of the Constitution were complied with in the disciplinary proceedings that culminated in the petitioner's dismissal in 1956.
  2. Whether Article 311(1) of the Constitution was contravened on the ground that the Deputy Commissioner (the dismissing authority) was subordinate to the appointing authority and thus lacked power to dismiss the petitioner.
  3. Whether earlier procedural irregularities (including an earlier ex parte dismissal in 1951) were cured by the subsequent regularized proceedings taken after Government directed that disciplinary rules be followed.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Mr. R. Mohanty) Arguments

  • It was contended that Article 311(1) had been contravened: because the petitioner was appointed as Inspector of Supplies by the Government of Orissa (Supply Department), only the Government could dismiss him; the Deputy Commissioner (being subordinate to Government) lacked power to dismiss.
  • It was also urged that the Deputy Commissioner may have been influenced by an ex parte enquiry conducted earlier by the S.D.O., Bargarh (July 1952), implying procedural unfairness or impermissible influence on the later decision.

Respondent's (Advocate General / Deputy Commissioner) Arguments

  • The Advocate General filed a supplementary affidavit from the Deputy Secretary, Supply Department, explaining that the Secretary/Deputy Secretary acted in dual capacities: as Secretary to Government (whose orders are Government orders) and as Head of Department/Deputy Controller (whose orders are departmental and not Government orders).
  • It was explained that non-gazetted government servants (such as the petitioner) are appointed by Heads of Departments (Controller acting as Head) or by Deputy Commissioners in their jurisdictions, and that the petitioner's appointment was made by the Controller of Supplies in his capacity as Head of Department, not by the Government. This factual statement in the supplementary affidavit was not challenged by the petitioner.
  • The Deputy Commissioner asserted (and the record showed) that after Government advised regularization the disciplinary process was re-conducted (including notices, enquiry by Mr. Dutta, consideration of his report, show-cause opportunities and a personal hearing), such that the requirements of natural justice and Article 311(2) were adhered to before final dismissal in 1956.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sobhagmal v. State, AIR 1954 Raj 207 Held that the word "subordinate" in Article 311(1) refers to subordination in rank, not subordination in respect of powers and duties. Used to support the proposition that subordination for Article 311(1) is a question of rank/grade rather than functional control; applied to compare the ranks of the Controller of Supplies and the Deputy Commissioner.
M.P. Roy v. S.N. Chatterjee, AIR 1954 Pat 285 Same construction: "subordinate" refers to rank, not merely to subordination in functions. Relied on in corroboration of the rank-based interpretation of "subordinate" for Article 311(1).
Anukul Chandra Mondal v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, AIR 1962 Cal 3 Similar proposition regarding interpretation of "subordinate" as referring to rank. Referenced along with the other decisions to establish consistent judicial interpretation that subordination for Article 311(1) is determined by rank/grade.
Mahesh Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1955 SC 70 Clarified that removal need not be by the very same authority who made the appointment or by his direct superior; it is sufficient that the removing authority is of the same rank or grade. The Court quoted this authority directly and applied its observation that where appointing and removing authorities are of the same grade the removal does not contravene Article 311(1). This supported the conclusion that the Deputy Commissioner (being of the same senior scale) was not subordinate to the Controller for Article 311(1) purposes.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a chronological and legal analysis that can be summarized in these steps, based strictly on the material on record:

  1. Procedural History and Remedial Action: The court noted the initial irregular dismissal on 30-10-51 and the petitioner's objections. The State Government directed regularization. The Deputy Commissioner modified the dismissal to suspension/absence pending disciplinary proceedings and then proceeded to re-conduct the disciplinary process (annexures show notices, an enquiry report by Mr. K.P. Dutta, a show-cause notice, and a personal hearing), culminating in a fresh dismissal order of 22-11-56 (effective 18-11-56).
  2. Compliance with Article 311(2) / Natural Justice: The court held that, notwithstanding earlier irregularities prior to October 1953, the later proceedings complied with the requirements of natural justice embodied in Article 311(2). The court found that the petitioner had not alleged at any stage that Mr. Dutta's enquiry (the principal later enquiry) was conducted against the rules of natural justice or that he was denied opportunity to adduce or challenge evidence. Two notices were issued as required by law and a personal hearing was given; consequently the court held there was no contravention of Article 311(2).
  3. Allegation of Influence by Earlier Ex parte Enquiry: The petitioner urged the Deputy Commissioner was influenced by an earlier ex parte enquiry by S.D.O., Bargarh (July 1952). The court observed that the Deputy Commissioner's findings did not indicate any such influence and that the later enquiry by Mr. Dutta was on record and duly considered. The court noted that the Deputy Commissioner was not bound to accept all of Mr. Dutta's findings; he could form his own conclusion.
  4. Constitutional Question under Article 311(1) — Identity of Appointing Authority: The core constitutional question was whether the Deputy Commissioner could validly dismiss the petitioner when the petitioner had been appointed as Inspector of Supplies by an order signed in the Supply Department. The court relied on the unchallenged supplementary affidavit of the Deputy Secretary which explained the Secretary/Deputy Secretary's dual roles: (a) as Secretary to Government issuing Government orders, and (b) as Head of Department (Controller of Supplies) issuing departmental orders. The affidavit stated that the petitioner's appointment was made by the Controller of Supplies in his capacity as Head of Department, not as Government; this factual stance was not disputed by the petitioner.
  5. Meaning of "Subordinate" in Article 311(1) and Precedent Application: The court reviewed authority holding that "subordinate" in Article 311(1) pertains to rank/grade rather than mere functional subordination. It quoted Mahesh Prasad v. State of U.P., which held that removal by an authority of the same rank or grade as the appointing authority does not contravene Article 311(1). Applying these precedents and the uncontroverted fact that both the Controller of Supplies and the Deputy Commissioner were officers of the Indian Administrative Service in the senior scale, the court concluded that the Deputy Commissioner was not an authority "subordinate" to the Controller for the purposes of Article 311(1), even if there was functional subordination in certain matters.
  6. Alternative Contentions (Delegation / Renewal of Posts): The Advocate General argued some posts in the Supply Department were temporary and renewed annually and that by operation of delegation the Deputy Commissioner might be regarded as appointing authority from 1948. The court observed there was some force in this contention but found it unnecessary to decide that question in detail. Even assuming the contrary, the unchallenged affidavit established the Controller as the real appointing authority and thus the Article 311(1) rank analysis remained decisive.
  7. Conclusion of Analysis: On the combined factual findings and legal authorities, the court found no ground to interfere with the Deputy Commissioner's dismissal order.

Holding and Implications

APPLICATION DISMISSED

Holding (core ruling): The court dismissed the petitioner's application under Article 226 and upheld the Deputy Commissioner's dismissal order of 22-11-56 (effective 18-11-56). The court found that the later disciplinary proceedings met the requirements of natural justice and Article 311(2), and that Article 311(1) was not contravened because the Deputy Commissioner was not an authority subordinate in rank to the Controller of Supplies (the appointing authority).

Direct consequences and orders: The petition is dismissed with costs; the hearing fee was assessed at Rs. 100/-. Das, J. concurred with the reasoning and result.

Broader implications: The opinion applied and followed existing authorities on the construction of "subordinate" in Article 311(1) (notably Mahesh Prasad and earlier Provincial decisions) to hold that subordination for constitutional protection is determined by rank/grade rather than merely by functional direction. The opinion does not state that it establishes a new precedent beyond applying those authorities.

    Laxminarayan Sarangi v. State Of Orissa And Another Opposite Parties.

    Narasimham, C.J:— This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution against the order of the Deputy Commissioner, Sambalpur, No. 4134 dated 22-11-56 dismissing the petitioner from Government service. An appeal was filed before the State Government which was unsuccessful.

    2. The petitioner entered the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Sambalpur in a clerical capacity and was, in due course confirmed in that post. On 4-7-47 he was appointed Inspector of Supplies (Enforcement) with retrospective effect from 24th March 1947 by an order signed by the Assistant Secretary to the Government of Orissa in the Department of Supply and Transport (See annexure A). He was however attached to the Supply Branch of the Office of the Deputy Commissioner at Sambalpur. On 28-5-51 proceedings were drawn up against him in respect of 8 charges (Annexure B) and he was called upon to show cause why suitable disciplinary action may not be taken against him. He showed cause but without holding a regular enquiry the Deputy Commissioner passed an order on 30-10-51 dismissing him from service (Annexure E). The petitioner then pointed out to the Deputy Commissioner the irregularity in the conduct of the proceedings and requested him to reconsider his order. But the Deputy Commissioner declined to accede to his prayer (see annexure J). Then the petitioner appealed to Government in the Supply Department on 30-4-52 (annexure K) who noticed the irregularity in the proceedings and suggested to the Deputy Commissioner to regularize the matter by following the departmental rules relating to conduct of disciplinary proceedings against Government servants. The actual order and the date on which the order was passed are not on record. But in the counter affidavit of the Deputy Commissioner of Sambalpur (in paragraph 7) this fact was mentioned and not controverted. Moreover, when on receipt of the Government Order the Deputy Commissioner tried to regularize the matter (see annexure U), he made a reference to Government of Orissa Supply Department's letter No. 27044 dated 1-10-53. It may therefore be taken as well established that sometime after October 1953 the Deputy Commissioner, on the advice of the Secretary, Supply Department decided to draw up proceedings afresh against the petitioner. But as the previous order of dismissal had not been formally set aside by the superior authority and no fresh proceedings could be drawn up against a person already dismissed the Deputy Commissioner by his order dated 20-10-53 (annexure U) modified his previous order of dismissal to one of suspension from 5-11-51.

    3. Against this order also it was pointed out that there could be no retrospective order of suspension. Thereupon, by his subsequent order dated 11-11-54 (annexure Y) he partially modified his earlier order and directed that the petitioner shall be deemed to be absent from duty from 26-10-53 till the completion of the departmental proceeding. It may therefore be taken as unchallenged that the original order of dismissal dated 30-10-51 was modified to one of absence from duty till 25-10-53 and suspension from 25-10-53. Then on 30-11-53 (Ann. W) the Deputy Commissioner enclosed a copy of the charges against the petitioner together with enquiry report of one Mr. K.P Dutta, Civil Supply Officer, Sambalpur and informed the petitioner that if he wished to be heard in person the Deputy Commissioner would be glad to see him on 10-12-53.

    4. The exact date on which Mr. K.P Dutta conducted the enquiry against the petitioner is not on record, though the petitioner himself had filed a copy of his report along with Annexure W. But apparently the enquiry must have been held sometime before 30-11-53 and sometime after the receipt of Government Orders asking the Deputy Commissioner to regularize the entire proceeding. It is not alleged either in the application under Article 226 or in the subsequent show cause petition filed by the petitioner before the Deputy Commissioner that Dutta's enquiry was held behind back or that he was not given an opportunity to adduce evidence or to cross examine his witnesses if desired by him. The enquiry by Mr. Dutta has not been challenged anywhere by the petitioner. Mr. Dutta in his enquiry report held that only 4 out of the 8 charges were proved.

    5. On 22-12-54 the Deputy Commissioner (see annexure Z) communicated to the petitioner his own findings on the charges and stated that the charges which had been established were sufficient to warrant his dismissal. Hence he called upon him to show cause why he may not be dismissed from Government service. A copy of his findings was also enclosed along with the second notice. While showing cause against this notice also the petitioner, though he made some grievance of the fact that the S.D.O Bargarh had made some previous enquiry behind his back (annexure Z.b) did lot allege that Mr. Dutta's enquiry was held behind his back. The enquiry by S.D.O Bargarh ??? place much earlier on 29-7-1952 see annexure ??? a/1. A personal hearing also appears to have been given to the petitioner sometime before 10-2-5 (see annexure Z/C) and eventually, on 22-11-56 the Deputy Commissioner dismissed him from service with effect from 18-11-56 (Annexure Z-d).

    6. Thus, whatever might have been the irregularities committed in the departmental proceedings prior to October 1953 there can be no doubt that thereafter the requirements of natural justices embodied in Article 311(2) of the Constitution have been followed. The previous order of dismissal dated October 30, 1951 was modified to one of suspension, charges were again communicated to the petitioner (Annexure W) some sort of enquiry was made by Mr. K.P Dutta, Civil Supplies Officer, Sambalpur, a copy of his findings was forwarded to the petitioner and then he was called upon to show cause why suitable action may not be taken against him. The Deputy Commissioner then tentatively held that he should be dismissed from service and issued the second notice on the petitioner to show cause why that punishment may not be inflicted (see annexure Z); and then, after giving a personal hearing he eventually dismissed, him from service.

    7. Though the actual details connected with the enquiry made by Sri K.P Dutta and the exact dates of that enquiry are not on record, nevertheless as the petitioner had on no previous occasion, alleged that the enquiry was held against the rules of natural justice or else that he was not given any opportunity to cross examine witnesses or to adduce evidence on his behalf, I must hold, so far as the proceeding is concerned, that the enquiry was held in accordance with the rules. Two notices were also sent to the petitioner as required by law. Hence there was no violation of the rules of natural justice or of the provisions of Article 311(2) of there Constitution when the Deputy Commissioner finally dismissed him from service in 1956. Mr. R. Mohanty; however, urged that the Deputy Commissioner must have been very much influenced) by the ex-parte enquiry made by the S.D.O, Bargarh in July 1952 (annexure Z-a/1) before coming to his findings. The findings of the Deputy Commissioner do not show that he was in any way influenced by the opinion expressed by the S.D.O Bargarh. On the other hand the later enquiry held by Mr. Dutta was on record and was duly considered by him. It is true that the Deputy Commissioner eventually did not accept all the findings; of Mr. Dutta, but he was not bound, in law, to accept those findings.

    8. The only substantial question raised by Mr. Mohanty for the petitioner is that Article 311(1) of the Constitution has been contravened. He urged that as the petitioner was appointed as Inspector of Supplies (Annexure A) by the Government of Orissa in the Department of Supply and Transport, Government alone had the power to dismiss him and that the Deputy Commissioner, Sambalpur who is an authority subordinate to Government had no such power. To meet this argument the learned Advocate General filed a supplementary, affidavit from the Deputy Secretary, Supply Department Government of Orissa, stating certain facts which have not been controverted by the petitioner. From this supplementary affidavit it appears that the Secretary to the Government in the Department of Supply has dual functions to perform. He is, first, Secretary to Government and in that capacity he is authorised to issue orders on behalf of Government. But he is also a Head of a Department in his capacity as Controller of Supplies and Transport and any order passed by him in that capacity will not be an order of Government but merely an order passed by a Head of a Department. The same dual functions are exercised by his subordinate officers. Thus the Deputy Secretary to Government in the Department of Supply is also the Deputy Controller and the Assistant Secretary in that Department. It is further stated that non-gazetted Government servants are never appointed by Government but by Heads of Departments or the Deputy Commissioner in their respective jurisdictions. Hence though the original order appointing the petitioner as Inspector of Supplies (Annexure A) was signed by the Assistant Secretary to Government in the Supply Department nevertheless according to the aforesaid supplementary affidavit of the Deputy Secretary that appointment was made by the Assistant Secretary in his capacity as Assistant Controller acting on behalf of the Controller of Supplies as Head of a Department. It is also stated that the Department of Supply was a Temporary Department till 1957 and sanction used to be given annually for extending the life of the Department from year to year.

    9. As the facts stated in the supplementary affidavit have not been challenged it may be taken as well established that the petitioner was appointed as Inspector of Supplies not by the Government of Orissa but by the Controller of Supplies. The Controller of Supplies is an Officer of the Indian Administration Service in the senior scale. The petitioner was dismissed from service in 1956 by the Deputy Commissioner Sambalpur and that officer was also an officer of the Indian Administrative service, in the senior scale. Thus both the officers were of the same grade though the Controller of Supplies in his capacity as a Head of Department may have some powers to issue directions from time to time to the Deputy Commissioner in respect of the management of the Supply branch of the Deputy Commissioner's office. It appears that from 1948 there was some delegation of functions by which the power to appoint Inspectors of Supplies was conferred on the Deputy Commissioner (see annexure 3 to the supplementary affidavit of the Deputy Secretary). The Controller reserved to himself the powers to appoint only Supervisors and other officers. But here admittedly the appointment took place in 1947 and it may be assumed without deciding that the said order of delegation will not apply to the facts of the present case. Hence, the constitutional question for decision is whether when the appointing authority of the Civil servant concerned is the Controller of Supplies, the Deputy Commissioner could validly dismiss him from service. The answer to this question depends on a true construction of the words “by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed” occurring in clause (1) of Article 311 of the Constitution. These words have been construed in Sobhagmal v. State, AIR 1954 Raj 207; M.P Roy v. S.N Chatterjee*, AIR 1954 Pat 285 and Anukul Chandra Mondal v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bangal, AIR 1962 Cal 3. In all these decisions it was held that the word “subordinate” occurring in the aforesaid clause of Article 311, has reference to subordination in rank and not subordination in respect of powers and duties. This point has been clarified in a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Mahesh Prasad v. State Of Uttar Pradesh , (S) AIR 1955 SC 70. There, their Lordships while discussing the aforesaid Article observed as follows:

    “These provisions cannot be read as implying that the removal must be by the very same authority who made the appointment or by his direct superior. It appears to us to be enough that the removing authority is of the same rank or grade”. While discussing the facts of that case their Lordships observed that both the appointing authority and the dismissing authority (Divisional Personnel Officer and the Superintendent Power) were in the same senior scale of Rs. 625-50-1375/-, and that was a clear indication that the two officers were of the same rank. These observations apply with full force here. It is not denied that the Controller of Supplies was an officer in the senior scale of the Indian Administrative Service. Similarly, it is not challenged that the Deputy Commissioner of Sambalpur, was also an officer in the senior scale of the Indian Administrative Service though the actual pay drawn by him might have been less than that drawn by the Controller of Supplies. But so long as the two officers were of the same grade it cannot be said that the Deputy Commissioner was an authority subordinate to the Controller for the purpose of Article 311(1) though there may be subordination in the functions of the Deputy Commissioner.

    10. The learned Advocate General also contended that all the posts in the Supply Department were being renewed from year to year as soon as sanction for those posts expired, the petitioner must be deemed to have reverted to his permanent post of a clerk in the Deputy Commissioner's Office momentarily, until the post of Inspector of Supplies was again renewed and that consequently the Deputy Commissioner of Sambalpur may be held to be his “appointing authority” inasmuch as at any rate from 1948 by virtue of the delegation of powers (see annexure 3) to the supplementary affidavit of the Deputy Secretary the Deputy Commissioner became the appointing authority in respect of Inspector of Supplies also within his district. There is some force in this contention but it is unnecessary to examine this in detail. Even if we accept the extreme contention put forward by Mr. Mohanty that as the petitioner was ‘appointed’ in July 1947 the subsequent order of delegation made in 1948 has no application to his case, nevertheless we must hold on the basis of the supplementary, affidavit of the Deputy Secretary that the real appointing authority of the petitioner was not the Government of Orissa but the controller of supplies and transport who was a head of Department. I have already shown, on the basis of the authorities discussed above, that the Deputy Commissioner of Sambalpur was not an authority subordinate to the Controller of Supplies and Transport for the purpose of Article 311(1) of the Constitution.

    11. For the aforesaid reasons I see no ground for disturbing the order of dismissal passed against the petitioner. This application is dismissed with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 100/- (Rupees one hundred only).

    12. Das, J.:— I agree.

    HF/K.S.B

    13. Application dismissed.

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    Laxminarayan Sarangi v. State Of Orissa And Another Opposite Parties.
    (May 11, 1962)