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  • provisions of Section 22(2) of the Bengal Tenancy Act,
  • Sub-s. (2) of Section 22 of the Bengal Tenancy Act,
  • Section 26(2) of the Orissa Tenancy Act,
  • Section 22(2) of the Bengal Tenancy Act,
  • provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act,
  • u/s. 26(2) of the Orissa Tenancy Act
  • provisions of Act XI [11] of 1859
  • 2 u/s. 26(2) Orissa Tenancy Act.
  • u/s. 26(2), Orissa Tenancy Act,
  • Section 26(2) of the O.T Act.
  • Orissa Tenancy Act of 1913
  • u/s. 26(2), O.T Act
  • u/s. 26(2), B.T Act,
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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Acts
  • provisions of Section 22(2) of the Bengal Tenancy Act,
  • Sub-s. (2) of Section 22 of the Bengal Tenancy Act,
  • Section 26(2) of the Orissa Tenancy Act,
  • Section 22(2) of the Bengal Tenancy Act,
  • provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act,
  • u/s. 26(2) of the Orissa Tenancy Act
  • provisions of Act XI [11] of 1859
  • 2 u/s. 26(2) Orissa Tenancy Act.
  • u/s. 26(2), Orissa Tenancy Act,
  • Section 26(2) of the O.T Act.
  • Orissa Tenancy Act of 1913
  • u/s. 26(2), O.T Act
  • u/s. 26(2), B.T Act,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal is by defendant No. 2 (the appellant); the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 are respondents. During the lower appellate proceedings the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 appear to have compromised, which explains why only defendant No. 2 prosecutes this second appeal. Defendants 1 and 2 were proprietors of a residuary Touzi No. 2463.R (Cuttack Collectorate). The Touzi was sold for arrears of revenue and purchased by the plaintiff on 11-9-1944. The plaintiff brought suit to recover Khas possession of certain lands (1.90 acres) within the Touzi, recorded in the current settlement khatain (Ext. 3) as in the Khas possession of the father of defendants 1 and 2 under Section 26(2) of the Orissa Tenancy Act (O.T. Act).

The plaintiff's case is that his purchase at the revenue sale entitled him to the Khas possession comprised within the proprietary interest he acquired. The lands were formerly a raiyati holding, purchased by the defendants' father and kept in family possession. Both courts below upheld the plaintiff's contention and awarded him the right; the present appeal challenges that outcome. The Court noted a related earlier decision (Nilmoni v. Govinda Chandra, I.L.R. 1950 Cut. p. 526) dealing with purchases made prior to the Orissa Tenancy Act, but the present fact—confirmed on adjournment—was that the relevant purchase occurred after 1913 (i.e., after the Orissa Tenancy Act of 1913).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the nature of the right or interest which a co-sharer proprietor has under Section 26(2) of the Orissa Tenancy Act?
  2. Does a purchaser at a revenue sale obtain, by his purchase, that right or interest which was enjoyed by the defaulting co-sharer proprietor under Section 26(2)?

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff contends that by purchasing the proprietary interest of the defaulting proprietors at the revenue sale he also obtained the right to Khas possession of the suit lands that was comprised within that proprietary right under Section 26(2) O.T. Act.

Defendants' Arguments

  • The defendants argue that the plaintiff's purchase conferred only the right to the defendants' share in the estate as originally recorded and did not vest the plaintiff with the additional advantage of Khas possession that the defendants (or their father) had acquired with their own money.
  • They further contend that Section 26(2) imposes only a disqualification while the purchaser remains a proprietor — i.e., the disqualification is temporary — and that once they cease to be proprietors their earlier occupancy/tenancy rights revive, placing them in the position of occupancy raiyats.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nilmoni v. Govinda Chandra, I.L.R. 1950 Cut. p. 526 Effect of purchase made prior to Orissa Tenancy Act: created an intermediate status for the purchasing proprietor (neither occupancy tenant nor tenant-at-will), producing a tenancy right that did not merge with proprietary right. The Court referenced this earlier decision as distinguishing purchases before 1913 from those after; it noted that in Nilmoni the result was creation of an intermediate tenancy, but the present case involves a post-1913 purchase and thus required separate consideration under Section 26(2) O.T. Act.
Bambhadur Lal v. Mt. Gungra, A.I.R. 1925 Pat. 547 Held that the interest under Section 26(2) ceases when proprietary interest is lost and would pass to the purchaser of that interest (as stated in the cases relied upon below). The Court observed that the courts below relied on this case, but distinguished it on the ground that those decisions likely involved private or civil-court sales rather than revenue sales; thus Bambhadur Lal did not control the revenue-sale situation.
Gopi Singh v. Jagdeo Singh, A.I.R. 1927 Pat. 172 Similar proposition regarding cessation of the Section 26(2) right when proprietary interest ceases. Again relied upon by courts below; Court distinguished it because it did not clearly involve a revenue sale and therefore did not conflict with the principle that a revenue sale passes only the Crown's/share interest.
Sukhdeo Pandey v. Bameshwar Prasad, A.I.R. 1939 Pat. 522 Stated that the anomalous interest under Section 26(2) ceases when proprietary interest is lost. Relied upon by the courts below; the present Court treated the decision as potentially concerning private or civil sales and therefore not inconsistent with the rule applicable to revenue sales.
Surja Eanta v. Sarat Chandra, A.I.R. 1914 P.C. 82 Held that on failure to pay government assessment the estate/interest is forfeited and what is sold at revenue sale is not the interest of the defaulting owner but the interest of the Crown (i.e., purchaser gets the Crown's/share interest, not vendor's personal rights). The Court relied on this decision as establishing the key principle that a revenue sale does not transfer the defaulting proprietor's personal right, title and interest; it used this to conclude the revenue purchaser does not obtain the Section 26(2) right enjoyed by the defaulting proprietor.
Narayan Das v. Jatindra Nath, A.I.R. 1927 P.C. 135 Reiterated the principle that the purchaser at a revenue sale gets the share as recorded and not the vendor's right, title and interest. Adopted by the Court as authority supporting the proposition that revenue sales convey only the recorded share, reinforcing the conclusion that the plaintiff did not acquire Section 26(2) rights by revenue purchase.
Khemesh Chandra v. Abdul Hamid, A.I.R. 1916 Cal. 184 Stated that what passes at a revenue sale is the share as recorded in the Collector's book on which the revenue is assessed, not the vendor's full rights. The Court cited it as consistent authority for distinguishing revenue sales from private/civil sales and for denying that a revenue purchaser acquires the vendor's Section 26(2) right.
Afzul Hussain v. Raj Buno Sahai, 30 Cal. p. 1071 Held that sale of a share for arrears under Act XI of 1859 does not affect a valid Mokarari lease of land comprised in the estate, even if the lease is held by some defaulting proprietors. Used to support the general proposition that certain vested rights of third parties or leases are not displaced by a revenue sale; this reinforces the Court's view that revenue sales have limited effect on the vendor's personal rights.
Midnapore Zamindari Co. v. Naresh Narayan Roy, A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 144 Principle that a tenancy right may merge into proprietary right on purchase by a proprietor (merger doctrine). The Court invoked this authority to support the proposition that any tenancy right of an occupancy-holder would merge in the proprietary interest when purchased by a co-sharer, and that Section 26(2) grants only an additional possessory advantage rather than a revived tenancy.
Upendra Pratap v. Ishwarwati Koer, A.I.R. 1950 Pat. 115 (Full Bench) Discussion in a Full Bench about the status of the co-sharer proprietor under Section 22(2) B.T. Act; majority saw an intermediate tenancy; one view held the anomalous tenancy lasts only while the proprietary interest subsists. The Court used this Full Bench discussion to compare the Bengal Tenancy provisions with Section 26(2) O.T. Act and to show that under the Orissa provision the co-sharer purchaser's position is weaker—i.e., the possessory right does not survive cessation of proprietary interest.
Ahmad Sahib v. Magnesite Syndicate Ltd., A.I.R. 1915 Mad. 1214 Illustrates that one co-sharer can maintain ejectment against a trespasser without impleading others, though for the benefit of all co-owners. The Court referred to this case to explain the proper form and beneficiaries of an ejectment suit brought by one co-sharer against a trespasser; it concluded the present plaintiff's plaint was not framed in a way that could entitle him to the relief claimed.
Maganlal Dulab Das v. Budhar Purshotam, A.I.R. 1927 Bom. 192 Same proposition as above: a co-sharer may sue for ejectment of a trespasser, but the relief is for benefit of all co-owners. Relied on to show limitations: the plaintiff can get possession only for himself and really for the benefit of co-owners; the present plaint did not seek relief in that form.
Currimbhoy & Co. Ltd. v. L.A. Greet, A.I.R. 1930 Cal. 113 Authority cited among cases showing co-sharer can sue for ejectment for collective benefit. Used to support the Court's view about the proper framing of an ejectment suit by a co-sharer against a trespasser.
Sambhu Gosain v. Piyari Mian, A.I.R. 1941 Pat. 351 Another case cited to show that a co-sharer may maintain ejectment but only for the benefit of co-owners. Applied to emphasize that the plaintiff's present suit, which alleged acquisition of Section 26(2) rights, was not in the correct form to obtain the relief sought.
Hira Lal v. Bhairon, 5 All. 602; Radha Proshad v. Esuf, 7 Cal. 414; Harendra Narain v. Moran, 15 Cal. 40 Authorities establishing that where a trespasser is in possession with the consent of another co-owner, a plaintiff co-owner can only recover to the extent of his own share and obtain joint possession. The Court relied on these cases to explain the limits on relief available to a co-sharer plaintiff in an ejectment suit and to justify dismissing the plaint framed on a different cause of action.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court approached the problem by first asking whether a purchaser at a revenue sale acquires the special possessory advantage conferred by Section 26(2) O.T. Act that a co-sharer proprietor may have.

The Court reasoned that the right conferred by Section 26(2)—that the purchaser-proprietor shall hold the land as a proprietor and not as a raiyat and pay co-sharers a fair sum for use and occupation—is an independent, statutory possessory advantage and is not an incident of the co-proprietary estate itself. Because that right arises from statute and is not necessarily part of the vendor's estate, it does not automatically pass to a revenue purchaser.

The Court relied on established authority (Surja Eanta; Narayan Das; Khemesh Chandra) to state the settled proposition that a revenue sale does not transfer the vendor's personal right, title and interest but only the recorded share or the Crown's interest subject to assessment. Consequently, a revenue purchaser does not, by reason of the revenue sale alone, step into the vendor's shoes with respect to rights that are personal or arise independently (such as the possessory advantage under Section 26(2)).

The Court examined the cases relied upon by the courts below (e.g., Bambhadur Lal, Gopi Singh, Sukhdeo Pandey) and concluded they did not conflict with the settled rule because those decisions appear to concern private or civil-court sales where the purchaser acquires the vendor's right, title and interest — a fundamentally different situation from a revenue sale.

The Court then considered whether the possessory right under Section 26(2) endures after the proprietary right ceases. It analysed the statutory language and legislative history (comparing the Bengal Tenancy Act provisions and amendments with Section 26(2) O.T. Act) and concluded that the Orissa provision is stronger and indicates extinction (not mere suspension) of the raiyat/occupancy right when the occupancy right is transferred to a co-sharer proprietor. The Court held that the tenancy/occupancy right merges in the proprietary right upon such purchase and that the statutory phrase "shall hold it as a proprietor" means the possessory right granted by Section 26(2) ceases when the proprietary right ceases.

Having reached the conclusion that defendants 1 & 2 would have lost their Section 26(2) possessory right once their proprietary interest ceased (and that a revenue purchaser does not acquire that Section 26(2) right), the Court addressed the procedural posture of the plaintiff's plaint. The plaintiff's claim was framed on the footing that he had acquired the right under Section 26(2) by his revenue purchase. The Court held that, if the plaintiff seeks ejectment by a co-sharer, the suit must be properly constituted — either for possession for the benefit of all co-sharers or for ejectment to the extent of the plaintiff's own share and for joint possession. Because the plaint was not so framed, it would be unfair to grant the plaintiff a decree on a different theory and deprive the defendants of their available defences in a properly constituted suit.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; the plaintiff's suit is dismissed.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The Court held that a purchaser at a revenue sale does not, by that revenue purchase, acquire the special possessory advantage enjoyed by a co-sharer proprietor under Section 26(2) O.T. Act. In other words, the revenue purchaser does not automatically "step into the shoes" of the defaulting proprietor with regard to that statutory right.
  • The Court interpreted Section 26(2) to mean that the possessory right given to a purchasing co-sharer-proprietor is to hold as a proprietor and that such possessory right ceases when the proprietary right ceases; the statutory wording indicates extinction rather than temporary suspension of the raiyat/occupancy right.
  • Although defendants 1 & 2 would, in law, be trespassers if they continued to cultivate the lands after their proprietary right ceased, the plaintiff's present suit was not properly framed to obtain ejectment either for the benefit of all co-sharers or for joint possession to the extent of his own share.
  • The plaintiff is left free to institute a separate, properly constituted suit for ejectment — either for the whole of the suit lands for the benefit of the co-sharers or for ejectment limited to his own share with a claim for joint possession.
  • The appeal was allowed with costs throughout.

    Gour Charan Das Applt. v. Atal Behari Ray & Another Resps.

    Jagannadhadas, J.:— The deft. 2 is the applt. before us, the resps. being the pltf. & deft. 1. During the pendency of these proceedings in the lower appellate Ct. the matter appears to have-been compromised between the pltf. & deft. 1 & that is apparently the reason why the present, second appeal is only by deft. 2. The appeal arises-under the following circumstances.

    2. Defts. 1 & 2 were the proprietors of a residuary Touzi No. 2463.R of the Cuttack Collectorate. This residuary Touzi was put up for sale for-arrears of revenue & purchased by the pltf. on 11-9-44. The suit is by the said purchaser for recovery of Khas possession from the defts. of certain lands of the extent of 1.90 acres within the Touzi which have been recorded in the current., settlement khatain Ext. 3 as being in the Khas possession of the father of defts. 1 & 2 u/s. 26(2) Orissa Tenancy Act. The pltfs. case is that as a result of his purchase in Ct. auction, he has obtained also the right to the Khas possession of the suit lands. Admittedly, the suit lands constituted, at one time a raiyati holding. They have been purchased by the defts' father & have been sine, then in the possession of the family. The contention of the pltf. is that u/s. 26(2), O.T Act, theses lands were held by the father of the defts. & thereafter by the defts. as mere proprietors & that therefore such interest as they had in it passed, on to him on his purchase of their proprietary interest in the revenue sale. This contention has been upheld by both the Courts below & hence, this second appeal. The Bench had occasion to consider recently in Nilmoni v. Govinda Chandra, I.L.R 1950 Cut. p. 526 the effect of such a purchase when it was made prior to the Orissa Tenancy Act of 1913 & when the Bengal Tenancy Act was in force in this Province. We held that the result of such a purchase was the creation of an intermediates status for the purchasing proprietor which was neither that of an occupancy tenant or of a tenant-at-will. It was a tenancy right nevertheless which did not merge with the proprietary right. The question that arises for consideration in the present case is what would be the legal position when the purchase of the occupancy holding by the co-sharer proprietor was subsequent to the passing of the Orissa Tenancy Act of 1913. It may be mentioned that the record in the present case did not make it clear as to whether the purchase of the occupancy holding by the father of the defts. in this case was before 1913 or thereafter. We therefore adjourned the case on a previous hearing to enable the advocates on both sides to ascertain what the fact was. We have been informed that the purchase in this case was after 1913.

    3. The question at issue turns upon the proper construction of Section 26(2) of the O.T Act. The argument for the pltf. is that the defts. were in Khas possession of the land only as proprietors & that whets he purchased their proprietary interest at the, revenue sale, he obtained also the right to such; Khas possession as was comprised within the proprietary right which he has purchased. The argument on behalf of the defts. is that the pltf. by his purchase obtained no more than the right to the defts.' share in the estate as it originally stood & did not obtain the right to the additional advantage of Khas possession of certain lands which they had purchased, with their own money. They also maintain that S. 26(2) has not the effect of entirely nullifying the purchase of the occupancy right made by them but that it merely imposes a disqualification on their holding the land as a raiyat, which disqualification continues only so long as they are proprietors. They contend therefore that having now ceased to be proprietors, there is nothing in law to prevent their getting the benefit of their original purchase of the occupancy right. They urged, therefore, that they are in the position of occupancy raiyat of the land after they ceased to be cosharer-proprietor.

    4. No decided case dealing with this specific question has been brought to our notice. We have been told that the question has not come up for direct decision in this form which is rather surprising in view of the fact that the contingency which has arisen in this case is not at all an uncommon one.

    5. The view taken by the Cts. below relying on Bambhadur Lal v. Mt. Gungra, A.I.R(12) 1925 Pat. 547; Gopi Singh v. Jagdeo Singh, A.I.R(14) 1927 Pat. 172 and Sukhdeo Pandey v. Bameshwar Prasad, A.I.R(23) 1939 Pat. 522, is that the right u/s. 26(2) of the Orissa Tenancy Act which defts. 1 & 2 had in the suit lands was a right which they had as proprietors of the Touzi & that by the revenue sale they lost the same & that the pltf. as the purchaser got it. The determination of the point at issue involves an answer to two questions (1) What is the nature of the right or interest which cosharer proprietor has u/s. 26(2)? (2) Does a purchaser at a revenue sale get, by his purchase that right or interest also?

    6. It would be convenient to take the second question first. Under S. 26(2), it is no doubt true that the purchaser-proprietor has the right to hold the land only as a proprietor & not as a raiyat. But the right or interest so acquired by purchase is not a part of the estate itself which he holds in common with other co-proprietors, but is one outside it & is held by an independent source of title. Such a right is not comprised in, nor is it incidental to the co-proprietary interest. The statutory declaration that his right to hold it is as a proprietor is only a limitation of the rights which he would otherwise have had under the purchase enacted on consideration of public policy. There is therefore prima facie no reason to think that the purchaser at a revenue sale will be entitled to get the benefit of this additional right of the defaulting proprietor unless his revenue purchase can be said to be a purchase of the right, title & interest of the defaulting proprietor himself. That a revenue sale has not that effect is well settled by the decisions of the P.C & of the various H.Cs In Surja Eanta v. Sarat Chandra, A.I.R(1) 1914 P.C 82, it has been laid down that

    “On the failure of an owner to pay the Govt. assessment his estate or interest in the land is forfeited or rather determined & under such a sale what is sold is not the interest of the defaulting owner, but the interest of the Crown subject to the payment of the Govt. assessment.”

    7. This view has been reiterated by their Lordships in Narayan Das v. Jatindra Nath, A.I.R(14) 1927 P.C 135, in Khemesh Chandra v. Abdul Hamid, A.I.R(3) 1916 Cal. 184 it is laid down that:

    “What passes at a revenue sale is not the right, title & interest of the defaulting proprietor, but the share as recorded in the Collector's book on which the revenue in assessed.”

    8. In Afzul Hussain v. Raj Buno Sahai, 30 Cal p. 1071, it has been held that the sale of the share of an estate for arrears of revenue under the provisions of Act XI [11] of 1859 does not affect wholly or in part a valid Mokarari lease of the land comprised in the estate notwithstanding the fact that the lease is held by some of the defaulting proprietors of the share sold, having fractional proprietary interest therein. These authorities are clear & decisive & it is the view so well-settled in these cases that has been adopted by my learned brother Panigrahi J. in I.L.R (1950) Cut. 526, to which I was also a party. The cases in A.I.R(12) 1925 Pat. 547 : A.I.R(14) 1927 Pat. 172 & A.I.R(26) 1939 Pat. 522 relied on by the Cts. below do not conflict with this view. It has no doubt been stated broadly in these cases that the interest of a cosharer proprietor u/s. 26(2), O.T Act which is some what peculiar & anomalous one ceases when his proprietary interest is lost & that it would pass on to the person who acquires the interest of that cosharer. But an examination of the facts of these three cases would show that the sales with which the Ct. was concerned therein were probably either private sales or sales in Ct. auction of a Civil Ct. decree. At any rate, it is not clear that those decisions were concerned with the rights of the purchaser at a revenue sale. There is an obvious & clear distinction between the right obtained under a private sale or a Civil Ct. sale & those under a revenue sale. In the former, the purchase is of the right, title & interest of the vendor or of the J.D, but in the latter, as has been pointed out above, the purchaser gets only the defaulter's share in the estate & not the right, title & interest of the defaulter. This distinction has been overlooked by the Cts below. I am therefore of the opinion that the pltf. is not entitled on account of his revenue purchase to step into the shoes of defts. 1 & 2 in respect of the lands held by them u/s. 26(2), O.T Act, whatever the nature of their right or interest may be in the lands.

    9. This, however, does not conclude the matter. If as has been suggested in some of the cases, the co-sharer proprietor loses, his rights u/s. 26(2) the moment he ceases to be a proprietor, then it may follow that the has no longer any right to hold the land at all & he may, therefore, be in the position of a trespasser liable to be ejected. In reply it has been contended on behalf of the applt. that the effect of S. 26(2) is merely to impose a disqualification which subsists only so long as he is a proprietor & that his right under the original purchase of the occupancy right is revived the moment he ceases to be a proprietor. This requires a consideration of the nature of the interest of the purchasing cosharer-proprietor u/s. 26(2). That interest is a right to hold the land as a proprietor but not as a raiyat. It is clearly, therefore, not a tenancy right at all. The tenancy right must be taken to have become merged in the proprietary right & that is what has been incidentally pointed out in the judgment of my learned brother Panigrahi J. in I.L.R 1950 Cut. 526 at p. 530. The merger of the tenancy right on such a purchase is in accordance with the law propounded by the P.C in Midnapore Zamindari Co. v. Naresh Narayan Roy, A.I.R(11) 1924 P.C 144 at p. 146 (2). In spite, however, of the merger, S. 26(2) gives the purchasing proprietor one individual advantage, viz., the right to hold the land as against the other co-proprietors merely paying to them a fair & equitable sum for use and occupation. That is, he gets the sole benefit of the cultivating possession by his purchase & does not share this benefit with the other co-proprietors. To this extent only the Statute law in S. 26(2) appears to have modified the law as laid down in A.I.R(11) 1924 P.C 144 at p. 146 (2). A consideration of the various legislative changes with reference to the rights of a co-sharer-purchaser who purchases the holding of an occupancy-raiyat is instructive. Sub-s. (2) of Section 22 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, as it stood before the amendment in 1907 was as follows:

    “If the occupancy right in a land is transferred to a person jointly interested in the land as a proprietor or permanent tenure holder, it shall cease to exist, but nothing in this sub-section shall prejudicially affect the rights of any third person.”

    10. After the 1907 amendment, the same sub-section in the B.T Act stood as follows:

    “If the occupancy right in the land is transferred to a person jointly interested in the land as proprietor or permanent tenure holder, he shall be entitled to hold the land subject to the payment to his co-proprietors or joint permanent tenure-holders of the shares of the rent which may be from time to time payable to them, & if such transferee sublets the land to a third person, such third person shall be deemed to be a tenure-holder or a rayat, as the case may be in respect of the land.”

    11. The corresponding present provision in the Orissa Tenancy Act of 1913 which is S. 26(2) thereof is as follows:

    “If the occupancy right in the land is transferred to a person jointly interested in the land, as proprietor or permanent tenure-holder, such person shall have no right to hold the land as a raiyat, but shall hold it as a proprietor or permanent tenure-holder as the case may be, & shall pay to-his co-sharers a fair & equitable Sum for the use & occupation of the same.”

    12. The position of the cosharer-proprietor u/s. 26(2), B.T Act, both before & after 1907 has been fully dealt with, in the F.B judgment in Upendra Pratap v. Ishwarwati Koer, A.I.R(37) 1950 Pat. 115. In the majority view the right of the cosharer-proprietor is an intermediate tenancy of some sort (see p. 126, col. 11). In the view of Narayan J. in the same F.B as expressed at p. 134, col. I, this anomalous tenancy right can last only so long as the proprietor continues to possess his proprietary interest, a view for which his Lordship derives support from the decision in A.I.R(12) 1925 Pat. 547. That is also what is laid down in A.I.R(14) 1927 Pat. 172 & A.I.R(26) 1939 Pat. 522. The difference of views reflected in the above F.B case in A.I.R(37) 1950 Pat. 115 turned only on whether the right ceased on partition & allotment of the lands to another sharer. But there was no difference in the view that the right to hold ceases when the proprietary right itself ceases. If that is the correct legal position, as regards the right or the interest of the cosharer proprietor, with reference to the provisions of Section 22(2) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, it appears to me that the position of the co-sharer-proprietor is definitely weaker u/s. 26(2), Orissa Tenancy Act, having regard to the difference in the wording. Under the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act, as it stood in 1907, all that is provided, is that the occupancy right ceases to exist. This was held to mean that the holding continued & that the purchasing proprietor has some sort of a tenancy right. This view was recognised by the 1907 amendment by specifically providing that what the co-sharer was to pay was a proportionate share of the rent to other co-proprietor. Therefore, under these provisions, there was definite scope for holding that the purchasing co-proprietor had an interest by way of a tenancy right. But the present provision in the Orissa Tenancy Act makes it quite clear that the purchasing co-proprietor shall have no right to hold the land as a raiyat. Therefore, any tenancy right in the purchase is ruled out & as has been pointed out above it is merged in the proprietary right. He has the right to hold the land only as a proprietor. The sub-section, therefore, recognises nothing more than his right to hold possession, & gives him the right to keep that possession as against the other co-proprietors, who cannot call upon him to share the benefits of the cultivating possession, but are only entitled to a fair & equitable sum for the use & occupation of the land. It appears to me, therefore, quite clear that under the present provision of S. 26(2), what the cosharer purchaser has, is only a mere possessory right & not any interest in the land by way of tenancy or otherwise. It may be that this possessory right is heritable & transferable along with the proprietary right; but the question is whether it continues if the proprietary right ceases. In my view, the only reasonable construction of the phrase ‘shall hold it as a proprietor” occurring in Section 26(2) of the Orissa Tenancy Act, is that the possessory right given thereby ceases when the proprietary right ceases. There appears to me to be absolutely no justification for reading into the sub-section a revival of the occupancy right on the cessation of the proprietary right. Section 22(2) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, as it stood prior to 1907 categorically said that “the occupancy right shall cease to exist” & not merely that it shall be suspended. It is to my mind the same idea, of extinction & not suspension & something more that is conveyed in Section 26(2) of the Orissa Tenancy Act, when it says “such person shall have no right to hold the land as a raiyat but shall hold it as a proprietor.” It is not possible to read these words with the qualification that the right to hold as a raiyat would be revived on the cessation of the proprietary right & as implying any limitation on the prohibition confined to the period of the subsistence of the proprietary right. In my view, therefore, defts. 1 & 2 have lost the right to continue in cultivating possession of the suit-lands & would, therefore, in the eye of law be trespassers by such continuance.

    13. Learned counsel for the applt. (sic) argues that in this view, he, as a co-sharer, though he may not have acquired the right which defts. 1 & 2 had, u/s. 26(2), would still be entitled to get a decree in ejectment against them. In support of this position, he relies on the cases in Ahmad Sahib v. Magnesite Syndicate Ltd., A.I.R(2) 1915 Mad. 1214, Maganlal Dulab Das v. Budhar Purshotam, A.I.R(14) 1927 Bom. 192, Currimbhoy & Co. Ltd. v. L.A Greet, A.I.R(17) 1930 Cal. 113 and Sambhu Gosain v. Piyari Mian, A.I.R(28) 1941 Pat. 351. While no doubt these cases show that one co-sharer can maintain ejectment as against a trespasser, without impleading the other co-sharers, they also show that he can do so only, for the benefit of the entire group of co-sharers. This is made clear in A.I.R(14) 1927 Bom. 192 at p. 195, where their Lordships say as follows:

    “It may be pointed out, however, though it should hardly be necessary to do so, that the pltf. could get possession in the suit, not only for himself alone, but really for the benefit of the co-owners.”

    14. In such a suit by one co-sharer for ejectment, it would be open to the deft. trespasser to show that he is in possession with the consent of the other co-owner. If he shows the same, the pltf. co-owner will be entitled to get a decree in ejectment only to the extent of his own share & will be entitled only to joint possession. This was clearly laid down in Hira Lal v. Bhairon 5 ALL. 602, Radha Proshad v. Esuf, 7 cal. 414 and Harendra Narain v. Moran, 15 Cal. 40. Such possession, however, to the extent of his own share, he can get only in a properly constituted suit. The pltf. has either to file a suit lin ejectment of the defts. from entirety of the suit-lands but for the benefit of the whole body of co-sharers, or in the alternative a suit for ejectment from his own share & for joint possession along with the defaulter defendants. The suit as filed & as appears from the plaint, is on the footing that the pltf. has acquired the right u/s. 26(2) to khas possession of the suit lands, by his purchase. It is not a suit for possession either for the benefit of the entire body of co-sharers or one for joint possession with defts. 1 & 2 to the extent of his own share. It would, therefore, be unfair to the defts. to give a decree in ejectment in favour of the pltf. on a footing different from what the plaint has asked for & on a title & cause of action which is different depriving the defts. of the defence which they may have in a properly constituted suit.

    15. In the circumstances, therefore, the pltf.'s suit has to be dismissed leaving it open to him to obtain ejectment of the defts. from the suit lands either wholly or partially in a separate & properly constituted suit. In the result, therefore, the appeal must be allowed with costs throughout.

    Panigrahi, J.:— I agree.

    D.H

    16. ‘Appeal allowed.

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    Gour Charan Das Applt. v. Atal Behari Ray & Another Resps.
    (Mar 16, 1951)