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  • provisions of Sections 14,15,17A, 18 and 23-A of the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973 (for short 'the Adhiniyam')
  • Article 243ZD of the Constitution and hence Section 17-A
  • provisions of Sections 14, 16, 17-A, 18 and 20
  • Constitution (Seventy-fourth Amendment) Act,
  • Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 23-A
  • Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 23-A
  • Section 23-A of the Adhiniyam by Act
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  • provisions of Sections 14,15,17A, 18 and 23-A of the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973 (for short 'the Adhiniyam')
  • Article 243ZD of the Constitution and hence Section 17-A
  • provisions of Sections 14, 16, 17-A, 18 and 20
  • Constitution (Seventy-fourth Amendment) Act,
  • Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 23-A
  • Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 23-A
  • Section 23-A of the Adhiniyam by Act
Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion — Writ Petition under Article 226 (Public Interest Litigation)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution as a Public Interest Litigation seeking a declaration that the provisions of Sections 14, 15, 17-A, 18 and 23-A of the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973 (the "Adhiniyam") are ultra vires the Constitution. The petition was heard along with W.P. No. 13753/2006; the Court delivered a separate judgment in that connected matter holding that the provisions of Sections 14, 16, 17-A, 18 and 20 of the Adhiniyam are not ultra vires. Because the present petition raised additional grounds, the Court heard and disposed of it separately. The writ petition is disposed of in terms of the judgment delivered in W.P. No. 13753/2006.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the challenged provisions of the Adhiniyam — specifically Sections 14, 15, 17-A, 18 and 23-A — are ultra vires the Constitution.
  2. Whether Section 14 of the Adhiniyam, which vests power to prepare the development plan in the Director Town and Country Planning, is inconsistent with Article 243W of the Constitution (which concerns conferring powers on Municipalities in relation to subjects in the Twelfth Schedule, including town planning).
  3. Whether Section 17-A of the Adhiniyam, by virtue of its constitution and composition of the committee it creates, is incompatible with Article 243ZD of the Constitution (which contemplates District Planning Committees and specifies composition rules).
  4. Whether the amendment to Section 23-A (by Act No. 22 of 2005) — which omitted the words "for urgent public purpose" — permits the State Government to modify development or zoning plans for purposes that are not public purposes, thereby rendering the provision constitutionally impermissible.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Vivek Dalai)

  • Section 14 vests the power to prepare development plans in the Director Town and Country Planning rather than in Municipalities. Article 243W of the Constitution and the Twelfth Schedule contemplate that town planning falls within the Municipalities' domain; hence Section 14 is ultra vires Article 243W.
  • Article 243ZD requires certain composition rules for District Planning Committees. Section 17-A of the Adhiniyam constitutes a committee with a composition that differs substantially from Article 243ZD, and therefore Section 17-A is ultra vires the Constitution.
  • Before amendment, Section 23-A allowed the State Government to modify plans only "for urgent public purpose." After substitution by Act No. 22 of 2005, the phrase was omitted, allegedly allowing the State Government to make modifications even where no public purpose exists, thereby upsetting constitutional limits.
  • The Collector of Indore's report (residential area increase and reduced roads) and certain case law (K.K. Bhalla v. State of Madhya Pradesh and a Division Bench decision in Writ Petition No. 2902/95) were cited to show improper executive interference with land-use and final schemes under the Adhiniyam.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shanti G. Patel and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. Interprets Article 243W as an enabling provision ("may") — not an obligation upon the State to vest powers in Municipalities; the Seventy-fourth Amendment does not render existing laws non-operative or create a vacuum in enforcement of existing urban planning laws. The Court relied on this authority to reject the submission that Section 14 is automatically displaced by Article 243W. The Court held that Section 14, which entrusts preparation of development plans to the Director, continues to operate until the legislature vests such powers on Municipalities under Article 243W.
K.K. Bhalla v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. Holds that the State Government, exercising executive powers, could not direct that lands designated for commercial use be repurposed for industrial use (interpretation in relation to enforcement of the Adhiniyam). The petitioner relied on this decision to argue against executive interference in land-use. The Court noted this authority was cited by the petitioner but held that these submissions were not directly relevant to the question of vires of the challenged sections and therefore it was unnecessary to express any opinion on that matter in this petition.
Division Bench decision in Writ Petition No. 2902/95 (Raipur Development Authority matter) Quashed an order sanctioning construction of a community hall that encroached on open space in a final scheme; directed demolition and restoration of open space — reflects principle that once a scheme becomes final, State Government interference is limited. The petitioner cited this decision to argue limits on State interference with finalized schemes. The Court observed that the matter cited by the petitioner does not bear on the vires challenge to Sections 14, 17-A, 18 and 23-A and therefore declined to express a view on that decision in the context of the present petition.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed the petitioner's primary contentions sequentially and succinctly:

  1. On Section 14 and Article 243W:
    • The Court observed that Article 243W uses the word "may," indicating an enabling (not mandatory) provision. Citing Shanti G. Patel, the Court held that the Seventy-fourth Amendment does not automatically render existing laws inoperative or create a vacuum in enforcement of urban planning laws.
    • Applying that principle, the Court concluded that Section 14's vesting of the power to prepare development plans in the Director is permissible and continues to operate until the legislature, in exercise of its powers under Article 243W, decides to vest town-planning powers in Municipalities.
  2. On Section 17-A and Article 243ZD:
    • The petitioner pleaded that Section 17-A's committee composition conflicts with Article 243ZD's composition rules for District Planning Committees. The Court distinguished the two provisions on their subject-matter: Article 243ZD contemplates district planning committees, whereas Section 17-A creates a committee in relation to town and country planning (not district planning).
    • Because the statutory committee under Section 17-A is for a different planning purpose, the Court held the composition need not mirror Article 243ZD, and the petitioner's contention was rejected as misconceived.
  3. On Section 23-A (as substituted by Act No. 22 of 2005):
    • The Court parsed the substituted Section 23-A. Clause (a) permits modifications for proposed projects of the Government of India, the State Government and their enterprises, or projects related to State development or implementation of Town and Country Development Authority schemes — matters which the Court treated as inherently for public purposes.
    • Clause (b) permits modification on application where the State Government or the Director, after advice from a constituted committee, considers the proposed activity or scheme "to be beneficial to the society." The Court interpreted "beneficial to the society" as encompassing "public purpose."
    • Accordingly, the Court found no merit in the submission that omission of the words "for urgent public purpose" authorized non-public-purpose modifications; the statutory text still limits modifications to public-purpose or societally beneficial projects.
  4. On other materials and case references (Collector's report, K.K. Bhalla, Writ Petition No. 2902/95):
    • The Court observed that these materials and decisions were cited by the petitioner but were not directed to the constitutional vires issues raised against the specified sections. Therefore, the Court deemed it unnecessary to express any opinion on those matters in the context of this petition.

Holding and Implications

DISPOSED OF

Holding (direct effect): The writ petition challenging the vires of Sections 14, 15, 17-A, 18 and 23-A of the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973 was disposed of in terms of the Court's judgment delivered in W.P. No. 13753/2006. In substance, the Court rejected the petitioner's primary contentions:

  • Section 14's vesting of development-plan preparation power in the Director is not rendered unconstitutional by Article 243W; Article 243W is enabling and does not automatically displace existing statutes.
  • Section 17-A's committee composition is not required to mirror the District Planning Committee composition in Article 243ZD because Section 17-A pertains to town and country planning rather than district planning.
  • The amendment to Section 23-A (omitting "for urgent public purpose") does not permit non-public-purpose modifications because clause (a) and clause (b) as substituted still restrict modifications to projects that are for public purposes or "beneficial to the society."

Implications: The direct consequence is that the challenged provisions were not declared ultra vires by this Court in this petition and continue to operate as interpreted above. The opinion does not purport to set a new, general precedent beyond applying the existing authority (notably Shanti G. Patel). The Court declined to express views on other cited decisions and factual materials not directly bearing on the vires challenge.

This summary is prepared exclusively from the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond that text.

    Madan Parmaliya v. State Of Madhya Pradesh And Ors.

    1. The petitioner has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution as a Public Interest Litigation for declaring the provisions of Sections 14,15,17A, 18 and 23-A of the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973 (for short 'the Adhiniyam') as ultra vires the Constitution.

    2. This writ petition was heard alongwith W.P. No. 13753/-2006 in which we have delivered a separate judgment today holding that the provisions of Sections 14, 16, 17-A, 18 and 20 of the Adhiniyam are not ultra vires the Constitution. In this writ petition, however, the petitioner has taken same additional grounds and hence this separate judgment.

    3. Mr. Vivek Dalai, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that under Section 14 of the Adhiniyam power has been vested in the Director Town and Country Planning (for short 'the Director') to prepare the development plan. He submitted that article 243w of the constitution provides that subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the Legislature of a State may, by law, endow the Municipalities with powers in relation to matters listed in Twelfth Schedule of the Constitution which includes town planning. He submitted that Section 14 of the Adhiniyam which vests the power of preparing a development plan on the Director instead of the Municipalities is thus ultra vires article 243w of the constitution.

    4. We are unable to accept the aforesaid submission of Mr. Dalai. article 243w of the constitution says that subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the Legislature of a State 'may' by law endow the Municipalities with powers including those in relation to the matters listed in the Twelfth Schedule of the Constitution which includes town planning. The word "may" in article 243w of the constitution indicates that this is only an enabling provision and it is not mandatory for the legislature to make a law conferring on the Municipalities powers relating to town planning. This view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Shanti G. Patel and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. . Relevant portion of Para 9 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shanti G. Patel v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (supra) is quoted hereinbelow:

    The Twelfth Schedule of the Constitution referable to Article 243W, inter alia, provides for urban planning including town planning, regulation of land-use and construction of buildings. Thus, Article 243W contains merely an enabling provision, and it does not mean that the State is obligated to provide for such a statute. The Constitution (Seventy-fourth Amendment) Act, in any event, does not envisage that the existing laws would become non-operative or a vacuum would be created in the matter of enforcement of existing laws relating to urban planning and/or regulation of land-use and construction of building, etc. As per the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court in the case Shanti G. Patel v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (supra), article 243w of the constitution does not envisage that the existing laws relating to town planning would become non- operative. Thus, Section 14 of the Adhiniyam entrusting the powers to prepare a development plan to the Director will continue to operate till the legislature vests such powers on the Municipalities in accordance article 243w of the constitution.

    5. Mr. Dalai next submitted that Article 243ZD of the Constitution provides that there shall be constituted in every State at the district level a District Planning Committee to consolidate the plans prepared by the Panchayats and the Municipalities in the district and to prepare a draft development plan for the district as a whole and the legislature may by law make provision with respect to the composition of District Planning Committees and the manner in which the seats in such Committees shall be filled and the proviso in Article 243ZD further states that not less than four-fifth of the total members of the Committee shall be elected, by and amongst, the elected members of the Panchayat at the district level and to the Municipalities in the district in proportion to the ratio between the population of the rural areas and other urban areas in the district. He further submitted that Section 17-A of the Adhiniyam, on the other hand, provides for constitution of a committee consisting of Mayor of the Municipal Corporation or President of the Municipal Council or Nagar Panchayat as the case may be, President of the Zila Panchayat, Members of Parliament representing constituencies, all members of the State Legislative Assembly representing the constituencies, Chairman of the Town and Country Development Authority or Special Area Development Authority, if any, President of the Janpad Panchayat and Sarpanchas of the Gram Panchayats which wholly or partly fall within the planning area and other persons not exceeding seven to represent specific interests to be nominated by the State Government and an officer not below the rank of Deputy Director, Town and Country Planing, who shall be the Convenor of the Committee. He submitted that the composition of the Committee constituted under Section 17-A of the Adhiniyam is entirely different from the composition of the District Planning Committee envisaged in Article 243ZD of the Constitution and hence Section 17-A of the Adhiniyam is ultra vires the Constitution.

    6. This contention of Mr. Dalai is entirely misconceived. Article 243ZD of the Constitution provides for the composition of committee for district planning where Section 17-A of the Adhiniyam provides for constitution of a committee in relation to town and country planning and not district planning. Hence the composition of the committee constituted under Section 17-A of the Adhiniyam need not be same as composition of the district planning committee contemplated by Article 243ZD of the Constitution.

    7. Mr. Dalai next submitted that Section 23-A of the Adhiniyam before its amendment by Act No. 22 of 2005 provided that the State Government may make modification in the development plan or the zoning plan "for urgent public purpose", but Section 23-A of the Adhiniyam as substituted by Act No. 22 of 2005 has omitted the words "for urgent public purpose" and the consequence is that the State Government may make modification in the development plan or the zoning plan even if there is no urgent public purpose for such modification.

    8. Section 23-A of the Adhiniyam as substituted by Act No. 22 of 2005 is quoted hereinbelow:

    23-A. (1) (a) The State Government may, on its own motion or on the request of a Town and Country Development Authority, make modification in the development plan or the zoning plan for any proposed project of the Government of India or the State Government and its enterprises or for any proposed project related to development of the State or for implementing a scheme of a Town and Country Development Authority, and the modification so made in the development plan or zoning plan shall be an integral part of the revised development plan or zoning plan, (b) The State Government may, on an application from any person or an association of persons for modification of development plan or zoning plan for the purpose of undertaking an activity or scheme which is considered by the State Government or the Director, on the advice of the committee constituted by the State Government for this purpose, to be beneficial to the society, make such modification in the development plan or zoning plan as may be deemed necessary in the circumstances of the case and the modification so made in the development plan or zoning plan shall be an integral part of the revised development plan or zoning plan.

    It will be clear from Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 23-A of the Adhiniyam that the modifications in the development plan or the zoning plan under Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 23-A are to be for prosed projects of the Government of India or the State Government and its enterprises or for any proposed projects related to development of a State or for implementing a scheme of a Town and Country Development Authority and all these proposes by their very nature are public purposes. A reading of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 23-A of the Adhiniyam as substituted by Act No. 22 of 2005 quoted above would also show that the State Government may on application from any person or an association of persons make modifications to the development plan or zoning plan for the purpose of undertaking an activity or scheme which is considered by the State Government and the Director on the advice of the committee constituted by the State Government for this purpose, "to be beneficial to the society". "To be beneficial to the society" also mean "for public purpose". Thus, the contention of Mr. Dalai that by the omission of words "for urgent public purpose", from Section 23-A of the Adhiniyam by Act No. 22 of 2005, the State Government would be free to modify the development plan or the zoning plan even for a purpose other than public purpose has no merit.

    9. Mr. Dalai finally submitted that the Collector of Indore District has submitted a report to the Government that the residential area of Indore has increased by 62% and the roads have been reduced. He submitted that in K.K. Bhalla v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. , the Supreme Court has held while interpreting the Adhiniyam that the State Government in exercise of its executive powers could not have directed that the lands meant for use for commercial purposes may be used for industrial purposes. He further submitted that in Writ Petition No. 2902/95, a Division Bench of this Court delivered a judgment and order dated 16-2-1996 quashing an order passed by the Raipur Development Authority sanctioning the construction of a community hall in favour of the President, Lions Club and directed that the building be demolished and open space be restored of its original position. He submitted that this order was passed by the Court after holding that once a place has been left as an open space in a scheme prepared by the Town and Country Development Authority and such scheme has become final, there is no provision under the Adhiniyam under which the State Government could interfere with such scheme. These submissions of Mr. Dalal have nothing to do with vires of sections 14, 17-a, 18 and 23-Aof the Adhiniyam challenged in the writ petition and therefore it is not necessary to express any opinion thereon.

    10. With the aforesaid observations, this writ petition is disposed of in terms of our judgment delivered today in W.P. No. 13753/2006.

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    Madan Parmaliya v. State Of Madhya Pradesh And Ors.
    (Mar 23, 2007)