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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The accused, Babu Singh, was convicted by the J.M.F.C., Bhind for an incident dated 17-11-1982 in which he was found to have caused a grievous injury to the nose of one Chotelal (P.W.1). The trial court convicted him under Section 325, Indian Penal Code, imposing a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and simple imprisonment for 6 months, and directing that Rs. 500/- out of the fine, if recovered, be paid to the injured party as compensation. The accused appealed to the Court of Session, Bhind. By judgment dated 4-10-1990 the IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Bhind, set aside the conviction and sentence under Section 325 and remanded the case to the trial court for a fresh trial on a charge under Section 326, Indian Penal Code, directing that a charge under Section 326 be framed and that both parties be given an opportunity to adduce evidence afresh. The accused filed the present revision challenging the order remanding the case for re-trial.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order of the Additional Sessions Judge remanding the case for re-trial on a fresh charge under Section 326, Indian Penal Code, was justified.
  2. Whether the trial Magistrate erred by framing a charge under Section 325 when the material might have justified framing a charge under Section 326.
  3. Whether an order for re-trial can be directed by the appellate court when neither party — in particular the State — had sought such a course and had acquiesced in the earlier framing of charge under Section 325.

Arguments of the Parties

Accused's (Applicant's) Arguments

  • The direction for re-trial issued about eight years after the incident would amount to harassment of the accused; it would force him to undergo another protracted trial.
  • Evidence (including medical evidence) did not establish an offence under Section 326: Dr. D.P. Shrivastava (P.W.7) described a "lacerated wound 1"x1"x bone deep" on the right nostril; the description of a lacerated wound was argued as inconsistent with an injury caused by teeth, and while the doctor noted disfigurement, he did not state it was permanent; hence, grievous injury under Section 326 was contended not to be proved.
  • The appeal should be heard on merits instead of ordering a fresh trial, thereby giving the accused an opportunity of acquittal or maintenance of the existing conviction (and noting that the accused had already paid the fine imposed by the trial court).

State's Position

  • The learned counsel for the State (Shri D.R. Sihare) did not support the impugned appellate judgment directing re-trial.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ukha Kolhe v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 1531 Explains that an order for retrial is exceptional and may be made only where the appellate court is satisfied of jurisdictional defects, serious illegalities or irregularities, misconception of the nature of proceedings, or that a party was prevented from leading material evidence; retrial wipes out earlier proceedings and exposes the accused to another trial. The court relied on this authority to emphasize that retrial must be sparingly used and only for grave reasons; it applied the conditions identified in that case to assess whether remand for retrial in the present matter was justified.
Sanmukhsingh v. Emperor, AIR 1945 Sind 125 Demonstrates that if a magistrate tries a matter beyond his jurisdiction (i.e., usurps the jurisdiction of a higher court), the trial may be vitiated and commit to a higher court would be required. The court cited this case to distinguish the present facts: here the offence under Section 326 was triable by the Magistrate as well, so the jurisdictional vice considered in Sanmukhsingh was not present.
Matukdhari Singh v. Janardan, AIR 1966 SC 356 Also concerned with jurisdictional limits and consequences where a trial is in excess of the trial court's jurisdiction. The court referred to this authority to reinforce that the present case did not involve a magistrate usurping jurisdiction, and thus those precedents did not justify a retrial on jurisdictional grounds.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a step-by-step analysis grounded on the principle that orders for retrial are exceptional and should be exercised sparingly:

  1. Emphasis on exceptional nature of retrial: The court cited Ukha Kolhe to reiterate that retrial should be ordered only for grave reasons such as lack of jurisdiction, serious irregularities, or prevention of material evidence.
  2. Facts about charge and jurisdiction: The police initially filed a challan under Section 325 and the trial Magistrate framed charge under Section 325. The court noted that an offence under Section 326 would also have been triable by the Magistrate; therefore this case did not involve a magistrate trying a matter beyond his jurisdiction (distinguishing authorities cited concerning jurisdictional usurpation).
  3. State's conduct and acquiescence: The State never contested the framing of the charge under Section 325 at trial or before the Additional Sessions Judge; counsel for neither party raised objection to the charge during arguments before the Addl. Sessions Judge. The court treated the State's failure to challenge the charge as an implied discharge of the accused of the offence under Section 326.
  4. Availability of revision remedy: The court observed that had the State wished to challenge the implied discharge it could have sought revision under Section 398, CrPC, but it did not do so.
  5. Critique of appellate court's action: Given that neither party had sought framing of a fresh charge under Section 326 and the State had acquiesced to the charge under Section 325, the Additional Sessions Judge erred in directing framing of a new charge and retrial on his own initiative. The court characterized the reasoning of the Additional Sessions Judge as "perverse and injudicious" in directing something the parties did not and could not have asked for.

On that basis the court concluded that the conditions justifying retrial were not present in this case and that the remand order should be set aside.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Revision allowed; the impugned judgment directing re-trial is set aside.

Direct consequences:

  • The impugned judgment of the IInd Addl. Sessions Judge, Bhind in Criminal Appeal No. 38/89 dated 4-10-1990 directing re-trial of the accused for an offence under Section 326, Indian Penal Code, is set aside.
  • The Criminal appeal shall now be re-heard and disposed of expeditiously according to law.
  • The accused/applicant, Babu Singh, is directed to appear before the IInd Addl. Sessions Judge, Bhind for further proceedings in the appeal on 2nd March, 1993 without any notice from that Court.

Broader implications: The court reiterated established principles limiting the use of retrial orders (as set out in Ukha Kolhe) but did not purport to lay down any new legal principle beyond those authorities; the decision's immediate effect is to vacate the retrial direction and restore the appeal to the appellate court for re-hearing.

    Babu Singh Simbhoo Singh v. State Of Madhya Pradesh

    1. This is a revision by an accused directed against an order of his re-trial.

    2. The applicant/accused Babu Singh was convicted by J.M.F.C., Bhind of the offence under Section 325, Indian Penal Code on the finding that he had on 17-11-1982 at about 9 A.M. caused injury to the nose of one Chotelal (P.W.1), which was a grievous injury. The sentence inflicted was a fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default, simple imprisonment for 6 months. It was further directed that Rs. 500/- out of the fine, if recovered, shall be paid to Chotelal as compensation. Aggrieved by that Judgment, the accused filed an appeal in Court of Session, Bhind. Shri R.P. Dubey, IInd Addl. Sessions Judge, Bhind, who heard the appeal, by Judgment dated 4-10-1990, set aside the conviction and sentence of the accused under Section 325, Indian Penal Code but remanded the case to the trial Court for re-trial for an offence under Section 326, Indian Penal Code. It was directed that after the framing of charge under Section 326, Indian Penal Code against the accused, both the parties shall be given opportunity to adduce evidence again and thereafter the case shall be decided afresh by the trial Court on merits. It is against that order of remand of the case for re-trial, that accused has now come to this Court in revision.

    3. In the impugned Judgment the learned Addl. Sessions Judge has observed that Chotelal (P. W. 1) in his report (Ex. P-1) had stated that accused Babu Singh had bitten his nose by teeth. This was also the police statement of Chotelal. A reference to police statement was perhaps made by the Judge for the limited purpose of considering the matter about charge. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge further observed that Chotelal in his testimony before the Court had also deposed that accused Babu Singh had thrown him down on the ground and bitten his nose by teeth. Even Chotelals wife Mst. Devi (P.W. 4) had deposed that she saw the nose of her husband, which had been bitten by teeth. The learned Judge observed that the police ought to have filed a challan against the accused for an offence under Section 326. Indian Penal Code. Even if the police filed a challan for an offence under Section 325. Indian Penal Code, the learned trial Magistrate should have applied his mind and should have framed charge under Section 326. Indian Penal Code in place of Section 325. The names of A.P.P. and the defence counsel were not recorded in the order sheet by the trial Magistrate on the date when charge was framed by him against the accused. Hence it appeared that the trial Magistrate had. without hearing either the A.P.P. or the defence counsel and without applying his own mind, framed the charge under Section 325. Indian Penal Code just because the police had filed the challan for that offence. The material disclosed in the case justified the framing of charge under Section 326 Indian Penal Code. The learned trial Magistrate had committed another illegality inasmuch as he had not sentenced the accused to any substantive sentence of imprisonment but had merely fined him Rs. 1,000/-. It was mandatory to have inflicted substantive sentence of imprisonment on the accused for the offence under Section 325, Indian Penal Code. Considering all these alleged illegalities, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge by the impugned Judgment, while setting aside conviction and sentence of the accused under Section 325. Indian Penal Code, remanded the case for re-trial of the accused for an offence under Section 325, Indian Penal Code.

    4. Shri S.P.P. Shrivastava, learned counsel for the accused/applicant, contended that the alleged incident was said to have taken place on 17-11-1982. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge by the impugned Judgment dated 4-10-1990 i.e., after about 8 years of the alleged incident, had directed re-trial of the accused, which was nothing short of harassment of the accused. The accused will have to again run the gauntlet of a fresh trial, which may take some more years for decision. The learned counsel also drew the attention of this Court to certain pieces of evidence to contend that offence under Section 326. Indian Penal Code was not really made out. In this connection, the evidence of Dr. D. P. Shrivastava (P. W. 7) was placed for consideration, in which it was stated that Chotelal had sustained a lacerated wound 1"x 1" x bone deep on the right nostril. It was contended that the description of the wound as lacerated wound contraindicated that teeth were used to cause the injury. It was further pointed out that the doctor stated that the nose injury had disfigured the face and hence it was a grievous injury. The doctor, it was pointed out, did not say that the disfiguration was permanent. It could not therefore be said that the injury was grievous. As such, the offence under Section 326. Indian Penal Code was not made out. There was no justification for directing re-trial of the accused for the offence under Section 326, Indian Penal Code. The appeal should be directed to be heard on merits, for in that situation the accused will have the chance of securing an acquittal or at the worst, his conviction might be maintained and he may be required to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, which he has already paid in the trial Court after its Judgment. The accused should be spared of the agony arid ordeal of a fresh trial.

    5. Shri D.R. Sihare, learned counsel for non-applicant/State could not bring himself to support the impugned appellate Judgment directing re-trial.

    6. It needs to be emphasized that the power of ordering re-trial should be sparingly used and only for grave reasons. The order of re-trial has the effect of wiping out from the record the earlier proceedings and exposes an accused to another trial which may afford the prosecution an opportunity to rectify the infirmities disclosed in the earlier trial. A reference may here be made to the Supreme Court decision in Ukha Kolhe v. State Of Maharashtra . reported in AIR 1963 SC 1531. The following observations in that case are pertinent :

    "An order for retrial of a criminal case is made in exceptional cases, and not unless the appellate Court is satisfied that the Court trying the proceeding had no jurisdiction to try it or that the trial was vitiated by serious illegalities or irregularities or on account of misconception of the nature of the proceedings and on that account in substance there had been no real trial or that the Prosecutor or an accused was, for reasons over which he had no control, prevented from leading or tendering evidence material to the charge, and in the interests of justice the appellate Court deems it appropriate, having regard to the circumstances of the case, that the accused should be put on his trial again. An order of retrial wipes out from the record the earlier proceeding, and exposes the person accused to another trial which affords the prosecutor an opportunity to rectify the infirmities disclosed in the earlier trial."

    7. It is seen in the present case that the police itself filed a challan against the accused under Section 325, Indian Penal Code. That did not of course prevent the Magistrate from framing a proper charge. The fact remains that the learned Magistrate also framed the charge under Section 325, Indian Penal Code. The offence even under Section 326, Indian Penal Code was triable by the Magistrate himself. This was not a case where the Magistrate was trying to usurp the jurisdiction of the Court of Session and trying himself a case exclusively triable by the Court of Session. It is understandable that in that situation, the trial by the Magistrate would have been vitiated and an order of commitment on a charge exclusively triable by the Court of Session could have been passed by the higher Court. See Sanmukhsingh v. Emperor in AIR 1945 Sind 125 and Matukdhari Singh v. Janardan in AIR 1966 SC 356. That was not the situation in the present case. Not only the learned Magistrate in the present case framed a charge under Section 325, Indian Penal Code but even the State never felt aggrieved with that charge. The State did not challenge the correctness of the charge under Section 325, Indian Penal Code even before the learned Additional Sessions Judge. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge in the impugned Judgment has candidly observed that counsel for neither parties during the course of arguments before him raised any objection as to the charge. If that was so the learned Addl. Sessions Judge went clearly out of the way in directing something to be done which the party did not, and could not have asked to be done. Thus the State itself did not and could not have asked for framing of charge against the accused under Section 326, Indian Penal Code, when it had acquiesced to the framing of the charge against the accused under Section 325, Indian Penal Code in the Court of the Magistrate, constituting an implied discharge of the accused of offence under Section 326, Indian Penal Code. The State could have gone in revision under Section 398 Criminal Procedure Code against that order of implied discharge, but it did not. Even before the Addl. Sessions Judge the State did not challenge the correctness of the charge under Section 325, Indian Penal Code. In the circumstances what was not prayed for and could not have been asked for by the State; namely, framing of charge under Section 326, Indian Penal Code, could not have been directed by the Court itself in the manner the learned Addl. Sessions Judge sought to do. A re-trial is after all not a weapon to harass an accused or a sort of a bounty on the prosecution to enable it to do something which did not and could not have been asked for by it. The reasoning employed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge to direct re-trial was, to say the least, perverse and injudicious.

    8. For the foregoing reasons, this revision is allowed. The impugned Judgment of IInd Addl. Sessions Judge, Bhind in Cr.A. No. 38/89 dated 4-10-1990 directing re-trial of accused/applicant for the offence under Section 326, Indian Penal Code is set aside. It is further directed that the said Criminal appeal shall now be re-heard and disposed of expeditiously according to law. The accused/applicant Babu Singh shall appear before IInd Addl. Sessions Judge, Bhind for further proceedings in the appeal on 2nd March, 1993 without any notice from that Court.

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    Babu Singh Simbhoo Singh v. State Of Madhya Pradesh
    (Jan 18, 1993)