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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges the judgment of acquittal entered by the Fourth Additional Sessions Judge (Special Judge), Jabalpur, in Special Criminal Case No. 1 of 1982, dated 17-4-1982. The respondent, Vishnu Prasad Babele, was prosecuted for offences under Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1955, and under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code.

The prosecution alleged that on 15-5-1980, while working as Reader to the Executive Magistrate, the respondent accepted Rs. 50 as a bribe from two advocates (P.W. 1 Shri P.K. Tiwari and P.W. 2 Shri M.A. Khan) for securing the release on bail of one Ganesh Prasad, who had been produced under Section 107/116 CrPC. The advocates had applied for bail on 13-5-1980; Ganesh Prasad was allegedly not released then but was sent to jail. The advocates complained to the Vigilance Department; a trap was arranged using Rs. 50 treated with phenolphthalein and a panchanama prepared; on 15-5-1980 the money was passed to the respondent in court-room No. 12 and later the respondent's hands and pocket were washed producing a pink reaction, whereupon seizure and panchanama (Ex. P-7) were made and prosecution sanction (Ex. P-9) obtained.

At trial the Special Judge acquitted the respondent, holding that demand and acceptance of a bribe were not proved, independent witnesses were lacking, there were material variations in prosecution witnesses' statements, and the Executive Magistrate (P.W. 6 Shri U.D. Chaube) did not support the prosecution. The State appealed against that acquittal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent demanded and accepted a bribe of Rs. 50 for procuring bail (i.e., the core criminal allegations under the Prevention of Corruption Act and IPC Section 161).
  2. Whether the trial court's conclusion of acquittal was perverse and liable to be set aside by the appellate court, given the evidence (including the trap operation and recovery of marked notes).
  3. What legal principles govern evaluation of trap/ bribery cases — specifically the need for corroboration of trap witnesses, the application of presumptions under Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and the appellate court's approach to an appeal against acquittal where two views are possible.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (State) — Arguments

  • The findings of the learned Special Judge are perverse and should be reversed.
  • There were no material variations in the prosecution story; the Magistrate's file had been tampered with and contained interpolations.
  • The Executive Magistrate (P.W. 6 Shri U.D. Chaube) was biased in favour of the accused and therefore his unsupported testimony should not be relied upon.
  • There was no proof of enmity between the respondent and the two advocates (P.W.1 and P.W.2) whose testimonies supported the trap; hence their evidence should be accepted.
  • The demand and acceptance of a bribe were established, money was recovered from the respondent's possession, and accordingly the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.
  • Reliance was placed on several Supreme Court and High Court decisions (listed in the opinion) to support conviction in trap/bribery circumstances.

Respondent — Arguments

  • The respondent (a clerk/Reader) had no power to grant bail; bail orders are passed by the Court, so the prosecution story that the clerk had power (or exercised it) is inherently improbable.
  • The Executive Magistrate (P.W. 6 Shri U.D. Chaube) did not support the prosecution and was not declared hostile; his account undermined the prosecution story.
  • Material parts of prosecution witnesses' statements (P.W. 1, P.W. 2, P.W. 3, P.W. 13) were inconsistent and made the prosecution story unbelievable.
  • If the prosecution's central theory (delegation of power to the clerk and resultant demand) is disbelieved, the entire case collapses; the trial court was therefore right to acquit.
  • As an alternative, if two views of the evidence are reasonably possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the trial court's choice of the view favouring acquittal.
  • The respondent relied on authorities (listed in the opinion) to support the proposition that trap witness evidence requires independent corroboration and appellate restraint in interfering with acquittals.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sarupchand v. State of Punjab, AIR 1987 SC 1441 Principle cited: the absence of an explanation by the accused why he received money is noteworthy; adverse inference may follow when no suggestion was given that no money was received by the accused. The court noted this authority among others but, after reviewing the evidence and inconsistencies, found no error in the trial court's acquittal; it considered Sarupchand as part of the legal landscape but did not treat it as determinative here.
State of Gujarat v. Raghunath, AIR 1985 SC 1092

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

State Of U.P. v. O.K. Ghosh (Dr.), AIR 1984 SC 1453

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

State of Assam v. Krishna Rao, AIR 1973 SC 28

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

State of M.P. v. Dr. J.L. Jain (Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1985)

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Dwarkaprasad v. State (1987 MPLJ 527) Principles summarized for bribery/trap cases (as cited): burden of proof generally lies on prosecution even in trap cases; Section 4's presumption has limited application; acceptance must be wilful and voluntary; accused can rebut presumption on preponderance of probability; trap witnesses may require independent corroboration. The court relied on these enumerated principles to explain the proper approach to trap/bribery evidence and corroboration; this frame informed the evaluation that prosecution had not discharged its burden here.
Pannalal (Panalal) v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1979 SC 1191 Rule: the complainant in a bribery case (or person offering bribe) is in the position of an accomplice after introduction of Section 165-A IPC; therefore his evidence requires corroboration in material particulars. The court invoked this authority to emphasize that the prosecution's principal witnesses (those who gave the bribe/complainants) required corroboration in material particulars; this principle supported the trial court's insistence on corroboration and contributed to upholding the acquittal.
Gulam Mahmood v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1980 SC 1558 Principle: the complainant is in the nature of an accomplice and his testimony requires corroboration in material particulars before a court can act on it. The court cited this decision to reinforce the corroboration requirement for trap/complainant witnesses; the absence of such corroboration weighed against the prosecution.
Raghubir (Raghubir) Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 91 Principle: the officer laying a trap must endeavour to secure independent and respectable witnesses so that evidence in regard to the raid/trap inspires confidence. The court used this authority to underscore the need for independent panches/witnesses in trap cases; it found the prosecution had not secured adequate independent corroboration, supporting the acquittal.
Lachman Dass v. State of Punjab, AIR 1970 SC 450 Principle: there should be other evidence before relying solely on the word of a trap witness; in trap cases at least some panches should overhear or see something to which they can depose. Used by the court to highlight the inadequacy of uncorroborated trap testimony in this case; the shortage of independent witnesses informed the finding that prosecution failed to prove demand/acceptance.
Salim Khan v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1986 SC 307 Observation (quoted): circumstances may be suspicious where currency notes appear to have been inserted into a pocket rather than taken by pickpockets — indicating the possibility of fabrication. Referred to as an illustration of caution in accepting trap evidence where the physical circumstances suggest possible manipulation; contributed to the court's skepticism about the prosecution narrative.
Sita Ram v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1975 SC 1432 Principle: if the story of demand/payment of bribe is not established, the presumption under Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act cannot be invoked; mere recovery of money from an accused without proof that it was paid for official favour does not give rise to the presumption. The court relied on this authority to state that recovery of money alone was insufficient to raise the statutory presumption; because the prosecution had not proved payment/demand convincingly, the presumption could not be applied to convict.
Darshan Lal v. Delhi Admn., AIR 1974 SC 218 Principle: trap witnesses are interested or partisan and their evidence should not be relied upon without corroboration; courts should look for independent and unimpeachable evidence of the actual passing of currency in trap cases. The court cited this authority to support the position that the trial court was justified in requiring independent corroboration and in being cautious about accepting trap witness testimony without it.
Major S.C. Barsay v. State of Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 1762 Principle: (as cited) interested/partisan witnesses in trap cases warrant the court's caution and, in proper cases, independent corroboration may be required. The decision was cited for the established need for corroboration of interested trap witnesses; the court applied this to evaluate the trustworthiness of prosecution evidence here.
Suraj Mal v. The State (Delhi Admn.), AIR 1979 SC 1408 Principle: mere recovery of money, divorced from credible circumstances showing payment or voluntary acceptance as a bribe, is not sufficient when substantive evidence is unreliable. The court relied on this authority to hold that recovery alone (without reliable evidence of payment/demand) cannot sustain conviction; this point supported dismissal of the appeal.
Banshi Lal Yadav v. State of Bihar, AIR 1981 SC 1235 Principle: before the presumption under the Act can be raised, the prosecution must first prove that the accused accepted gratification for himself. Used to reinforce that statutory presumptions do not automatically apply on recovery alone; trial court’s conclusion that prosecution failed to prove acceptance meant the presumption could not be invoked.
Hari Dev v. State (Delhi Admn.), AIR 1976 SC 1489 Principle: where important parts of the prosecution case are disbelieved by the court, it may not be safe to sustain a conviction despite suspicious circumstances. The court cited this to justify not sustaining conviction in the face of the trial court's disbelief of essential parts of the prosecution case.
M. P. Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1974 SC 773 Principle: the accused may establish his case on the preponderance of probabilities; he need not prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt. Referred to show the standard by which the accused can rebut statutory presumptions — a factor considered in evaluating whether the respondent had successfully rebutted any presumptions in this case.
Autar Singh v. State of M.P., AIR 1979 SC 1188 Principle: while appellate powers are coextensive, a High Court should not lightly discard the trial court's view in an appeal against acquittal; where two views are possible, the appellate court should be slow to disturb an acquittal. The court relied on this authority to underscore appellate restraint; it concluded that the trial court's view was a reasonable one and should not be disturbed.
Dhan Kumar v. Delhi Municipality, AIR 1979 SC 1782 Principle: if two views of the evidence are reasonably possible, one favouring acquittal and the other conviction, the High Court should not reverse the order of acquittal. Applied by the court to support the conclusion that the appellate court should not upset the trial court's acquittal where the trial court reached a plausible and reasonable view favouring the accused.
Ramji Surjya (Ramji Suriya) v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1983 SC 810 Principle: in appeals against acquittal appellate courts must respect trial court's appreciation of evidence; reasons for reversing acquittal should be cogent and appellate interference must be cautious. The court cited this authority to reinforce the principle of appellate restraint and to justify upholding the acquittal in absence of cogent reasons to reverse it.
Bhajan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 674

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

C. Chellappan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1979 SC 1761

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Moti Ram Jai Singh Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (1985 (II) Crimes 18)

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Antar Singh v. State of M.P., AIR 1979 SC (citation as given)

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

K. Thevar v. State of T.N., AIR 1976 SC 980

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

State of Gujarat v. Gulam Mahmood / Gulam Mahmood v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1980 SC 1558 Principle: the complainant/offeror in bribe cases is akin to an accomplice; corroboration is necessary before acting on such testimony. Cited to reinforce the corroboration requirement; supported the conclusion that prosecution needed independent corroboration of the trap/complaint evidence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by first stating and summarizing the governing legal principles drawn from Supreme Court precedents concerning trap/bribery cases, corroboration, the role of trap witnesses, the operation of statutory presumptions (Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act) and appellate restraint in appeals against acquittal. Key legal points emphasized by the court (as stated in the opinion) included:

  • Complainants or persons who give bribes are regarded as being in the nature of accomplices; their testimony requires corroboration in material particulars before a court may safely act upon it (Pannalal, Gulam Mahmood).
  • The officer or agency laying a trap must endeavour to secure independent and respectable witnesses (panches) so the evidence of the raid/trap inspires confidence (Raghubir Singh, Lachman Dass).
  • Trap witnesses are interested/partisan and their evidence should be tested like that of any interested witness; in appropriate cases independent corroboration may be required (Darshan Lal, Major S.C. Barsay).
  • Mere recovery of money from an accused, absent reliable proof of its payment to obtain official favour, is insufficient to invoke the statutory presumption under Section 4(1) (Sita Ram, Suraj Mal, Banshi Lal Yadav).
  • Appellate courts should be slow to disturb an acquittal where the trial court's view is one of two reasonable views after assessing the evidence (Autar Singh, Dhan Kumar, Ramji Surjya).

Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, the court reviewed the testimony of prosecution witnesses for each relevant date (13-5-1980, 14-5-1980 and 15-5-1980) and identified material inconsistencies among P.W.1 (Shri P.K. Tiwari), P.W.2 (Shri M.A. Khan) and P.W.3 (Shri S.K. Shukla), as well as reliance by the trial court upon the Executive Magistrate P.W.6 (Shri U.D. Chaube), whose statements undermined the prosecution narrative.

Concretely:

  1. The trial court found the demand of bribe and its acceptance were not proved; the appellate court noted that the versions of the prosecution witnesses about the incidents on 13th and 14th May did not reconcile with each other.
  2. Regarding the 15-5-1980 trap, although the prosecution produced a panchanama, treated notes and a cloth/washing reaction, the trial judge disbelieved the prosecution witnesses (paras 21–25 of the trial judgment) and pointed to other surrounding circumstances that raised doubt.
  3. The trial court relied on the Executive Magistrate's statement that the bail order for Ganesh Prasad had already been passed on 13-5-1980 and that he had not asked the accused to write the order-sheet on 14-5-1980 — facts inconsistent with the prosecution's demand narrative. The appellate court accepted that reliance.
  4. The appellate court applied the established authorities to hold that the prosecution had failed to establish demand and acceptance beyond reasonable doubt, that recovery alone could not supply missing corroboration, and that the trial court's choice between two reasonable views (one favouring acquittal) should not be lightly disturbed.

The court concluded that there was no error in the trial court's judgment; the view taken by the trial court was "probable and reasonable" in light of the evidence and precedents regarding corroboration and appellate restraint.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed and the judgment of acquittal is maintained.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the respondent Vishnu Prasad Babele remains acquitted of the offences charged; the trial court's acquittal is affirmed.
  • The court reiterated established principles on trap cases: corroboration of complainant/trap-witness evidence is essential, recovery of money alone is not necessarily determinative, and appellate courts should be cautious about overturning acquittals when two reasonable views of evidence exist.
  • No new legal precedent or enlargement of law is stated in this opinion; the court applied and reaffirmed existing authorities and concluded that the trial court's assessment of evidence did not suffer from error warranting interference.

If any portion of the required information was not detailed in the provided opinion (for example some precedents were cited without an explicit rule or specific application in the text), that absence has been noted in the table above rather than inferred.

    State Of Madhya Pradesh v. Shri Vishnu Prasad Babele .

    1. This appeal arises out of the judgment of acquital Under Section 5(1)(d), read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1955, and also Under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, by the Fourth Additional Sessions Judge (Special Judge), Jabalpur in Special Criminal Case No. 1 of 1982, decided on 17-4-1982.

    2. The respondent Vishnu Prasad Babele was prosecuted on the allegation that, on 15-3-1980, while working as Reader to the Executive Magistrate, accepted Rs. 50/- as bribe from Shri P.K. Tiwari (P.W. 1), Advocate, and Shri M.A. Khan (P.W. 2), Advocate, for releasing one Ganesh Prasad son of Shambhoo Prasad, who was apprehended under Section 107/116 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on bail. The aforesaid Advocates were appearing for Ganesh Prasad and had applied for grant of bail on 13-5-1980. The said Ganesh Prasad was not released on 13-5-1980, but was sent to the jail. It is alleged that on 14-5-1980, two other accused persons were released, but not Ganesh Prasad, because the bribe was not given as demanded. The Advocates requested the Presiding Magistrate Shri U.D. Chaube (P.W. 6) to pass in order for release of Ganesh Prasad, but the Presiding Magistrate asked them to go and contact the Reader. Being disgusted with the attitude of the Magistrate and his Reader, the said Advocates made an application (Ex. P. 1) to the Vigilence Department for taking the Reader to task. Shri Hanumant Singh (P.W. 13) arranged a trap. Rs. 50/- were treated with phenolphthalein powder and Panchnama (Ex. P. 2) was prepared in the presence of P.W. 5 Shri Mahadeo Prasad Khare and other Officers. The money was handed over to the Advocates and a trap was laid on 15-5-1980.

    3. At about 3-00 p.m. on 15-5-1980, P.W. 1 Shri P.K. Tiwari and P.W. 2 Shri M. A. Khan along with P.W. 3 Shri S.K. Shukla, Advocate, went into the court-room No. 12 of Collectorate at Jabalpur and after some conversation with the accused-respondent, passed on the bribe money to him. The accused-respondent kept the money in his pocket. After receiving the signal, P.W. 5 Shri M. P. Khare and P.W. 13 Shri Hanumant Singh and others, reached the spot. The hands of the accused were washed with lotion of sodium carbonate powder and the same turned into pink colour. His pocket of the pant was also washed-which also turned into pink colour. Thereafter, a panchanama was prepared, which is Ex. P. 7. Seizure of the pant etc. was made vide Exs. P-4 and P-5. The concerning file was also seized vide Ex. P-6 Ex. P-7 is the Panchanama of the proceedings. Sanction to prosecute the respondent was obtained vide Ex. P-9 which is proved by P.W. 7 B.D. Jugade. The allegation of the prosecution is that the property in question had been changed, except the notes, which were seized from the possession of the respondent. The application for grant of bail dated 13-5-1980, filed by the learned Advocates, is also missing from the record.

    4. The learned Special Judge held that the demand of bribe and acceptance thereof, has not been proved. He further held that no independent witnesses were examined. The Executive Magistrate P.W. 6 Shri U.D. Chaube did not support the prosecution case. He was not declared hostile. The story of the prosecution is unbelievable. There had been material variations in the statements of the witnesses examined by the prosecution. Thus, the trial Court was of the view that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond all reasonable doubt.

    5. The learned counsel appearing for the State argued that the findings recorded by the learned Special Judge are perverse. There is no variation in the prosecution story. The file of the Magistrate had been tampared with and there had been material interpolations. The Magistrate Shri U.D. Chaube (P.W. 6) was out and out to help the accused respondent. Though he had not been declared hostile, but no reliance should have been placed on his version. No enmity between the accused-respondent and the two Advocates examined as P.W. 1 (Shri P.K. Tiwari) and P.W. 2 (Shri M. A. Khan) has been proved. The demand of bribe has been proved. The amount of bribe was accepted and the money was recovered from the possession of the accused-respondent. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the State that the prosecution has proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt. Reliance was placed on the decisions of --

    (i) Sarupchand v. State of Punjab, AIR 1987 SC 1441 : 1987 Cri LJ 1180.

    (ii) State of Gujarat v. Raghunath, AIR 1985 SC 1092 : 1985 Cri LJ 1357.

    (iii) State Of U.P v. O.K Ghosh (Dr)., AIR 1984 SC 1453 : 1983 All LJ 1170

    (iv) State of Assam v. Krishna Rao, AIR 1973 SC 28 : 1973 Cri LJ 169 and

    (v) The judgment of this Court, i.e., State of M.P. v. Dr. J.L. Jain (Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1985, decided on 27-3-1989).

    6. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent relied on the statement of P. W. 6 Shri U.D. Chaubey. He made a reference to para 6 of this witness's statement. He also referred to the statements of P.W. 1 Shri P.K. Tiwari, with special emphasis to paras 2, 23 and 25; P.W. 2 Shri M.A. Khan Paras 11,15, 21 and 22, P.W. 3, Shri S.K. Shuklaparas 10 and 12; and P.W. 13 Shri Hanumant Singh paras 20 and 27. His submission was that the respondent, who was merely a clerk, had no right to grant bail, as the bail orders are always passed by the Court and not by a clerk or Reader of the Court. The story that the Magistrate had delegated his power to his clerk, cannot be believed. The Magistrate was examined as P.W. 6 (Shri U.D. Chaube), but he did not support the prosecution story. He has not been declared hostile. The question was not put to him with regard to the delegation of power to his clerk by him. If this story of the prosecution is not believed, the entire case falls to the ground. In the end, it is submitted that the story put up by the prosecution, was rightly not believed by the learned Special Judge. In the alternative, it is submitted that if two views are possible and the trial Court acquitted the accused by accepting one of the two views, the appellate Court should not interfere, in an appeal against acquittal, with the view taken by the learned Special Judge. He referred to paras 8, 13, 14, 17, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26 and 31 of the judgment. He also relied on the following cases --

    (i) Dwarkaprasad v. State (1987 MPLJ 527);

    (ii) Pannalal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1979 SC 1191 : 1979 Cri LJ 936;

    (iii) Bhajan Singh v. State Of Punjab ., AIR 1977 SC 674 : 1977 Cri LJ 439;

    (iv) M.P. Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1974 SC 773 : 1974 Cri LJ 509;

    (v) Salim Khan v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1986 SC 307 : 1985 Cri LJ 1901;

    (vi) Surajmal v. State AIR 1979 SC 1408 : 1979 Cri LJ 1087;

    (vii) C. Chellappan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1979 SC 1761 : 1979 Cri LJ 1335;

    (viii) Moti Ram Jai Singh Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (1985 (II) Crimes 18);

    (ix) Ramji Suriya v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1983 SC 810 : 1983 Cri LJ 1105;

    (x) Antar Singh v. State of M. P., AIR 1979 SCI 188: 1979 Cri LJ 715;

    (xi) Dhan Kumar v. Delhi Municipality, AIR 1979 SC 1782 : 1979 Cri LJ 1343; and also

    (xii) K. Thevar v. State of T. N., AIR 1976 SC 980. and submitted that the judgment of the Special Judge does not suffer from any infirmity as pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant-State.

    7. Before I proceed to deal with the evidence and findings recorded in the case, I feel it my duty to state the law on the subject as decided by the Supreme Court. In the case of Panalal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1979 SC 1191 it has been held (at page SC 1192; AIR 1979 :

    "There could be no doubt that the evidence of the complaint should be corroborated in material particulars. After introduction of Section 165-A of the I.P.C. making the person who offers bribe guilty of abetment of bribery the complainant cannot be placed on any better footing than that of an accomplice and corroboration in material particulars connecting the accused with the crime has to be insisted upon."

    In the case of Gulam Mahmood v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1980 SC 1558 : 1980 CrilJ 1096 it has been held --

    "......the complainant is in the nature of an accomplice."

    "........Before any court could act on his testimony, corroboration in material particulars is necessary............"

    In the case of Raghubir Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 91 : 1976 Cri LJ 172 it has been held --

    "They must seriously endeavour to secure really independent and respectable witnesses so that the evidence in regard to raid inspires confidence in the mind of the court and the court is not left in any doubt as to whether or not any money was paid to the public servant by way of bribe........."

    xx xx xx xx xx .

    ".......The evidence in regard to the search of the appellant and the seizure of five marked currency notes from him is, in the context of the other facts and circumstances of the case, not such as to inspire confidence and cannot be implicitly accepted."

    In the case of Lachman Dass v. State of Punjab, AIR 1970 SC 450 : 1970 Cri LJ 526 it was held --

    ".......There ought to be some other evidence before his word can be accepted with so much other evidence to contradict him. In trap cases at least some panches over-hear the conversation or see something to which they can depose....."

    xx xx xx xx xx

    ".......We are satisfied that there is considerable room for doubt in this case and that the statement of Kishori Lal which alone is the foundation of the charge against the appellant cannot be accepted without corroboration."

    In the case of Salim Khan (supra), it was held --

    ".........very clever people who are young and agile are often victimised by pick-pockets and only when their valuables have been lost the fact is noticed by them. The process here is the reverse one. Instead of the pocket being picked, currency notes have been inserted into it....."

    In the case of Sita Ram v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1975 SC 1432 : 1975 Cri LJ 1224 it was held (at page 1436 SC; AIR 1975) --

    ".........The result is that not only the story of demand of bribe by the appellant from the complainant is not proved but even the story of payment of the money by the complainant is not established beyond reasonable doubt. That being so, the rule of presumption engrafted in Section 4(1) cannot be made use of for convicting the appellant."

    "....On mere recovery of certain money from the person of an accused without the proof of its payment by or on behalf of some person to whom official favour was to be shown the presumption cannot arise."

    In the case of Darshan Lal v. Delhi Admn., AIR 1974 SC 218 : 1974 Cri LJ 307 it was held --

    "......There is thus no independent reliable corroboration of the statements of Niranjan Lal and Anand Behari Lal as regards the first offer. Lastly, in this background it was proper to took for unimpeachable evidence as to the passing of the currency note from Niranjan Lal to the appellant. We have already indicated certain important circumstances which cast doubt on that story"
    .

    xx xx xx xx xx

    "Having regard to all these circumstances, we think it is a fit case whether the courts below should have required independent and trustworthy corroboration of the evidence of Niranjan Lal and Satish Chandra who had laid the trap........."

    8. In the case of Raghbir Singh (supra), it was held that the officer laying the trap must seriously endavour to secure really independent and respectable witnesses so that the evidence in regard to raid inspires confidence. Please also see : Lachman Dass v. State of Punjab, AIR 1970 SC 450.

    9. In the case of Darshan Lal (supra), it has been held that though the trap witness is an interested witness in the sense that he is interested to see that the trap laid by him succeeded. He could at least be equated with a partisan witness and it would not be advisable to rely upon his evidence without corroboration. The interested and partisan witnesses are concerned in the success of the trap. Their evidence must be tested in the same way as that of any interested witness and in proper case, the court may look for independent corroboration for convicting the accused person. Please also see : Major S.C. Barsay v. State of Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 1762 : 1961 (2) Cri LJ 828.

    10. Is the story of demand of bribe and its payment is not established, the rule of presumption engrafted in Section 4(1) cannot be made use for convicting the appellant. Sita Ram v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1975 SC 1432. In Suraj Mal v. The State, (Delhi Admn.), AIR 1979 SC 1408 it was said that mere recovery of money divorced from the circumstances under which it was laid was not sufficient when the substantive evidence in the case was not reliable to prove payment of the bribe or to show that the accused voluntarily accepted the money. In Banshi Lal Yadav v. State of Bihar, AIR 1981 SC 1235 : 1981 Cri LJ 741 the Court held that before presumption can be raised, the burden is on the prosecution to prove that the accused accepted any gratification for himself. In the case of Hari Dev v. State (Delhi Admn.), AIR 1976 SC 1489 : 1976 Cri LJ 1176 it is held (at page 1492 SC; AIR 1976) :--

    ".......Undoubtedly there are circumstances in this case which are highly suspicious against the appellant, but the High Court having disbelieved an essential part of the prosecution case on which the other part was dependent, we do not consider it safe to sustain the conviction of the appellant."

    11. In the case of M. P. Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1974 SC 773 : 1974 Cri LJ 509 the Supreme Court had held as under (at page 774 SC; AIR 1974) :--

    "7. the accused can establish his case by preponderance of probabilities, that is to say, he need not prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt."

    In Sarupchand v. State of Punjab, AIR 1987 SC 1441 it has been held--

    "11. No explanation has been given by the appellant why he received the money and kept the same into his pocket. Indeed, no suggestion was given to any witness that no money was received by the appellant."

    In Dwarkaprasad v. State, 1987 MPLJ 527 it has been observed --

    "7-A. The principles of law regarding the appreciation of evidence in bribery or trap cases; generally speaking, are as follows --

    (a) that the burden of proving the prosecution case, generally lies on the prosecution even in case of trap or bribery, this burden in not shifted by Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act; (b) that Section 4 has not limited application only for raising of presumption regarding the motive of the taking of money provided it is proved that the money was obtained or accepted by the accused; (c) that even in raising the presumption Under Section 4, the Act of acceptance or obtaining must be wilful, voluntary and with conscious mind; (d) that even where such a presumption is drawn, the accused can rebut it by showing there is a plausible

    " explanation and the basis of preponderance of probability of other theory; (e) the accused is not required to rebut this presumption by leading evidence beyond reasonable doubt. But all that is required to show is to establish preponderance of probability in his favour; (f) that the witnesses of trap are not to be discharged as accomplices but in a given case the court can insist on independent corroboration for believing their testimony."

    12. The Supreme Court, in the case of Autar Singh v. State of M. P., AIR 1979 SC 1188 : 1979 Cri LJ 715 has held as under (at page 1190 SC; AIR 1979) :--

    "11.......in an appeal against acquittal, the powers of the High Court in dealing with the case are as extensive as of the trial Court, but before reversing the acquittal, the High Court should bear in mind that the initial presumption of the innocence of the accused is in no way weakened, if not reinforced, by his acquittal of the trial, and further, the opinion of the trial Court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of the witnesses, as to the value of their evidence should not be lightly discarded. Where discarded. Where two views of the evidence are reasonably possible, and the trial court has opted for one favouring acquittal, the High Court should not disturb the same merely on the ground that if it were in the position of the trial court, it would have taken the alternative view and convicted the accused accordingly.--"

    In the case of Dhan Kumar v. Delhi Municipality, AIR 1979 SC 1782 : 1979 Cri LJ 1343 the Supreme Court has observed at page SC 1785, AIR 1979.

    "15. It is well settled that if two views of the evidence are reasonably possible, one favouring acquittal and the other conviction, the High Court should not reverse the order of acquittal."

    13. Ramji Surjya v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1983 SC 810 : 1983 Cri LJ 1105 it has been held as under at page 1110 : Cri LJ 1983.

    "11. -- While there is no doubt that the jurisdiction of an appellate court is coextensive with that of the trial court, in the case of an appeal against a judgment of acquittal it cannot totally brush aside the appreciation of the evidence by the trial court. The reasons for reversing a judgment of acquittal should be cogent and if two views are reasonably possible, the appellate court should be slow in interfering with the judgment of the trial court even if it is possible for it to take a different view after a process of laborious reasoning......"

    14. The first question which arises for consideration is whether the learned trial Court was right in holding that the prosecution has failed to prove that a demand for bribe was made by the accused-respondent? Shri P. K. Tiwari (P.W. 1), for the incident dated 13-5-1980, has stated as under :--

    ‘‘2 .................. दिन के करीब 12 बजे दिन या तो मुझे अभियुक्त ने कहा था दिन के करीब 2 बजे आये और उन्होंने यह भी कहा आप इन्तजाम से आयेगे उनका मतलब यह था पैसे बगैरा का इंतजाम करके आयेगें। प्द चंतं 3ए ीम ेजंजमे ..

    ‘‘3.............. 311-4 बजे में और श्री एम. ए. खान अधि. श्री यु. डी. चाबे कार्यपालिका दण्डाधिकारी के न्यायालय

    में पहूँचे। तो मैने अभियुक्त विष्णुप्रसाद अकेले से कहा में तबह कि कितने की जमानत आर्डर हुआ ताकि मैं जमानत का फार्म भर दूं। अभियुक्त विष्णु प्रसाद अकेले ने कहा अभी विष्णु प्रसाद की जमानत नहीं हुई है यु. डी. चैबे साहब घर चले गए है। मैं लौटने लगा तो मुझे अभियुक्त विष्णु प्रसाद अकेले में बुलाया और कहा वकील साहब 50-60 रुपये लेकर आएगे तभी जमानत होगी।

    15ण् च्ण्ॅण् 2 ैीतप डण्।ण् Khan, Advocate, has discribed the incident dated 13-5-1980 as under :--

    ‘‘2............... फिर मैं और श्री तिवारी मनेश की जमानत करनाने के लिये श्री यु. डी. चैबे कार्यपालिक दंडा. के न्यायालय में गये। यहाँ पर चैबे (यु. डी. चैबे) की अदालत में गये। ये डायस पर नहीं थे। उनके रीडर अभियुक्त बबेले जो न्यायालय में उपस्थित है उक्त न्यायालयों में उपस्थित मिले। अभ्यिुक्त बबेले ने हमें सूचित किया कि गणेश को अभिरक्षा में जेल भेज दिया गया है। और कार्यपालिका दंडा. चैबे भी अदालत में नहीं है। इसलिये गणेश प्रसाद की जमानत आज नहीं हो सकती थी।’’

    16ण् ैीतप न्ण्क्ण् ब्ींनइम ;च्ण्ॅण्6द्धए Executive Magistrate, has stated as under :--

    ‘‘1............. दि.

    13-5-80 को पुलिस लालगंज थरा अभियुक्त गणेश प्रसाद को धारा 151 में गिरप्तार कर 107 / 116 में भरे न्यायालय में पेश किया गया। मेरे द्वारा उसे दो हमार की सक्षम जमानत देने के आदेश दिए गये। जमानत पेश न करने पर उसे जेल भेजा गया। ;q- Mh- 2 मेरे दस्तखत है। उसी दि. 13-5-80 को मेरे द्वारा धारा 116 / 3 द.

    प्र. सं. के अंतर्गत आदेश पारित किये गये। उस अनुसार दो हजार रु. की जमानत अभियुक्त द्वारा पेश करनी थी। प्र. डी. 3 पर मेरे दस्तखत है।’’

    17. Thus, the difference in the versions of the three prosecution witnesses of the incident dated 13-5-1980 is apparent -- as they do not reconcil with each other.

    18. Regarding the incident dated 14-5-1980, the versions of the prosecution witnesses are as under :--

    P.W. 1 Shri P. K. Tiwari --

    ‘‘4.............. दि.

    14-5-80 को 13-12।। बजे दिन के श्री यु. डी. चैबे कार्यपालिका दण्डा. के कमरा नं. 12 स्थित है अभियुक्त गणेश की जमानत के बारे में गए खान साहब भी मेरे साथ थे। श्री एम. ए. खान एड. न श्री विष्णु प्रसाद अकेले से कहा अभियुक्त गणेश की फाइल निकाल लीजिये। विष्णु प्रसाद अकेले ने कहा मैं फाइल निकालता हूँ। तो मैं और श्री एम. ए. खान. अधि. आधे घंटे यहां बैठे रहे। दोबारा अभियुक्त के कहने पर फाईल गणेश की निकाल कर हमको दी जो काफी हीला हवाला कर फाईल निकाला। वो फाईल देखने पर पता लगा अभियुक्त गणेश की जमानत का आर्डर तब तक नहीं हुआ था। तो हम लोगों ने विष्णु प्रसाद बबेले से कहा आपने अभी तक फाईल साहाब के सामने नहीं रखी ओर जमानत का आर्डर नहीं करवाया तो फाईल साहाब के सामने रख दीजिए। अभियुक्त विष्णु प्रसाद बबेले ने कहा (साहब श्री यु. डी. चैबे) पता नहीं कहा गये। इसी बीच कोतवाली और गोरखपुर थाने के दो मुलजिम धारा 107 /116 भा. द. वि. उन्हें पेशं होने के करीब दो घंटे में जमानत पर अभियुक्त ने मुक्त कर दिये। दिन के एक बजे करीब जब उपरोक्त दोनों मुलजिम रिहा हुए तो हमें पता लग गया कि यु. डी. चैबे साहाब कलेक्टेड में कही बैठे है तो हमने विष्णु प्रसाद बबेले अभियुक्त से पूछा आप हमें बताइये कि श्री चैबे साहब कहां बैठे हैं। तो कोर्ट उपस्थित चपराशी ने हमें बताया कि श्री चौबे कार्यपालिक दण्डा. कापि सेक्शन कमरा नं.

    32 में बैठे हैं। फिर मैं और खान साहब कमरा नं. 32 में यु. डी. चैबे कार्यपालिक दण्डाधिकारी के पास गये। श्री चैबे के समझ हमने अभियुक्त गणेश के आवेदन पत्र की बहस की श्री चैबे ने कहा आप अभियुक्त विष्णुप्रसाद बबेले से फाईल पर जमानत के बारे में लिखवाकर लाईये। मैं और श्री खान अधि. वहां से वापस आए और अभियुक्त विष्णुप्रसाद बबेले के पास गए और हमने उन्हे बताया चैबे साहब में क्या कहा तब विष्णुप्रसाद बबेले ने हमें कहा हमें साल्वेन्सी की जमानत का आर्डर कर देता हूं। 5. मैंने अभियुक्त विष्णुप्रसाद बबेले से कहा आप ने अभी दो मुलजिमों का बिना साल्वेन्सी के आर्डर कर दिया जो अभियुक्त विष्णुप्रसाद ने हमें कहा आपको दूसरा रास्ता पैसो वाला बताया था। आप 5 रु. ले आईये तो गणेश की जमानत हो जायेगी। मैंने अभियुक्त विष्णुप्रसाद बबेले अभियुक्त से कहा हमारे पास पैसा नहीं है तो अभियुक्त विष्णुप्रसाद ने हमें कहा आपका काम नहीं होगा। P. W. 2 Shri M.A. Khan --

    ‘‘3...............फिर दिनांक 14-5-80 को हम उक्त न्या. में जमानत कराने गये। पुनः 11 बजे दिन को गये थे। उस समय भी श्री यु. डी. चैबे कार्यपालिका दंडा. अदालत में उपस्थित नहीं थे। अभियुक्त बबेले से हमने पूछा तो उन्होंने बताया कि पता नहीं कहां गये हैं। हमने अभियुक्त से कहा कि जमानत से क्या होगा तो अभियुक्त ने कहा कि जमानत से क्या होगा तो अभियुक्त ने कहा कि हमने कल भी आप से कहा था कि पचास रुपये ले आईये हम जमानत का आर्डर करवाकर रख लेेंगे। इसके बाद हमने अभियुक्त से कहा कि मुलजिम जेल में है और हमारे पास पैसे नहीं तो बबेले ने कहा कि बिना पैसा दिये जमानत का आर्डर नहीं हो सकता और जिन-जिन की दौलत में जमानत होती है साहब को उसका हिसाब देना पड़ता है। मैं और श्री पी. के तिवारी अधि. वापस आ गये। हमने चैबे साहब को वहां देखा तो वह नहीं मिले। 4. उसी दिन के सवा दो बजे हम फिर गये थे और पी. के. तिवारी अधिवक्ता पुनः उसी अदालत में गये। उस समय भ्ज्ञी श्री चैबे कार्यपालिक दंडा. अपनी अदालत में मौजूद नहीं थे। अभियुक्त विष्णुप्रसाद से हमने पूछा कि चैबे साहब कहा है और गणेश कि जमानत का क्या हो रहा है। अभियुक्त ने कहा कि चैबे चाहब पता नहीं कहां है और गणेश की जमानत के बारे में हमने रास्ता बता दिया है और आप करना ही नहीं चाहते। उसके बाद में और भी श्री तिवारी श्री चैबे को कलेक्टेड के अन्य कमरो में नहीं मिले। चैबे जी का न्या. कमरा नम्बर 12 में है। किन्तु हमे वे कमरा नम्बर 32 में मिले। वहां मैं और तिवारी उनसे मिले। और प्रार्थना की कि गणेश की जमानत ली जाये। उनने कहा कि आप हमारे बबेने (रीडर्) से लिखा लाइये। हम वहां से फिर कमरा नम्बर 12 में बबेले अभियुक्त के पास आये। मैंने अभियुक्त से कहा कि लिखकर दे दीजिये। तो अभियुक्त ने कहा कि पांच हमार रुपये की साल्वन्सी लगेगा तब जमानत होगी। हमने कहा हम पाच हजार की साल्वेन्सी कहां से लायेगें तो अभियुक्त ने कहा कि दूसरी तरकीब यानी की पचार रुपये दो और अभियुक्त को जमानत पर छुडा लो फिर मैं और श्री पी. के. तिवारी उक्त कमरे में रुक रहे। 5. हमने देखा कि गोरखपुर थाने के सिपाही करीब दो मुलजिम को लेकर आये थे। उनसे भी अभियुक्त बनेले ने कहा कि पाचास रुपये दो हम अभी हथकड़ी छुड़वा देते हैं। उनमें से एक अभियुक्त से पाचस रुपये लेकर अभियुक्त ने हथकड़ी से छुड़वा दिया। 6. हम लोगों को यह बात बुरी लगी कि अभियुक्त ने पचास रुपये लेकर दूसरे मुलजिम को जमानत पर छोड़ दिया और हम दो दिन से जमानत के लिये परेशान थे। फिर मैं और श्री चैबे की कोर्ट से आने लगे तो बबेले ने दूसरे मूलजिम से कहा कि दो दा वकील गये थे ये जमानत पर नहीं छुड़ा सके पचास रुपये दो हम अभी तुम्हें छुड़ा देते है। उस अभियुक्त का नाम संतोष था। फिर हम बाहर आ गये। च्ण्ॅण् 6 ैीतप न्ण्क्ण् ब्ीवनइमल ..

    ‘‘2.............. दि.

    14-5-80 को जब में सहायक अधीक्षक श्री चैबे के कमरे में बैठा था उस समय

    दो सज्जन जिन्हें में नहीं जानता था वे मेरे पास आए और उन्होंने गणेशप्रसाद की जमानत के संबंध में मुझसे निवेदन किया था कि गणेशप्रसाद की जमानत करवाने आए है उनसे कहा कि वे न्यायालय में चले मैं वही आता हूं। तद्पश्चात ने अपने न्यायालय में आया किन्तु वे दोनों व्यक्ति मुझे नहीं मिले।’’ The difference in the version of the three prosecution witnesses can be noticed.

    19. Regarding the incident dated 15-5-1980, the versions of the prosecution witnesses are reproduced hereunder --

    P. W. 1 Shri P. K. Tiwari --

    ‘‘8. फिर दिन के 3 बजे में आर.

    एम. ए. खान एड. आर श्री खरे एकाउन्ट आफीसर कलक्टेड़ पहुंचे और श्री यु. डी. चैबे कार्यपालिका दण्डाधिकारी के यहां पहुंचे। कलेक्टेड के मुख्य द्वार के पास हमे श्री शिवकान्त शुक्ला एड. मिले उन्होंने हमसे पुछज्ञ आप लोग यहां कैसे तो हमने काह गणेश की जमानत करवाने आए हैं। जो धरा 107 / 116 द. प. में बंद हैं और 50 रु.

    रिश्वत बबेले बाबू को देने आये हैं। श्री एम. ए. खान एड. ने श्री शिवकान्त शुक्ला से कहा आप यहां कैसे आए तो श्री शुक्ला साहब ने बताया मैं कलेक्टर के पास एक डेपूटेशन लेकर आया हूं। इतनी बातचीत हुई तो मैं और खान और श्री शुक्ला एड. यू. डी.

    चैबे कार्यपालिक दण्डाधिकारी के न्यायालय में प्रविष्ट हो गये। मैं और श्री एम.

    ए. खान एड. श्री विष्णुप्रसार बबेले की टेबिल के पास पहुंचे और मैंने अभियुक्त विष्णुप्रसार बबेले से कहा आप कल वालेगणेश मुलजिम की फाइल निकाल दीजिये जमानत करवाना है। तो मुझसे अभियुक्त विष्णुप्रसाद ने पूछा दूसरा रास्तां बताया था उसकी तैयारी से आए हो कि नहीं तो मैंने कहां आप है आप फाइल निकालिए। अभियुक्त विष्णुप्रसाद बबेले ने फाईल निकाली और मैने विष्णुप्रसाद बबेले को 50 रु. दे दिए। मैं अन्दर की खड़ा रहा और मेरे साथ श्री एम. ए. खान एड. न्यायालय

    से बाहर चले आए। मैंने अन्दर से देखा श्री एम. ए. खान एड. ने अपना चश्मा उतारकर 2-3 बार इशारा किया उस इशारे के कारण हनुमंतसिंह, प्रकाश खरे इन्सपेक्टर, रामायणसिंह, दो तीन सिपाही और एकाउन्ट आफीसर खरे श्री यु. डी. चैबे के न्यायालय

    में प्रविष्ट हो गए। फिर हनुमंतसिंह सकर्िल इन्सपेक्टर ने अपना परिपत्र भी विष्णुप्रसाद बबेले को दिया और हनुमंतसिंह ने अभियुक्त से कहा अभी वकील साहब तिवारी जी से 50 रु. दिए है वह निकालिये। अभियुक्त ने मौके पर ही हनुमंतसिंह से कहा मैंने रुपये नहीं लिए। याद में हनुमंतसिंह ने दो गिलास में पानी बुलाया एक गिलास में पानी सोडियम काबर्ोनेट पाउडर डाला तो उसमें कोई कलर नहीं आया। दूसरे गिलास म हनुमंतसिंह ने सोडियम काबर्ोनेट डाला किनाकथिलन पाउडर डाला और अभियुक्त विष्णुप्रसाद का हाथ धुलवाया तो उस पानी में हल्का गुलाबीर कलर आ गया। मौके पर जा पानी हल्के गुलाबी रंग का हो गया उसकी जप्ती बनाई अपने फुलपेट क बायें खीसे से निकालकर अभियुक्त ने 50 रु. दिए। यह वही रुपये थे जो मैंने विष्णुप्रसाद बबेले को दिये थे। इन 50 रु. के नोटो के नंबर मिलान किए गए, एफ आई आर के नंबर से मिल गये और श्री खरे ने अपने छोटे दस्तखत भी देखे जो इन नोटोपर ये खरे साहब ने अपने हस्ताक्षर पहचान लिए।’’ P. W. 2 Shri डण्।ण् ज्ञींद ‘‘11. कोर्ट रुम में श्री चैबे उपस्थित नहीं थे यहां पर अभियुक्त बबेले उपस्थित थे। श्री पी. के तिवारी ने कहा कि मुलजिम गणेश की जमानत करवा दीजिये। अभियुक्त बबेले ने कहा कि रुपये लाये हो क्या ‘अभियुक्त बबेले ने कहा कि मांगे तो तिवारी अपनी कमीज के बाये जेब से निकालकर पचास रुपये बबेले को दे दिया। अभियुक्त ने गणेश की फाईल निकालकर टेबिल पर रखी तिवारी ने जो नोट दिये थे वह अभियुक्त बबेले ने पेंट के बाये जेब में रख लिये थे इसके बाद जैसे कि तय था में उक्त कमरे से बाहर आया। मैंने अपना चशम दो-तीन बार लगाया और निकाला। ये इस बात का निगनल था था कि मुलजिम us iSls ys लिये हैं। वरान्डे में यूरेनियल के पास बिजनेस इन्सपेक्टर हनुमंत अपने साथियों सहित उक्त कमरे में प्रविष्ट हो गये। मैं भी कमरा नम्बर 12 में आ गया। फिर हनुमंतसिंह ने बबेले से कहा खड़े हो जाओ। और अभियुक्त बबेले के दोनों हाथ इन्सपेक्टर हनुमंत ने पकड़ लिये। फिर एक गिलास में साहिडयम काबर्ेनेट का बोल हनुमंत ंिसंग ने बनाया। वह धोल बिना रंग का था। और अभियुक्त बबेले के हाथ उस घोल में हल्का गुलाबी रंग हो गया। फिर अभियुक्त बबेले का पेंट उतरवाकर पेंट की जेब को उस पानी में डाला गया तो उसका रंग हल्का गुलाबी हो गया। उक्त पेंट को सील किया गय। गणेश का ये प्रकरण कार्यपालिका दंडा. केन्या. में था वह भी जप्त किया गया। अभियुक्त की जेब से पचास रुपये के अतिरिक्त सिक्सटी सेवन रुपये और निकले। इन नोटो को अलग-अलग जप्त किया गया। पचास रुपये के नोट जिनके नम्बर नोट किये गये थे और जिन पर खरे साहब के इनीशियल करवाये गये थे, तो उन्हें भी बेरीफाई किया गया। फिर जप्ती की कार्यवाही पूरी हो गयी। और इस कार्यवाही का पंचनामा बनाया गया।’’ च्ण् ॅण् 3 ैीतप ैीपआंदज ैीनासं ..

    ‘‘ 1............... मुझे पी.

    के. तिवारी वकील साहब और एम. ए. खान वकील सा. मिले। मैंने खान साहब से पूछा आप तो याहं दिखते ही नहीं आज कैसे आए। उन्होंने बताया कि चैबे साहब के कोर्ट में जो बबेले है वह बड़ा परेशान कर रहा है सो मैनं कहा वे तो भले आदमी है तो तिवारी और खानप वकील सा. ने मुझे कहा आप चलकर बोल दो। फिर में तिवारी और खान अधि. बबेले के पास चैबे के कोर्ट में गए। मैंने अभियुक्त बबेले से कहा इनका काम कर दो इन्हे तंग क्यों कर रहे हो। तब तक पी. के. तिवारी ने कहा मैं भी आया हूं अभियुक्त बबेले ने हम तीनों के सामने कहा 50 रु. लाए हो क्या। तो पी. के तिवारी अधि. ने कहा हां मैं रुपये लाया हूं किन्तु जमानत तो करा दो। फिर पी. के.

    तिवारी ने 50 रु. निकालकर अभियुक्त बबेले को दिया। अभियुक्त बबेले ने वह रुपये अपनी पेंट की जेब में रख लिये। फिर बबेले अभियुक्त ने फिर तिवारी और खान अधि. से कहा आप बैठिये और फिर ये लोग वही बैठे रहे और मैं चला गया। वह फाईल आलमारी में थी जिसे अभियुक्त बबेले ढूंडरहे थे।’’ च्ण् ॅण् 6 ैीतप न्ण्क्ण् ब्ीवनइमल ..

    ‘‘3. दि. 15-5-80 को लंच इन्टरवल के बाद में दिन के 2 बेज ही डायल पर आकर बैठ गया था। 15-5-80 के शाम को मुझे को कोई बात का पता नहीं लगा। दि. 15-5-80 के शाम को करीब 5।। बजे मुझसे श्री तिवारी और खान अधि. ने अभियुक्त गणेश की जमानत के बारे में बातचीत की तब मुझे उन लोगों ने श्री तिवारी और खान को बताया आपके कोर्ट में टेप हो गया है।’’

    20. The learned Special Judge, in paras 12 to 18 of his judgment, has discussed the testimony of all the above witnesses and has come to the conclusion that the allegation of demand of bribe has not been proved. He relied on the statement of Shri U. D. Choubey, Executive Magistrate, for holding that the order for release of Genesh Prasad was already passed on 13-5-1989. Hence, there was no question of demanding the bribe of Rs. 50/- on 13th or 14th of May, 1980 as alleged by the prosecution. In para 20 of his judgment, the learned lower Court has again relied on the statement of Shri U. D. Choubey, Executive Magistrate, who had stated that he did not ask the accused to write the order-sheet on 14-5-1980. Hence, there was no occasion for him to demand the bribe on that day. The learned Judge, regarding the incident dated 15-5-1980, has discussed in his judgment (paras 21 to 25) the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2 and 3, viz., Shri P. K. Tiwari, Shri M. A. Khan and Shri Shivkant shukla and has disbelieved them. He has pointed out other circumstances also for holding the prosecution story doubtful. In my view, there is no error in the judgment of the trial Court, for holding the respondent-accused not guilt of the offences with which he was charged. The view taken by the trial Court is probable and reasonable.

    21. I, therefore, find no substance in this appeal, which is hereby dismissed.

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    State Of Madhya Pradesh v. Shri Vishnu Prasad Babele .
    (Oct 3, 1989)