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Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion — Appeal under Section 110‑D, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal under Section 110‑D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 directed against an award dated 2.3.1981 made by the Member, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Dewas in Claim Case No. 14 of 1978 (old No. 78 of 1974).

The deceased, Mitthu Lal (aged 24), worked on daily wages in truck No. MPE 3625. On 11.8.1973 the truck was stuck in mud near Bank Note Press, Dewas. To pull it out, truck No. MPE 8775 (belonging to respondent Mishri Lal and Champa Lal) was brought; respondent No.3 Udai Lal was driving that truck which was insured with respondent No.4 against third party risk.

According to the appellants, after the recovery task was over, Udai Lal drove the truck in reverse without warning to give a push and Mitthu Lal was crushed between the rears of the two trucks, resulting in instantaneous death.

The widow Meera Bai and the parents filed a claim petition under Section 110‑A against the owners, driver and insurer of truck No. MPE 8775 claiming Rs. 50,000. The petition alleged the deceased earned Rs.15–20 per day and about Rs.350 per month and attributed the accident to rash and negligent driving by Udai Lal.

The claim was contested by Mishri Lal and the insurer (respondent No.4) by written statements. Champa Lal and Udai Lal remained ex parte from the start; Mishri Lal was later set ex parte. The insurer alleged negligence on the part of the deceased and the driver of the other truck.

The Tribunal found both drivers negligent in equal measure, assessed annual dependency at Rs.1,200 (monthly income taken as Rs.200), applied multiplier 20 to reach Rs.24,000, reduced to Rs.20,000 after deductions for uncertainties, then halved liability because of the other negligent driver not impleaded, and awarded Rs.10,000.

The claimants (appellants) appealed, arguing sole negligence of Udai Lal (or alternatively that in cases of composite negligence the claimant can recover full compensation from either joint tortfeasors), and challenged the deduction for uncertainties. The insurer contested the appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Tribunal's finding of composite negligence (i.e., negligence attributable to drivers of both trucks) was correct, or whether the accident was occasioned solely by the negligence of respondent Udai Lal.
  2. If composite negligence is assumed, whether non‑impleading of the other tortfeasor absolves or reduces the legal liability of the tortfeasor who has been sued (i.e., whether apportionment of liability is required between joint tortfeasors).
  3. What is the correct measure of compensation (income, annual dependency, appropriate multiplier, and deductions such as for lump sum payment or uncertainties of life) in the facts of this case?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The accident was caused solely by the negligence of Udai Lal (driver of truck MPE 8775).
  • Even if the case is one of composite negligence, under the law of torts the claimants are entitled to recover the entire compensation from either of the joint tortfeasors (i.e., apportionment should not defeat recovery from a sued tortfeasor).
  • The deduction made by the Tribunal for uncertainties of life was challenged as being contrary to recent trends in decisions (i.e., sought a larger award).

Respondent No. 4 (Insurer) and Other Respondents' Arguments

  • The insurer contested the claim on several grounds in its written statement, including that negligence of the deceased and of the driver of the other truck contributed to the accident.
  • The insurer's counsel relied on a decision (M.P.S.R.T.C. v. Satish Mittal, Civil Revision No. 328 of 1977, decided 10.3.1980) holding that liability for compensation must be apportioned between negligent parties in accordance with the amendment of 1969 in Section 110‑B.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Manjula Devi Bhuta v. Manjusri Raha, 1968 ACJ 1 (MP) Authority interpreted Section 110‑B; relied on Pollock on Torts to state that a victim of composite negligence can sue all or any of the negligent persons. The court reviewed Manjusri Raha and the Pollock excerpt; it noted prior reliance on the treatise for the proposition that a claimant can sue any joint tortfeasor and used that principle in rejecting apportionment in composite negligence.
M.P.S.R.T.C. v. Satish Mittal, Civil Revision No. 328 of 1977 (decided 10.3.1980) Held that, in view of the 1969 amendment to Section 110‑B, liability for compensation must be apportioned in the ratio of negligence causing the accident. The insurer relied on this decision to argue for apportionment. The court considered it but ultimately rejected apportionment on the facts and legal reasoning it applied.
Rama Bai alias Meenakshi v. H. Mukunda Kamath, 1986 ACJ 561 (Karnataka) Decision supporting the view (following Manjusri Raha) that the claimant can recover full compensation from either joint tortfeasor. The appellants relied on this decision; the court cited it among authorities supporting the position that apportionment is not required where composite negligence exists.
Shankarrao Prahladrao Joshi v. Babulal Fouzdar, 1982 ACJ (Supp) 338 (MP) Held that Sections 110‑A to 110‑F are procedural and that liability for compensation should be determined with reference to the Fatal Accidents Act and the general law of torts (not merely by a narrow procedural view). The court invoked this Division Bench decision to support the proposition that liability assessment should follow general tort principles and the Fatal Accidents Act; it noted that the current view is these provisions are partly substantive.
Nandlal Asadmal v. M.P.S.R.T.C., 1980 MPWN 99 Held that where both drivers were negligent they were joint tortfeasors and compensation could be claimed from one of them alone. The court cited this decision as authority consistent with allowing recovery from one tortfeasor despite composite negligence, supporting its conclusion against apportionment.
Kerala State Electricity Board v. Kamalakshy Amma, 1987 ACJ 251 (Kerala) Explains that under Section 110‑B the Tribunal has wide discretion to award compensation that appears just; arithmetic must not be treated as the sole criterion. The court relied on this to emphasise the Tribunal's wide discretion in assessing just compensation and to justify a flexible approach in the present assessment.
State of M.P. v. Devi Rawat, 1981 JLJ 42 One method of assessing compensation is to determine annual dependency and apply a suitable multiplier; factors such as lump sum payments and uncertainties of life should be considered. The court referred to this decision for methodological guidance in selecting the multiplier and considering other relevant factors in quantifying dependency and compensation.
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pushpa Kunwar, 1983 ACJ 629 (MP) Declined to allow deductions for lump sum payment and uncertainties where future prospects were not taken into account. The court cited this case among authorities on whether to allow deductions for lump sum and uncertainties while assessing compensation.
Nasib Kaur v. Balbir Singh, 1987 ACJ 366 (Delhi) Did not allow deduction on account of lump sum payment because of high inflation and liabilities towards dependents (four minor children). The court cited this decision as part of the jurisprudence regarding whether deductions should be made for lump sum payment or uncertainties.
Satyawati Sethi v. Subhash Chand, 1987 ACJ 441 (Delhi) No deduction made as future rise in salary and effect of price rise had not been accounted for. The court used this case while surveying authorities on deductions and future prospects in quantifying compensation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two main strands: (A) factual responsibility for the accident and (B) the legal question of apportionment and assessment of compensation.

A. Factual analysis of responsibility

  • The court examined testimony (Wasudeo, AW 3; Ramdayal, AW 4; and other evidence) and found the two trucks faced opposite directions and were tied by a rope.
  • The deceased was removing the rope when the accident truck (driven by Udai Lal) was driven in reverse to give a push; this was done without any warning.
  • As a result the deceased was crushed between the hind portions of the two trucks. Because the other truck was stationary, the court concluded no negligence could be attributed to its driver.
  • Accordingly the court held the Tribunal's finding of composite negligence was clearly wrong on the evidence and found the accident was occasioned solely by the negligence of respondent Udai Lal.

B. Legal analysis: apportionment and liability

  • The court considered whether non‑impleading of another tortfeasor should absolve or reduce liability of the tortfeasor who has been sued.
  • The insurer relied on a single‑Bench decision (M.P.S.R.T.C. v. Satish Mittal) holding that, after the 1969 amendment to Section 110‑B, liability must be apportioned. The appellants relied on authorities (including Rama Bai and Manjusri Raha) supporting the rule from Pollock on Torts that a victim of composite negligence may sue any or all negligent persons.
  • The court reviewed the line of authorities, including Division Bench and Full Bench references, and observed that while some decisions emphasize procedural character of Sections 110‑A to 110‑F, the current view recognises those provisions as partly substantive.
  • Relying on earlier precedents and the Pollock passage, and on decisions such as Nandlal Asadmal, the court concluded that notwithstanding the amendment, the legal position is that where an accident is caused due to composite negligence of two drivers it is not a case for apportionment (the case is not one of contributory negligence). Thus apportionment was not required to reduce the defendant's liability in such circumstances.

C. Assessment of compensation

  • The court reviewed authorities on the Tribunal's discretion under Section 110‑B (Kerala State Electricity Board v. Kamalakshy Amma) and the necessity to apply a just, not purely arithmetical, approach.
  • On the deceased's income, the court found that the claimants' witnesses had exaggerated the income. The Tribunal's finding that the deceased's average monthly income was Rs.200 was accepted by the court.
  • The court assessed annual dependency at approximately Rs.1,500 and applied a multiplier of 20, resulting in Rs.30,000 as the basic compensation figure.
  • The court noted Rs.1,000 had been paid ex gratia and stated that after deduction of that sum the figure would constitute just compensation; the court ordered payment of Rs.30,000 to the appellants (see final order paragraph for payment direction and interest/costs terms).

Holding and Implications

APPEAL PARTLY ALLOWED

Holding (direct effect on parties):

  • The court set aside the Tribunal's conclusion of composite negligence and held that the accident was occasioned solely by the negligence of respondent Udai Lal.
  • The court assessed just compensation at Rs.30,000 in the circumstances of the case and ordered the respondents to pay Rs.30,000 to the appellants. The respondents shall bear their own costs, pay the appellants' costs of the appeal, and the principal amount shall carry interest at 12% per annum from the date of application till realisation. Counsel's fee of Rs.200 is directed if certified.

Legal implications (as stated by the court):

  • On the legal question of apportionment, the court held that notwithstanding the amendment in Section 110‑B, where an accident is caused by the composite negligence of two drivers, the correct legal position is that apportionment is not appropriate in the manner contended for by the insurer — the claimant may recover against a single tortfeasor rather than have liability reduced by non‑impleading of another tortfeasor.
  • The court emphasised the Tribunal's wide discretion under Section 110‑B to award just compensation and reiterated accepted principles on assessing dependency, appropriate multipliers and consideration of lump sum/uncertainties in particular factual contexts.

No suggestion is made in this summary that the court created or announced a novel principle beyond the reasoning reflected in the opinion; the court applied existing authorities and made factual findings specific to this case.

    Meera Bai And Others v. Mishri Lal And Others

    1. This appeal under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short 'the Act') is directed against the award dated 2.3.1981 made by the Member, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Dewas (for short 'the Tribunal') in Claim Case No. 14 of 1978, the old number being 78 of 1974.

    2. For the purpose of this appeal it is not in dispute that the deceased Mitthu Lal, aged 24 years, was working in the accident truck bearing registration No. MPE 3625 on daily wages. This truck, on 11.8.1973 at about 10.30 a.m., was stuck in the mud near Bank Note Press, Dewas. In order to pull it out, the accident truck bearing registration No. MPE 8775 which belonged to the respondent Mishri Lal and the deceased respondent Champa Lal, was brought on the scene. At the relevant time the respondent No. 3 Udai Lal was its driver and it was insured with respondent No. 4 against third party risk.

    3. According to the appellants, after the task was over, Udai Lal in order to give the stationary track a push with a view to start it, drove the accident truck in the reverse direction with the result that Mitthu Lal was crushed between the back portions of the two trucks and met an instantaneous death.

    4. The appellant Meera Bai, the widow of the deceased Mitthu Lal and his parents filed the claim petition under Section 110-A of the Act only against the two owners, driver and the insurer of the truck No. MPE 8775 claiming a sum of Rs. 50,000/- as compensation. According to them the deceased was earning Rs. 15/- to Rs. 20/- per day by working as labourer in the truck and by preparing tiles during spare time; he was earning Rs. 350/-per month on an average. In the claim petition it was stated that the accident was occasioned due to rash and negligent driving by Udai Lal.

    5. The claim was contested by the respondent Mishri Lal and the respondent No. 4 the insurer. They filed separate written statements. Champa Lal, the other owner of the truck and the driver Udai Lal remained ex parte from the very start. At later stage Mishri Lal too was set ex parte.

    6. Respondent No. 4, the insurer, contested the claim on several grounds. According to the written statement the accident had occurred due to the negligence of the deceased as also that of the driver of the other truck.

    7. The learned Tribunal at the conclusion of the trial held that the respondent Udai Lal had himself, without any signal, driven the truck and was responsible for the accident together with the driver of the other truck who was negligent in equal measure. It held that the deceased was aged 24 years and was earning Rs. 200/- per month. The annual dependency was assessed at Rs. 1,200/- and applying the multiplier of 20, compensation was assessed at Rs. 24,000/-. From this, after deduction for uncertainties of life the figure of Rs. 20,000/- was arrived at. As the accident was found to be also as a result of the negligence of the other driver, who had not been imp leaded, the liability of the driver, the owners and the insurer of the accident truck was reduced by 50 per cent and ultimately an award in the sum of Rs. 10,000/- was made.

    8. Aggrieved by the award, the claimants preferred this appeal. According to them the accident was occasioned solely due to the negligence of Udai Lal. It is urged that assuming that the case is of composite negligence, under the law, the entire compensation could be recovered from either of the joint tortfeasors. The deduction for uncertainties of life was challenged as being against the current trend of decisions.

    9. The learned counsel for the insurer has controverted the contentions sought to be canvassed on behalf of the claimants.

    10. It may be stated at the outset that during the pendency of this appeal, Kala Bai, the mother of the deceased and the respondent Champa Lal died and their legal representatives are on record.

    11. The point for consideration is whether the appeal deserves to be allowed.

    12. From a perusal of the evidence of Wasudeo, AW 3 and Ramdayal, AW 4, it is gathered that the two trucks were facing towards opposite directions and were tied by a rope. When the deceased was engaged in removing the rope, the accident truck was driven in the reverse to give a push to the other truck which was stationary so that it might start. This driving was done without any warning and as a result the deceased was crushed between the hind portions of the two trucks. As the other truck was stationary, I hold that no negligence can be attributed to its driver.

    13. On a careful consideration of the evidence on record I find that the conclusion of the learned Tribunal that the accident was occasioned due to the composite negligence of the drivers of the two trucks is clearly wrong. I find that the accident was occasioned solely due to the negligence of the respondent Udai Lal.

    14. Assuming that the accident was occasioned by composite negligence, the question is whether the non-imp leading of the other tortfeasor has the effect of either absolving or reducing the extent of the legal liability of the one sued.

    15. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 relied on a single Bench decision of this court in M.P.S.R.T.C. v. Satish Mittal Civil Revision No. 328 of 1977; decided on 10.3.1980 and contended that the liability for compensation has to be apportioned in the ratio of negligence occasioning the accident in question. In the aforesaid decision, in view of the amendment of 1969 in Section 110-B of the Act, observing that the decision in Manjula Devi Bhuta v. Manjusri Raha 1968 ACJ1 (MP), was distinguishable, it has been held that the liability of the joint tortfeasors has to be apportioned.

    16. The learned counsel for the appellants contends that as the liability has to be determined according to the law of Torts there is no question of apportioning the liability and the claimants are entitled to recover the entire compensation from either or both of them. In support of this contention he has placed reliance on the decision in Rama Bai alias Meenakshi v. H. Mukunda Kamath 1986 ACJ 561 (Karnataka), in which the decision in Manjula Devi Bhuta v. Manjusri Raha 1968 ACJ 1 (MP), has been relied upon.

    17. In the Division Bench decision in Shankarrao Prahladrao Joshi v. Babulal Fouzdar 1982 ACJ (Supp) 338 (MP), relying on a Full Bench decision of this court, a Supreme Court decision and several other decisions, it has been held that Sections 110-A to 110-F introduced in the Act are merely procedural and provide a cheap and speedy remedy and that the liability for compensation has to be determined with reference to the Fatal Accidents Act and the general law of Torts. Current view is that the provisions are partly substantive.

    18. A perusal of para 49 of the judgment in Manjusri Raha's case 1968 ACJ 1 (MP), shows that the interpretation of Section 110-B of the Act is based on the statement of law by Pollock on Torts at page 362, according to which a victim of composite negligence, within the limits set by the general rule as to remoteness of damage, can sue all or any of the joint tortfeasors. The excerpt from Pollock on Torts reads thus:

    Where negligent acts of two or more independent persons have between them caused damage to a third, the sufferer is not driven to apply any such analysis to find out whom he can sue. He is entitled, of course, within the limits set by the general rules as to remoteness of damage to sue all or any one of the negligent persons. It is no concern of his whether there is any duty of contribution or indemnity as between those persons though in any case he cannot recover in the whole more than his whole damage.

    19. Reference at this stage may also be made to the Division Bench decision in Nandlal Asadmal v. M.P.S.R.T.C. 1980 MPWN 99, wherein it has been held that where the accident had been occasioned by the negligence of the drivers of two buses, they were both joint tortfeasors and compensation could be claimed from one of them alone.

    20. From the foregoing discussion I am of the view that notwithstanding the amendment in Section 110-B of the Act, the legal position is that where an accident is caused due to the composite negligence of the two drivers of the accident vehicles, there is no question of apportionment as the case was not one of contributory negligence.

    21. This brings us to the question of compensation. In the decision in Kerala State Electricity Board v. Kamalakshy Amma 1987 ACJ 251 (Kerala), it has been pointed out that in working out the compensation under Section 110-B of the Act the Tribunal has a wide discretion and has to award compensation which appears to it to be just. Thus the Tribunal has a wider discretion than that under the Fatal Accidents Act and in determining just compensation arithmetic is a good servant but a bad master. It has also to be remembered that misfortune is not to be converted into a fortune.

    22. As pointed out in the decision in Shankarrao Prahladrao Joshi v. Babulal Fouzdar 1982 ACJ (Supp) 338 (MP), compensation has to be determined both under Section 1 and Section 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act. As pointed out in State of M.P. v. Devi Rawat 1981 JLJ 42, one method of assessing compensation is to determine the annual dependency and to apply a suitable multiplier. Several factors have to be borne in mind in selecting the suitable multiplier. The facts of lump sum payment and uncertainties of life have also to be taken into consideration.

    23. In the decision in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pushpa Kunwar 1983 ACJ 629 (MP), this court did not allow any deduction on the ground of lump sum payment and uncertainties of life as the future prospects of the deceased had not been taken into consideration. In the decision in Nasib Kaur v. Balbir Singh 1987 ACJ 366 (Delhi), no deduction on account of lump sum payment was made because of high inflation and liabilities towards four minor children. In the decision in Satyawati Sethi v. Subhash Chand, 1987 ACJ 441 (Delhi), no deduction was made as future rise in salary and effect of price rise had not been taken into consideration.

    24. According to the claim petition, the deceased by working as labourer on the truck and by preparation of tiles used to have an average monthly income of Rs. 350/-. On the point of income of the deceased we have the evidence of Kukhiya, AW 1, the father of the deceased, Meera Bai, AW2, his widow and his co-labourers Wasudeo, AW 3, and Ramdayal, AW 4. In the context of pleadings, it is clear that these witnesses have given an exaggerated account of the income of the deceased. The learned Tribunal, on a proper appreciation of the evidence on record, has correctly held that average monthly income of the deceased was Rs. 200/- only.

    25. On a careful consideration of the material on record, 1 hold the annual dependency to be near about Rs. 1,500/- and a multiplier of 20 should be applied in this case. Thus I hold that a sum of Rs. 30,000/- after deduction of Rs, 1,000/- paid ex gratia would constitute just compensation.

    26. In the result the appeal is partly allowed. The respondents shall pay Rs. 30,000/-(thirty thousand) to the appellants as detailed below:

    27. The respondents shall bear their own costs and shall pay to the appellants the latter's costs of this appeal. The principal amount shall carry interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of application till realisation. Counsel's fee Rs. 200/-, if certified.

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    Meera Bai And Others v. Mishri Lal And Others
    (Jul 29, 1988)