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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit below was founded on a document referred to as Ex. P/1. According to the plaint (para 3), the plaintiff's principal plea relied on the doctrine of part-performance, and the plaintiff also sought specific performance on the footing that Ex. P/1 was an agreement to sell the suit land. Two courts below dealt with the matter: the trial Court initially passed a decree which was reversed by the learned appellate Court. The present opinion reviews that reversal. The judge observed that the two courts below had not properly read or construed Ex. P/1. On the judge's reading of Ex. P/1 (with counsel), the document appeared to be a sale-deed (described in the document as a "BIKRINAMA", reciting payment of Rs. 600 for about 5 bighas, containing the expression "BECH DIYA", and stating delivery of possession), but Ex. P/1 was unregistered and therefore the sale could not stand. The appeal was allowed in part and remanded for rehearing on a limited point regarding delivery and continuation of possession.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Ex. P/1 is a sale-deed or an agreement to sell, as that characterisation affects the availability of relief.
  2. Whether the plaintiff, relying on the doctrine of part-performance, was entitled to a decree of permanent injunction to protect his possession of the suit land.
  3. Whether, if Ex. P/1 is treated as a sale-deed, it must fail on account of being unregistered.
  4. Whether the findings of the trial Court (and the lower appellate Court) on the crucial factual question of delivery and continuity of possession were recorded after proper discussion of the evidence of both parties, and whether those findings could safely bind the court in second appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant / Plaintiff (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The plaintiff's main plea was founded on the doctrine of part-performance (explicitly mentioned in para 3 of the plaint).
  • The plaintiff claimed specific performance on the footing that Ex. P/1 was an agreement to sell the suit land.
  • Counsel Shri R.D. Jain emphasised the clause "ISKA BAY MAIN AP KO KARA DUNGA" in Ex. P/1 (the opinion records that this clause was relied upon or stressed by counsel).

Respondent / Defendant (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The trial Court made a categorical finding in the defendant's favour that possession was not delivered to the plaintiff; that finding was based on the defendant's witnesses (the opinion records that the trial Court relied on defendant witnesses and found plaintiff's witnesses to be liars).
  • Respondent's counsel Shri H.D. Gupta submitted that an earlier order of this Court dated 14-7-1975 directing the appellant to deposit mesne profits had not been complied with, and on that ground the appellant should be penalised.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in the following steps, as reflected in the opinion:

  1. Examination of Pleadings and Primary Plea: The court noted that the plaintiff's principal pleading relied on the doctrine of part-performance (para 3 of the plaint), entitling the plaintiff, if proved, to a decree of permanent injunction to protect possession. The plaintiff also sought specific performance on the premise that Ex. P/1 was an agreement to sell.
  2. Reading of Ex. P/1: The judge read the document with counsel and concluded that the document, by its language and recitals, was in substance a sale-deed rather than a mere agreement to sell. The factors the court relied upon were: the description "BIKRINAMA" in the document, recitals of payment of the full consideration of Rs. 600 for about 5 bighas, the use of the expression "BECH DIYA", the clause "ISKA BAY MAIN AP KO KARA DUNGA" (which the judge did not interpret as negativing the sale character), and the express statement in the document that possession was delivered to the vendee. The absence of any fixed future date for completion was also noted.
  3. Effect of Non-registration: Because Ex. P/1 was unregistered, the court held that, if regarded as a sale-deed, it must fail for want of registration.
  4. Limit of Relief under Part-Performance: The court recorded that, on the basis of a part-performance plea, the plaintiff would be entitled to a decree for permanent injunction to protect possession, notwithstanding the failure of the sale claim.
  5. Evaluation of Trial Court's Findings on Possession: Having concluded the plaintiff could not succeed on the sale claim, the court examined whether the trial Court's factual finding that possession was not delivered to the plaintiff was reliable. The opinion criticises the trial Court's reasoning: that finding was based only on defendant witnesses, there was no discussion of the plaintiff's evidence, yet the trial Court observed that plaintiff's witnesses were liars without clear explanation. The appellate judge found such a conclusion unsafe to accept as binding on second appeal.
  6. Remand for Rehearing on Limited Point: Because of the inadequacy in the treatment of evidence on the possession question, the court allowed the appeal in part and remanded the matter to the lower appellate Court for rehearing limited to (a) whether the plaintiff was delivered possession of the suit land simultaneously with the execution of Ex. P/1 and (b) whether the plaintiff remained continuously in possession so as to be entitled to a decree for permanent injunction. The lower appellate Court was directed to properly discuss the evidence adduced by both sides and to record fresh findings on these questions.
  7. Directions on Compliance with Earlier Order: The court noted the respondent's submission about non-compliance with the earlier order to deposit mesne profits and directed that the lower appellate Court ensure, before rehearing the appeal, that the appellant satisfies that court that the required deposits have been duly made; any penalty for default was to be considered by the lower appellate Court.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed in part; the judgment and decree passed by the Court below are set aside and the matter is remanded to the lower appellate Court for rehearing on the limited questions of (a) whether possession was delivered to the plaintiff simultaneously with Ex. P/1 and (b) whether the plaintiff was continuously in possession so as to be entitled to a decree for permanent injunction. There shall be no order as to costs.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • Ex. P/1 was held by the court to be in substance a sale-deed (recitals and language supported that view), but because Ex. P/1 was unregistered the purported sale cannot be upheld on that basis.
  • The plaintiff's remedy, if the factual prerequisites of part-performance (possession delivered and continuous possession) are established on rehearing, would be limited to a decree for permanent injunction to protect possession rather than specific performance based on the (failed) sale claim.
  • The lower appellate Court is directed to rehear the appeal on the specified limited issues after a proper discussion of evidence from both sides, and to record fresh findings; counsel for the parties were to appear in that court on 9 March 1987, and final judgment in that appeal was to be rendered within one month thereafter in the light of the directions.
  • On the procedural point raised by respondent's counsel concerning non-compliance with the earlier deposit order (14-7-1975), the court indicated that any penalty for default should be imposed by the lower appellate Court; before rehearing the appeal, the lower appellate Court must ensure the appellant satisfies it that the requisite deposits have been made.
  • No costs were awarded, and the opinion does not state or establish any broader legal precedent beyond the directions given in this case.

    Madan Mohan v. Gauri Shankar And Another

    1. It is a very unfortunate case that two courts below have not even read and properly construed Ex. P/1 on which the suit was based, even though the suit was dismissed by the learned appellate Court, reversing the decree passed by the trial Court.

    2. On reading the pleadings, I have little doubt that plaintiff's main plea was founded on the doctrine of part-performance which is mentioned in categorical terms in para 3 of the plaint. On the basis of this plea, the plaintiff was merely entitled to a decree of permanent injunction to protect his possession although he laid a tall claim for specific performance of contract on the footing that Ex. P/1 was an agreement to sell the suit land. I have myself read the document with counsel for the parties but I am unable to satisfy myself that it is any thing else than a sale-deed. However, Ex. P/1 being an unregistered document, the sale must fail.

    3. There is a very clear averment in the description itself that it was a "BIKRINAMA" and further fact is that the full consideration of Rs. 600/- was duly paid for the suit land which is 5 bighas and odd in area. No doubt at all is left about its character in that parties meant it to be understood as a sale deed by using the expression "BECH DIYA" which would not mean anything, but passing of the title along with passing of consideration; Shri R.D. Jain has laid great emphasis on the clause in the document -- "ISKA BAY MAIN AP KO KARA DUNGA". I do not read in this expression anything by which the document can be construed not as a sale deed, but a mere agreement to sell the land. I say so far the further reason that by the said document itself, it was stated that the possession of the suit land was also delivered to the vendee. No date is fixed for anything else to be done to complete the sale. The parties meant that the sale was complete with the execution of that document itself. Indeed, the very averment of passing of consideration and passing of title, two essential incidents to constitute a sale deed, being constituents of the document, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the document was nothing, but a sale deed and even if there was any promise to do any further act, that was not enforceable because the promise was as vague as anything.

    4. Having taken the view that the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief on the basis of Ex. P/1, I have looked into the finding of the trial Court as to whether the plaintiff could be non-suited by denying him the relief of parmanent injunction to protect his title. I have read the discussion of evidence in paras 9 and 10 of the impugned judgment which is severely criticised by Shri Jain and indeed rightly. It is true the Court below has made a clear and categorical finding in defendant's favour that possession was not delivered to the plaintiff, but that finding was reached only on a discussion of evidence of the witnesses of the defendant. There is no discussion at all of the evidence of the plaintiffs side though it is equally true that there is an observation that the witnesses of the plaintiff were liars and not reliable. How this view could be taken does not appear clear in the judgment and I do not find it safe to accept such a finding to be a conclusive finding to bind me in second appeal.

    5. This appeal must, therefore, succeed and is allowed partly in that, on a limited point, the appeal is remanded for re-hearing to the Court below. The lower appellate Court shall, after proper discussion of evidence on record adduced by both sides, record afresh a finding on the question as to whether the plaintiff was delivered possession of the suit land simultaneously with the execution of the sale deed Ex. P/1 and whether he was continuously in possession of the suit land so as to entitle him to decree for permanent injunction. That is all for the day and for disposal of this appeal.

    6. The appeal is accordingly allowed, but there shall be no order as to costs. The judgment and decree passed by the Court below are set aside. Counsel agree to appear in the Court below on 9th Mar. 1987 for rehearing of the appeal. Within a month thereafter, final judgment in the appeal shall be rendered afresh in the light of observations and directions herein made.

    7. Respondent's counsel Shri H.D. Gupta has, however, made a submission of which notice must be taken. Counsel's content ion is that the order passed in this appeal on 14-7-1975 directing the appellant to deposit in the trial court mesne profits for the land has not been religiously complied with and for that default, the appellant must be penalised. Yes, some penalty, the appellant must suffer. But, that he can suffer at the lower appellate Court and order in that regard may be passed by the lower appellate Court. The Court below shall ensure that before the appeal is heard, the appellant herein, namely, the plaintiff, satisfies that court that the deposits which he was required to make pursuant to this Court's order have been duly made.

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    Comments

    Madan Mohan v. Gauri Shankar And Another
    (Jan 30, 1987)