1. This judgment shall also dispose of Civil Revision No. 202/1985 (Kedarnath Gupta v. Smt. Sushila Devi Somani). In both the Civil Revisions, filed under Section 23-E of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (as amended by Act No. 27 of 1983) (hereinafter called 'the Act'), both the applicants have challenged the legality of the impugned order passed by the Rent Controlling Authority, Gwalior, on 3-6-1985 in Case No. 336/83-84 (90)(7).

2. This is a battle between the landlord and tenant. One Gopal Somani was the landlord of the non-residential suit accommodation, situate in the area of Deedwana Oli, Lashkar, Gwalior. He inducted one Kedarnath (hereinafter addressed as 'tenant') in the suit premises as his tenant, on 22-6-1979, for a period of 5 years, by a registered lease deed, on a monthly rent of Rs. 750.00 p.m. Landlord, Gopal Somani, died on 19-5-1981 leaving behind him, his widow, Smt. Sushila Devi, and two major sons, Krishna Kumar Somani and Shiv Kumar Somani. The period of 5 years as mentioned in the lease deed expired on 21-6-1984. The widow of the deceased landlord filed an application under Section 23-A(b) of the Act before the Rent Controlling Authority, Gwalior, on 13-7-1984 praying for the eviction of the tenant from the suit premises on the ground of bona fide requirement of the premises for starting cloth business for her major sons. The tenant within time filed an application before the Rent Controlling Authority for permission to defend and therein he raised several grounds. One of them was that the applicant-widow has no right to file the present proceeding because after the death of the landlord, his both major sons along with the widow have inherited the suit property and all the three are the landlords. Inter alia, the tenant also raised a plea that the applicant has no right under law to present the present application, as the premises are not required by her but the requirement is of her sons. The tenant also filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and therein raised an objection that the registered lease deed contains an arbitration clause; hence the ejectment proceedings be stayed.

3. The Rent Controlling Authority (hereafter referred to as 'the Authority') in the impugned order held : --

(i) The suit premises were jointly inherited - by both his major sons and the widow, and the widow alone has no right under taw to file the present proceeding: hence, it be transferred to Civil Court.

(ii) Provisions of Arbitration Act are not applicable in a proceeding under the Act and hence the proceeding, as prayed for, cannot be stayed.

In Civil Revision No. 157/1985, Smt. Sushila Devil the widow of the original landlord, has challenged conclusion No. (i), and in C.R. No. 202/1985 the tenant has challenged conclusion No. (ii), mentioned hereinafeove, of the impugned order.

4. History of the Rent Control Law of this State is interesting, Clauses. (e) and (f) of Sub-

section (1) of Section 12 of the Act 1961, contain grounds for eviction of the tenant on the basis of bona fide requirement of accommodation for residential or non-residential purposes, respectively. It is a suit in a Civil Court which is required to be filed for such eviction on one or more grounds permitting eviction. The Act of 1961 was amended by the Amendment Act of 1983, primarily providing for the expeditious trial of eviction cases on ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. In substance, the effect of this amendment of 1983 was to omit or delete Clause. (e) and (f) from Sub-section (l) of Section 12 of the parent Act of 1961, as well as Sub-sections (4), (5) and (6) of Section 12; to amend Section 13; to omit Sections. 17, 20-A and 20-AA and to insert a new Chapter III-A in the parent Act containing Sections. 23-A to 23-1, in order to provide for eviction of tenants on grounds of bona fide requirement, etc. The net result of the amendment made by Amendment Act of 1983 was that the grounds of bona fide requirement of the landlord, which were earlier contained in Clauses. (e) and (f) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the parent Act, are inserted in Section 23-A, and the proceedings for the eviction of the tenants on these grounds are to lie before the Authority governed by the special procedure enacted in the newly added Chap. III-A; and the pending suits and proceedings are to be governed by Section 12 of the Amendment Act.

5. After the hereinabove noted amendments, it was felt that the proceedings for eviction of tenants on the ground of bona fide requirement of landlords need not go before the Authority, to be disposed of in accordance with the special procedure, in case of all categories of landlords, and that this special procedure should be made available only to certain specified categories of landlords. Therefore, the parent Act was further amended by M.P. Accommodation Control (Amendment) Ordinance, 1985 (Ordinance No, 1 of 1985). This Ordinance was subsequently replaced by M.P. Accommodation Control (Amendment) Act, 1985 (No. 7 of 1985). The Statement of Objects and Reasons of 1985 Amendment Act stated that the amendment made in 1983 was--

"to provide a special forum for expeditious disposal of eviction proceedings filed by landlords in general on the ground of bona fide need, but it was brought to the notice of the Government that the new forum provided by amendment was being misused by certain landlords to evict the tenants and therefore it was proposed to restrict the application of the provision relating to the new forum only to the specified categories of landlords, like retired Government servants, including members of Defence Services, widows and divorced wives and physically handicaped persons................. etc."

The Amendment Act of 1985 inserted a new Section 23-3 in Chap. III-A of the parent Act defining the landlord. Section 23-J is being reproduced for convenience : --

"23-J. Definition of landlord for the purposes of Chap. III-A.-- For the purposes of this Chapter 'landlord' means a landlord who is--

(i) a retired servant of any Government including a retired member of Defence Services; or

(ii) a retired servant of a company owned or controlled either by the Central or State Government; or

(iii) a widow or a divorced wife; or (iv) physically handicapped person; or

(v) a servant of any Government including a member of defence services who, according to his service conditions, is not entitled to Government accommodation on his posting to a place where he owns a house or is entitled to such accommodation only on payment of penal rent on his posting to such a place."

6. The category of the landlords specified thus in Section 23-J belongs to s special category distinct from the remaining category of landlords, who deserve the benefit of the special procedure on account of their need being more pressing and the handicap from which they suffer, as compared to the remaining landlords, the object of the amendment being to provide for expeditious trial of eviction cases on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord. The category of the landlords, provided in Section 23-J, has been considered to be handicapped in comparison with the rest of the landlords. This classification of the landlords in two categories has been made only because the category belonging to Section 23-J is not only handicapped but is also weaker as compared to the other category. Intention of the legislature is apparent that it desired that a quicker remedy in a different forum should be made available to this handicapped and weaker category enumerated in Section 23-J. The creation of these two categories has been held in B. Johnson, AIR 1986 Madh Pra 72 by a Division Bench of this Court, to be reasonable and non-offending of the doctrine of equality. But if this legal infirmity given in Section 23-J disappears, then the landlord described therein shall slip to the general category and shall not get the benefit of this permissible classification amongst the landlords for conferral of the benefit of special procedure. In Kewal Singh, AIR 1980 SC 161, their Lordships of the Supreme Court reiterated and clarified that the Rent Control Legislation is a piece of social legislation, meant mainly to protect the tenant from frivolous eviction and, at the same time, to do justice to the landlords by making special provisions. Their Lordships further observed that the rent control legislation attempts the balancing trick of protecting the tenant from frivolous eviction while ensuring that only such restrictions are placed on the landlord's right to evict, which are sufficient to protect the tenant from frivolous eviction without destroying the landlord's right to property as its owner.

7. The evolutionary history of the Rent Control legislation indicates that putting away the general law. the legislature stepped in and afforded special protection to the tenant by conferring upon him the status of a statutory tenant who could not be evicted except under conditions specified and the procedure prescribed by the rent control laws. Thus, rent control laws are ordinarily intended to interfere with contractual leases; they are Acts for the protection of the tenants and are, consequently, restrictive and not enabling, conferring no new right of action, but at the same time, restricting the existing rights either under the contract or under the law. Rent Control laws can be termed welfare legislation and, hence, they need beneficent construction. Accommodation shortage in the country, with the population explosion, necessitated such a welfare legislation, designed to protect tenants from harassment and unreasonable evictions.

The object of Rent Control legislation should not be defeated, hence it needs treatment in liberal spirit and not by constricted hands.

Wide amplitude should be given to the principal object of the rent control legislation.

8. Before I grapple with the case in hand, it would not be out of place to remember Heydon's case 76 ER 637. When the material words are capable of bearing two or more constructions, the most firmly established rule of construction of such words is laid down in Heydon's case (supra). The rule enables consideration of four matters in construing an Act : --

"(i) What was the law before making of the Act.

(ii) What was the mischief or defect for which the law did not provide.

(iii) What is the remedy that the Act has provided, and

(iv) What is the reason of the remedy."

(G.P. Singh's Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 3rd edition.) Thus, the rule directs that the Courts must adopt the construction which "shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy" and also to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief and also to add force and life to the cure and remedy in accordance with the true intentions of the makers of the Act. The rule in Heydon's case (supra) is applicable only when the words in question are ambiguous and are reasonably capable of more than one meaning. As the ambiguity has been alleged with regard to word 'widow', 1 shall have to examine whether the language used in the Amending Act of 1485 is ambiguous or not. because the correct principle is that after the words have been construed in their context and it is found that the language is capable of bearing only one construction, the rule in Heydon's case (supra) ceases to be controlling, and gives way to the plain meaning rule.

8A. Sri N.K. Mody. learned counsel for the landlord, forcefully contended that the intention of the legislature is clear, and if the landlord is a widow, then the forum under law for eviction proceedings is before the Authority. He further contended that the applicant is a landlord as defined in Section 23-J of the Amending Act of 1985. She has been issuing receipts to the tenant, and the tenant is now estopped. Sri R.D. Jain, learned counsel for the tenant, contended that after the death of the landlord, the suit property devolved upon his two major sons and the widow : hence, the widow is not the sole landlord. Sri Jain further contended that in para 8 of the application of the landlord filed before the authority, the need shown is that of the two major sons of the original landlord, who after his death, have themselves acquired the status of landlord and the requirement is not that of the widow.

9. Indeed, the requirement in the original pleading of the landlord has been shown to be that of her major sons and not that of the widow. The legislative intent seems to be clear to me that the incorporation of Section 23-J in the parent Act, by way of amendment in 1985, is only for the benefit of the widow and none else. It is the widow who should require bona fide a non-residential accommodation for the purpose of continuing or startinger business, if the widow is the owner thereof. After the death of her husband, the property was inherited by the two major sons and the widow according to the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act (No. 30 of 1956). After the death of the landlord, his two major sons and the widow became the owner thereof, and all the three also, at the same time became the landlords of the premises. But the major sons, who are now landlords, belong to the general category of landlords, while their mother or the widow becomes landlord of the special category as defined in Section 23-J of the Amendment Act of 1985. 'Widow' has been defined in Corpus Juris Secundum (Vol. 94) at p. 616 thus:

"Widow. The word "widow," of Sanskrit derivation, and meaning without a husband, or lack of a husband, is said to be as old as the language itself. The present. meaning of. the term is familiar, well fixed, certain, and definite, and it is defined, both popularly and legally, to mean a woman who has lost her husband by death and has not taken another; the surviving lawful wife of a decedent; a wife who outlives her husband; one whose husband is dead; a surviving wife; and it has been said that in legal writings "widow" is an addition given to a woman who is unmarried and whose husband is dead.

*** *** *** From the definition mentioned hereinabove, it becomes clear that a woman becomes widow when her husband dies. But if she has major sons, she still shall be called a widow. Hence, on the death of her husband, a wife will become a widow. It is on the eclipse of the marital status that a woman becomes a widow and not otherwise. On the death of the husband, she does not only lose a spouse but also a bread earner. That is why, to help the weaker section of the landlords, the legislature chose to incorporate Section 23-J in the Act. The intent of the legislature in enacting Section 23-J of the Act was to help only those who cannot afford to wait for the culmination of the legendary protracted ejectment proceedings in a Civil Court under the general law. Legislature created the special category with the intent that this special category gets the premises as soon as possible without any delay in a special forum so that their requirement be not postponed indefinitely under the general law. it is, thus, the requirement of the widow for getting the premises vacated if she requires it bona fide. But if the requirement is not of a widow but of someone else of the family, say that of a son, then it will not be called the requirement of the widow.

10. According to the pleading of the landlord (widow), in this case, she requires the accommodation bona fide for the purpose of starting not her business but the business of her major sons, who are also the landlords of the premises. It is, thus, dead that the major co-landlords require the accommodation for starting their own business. It is the requirement of Krishna Kumar Somani and Shiv Kumar Somani, who are also the landlords of the premises. As they are landlords of the premises, as they ' require the premises for starting their business and they are also the owners thereof, they belong to the general category and not to the special category. Intent of the legislature, cannot be hoodwinked even if they walk behind the skirt of their mother. If I interpret the legislative mandate otherwise. that interpretation is likely to offend the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. If the major sons require the premises, who are not only landlords of the premises but are also the owners thereof, then their requirement is of the person belonging to the general category, and they shall get the forum of the Civil Court and not the forum of the Authority.

11. Section 23-J of the Amending Act of 1985 has to be read along with the provisions of Section 23-A(b) of the Act. If both these provisions are read together, then the legislative intent is crystal clear. The summary proceedings as described in Section 23-D of the Amending Act are available to the widow only, who is a landlord and owner of the premises. Krishna Kumar Somani and Shiv Kumar Somani, who are the landlords and also owners of the premises, along with their mother (widow), do not belong to the special category enumerated in Section 23-J of the Act. I have no doubt that to place reasonable construction on any statutory provision, the duty of this Court is not only to read the provision first literally to construe it on its plain language, but, in order to clear doubts, to read also in its context and setting in conjunction with other cognate or collateral provisions of the same enactment. This course is variably mandated by the superior and progressive norm of purposive interpretation so as to advance and promote effectively the legislative intent and object, lest social welfare legislations may lose their force, efficacy and relevance. By enacting Section 23-J of the Act, the legislature intended to create a privileged class or special class of landlords to secure social justice to them without any delay. I do not feel least hesitant but feel fully confident to sustain this view, which I have just taken. My this view is further strengthened by the view taken by the Calcutta High Court in the case of Asoke Gopal, AIR 1981 Cal 329.

12. Sri N.K. Modi, learned counsel for the applicant, persisted in his contention; contained in the case of Sri Ram Pasricha, AIR 1976 SC 2335. But, unfortunately, neither the facts and circumstances nor the ratio of the apex Court are applicable here. In Sri Ram Pasricha (supra), there was no dispute that the plaintiff was the landlord. It was, however, found that he was one of the co-owners of the premises, the other cosharers being his mother and married brother who used to reside in the same premises with him. The premises in suit, in occupation of the tenant, were required by the plaintiff for occupation of the members of the joint family and for their benefit. The apex Court rejected the contention that the plaintiff who was, admittedly, the landlord and co-sharer of the premises, was not the owner within the meaning of Section 13(1)(f) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act (No. 12 of 1956). The Supreme Court further observed in Sri Ram Pasricha that it is not necessary to establish that the plaintiff is the only owner of the premises for the purpose of Section 13(l)(f) of the Act, as long as he is co-owner of the property being at the same time acknowledged landlord of the defendants. The case in hand is clearly different. Merely because the applicant-widow in this case issued rent receipts in favour of the tenant after the death of her husband, she would not be either the sole owner or the sole landlord of the premises. According to the pleading, contained in para 8, of the applicant, before the authority, it is not the widow who requires the premises for starting her own business, but the requirement is clearly of Shiv Kumar Somani and Krishna Kumar Somani, who, according to law, belong to the general category of landlords and not to the special category.

13. In the case of Mrs. Winifred Ross, AIR 1984 SC 458, the Supreme Court has held that where the landlords are categorised, one landlord cannot file the proceedings for the requirement of another landlord. Thus, what cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly. Just as the widow is receiving the rent from the tenant as landlord, so also her sons are entitled to receive the rent, because they are also the landlords of the premises and also owners of the premises.

14. Undoubtedly, if the applicant-widow had pleaded that the requirement is of her own and it is she who requires the premises for starting her own business through her sons, then the interpretation of the provisions of Section 23-A(b) and Section 23-J of the Act would have been in her favour, as that is the clear mandate of the legislature.

It is the pleadings in a case on whose strength and merits the law is applied and interpreted and not otherwise.

15. Civil Revision No. 202/1985 deserves outright rejection because the Act provides that notwithstanding anything contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit or proceeding shall be filed against a tenant for his eviction except on one or more of the grounds enumerated under it. The defendant can be evicted only in accordance with the Act. No agreement, or any arbitration agreement under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, contrary to the provisions of the Act, could be enforced according to law. (1979) II M.P.W. Note 16).

16. The upshot of the above discussion is that both these Civil Revisions (No. 157/1985 and No. 202/1985) are dismissed and the order passed by the Authority is maintained. However, there shall be no order as to costs.