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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs contracted on 31 March 1965 to purchase from the defendant a five-storeyed building under construction at Napier Town, Jabalpur, for Rs. 1,55,103/-. The plaintiffs paid Rs. 10,101/- as part of the price. The agreement required the vendor to execute a sale deed within four months and to complete certain construction works. The sale was not completed and disputes arose, with each party alleging breach by the other. The parties abandoned the contract and, by an agreement dated 31 July 1965, referred two questions to a sole arbitrator: (1) which party had committed a breach, and (2) what damages were payable to the injured party.

By an award dated 30 November 1965 the arbitrator found the plaintiffs guilty of breach, directed forfeiture of Rs. 10,101/- (treating it as earnest money), but also directed that the plaintiffs could obtain conveyance on payment of the balance Rs. 1,45,000/- within two months. The plaintiffs sought to set aside the award under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act because they wanted their deposit back rather than specific performance.

The IV Additional District Judge, Jabalpur set aside only that part of the award which permitted completion of the sale on payment of the balance (holding that direction beyond the terms of reference and illegal) but refused to set aside the remainder of the award that forfeited Rs. 10,101/-. The plaintiffs appealed the judge's order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appeal against the order refusing to set aside the award was maintainable in the presence of a subsequent decree passed in conformity with the award (i.e., the preliminary question of the competence/maintainability of the appeal).
  2. Whether the arbitrator acted beyond the terms of reference and committed an error apparent on the face of the award by directing forfeiture of the Rs. 10,101/- deposit (i.e., whether the award should be set aside under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act).
  3. Whether, if the award was objectionable on its face, the appropriate course was to remit the award to the arbitrator for reconsideration or to set the award aside in toto.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • The plaintiffs applied under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act to set aside the arbitrator's award because they did not seek specific performance but wanted return of their deposit (they were aggrieved by the forfeiture of Rs. 10,101/-).
  • The appellants' counsel feared that if the award were remitted to the same arbitrator he might be prejudiced against the plaintiffs and that remission would therefore serve no useful purpose.

Respondent's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • The respondent raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal: because (a) two separate orders were made (one refusing to set aside the award and one making it a rule of the Court), appeals should have been filed against both, and (b) since a decree had been passed in conformity with the award, the plaintiffs should have appealed under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act and could not maintain the appeal under Section 39(1)(vi).
  • The respondent contended that the arbitrator was competent to decide which party was in breach and, having found the plaintiffs in breach, could lawfully direct forfeiture of the Rs. 10,101/- deposit, especially since both parties had on various occasions described that amount as "byana".
  • Reliance was placed on several authorities to the effect that errors of law or failure to give reasons by an arbitrator are not generally grounds for setting aside an award, and that parties who choose arbitration must accept the arbitrator's decision as final.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ghulam Jilani v. Mohd. Hussain, (1902) ILR 29 Cal 167 (PC) Privy Council holding that an appeal does not lie from a decree pronounced under the section except where the decree is in excess or not in accordance with the award. Used to reject the contention that an appeal lies against a decree in accordance with the award; court explained that this authority supports the settled view that a decree in accordance with the award does not automatically give rise to an appeal.
Shivramprasad v. Gokulprasad Parmeshwardayal, ILR (1958) Madh Pra 570 = AIR 1959 Madh Pra 102 Decision concerning composite orders (distinguished by respondent's counsel). Court noted these decisions as distinguishable on their facts and did not accept the respondent's reliance on them to defeat the appeal's maintainability.
Beniprasad Dixit v. Krishna Murari, F.A. No. 121 of 1957, D/-11-10-1960 (Madh Pra) Authority on composite orders (cited by respondent as distinguishable). Court observed these decisions were not applicable to deny the appeal; they did not take away the right of appeal under Section 39(1)(vi).
Keshavlal Ramdayal v. Laxmanrao, ILR (1940) Nag 659 = AIR 1940 Nag 386 Support for the view that in composite orders both the order refusing to set aside the award and the decree are appealable. Cited to support the proposition that the existence of a decree does not preclude an appeal against an order refusing to set aside an award.
Jayantilal v. Surendra, AIR 1956 Nag 245; ILR (1958) Madh Pra 570 = AIR 1959 Madh Pra 102 Support for the proposition that Sections 17 and 39 are not mutually exclusive in cases of composite orders. Relied upon to hold that an appeal against the order refusing to set aside the award was competent despite the passing of a decree.
Chiranjit Singh v. Har Swarup, AIR 1926 PC 1 Statement of the nature of earnest money: part of purchase price when transaction proceeds; forfeitable when transaction fails due to vendee's fault. Quoted to explain the concept of earnest money; used in analysis to distinguish earnest money from part payment under the particular contract.
Ballabhdas v. Paikaji, 12 Nag LR 177 = AIR 1916 Nag 104 Authority illustrating distinction between earnest money and part of purchase price. Listed among cases supporting the distinction which the court applied in construing Clause 4 of the contract.
Abbas All v. Kodhusao, 24 Nag LR 189 = AIR 1929 Nag 30 (2) (FB) Authority on distinguishing earnest money from part payment. Cited as part of the line of Nagpur decisions relied on to show that the deposit was a part of the price, not necessarily forfeitable earnest money.
Balchandra v. Mahadeo, ILR (1947) Nag 60 = AIR 1947 Nag 193 Supporting distinction between earnest money and part of the purchase price. Relied on in the court's consideration of the contract terms.
Chunnilal v. Mohanlal, AIR 1964 Madh Pra 126 Another authority distinguishing earnest money and part payment. Cited to support the court's interpretation of Clause 4 of the contract.
Fateh Chand v. Balkishan Dass, AIR 1963 SC 1405 Discussed in relation to the aforesaid distinction (court stated it does not lay down a different principle). Court observed that this Supreme Court decision does not alter the principle of distinction relied upon by the court.
Rustomji v. Manmal, 1963 MPLJ 284 = AIR 1964 Madh Pra 15 Authority cited by respondent for the proposition that parties must generally accept an arbitrator's award as final despite errors. Noted by the court as part of respondent's reliance that the arbitrator's decision on breach and consequences should stand; court acknowledged the principle but found difficulty applying it given the award's defects.
Smt. Santa Sila Devi v. Dhirendra Nath Sen, (1964) 3 SCR 410 = AIR 1963 SC 1677 Support for finality of awards and limited grounds for interference. Cited by respondent; court recognised the principle but held it could not save the award in the present circumstances.
Jivarajbhai v. Chintamanrao, (1964) 5 SCR 480 = AIR 1965 SC 214 Same principle on finality of arbitration awards. Referenced in the context of respondent's submissions; court found the factual basis here different.
Radha Wallabh v. Gopaldas, 1965 MP LJ 4923 Authority relied upon for the doctrine of finality of arbitration awards. Noted in the list of supporting authorities for respondent's argument; court did not consider it decisive here.
Bungo Steel Furniture v. Union of India, (1967) 1 SCR 633 = AIR 1967 SC 378 Support for the limited scope of interference with arbitral awards. Cited by respondent; court accepted the legal proposition but held it inapplicable where arbitrator acted beyond terms of reference.
Firm Madanlal Roshanlal v. Hukumchand Mills, (1967) 1 SCR 105 = AIR 1967 SC 1030 Another authority affirming the finality of arbitral awards in appropriate cases. Cited by the respondent; court distinguished the present case on its facts and the arbitrator's excess of jurisdiction.
Russel on Arbitration (17th Ed.) (pp. 308, 311) Textual authority describing the court's discretion to remit awards for reconsideration and the overlap with grounds for setting aside. Cited in connection with the Court's discretion whether to remit the award or set it aside; the court considered the text but declined remission here.
Re Tidswell, (1863) 33 Beay 213 (dictum of Romilly, M.R.) Dictum that remission may be inexpedient where the arbitrator might be prejudiced upon reconsideration. Quoted and applied as one reason against remitting the award to the same arbitrator in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the preliminary objection first. It rejected the respondent's contention that the appeal was not maintainable because a decree had been passed. Relying on Ghulam Jilani (Privy Council) and other Indian authorities, the court explained that a decree in accordance with an award does not preclude an appeal against an order refusing to set aside the award; Sections 17 and 39 of the Arbitration Act are not mutually exclusive in this context. The court therefore found the preliminary objection to be without merit and held the appeal to be competent.

On the merits, the court concluded that the learned Judge below erred in not setting aside the award in its entirety. The court identified two principal defects in the award:

  • The arbitrator based his decision to forfeit the Rs. 10,101/- deposit entirely on the use of the term "byana" in documents, but the reference to the arbitrator had not empowered him to determine the nature of the deposit (i.e., whether it was earnest money or part payment) or to adjudicate on a forfeiture unless so referred. Thus, by directing forfeiture, the arbitrator acted beyond the terms of reference.
  • Clause 4 of the contract expressly described the Rs. 10,101/- as "by way of part price" and provided that the balance would be payable on execution of the sale deed. There was no contractual stipulation making that sum forfeitable upon plaintiffs' non-fulfilment. The arbitrator's assumption that the deposit could be forfeited was therefore an error apparent on the face of the award.

The court further analysed the legal concept of earnest money. While quoting Chiranjit Singh v. Har Swarup for the general characteristic of earnest money (forfeitable if the vendee defaults), the court emphasized that whether a particular deposit is earnest money or merely part of the purchase price depends on construction of the contract. Here, the contract language (Clause 4) and the deletion of an earlier clause providing for liquidated damages indicated that the Rs. 10,101/- was part payment, not an agreed forfeitable earnest sum. Clause 7 provided only that both parties should pay damages if they fail to fulfil conditions — leaving the ascertainment of reasonable damages to the arbitrator — which the arbitrator did not properly do.

The court considered whether to remit the award to the arbitrator for reconsideration or to set it aside. While acknowledging the discretionary power to remit in appropriate cases (citing Russel on Arbitration), the court declined to remit because the appellants feared the arbitrator would be prejudiced and because the court found the bad portion of the award inseverable from the rest. The court quoted the dictum in Re Tidswell to support the view that remission may be inexpedient where the arbitrator might be biased on rehearing.

On this basis the court concluded that the award was bad in toto, and it set the award aside, leaving the parties free to pursue their remedies by suit.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal is allowed; the application under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act is allowed, and the arbitrator's award dated 30 November 1965 is SET ASIDE.

Direct consequences and orders:

  • The earlier order of the IV Additional District Judge dismissing the plaintiffs' application under Section 30 is set aside.
  • The arbitrator's award (30 November 1965) is set aside in its entirety and the parties are left to their remedy by way of suit.
  • The appeal is allowed with costs. Counsel's fee is to be paid as per Schedule or Certificate, whichever is less.

Broader implications: The court applied established principles without purporting to lay down any novel precedent; the decision's immediate effect is confined to setting aside the award and directing that the parties may pursue ordinary suit remedies.

    Jaykumar Jain And Others v. Om Prakash And Another

    1. This Is an appeal by the plaintiffs from a decision of the IV Additional District Judge, Jabalpur, dated 16th February 1968, arising out of proceedings instituted by them under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, for the setting aside of an award.

    2. The relevant facts leading to the appeal are these. By an agreement dated 31st March 1965, the plaintiffs had covenanted to purchase from the defendant, his five storeyed building which was under construction at Napier Town, Jabalpur, for a sum of Rs. 1,55,103/- and in pursuance thereof, paid Rs. 10,101/-as part of the price. It stipulated that the defendant was to execute a sale deed within 4 months from the date of agreement, during which he was also to complete the construction work then in progress, e.g., installation of electricity for pumping of water to the upper floors, affixing of fittings and fixtures, distempering of walls and polishing of floors, etc. The transaction of sale was, however, never completed and disputes arose between the parties, each complaining of the other of breach while signifying his own willingness to fulfil his part of the contract. Eventually, the parties appear to have abandoned the contract, and having done so, referred their dispute to the sole arbitration of one Seth Ramkumar, by their agreement in writing dated 31st July 1965. The reference to arbitration required the arbitrator to determine two questions: firstly, which of the parties had committed a breach of the contract, and, secondly, what were the damages payable to the injured party by the party responsible for the breach.

    3. By an award dated 30th November 1965, the arbitrator found the plaintiffs to be guilty of the breach complained of and has accordingly directed the forfeiture of the amount of Rs. 10,101/- paid by them, treating the same as earnest money. The arbitrator, however, directed that if the plaintiffs were so inclined, they could still have a conveyance of the property, on payment by them of the balance amount of Rs. 1,45,000/- within 2 months of the date of his award. The plaintiffs apparently did not want any specific performance of the contract and only wanted their money back and, therefore, applied for setting aside of the award under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act.

    The learned Judge has only set aside that part of the award by which the arbitrator had provided for a completion of the sale, upon payment of the balance of the price, on the ground that such a direction was beyond the terms of reference and hence Illegal. As to the rest, he was of the view that the award of the arbitrator holding that the plaintiffs were in breach and, therefore, the amount of Rs. 10,101/-deposited by them was liable to be forfeited, was binding on the parties and could not be set aside for the reason that there were no grounds made out for its being set aside under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act.

    4. The respondent has raised a preliminary objection as regards the maintainability of the appeal. The argument of Shri P.R. Naolekar, learned counsel proceeds on these lines. It is argued that there were two separate orders--one refusing to set aside the award, and the other making it a rule of the Court and, therefore, appeals should have been filed against both the orders. The decisions in Shivramprasad v. Gokulprasad Parmeshwardayal, ILR (1958) Madh Pra 570 = (AIR 1959 Madh Pra 102) and Beniprasad Dixit v. Krishna Murari, F.A. No. 121 of 1957, D/- 11-10-1960 (Madh Pra) are said to be distinguishable because they concerned a composite order. It is also urged that the decree not being in conformity with the award, an appeal lay under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act; and, that the order refusing to set aside the award had merged in the decree and since there was no appeal filed against the decree, the appeal against the order refusing to set aside the award under Section 30 was not appealable under Section 39(1)(vi) of the Act. These contentions are wholly unfounded and cannot be accepted.

    5. After the Privy Council decision In Ghulam Jilani v. Mohd. Hussain, (1902) ILR 29 Cal 167 (PC), it can no longer be contended that an appeal lies against a decree in accordance with the award. In delivering their Lordships' judgment, Lord Macnaghten stated:

    "They would be doing violence to the plain language of the Section and the obvious intention of the Code, if they were to hold that an appeal lies from a decree pronounced tinder it, except in so far as the decree may be in excess or not in accordance with the award."

    All the Courts in India apart from the Calcutta High Court have uniformly taken the view that no appeal is competent against a decree based even on an invalid award. This follows from the language of Section 17 which admits of no other construction. The principle is so well settled that we feel that no elaborate discussion on our part is needed. Suffice it to say that in so far as this Court is concerned, the settled view is that in the case of a composite order, by which a Court refuses to set aside an award and also passes a decree in accordance with its terms, the order refusing to set aside the award and the decree are both appealable as the provisions contained in sections 17 and 39 are not mutually exclusive. Therefore, the fact that a decree has been passed does not preclude an appeal against the order refusing to set aside the award. If the order is set aside, the decree which is founded on it would lapse and consequently it cannot operate as a bar to the appeal against the order (See, Keshavlal Ramdayal v. Laxmanrao, ILR (1940) Nag 659=(AIR 1940 Nag 386); Jayantilal v. Surendra. AIR 1956 Nag 245 and ILR (1958) Madh Pra 570= (AIR 1959 Madh Pra 102). A fortiori the making of two separate orders does not, in our opinion, take away the right of appeal given under Section 39(1)(vi) to a person aggrieved by an order setting aside or refusing to set aside an award.

    6. We fail to appreciate the necessity for the plaintiffs to have filed an appeal against the decree under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act. It is true that the decree in so far as it struck down that part of the award allowing them a right of a specific performance was not in conformity with the award. But the plaintiffs are not aggrieved thereby, for that direction was for their benefit. They have not availed of that direction because they do not want to specifically enforce their rights under the contract. Their grievance only lies against the order which refuses to set aside the award in so far as it directs a forfeiture of the amount of Rs. 10,101/- deposited by them. Now, the scope of an appeal under Section 17 of the Act is restricted by the terms of the section. If the plaintiffs were to file an appeal against the decree, their attack on the judgment and decree would necessarily be confined to the question whether it was in excess or not in accordance with the award F.A. No. 121 of 1957, D/-11-10-1960 (Madh Pra). In that case this Court ruled that where there are two distinct orders, as here, independent of each other, the appellant would be precluded from challenging the order refusing to set aside the award unless he filed an appeal under Section 39(1)(vi) of the Act. That being so, the appeal against the impugned order is competent even though it was followed by a decree and the preliminary objection must, therefore, stand rejected.

    7. We are inclined to think that the learned Judge has perhaps erred in not setting aside the award which was bad on the face of it. The arbitrator had made an award from which it is quite clear that he based his decision entirely upon the use of the term 'byana' in the agreement of reference. The parties had not by that agreement, referred to the arbitrator any dispute as regards the nature of the deposit of Rs. 10,101/- for adjudication. Nor had they empowered him to determine whether the said amount was liable to be forfeited in the event the plaintiffs were found to have committed a breach. In directing a forfeiture of the amount, the arbitrator has clearly acted beyond the terms of reference.

    8. Apart from this, the decision of the arbitrator that the payment of Rs. 10,101/-was by way of earnest money cannot be supported on the terms of the contract of sale. The relevant condition is contained in Clause 4 thereof, which reads:

    "4. Consideration for the sale agreed upon i.e., Rs. 1,55,101/-. Out of this consideration, the vendor has received this day the sum of Rs. 10,101/-. This is by way of part price. The balance of the price Rs. 1,45,000/- will be payable on the date of execution of the sale deed be-fore the Sub-Registrar."

    There was no stipulation anywhere in the contract that due to a nonfulfilment by the plaintiffs of their part of the contract, the amount of Rs. 10,101/- would be liable to be forfeited. The assumption of the arbitrator that there was such a liability on his finding that they had committed a breach of the contract, was clearly an error apparent on the face of the award, and this alone was a ground for setting aside the award or for remitting it to the arbitrator.

    9. The essential characteristics of earnest money are well known. Earnest money, although taken as part payment of the consideration, is also a guarantee for the due performance of the contract. As their Lordships of the Privy Council had stated in Chiranjit Singh v. Har Swarup: AIR 1926 PC 1--

    "Earnest money is part of the purchase price when the transaction goes forward. It is forfeited when the transaction falls through, by reason of the fault or failure of the vendee."

    In view of this, it is unnecessary for us to deal with this any further. So far as this Court is concerned, the view has throughout been that there is a distinction between earnest money and part of the purchase price (See, Ballabhdas v. Paikaji, 12 Nag LR 177= (AIR 1916 Nag 104); Abbas All v. Kodhusao, 24 Nag LR 189= (AIR 1929 Nag 30 (2)) (FB); Balchandra v. Mahadeo, ILR (1947) Nag 60= (AIR 1947 Nag 193) and Chunnilal v. Mohanlal, AIR 1964 Madh Pra 126). The decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Fateh Chand v. Balkishan Dass, AIR 1963 SC 1405 does not lay down any different principle.

    10. The learned counsel for the respondent argued before us that it was for the arbitrator to determine which party was in breach, and once he came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs had committed a breach of the contract, it was open to him to direct a forfeiture of the amount of Rs. 10,101/- deposited by them towards fulfilment of the contract, a sum which both the parties had not only in the agreement for reference but in all their statements subsequently filed, throughout referred to as 'byana'. In other words, the contention is that it had been accepted by the parties that it was so, and the award cannot be upset because the arbitrator has merely directed what, according to the learned counsel, was only a legal consequence that arose from the plaintiffs' breach of the contract. Reliance is placed upon Rustomji v. Manmal, 1963 MPLJ 284 = (AIR 1964 Madh Pra 15); Smt. Santa Sila Devi v. Dhirendra Nath Sen, (1964) 3 SCR 410= (AIR 1963 SC 1677); Jivarajbhai v. Chintamanrao, (1964) 5 SCR 480 = (AIR 1965 SC 214); Radha Wallabh v. Gopaldas, 1965 MP LJ 4923 Bungo Steel Furniture v. Union of India, (1967) 1 SCR 633= (AIR 1967 SC 378) and Firm Madanlal Roshanlal v. Hukumchand Mills, (1967) 1 SCR 105= (AIR 1967 SC 1030), for the submission that, when the parties have chosen their own arbitrator to be the judge in the disputes between them, they must accept the award as final for good or bad, and a mere error in decision on the part of the arbitrator or his failure to give reasons for his decision is no ground for setting it aside. The presumption is, that the arbitrator intended to dispose finally all the matters in difference; and the award should be held final, as it is by intendment made to be so.

    11. There can hardly be any quarrel with these principles which are firmly established, but there is difficulty in applying them to the facts of the present case. The question whether the deposit of Rs. 10,101/- was a part of the price or was in reality by way of earnest money depends upon the proper construction of the contract and not as to how the parties may have subsequently chosen to describe it. Their intention had to be gathered from the relevant term in regard to it, and not on their subsequent conduct. Having regard to Clause 4 of the contract, the deposit of Rs. 10,101/- made by the plaintiffs was nothing but a part of the price. Nor had they intended that the amount was liable to be forfeited, in the event of a breach, as a penalty. We are aware that parties not infrequently assess the damages at which they rate a breach of contract by one or both of them, and introduce their assessment into the terms of the contract. In this particular case, the parties had originally inserted a clause for payment of Rs. 10,101/-

    as liquidated damages by the party in breach, but that clause was struck out at the time of execution of the contract. Instead, the following clause now finds embodied therein:--

    "7. Both parties will pay the damage to each other if they fail to fulfil the Conditions."

    The term was nothing but a provision for payment of damages to the injured party for the loss that he suffers on account of a breach of contract, which arise 'naturally, according to the usual course for things', from the breach. What were the reasonable damages resulting from the breach of the contract had, nevertheless, to be ascertained and determined by the arbitrator and this he has failed to decide. We would agree with the learned counsel that if the arbitrator had stated that Rs. 10,101/- were, in his view, the amount of damages payable by the plaintiffs, the entire controversy would have rested with such adjudication, on the authorities relied upon by him, and the Court in that event would not have any jurisdiction to interfere with the award. But, unfortunately for the defendant, that is not the case here.

    12. The Court has a general discretion to remit an award for the reconsideration of the arbitrator. This discretion is in general exercisable upon substantially the same grounds as will justify the setting aside of an award (Russel on Arbitration, 17th Ed., p. 308). Looking to the facts of this particular case, we do not think it either just or proper to make any such direction. The learned counsel for the appellants fears that the arbitrator might be prejudiced against the plaintiffs applying for remission and that no useful purpose would be served in remitting the award to him when there is only one conclusion to which he could come, namely, that they were in breach. That being so, it would be more proper that the award should be set aside. Clearly there is no point in remitting the award when one of the parties is apprehensive that the arbitrator might not approach the question with a fresh mind.

    13. In Russel on Arbitration, 17th Ed., p. 311, after stating that in exercising its discretion as to whether to set aside or remit an award, the Court should have regard to the circumstances of the particular case, it is observed that where the arbitrator might be prejudiced against the party applying for remission, the discretion to setting aside should in preference be to remit it In illustrating the point the learned author relics upon the dictum of Romilly, M.R. in Re Tidswell, (1863) 33 Beay 213 to the following effect:

    The objection is, in my opinion, one which would make it inexpedient to remit the award; because, notwithstanding the perfect honesty and bona fides of an arbitrator, it is impossible, where an award has been set aside and sent back upon such grounds, that there should not be, in spite of himself, some disposition to favour one side and a disposition to make it appear that the objections to the award were useless and that the sending it back was productive of no good.

    We would on this principle, think it advisable to set aside the award as a whole rather than remit it inasmuch as, in our view, the bad portion of the award is inseverable from the rest of it. In the circumstances, the award which is bad in toto must be avoided altogether and we, accordingly, set it aside, leaving the parties to their own remedy by way of suit.

    14. For all these reasons, the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs. The order passed by the learned Judge, dismissing the application under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, is set aside and instead, the same is allowed, setting aside the award of the arbitrator dated 30th November 1965. Counsel's fee as per Schedule or Certificate, whichever is less.

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    Jaykumar Jain And Others v. Om Prakash And Another
    (Oct 4, 1969)