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  • section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922,
  • Madras Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1955.
  • clause (iii) of section 10(2)
  • section 10(2)(iii)
  • section 34(1)(b)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922,
  • Madras Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1955.
  • clause (iii) of section 10(2)
  • section 10(2)(iii)
  • section 34(1)(b)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a reference under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 arising from a Tribunal order, in which two questions of law were placed for decision. The assessee is Gangadharrao, proprietor of the firm Messrs. Ram Kishan Oil Mills, Lashkar. In a family partition pursuant to an order dated 5th August, 1946 of the Maharaja of Gwalior, Gangadharrao was required to pay Rs. 10,000 to his brother Narayanrao for certain property and Rs. 42,855 for Narayanrao's half share in the firm; a loan of Rs. 52,855 was advanced by the finance department of the former Gwalior State to Gangadharrao to make these payments. The assessee claimed deductions in the assessment years 1953-54 and 1954-55 under section 10(2)(iii) for interest paid on this loan; that claim was initially allowed by the Income-tax Officer but was later disallowed for the years 1955-56 and 1956-57. The Income-tax Officer issued notices under section 34(1)(b) reopening the assessments for 1953-54 and 1954-55 and in reassessment the deduction for those years was disallowed. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal agreed with the disallowance. The present consolidated reference arises out of the Tribunal's common order disposing appeals for the assessment years 1953-54, 1954-55, 1955-56 and 1956-57.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether interest paid towards a loan raised for acquiring the assessee's brother's interest in the family business on partition of the family assets is in the nature of a capital payment and therefore not allowable under section 10(2)(iii) of the Act?
  2. Whether, in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Officer's action in reopening the assessments under section 34(1)(b) for the years 1953-54 and 1954-55 was justified?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Assessee)'s Arguments

  • The assessee claimed deduction of interest under section 10(2)(iii) on the ground that the loan was borrowed for the purposes of the assessee's business (acquiring the brother's share in the family business) and that interest was actually paid.
  • The opinion records that there was no dispute before the taxing authorities or the Tribunal regarding the genuineness of the borrowing, that the capital was borrowed for business purposes, or that the interest was paid.

Respondent (Revenue / Income-tax Officer)'s Arguments

  • The Income-tax Officer disallowed the deduction on the view that the loan was not borrowed for the purpose of business.
  • The Officer relied on facts that the assessee was disputing his liability to pay the ordered amount in civil court, and that at the time of partition the assessee had a large bank deposit and thus had no need to borrow.
  • The department's counsel referred to decisions such as Metro Theatre and Bombay Steam Navigation Co. to support the position that interest on unpaid purchase price or on installments (without a borrowing properly creating capital for business) is not deductible as expenditure wholly and exclusively for business.
  • An additional factual contention was suggested (by the department) that there was no material to show the interest had actually been paid to the Gwalior Government or its successor.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Birla Gwalior Private Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax Interest paid is not subject to a test of reasonableness; once borrowing is genuine, for business and interest paid, deduction follows. Relied on to show that where borrowing is genuine and for business, interest deduction must be allowed; supports that no reasonableness test applies.
Metro Theatre, Bombay Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax Payment of interest on unpaid instalments of purchase-money for a capital asset was held not to be expenditure wholly and exclusively for business; purchase by instalments is not the same as borrowing capital. Distinguished: the court found Metro Theatre inapplicable because that case concerned interest on unpaid instalments (not a loan creating capital for business).
C.J. Coelho v. State of Madras Dissenting view from Metro Theatre: distinguished unpaid instalments from a loan contracted to provide capital for investment; held that interest on loans for purchase can satisfy wholly and exclusively test. Noted as a contrary view to Metro Theatre; the court referenced it while explaining why Metro is not applicable here, but ultimately relied on Calico Dyeing as the decision in point.
Calico Dyeing and Printing Works v. Commissioner of Income-tax (Bombay High Court) For deduction under section 10(2)(iii) it is sufficient that capital borrowed was used for the purposes of the business in the relevant year; no distinction between borrowing to acquire revenue or capital asset. Held to be the decision in point and applied: supports allowing deduction of interest where capital was borrowed for business even if used to acquire a capital asset.
Bombay Steam Navigation Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax Interest claimed was on unpaid balance of price of assets acquired; there was no borrowing; analogous to Metro Theatre where deduction was disallowed. Distinguished on facts: the court noted that Bombay Steam Navigation was analogous to Metro Theatre and therefore not applicable where there was an actual loan to provide capital for business.
Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax Two conditions for reopening under section 34(1)(b): (1) possession of "information" subsequent to the assessment order; (2) that information must lead to belief that income has escaped assessment, etc.; "information" includes legal information and judicial decisions. Applied to hold that there was no indication of any information coming into possession of the Income-tax Officer after the assessments to justify reopening; therefore reopening was unjustified.
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal v. B. P. Byramji and Co. An Income-tax Officer cannot take action under section 34 merely because he intends to change his view or hold an opinion different from his predecessor on the same set of facts. Relied upon to support the proposition that a successor officer's different view (change of mind or application of mind) does not itself constitute the required "information" to reopen assessments.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first analysed the scope of section 10(2)(iii). It extracted three conjunctive requirements from the provision as articulated in the opinion:

  • The money must have been borrowed by the assessee (i.e., there must be a loan).
  • The money must have been borrowed for the purposes of the assessee's business, profession or vocation.
  • The assessee must have paid the interest which is claimed as a deduction.

The court emphasised that the statutory language makes no distinction between capital borrowed to acquire a revenue asset and capital borrowed to acquire a capital asset, and it contains no requirement that the borrowing must have been strictly necessary (i.e., absence of a "necessity" or "need to borrow" test). The court relied on earlier authority (Birla Gwalior Private Ltd.) for the proposition that interest is not subject to a reasonableness test and that, if the borrowing is genuine, for business and interest has been paid, the deduction must be allowed.

The court then examined the precedents relied on by the Tribunal and the revenue. Metro Theatre was distinguished: that decision concerned interest on unpaid instalments of purchase-money where there was no borrowing of capital; Metro held that merely buying a capital asset on long-term credit with interest on the reduced balance does not constitute borrowing of capital. The Court treated Metro as inapplicable to the present facts because here there was an actual loan advanced by the Gwalior State to provide the capital.

The court noted the dissenting view in C.J. Coelho v. State of Madras which disagreed with Metro Theatre, but placed particular reliance on the Bombay High Court decision in Calico Dyeing and Printing Works, which held that where money is borrowed for business purposes (including acquisition of capital assets for the business) the interest is deductible under section 10(2)(iii) so long as the capital borrowed was used for the purposes of the business in the relevant year.

Applying these principles to the undisputed facts of the case—the existence of a genuine loan from the Gwalior Government, that the capital was borrowed for the purposes of the assessee's business (acquiring the brother's share), and that the interest claimed was paid—the court concluded that the interest was deductible and could not be treated as capital expenditure.

On the second issue (reopening under section 34(1)(b)), the court applied the tests stated in Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh: the Income-tax Officer must have come into possession, subsequent to the making of the assessment order, of "information" which leads to a belief that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment (and information includes legal information and judicial decisions). The court also reiterated the principle from B. P. Byramji that a mere change of opinion by the Income-tax Officer, without fresh information from an external source, does not justify action under section 34(1)(b).

The court examined the reassessment record and found no indication of any new information coming into the Income-tax Officer's possession after the original assessments. The reassessment order's statement that proceedings were initiated because the predecessor "had not applied his mind" (and the use of words such as "probably" and "presumably") was not treated as identifying any concrete material newly discovered. The court held that a successor officer's application of mind or change of opinion does not amount to the requisite information to reopen assessments and therefore the reopening was unjustified.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The court answered the two reference questions as follows:

  • First question: The interest paid by the assessee on the loan borrowed for acquiring his brother's share in the family business in a partition is deductible under section 10(2)(iii) of the Act; the payment of such interest cannot be treated as capital expenditure.
  • Second question: The reopening of the assessments for the years 1953-54 and 1954-55 under section 34(1)(b) was not justified; therefore the reopening was held invalid (the answer to the second question was in the negative).

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The assessee's claim for deduction of interest under section 10(2)(iii) is allowed on the stated facts, and the attempts to reopen the earlier assessments for 1953-54 and 1954-55 were held unjustified. The assessee was awarded costs of the reference and counsel's fee was fixed at Rs. 150.
  • Broader legal implications: The court reaffirmed that section 10(2)(iii) requires only that capital be borrowed, that it be borrowed for business purposes, and that interest be paid; it emphasised that borrowing to acquire a capital asset for the business falls within the provision and that the mere availability of other funds does not negative the claim. The court also reaffirmed the narrow scope for reopening assessments under section 34(1)(b), stressing the necessity of new information subsequent to the assessment order rather than mere change of opinion by a successor officer.
  • No new legal principle was established beyond applying and distinguishing earlier authorities; the decision focused on application of existing statutory tests and precedent to the facts before the court.

Costs: The assessee shall have the costs of the reference. Counsel's fee fixed at Rs. 150.

    Ram Kishan Oil Mills v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, U.P

    - In this reference under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, at the instance of the assessee, the questions that have been placed by the Tribunal before us for decision are :

    "Whether interest paid towards a loan raised for acquiring the assessees brothers interest in the family business on partition of the family assets, is in the nature of a capital payment and not allowable under section 10(2)(iii) ?

    2. Whether, in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Officers action in reopening the case under section 34(1)(b) for the years 1953-54 and 1954-55 was justified ?"

    The material facts are that in a partition of a joint family property between the assessee, Gangadharrao, who is the proprietor of the firm, Messrs. Ram Kishan Oil Mills, Lashkar, and his brother, Narayanrao, according to an order dated 5th August, 1946, of the Maharaja of Gwalior, Gangadharrao was required to pay Rs. 10,000 to his brother in lieu of Narayanraos share in certain item of property, and an amount of Rs. 42,855 for the half share of Narayanrao in Messrs. Ramkishan Oil Mills, Lashkar, which was allotted to Gangadharrao. At the time of the partition, the jagir estate of Gangadharrao was under the court of wards. In order to make this payment, a loan of Rs. 52,855 was advanced by the finance department of the former Gwalior State to Gangadharrao. In the assessment years 1953-54 and 1954-55 the assessee claimed a deduction under section 10(2)(iii) of the interest amount paid to the Gwalior Government on this loan. This claim was allowed by the Income-tax Officer, Gwalior, on 29th August, 1953. It was, however, disallowed in the assessment years 1955-56 and 1956-57. The Income-tax Officer also issued a notice to the assessee under section 34(1)(b) of the Act for reopening the assessment for the years 1953-54 and 1954-55, and in these reassessment proceedings the deduction on account of interest was ultimately disallowed for that assessment year also. The Income-tax Officer disallowed the deduction taking the view that the loan was not borrowed for the purpose of business, and that the assessee was still disputing in a civil court his liability to pay the amount that was ordered to be paid, by the order of the Maharaja of Gwalior, to his brother, Narayanrao, and the assessee had at the time of the partition a large deposit amount in the bank and had no need to borrow any money. In the appeals against the assessments for the four assessment years mentioned above, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner agreed with this view, and so did the Tribunal. This is a consolidated reference on the questions of law stated above arising out of the Tribunals common order disposing of the four appeals preferred by the assessee against the assessment orders made in the assessment years 1953-54, 1954-55, 1955-56 and 1956-57.

    Under section 10(2)(iii) of the Act, the amount of the interest paid "in respect of capital borrowed for the purposes of the business" is a permissible deduction in the computation of profits and gains of business, profession or vocation. It is plain from the language of clause (iii) of section 10(2) that for a claim for deduction of interest under that provision all that is necessary is that, first, the money, that is capital, must have been borrowed by the assessee; secondly, it should have been borrowed for the purposes of the business, profession or vocation of the assessee; and, thirdly, the assessee should have paid this amount as an allowance under that clause. This clause makes no distinction between the capital borrowed in order to acquire a revenue asset and the amount borrowed to acquire a capital asset. It also does not say that for the purposes of business the borrowing capital should have been necessary, so that if at the time of borrowing the assessee had sufficient money of his own to invest in the business then the deduction cannot be allowed. Again, as held by this court in Birla Gwalior Private Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax the interest paid is also not subject to the test of reasonableness. When the Income-tax Officer finds that the borrowing transaction was not illusory or colourable and that the capital was borrowed by the assessee for the purpose of the business and the amount of interest was paid, then the claim made by the assessee for deduction on account of the interest paid on borrowed capital has to be allowed. In holding that the interest paid by the assessee on the amount lent to him by the Gwakior State for acquiring his brothers share in the Ram Kishan Oil Mills was not a permissible deduction, the Tribunal relied on Metro Theatre, Bombay Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax. That was case where an assessee purchased a 999 years old leasehold interest in his business premises for a premium payable by instalments, and paid interest on the installments outstanding from time to time. The Bombay High Court disallowed the deduction of interest amount as not being expenditure wholly and exclusively incurred for the purposes of the business. In that case, Stone C.J. said :

    "In my judgment this interest payment on unpaid installments cannot be stated to be wholly or exclusively a payment for the purpose of such business. No doubt the payment of interest on the arrears of purchase price of this leasehold interest in which the business is carried on may be said to be for the purposes of the business but it is not wholly or exclusively for the purposes of the business. For example, if the cinema business had to be closed down the appellant would still have to make this payment unless he was prepared to have the license forfeited."

    Here, the case of Metro Theatre has no applicability at all. In that case, there was no question of payment of interest on any loan contracted to provide capital for investment in the business. The question that arose in that case was about the payment of interest on the installments where the purchase-money was payable by instalments. In Metro Theatres case it was distinctly held that a mere purchase of capital asset on a long term credit with a stipulation for the payment of interest on the reduced balance does not amount to the borrowing of capital.

    Metro Theatres case was dissented from in C.J. Coelho v. State of Madras, where the assessee claimed deduction of the interest paid by him on moneys borrowed for the purpose of purchasing a plantation. The deduction was claimed under the Madras Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1955. Rajagopalan J., who delivered the judgment of the court, while expressing his disagreement with the observations of Stone C.J. in Metro Theatres case, said :

    "These observations were really in the nature of obiter. Besides there is obviously a difference between the unpaid instalments the learned Chief Justice had to consider in that case and a loan contracted to provide the capital for investment in business, or as in this case for the purchase of the land, the income yielding investment. With all respect to the learned Chief Justice we are unable to agree with the implied principle, that though the payment of interest would satisfy the test that it had been incurred for purposes of the business, it would not satisfy the further test, that it must have been incurred wholly and exclusively for that business."

    In our opinion, the decision that is in point here is the decision of the Bombay High Court in Calico Dyeing and Printing Works v. Commissioner of Income-tax. In that case, the assessee-firm, which carried on the business of bleaching, dyeing and printing cloth, borrowed money in the year of account for extending its business, purchased land and erected additional plant and machinery, and paid interest on the borrowed capital. The assessee made a claim for deduction of interest under section 10(2)(iii), which was rejected by the taxing authority on the ground that the plant and the machinery were not used for business in the year of account. Chagla C.J., while holding that the deduction was permissible, said that for a deduction under section 10(2)(iii) all that the assessee has to show is that the capital which was borrowed was used for the purposes of the business of the assessee in the relevant year of account and it does not matter whether the capital was borrowed to acquire a revenue asset or a capital asset.

    Now, here, no dispute was ever raised before the taxing authorities or the Tribunal about the genuineness of the borrowing. It was also not disputed that the capital was borrowed for the purposes of the business of the assessee and that the interest amount, which the assessee claimed to deduct, was in fact paid. On these facts, the question whether the interest amount paid by the assessee, Gangadharrao, on the moneys borrowed by him from the Gwalior Government for acquiring his brothers interest in the family business on partition can be allowed, must be answered in the affirmative. The payment of such interest cannot be treated as capital expenditure.

    Shri Bhave, learned Government advocate, appearing for the department, referred us to Bombay Steam Navigation Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax. That case is distinguishable by the circumstances that in that case the interest amount, of which deduction was claimed, was paid on the unpaid balance of the price of the assets acquired and there was no borrowing. The case of Bombay Steam Navigation Co. was analogous to Metro Theatres case and was decided by following the decision in the latter case.

    It was also urged that there was no material to show that interest was paid by the assessee to the Gwalior Government or the successor Government. As to this, it is sufficient to say that we have not been asked to answer the question whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the amount in respect of which the assessee claimed deduction was paid by him as interest to the Government. Our answer to the first question, therefore, is that the interest paid by the assessee on the loan amount borrowed by him for acquiring his brothers share in the family business in a partition can be deducted under section 10(2)(iii) of the Act.

    This answer renders it strictly unnecessary for us to answer the other question. But it must be said in connection with that question that there was no information before the Income-tax Officer justifying the reopening of the assessment under section 34(1)(b) for the assessment years 1953-54 and 1954-55. According to the decision of the Supreme Court in Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax two conditions must be satisfied before the Income-tax Officer can act under section 34(1)(b). They are, that he must have come into possession, subsequent to the making of the assessment order in question, "information"; and that information must lead to his belief that income chargeable to income-tax has escaped assessment, or that it has been under-assessed or assessed at too low a rate or has been made the subject of excessive relief under the Act. The Supreme Court has further held that information for the purposes of section 34(1)(b) is not limited to factual information but includes information as to the true and correct state of law, and so covers information as to relevant judicial decisions. In Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singhs case the Supreme Court left open the question whether the Income-tax Officer could act under section 34(1)(b) even if he merely changed his mind without any information from an external source and came to the conclusion that in a particular case he had erroneously allowed an assessees income to escape assessment. But so far as this court is concerned, it has been held in Income-tax Appellate Tribunal v. B. P. Byramji and Co. that an Income-tax Officer cannot take any action under section 34 merely because he intended to change his view or to hold an opinion different from that of his predecessor on some set of facts. In the statement of the case before us, there is no indication whatsoever of the information which came into the possession of the Income-tax Officer subsequent to the making of the assessments for the assessment years 1953-54 and 1954-55 which led to his belief that the assessee had been wrongly allowed in those assessment years deduction on account of interest. The facts and circumstances in which the deduction was claimed were known to the Income-tax Officer even in the assessment years 1953-54 and 1954-55. In the assessment order, which the Income-tax Officer recorded on 1st February, 1958, in the reassessment proceedings for the assessment year 1953-54, it was said that proceedings under section 34(1)(b) had been initiated not on account of any change of opinion but because his predecessor-Income-tax Officer had not applied his mind to the admissibility of the deduction claimed "probably because full details about this interest had not been submitted before him". The Income-tax Officer did not indicate the material which came into his possession subsequently, and the use of the word "presumably" made by him indicates that he was also not certain as regards the material which was before his predecessor. If the predecessor of the Income-tax Officer did not apply his mind to the question of the deduction of interest amount, and his successor did, that does not mean that the successor-Income-tax Officer came into possession of information justifying the reopening of assessments under section 34(1)(b). On the other hand, the justification of "application of mind" for the issue of a notice under section 34(1)(b) only indicates that the notice was issued because of change of opinion. In our judgment, there was no justification whatsoever for reopening the assessments for the years 1953-54 and 1954-55. Consequently, the second question must be answered must be answered in the negative.

    We accordingly answer the two questions in the manner stated above. The assessee shall have costs of this reference. Counsels fee is fixed at Rs. 150.

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    Ram Kishan Oil Mills v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, U.P
    (Apr 21, 1964)