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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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Acts
  • Section 9 (3) of the Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan that Section 9 (3)
  • Section 83 (3) of the C.P. and Berar Panchayats Act, 1946,
  • Section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1955
  • Section 20 of the Relief of indebtedness Act, 1939.
  • SECTION 107 GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT 1935
  • Section 57 of the Madras Local Boards Act, 1920
  • Section 12 of the Accommodation Control Act
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • SECTION 115 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Section 115 of the Code.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 9 (3) of the Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan that Section 9 (3)
  • Section 83 (3) of the C.P. and Berar Panchayats Act, 1946,
  • Section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1955
  • Section 20 of the Relief of indebtedness Act, 1939.
  • SECTION 107 GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT 1935
  • Section 57 of the Madras Local Boards Act, 1920
  • Section 12 of the Accommodation Control Act
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • SECTION 115 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Section 115 of the Code.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners sought a writ of certiorari to quash an order of the Court of the District Judge, Bhopal, which was rendered in an appeal against an order of the Rent Controlling Authority, Bhopal. The Rent Controlling Authority had fixed the fair rent of two shop premises belonging to the applicants. A preliminary objection was taken that the petitioners should have filed a revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the decision of the Court of the District Judge and, because they had failed to avail themselves of that alternative remedy, the application under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be entertained. The High Court considered whether the decision of the District Judge under Section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1955, which stated that the appellate Court's decision "shall be final", was nevertheless subject to revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. After analysis of precedent and statutory text, the Court dismissed the petition and directed certain consequential orders (return of documents, no order as to costs, and refund of outstanding security to petitioners).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioners, having an alternative remedy by way of a revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, could invoke the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 226 to quash the decision of the Court of the District Judge given in an appeal under Section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1955.
  2. Whether a decision of the Court of the District Judge, made on appeal under Section 12 of the Accommodation Control Act and described in the statute as one whose "decision shall be final", is nonetheless open to revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  3. Whether the High Court should exercise supervisory powers under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution in circumstances where the petitioners have not availed themselves of the ordinary remedy of revision.

Arguments of the Parties

Preliminary Objection / Respondent's Position (as addressed by the Court)

  • It was contended that the petitioners ought to have filed a revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the decision of the Court of the District Judge and, since they did not do so, the present application under Article 226 should not be entertained.
  • The legal basis relied upon was that Section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act provides for an appeal to the Court of the District Judge and that the appellate court is an ordinary Court so that the ordinary incidents of its procedure (including revisional jurisdiction vested in the High Court by Section 115 of the Code) apply.

Petitioners' Arguments (summarised)

  • The petitioners sought to invoke the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 226 to quash the District Judge's decision.
  • Shri Sen, counsel for petitioners, relied on decisions (Hiralal, Laxmanrao Deshmukh, Rajaram) to support the contention that the District Judge's decision under the relevant statutory provision could not be revised under Section 115 of the Code.
  • Shri Sen also urged that the High Court should interfere under Article 226 or Article 227, relying on Satyanarayan v. Mallikarjun to argue that the powers of the High Court under Article 227 are wider than under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. Post Master General, AIR 1913 AC 546 Rule that when a question is referred to an established court "without more", ordinary incidents of procedure and the general right of appeal attach. Quoted with approval; used as the foundational rule that an appeal to an ordinary Court imports ordinary procedure and rights (including revisional remedies).
Secretary of State v. C. Rama Rao, AIR 1916 PC 21 Privy Council decision supporting the application of ordinary procedural incidents when an appeal is to an ordinary court. Relied upon to show that appeals to an established Court are governed by ordinary rules of the Civil Procedure Code, hence subject to revisional jurisdiction.
Hem Singh v. Basant Das, AIR 1936 PC 93 Privy Council authority on the application of ordinary procedural rules to appeals to established courts. Placed among authorities establishing the principle that appeals to ordinary courts carry ordinary procedural incidents.
Adaikappa v. Chandrasekhara, AIR 1948 PC 12 Privy Council decision cited in the cluster of authorities on the same rule. Used as one of the precedents supporting the conclusion that Section 12 appeals are to an ordinary Court and thus governed by Civil Procedure Code rules.
National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick and Bros. Ltd., AIR 1953 SC 357 Supreme Court decision cited in support of the rule applied from National Telephone Co. Adopted with the Privy Council decisions to reinforce that appeals to ordinary courts carry ordinary incidents including revisional scrutiny.
Shrikrishna v. Badrilal, Madh B LR 1953 Cir 144 Held (in that High Court decision) that an appeal under an analogous provision conferred special jurisdiction on the District Judge and was not as part of his ordinary jurisdiction. The Court rejected this view as unsound, explaining that the statute did not create a special court and that the appeal was to an ordinary established Court.
Shrinivas v. Superintendent, Government Printing Press, Nagpur, ILR (1944) Nag 540 : (AIR 1945 Nag 94) Authority for the proposition that making a decision "final" generally means it is not appealable but does not preclude revision under Section 115. Relied upon to interpret "final" as barring appeal only and not as excluding revisional jurisdiction under Section 115.
Parthasarathy Naidu v. Koteswara Rao, ILR 47 Mad 369 : (AIR 1924 Mad 561) (FB) Decision explaining that "final" ordinarily means non-appealable and does not oust revisional powers. Used as authority for the same interpretive principle regarding the meaning of "final".
Phani Bhusan v. Sanat Kumar, AIR 1935 Cal 773 Authority relied upon as part of the line of cases interpreting the meaning of "final". Included in support of the proposition that "final" does not necessarily bar revision under Section 115.
Indian Homeopathic Medical Association, Calcutta v. Kanai Lal, AIR 1950 Cal 263 Another decision cited on the meaning of "final" and revisional jurisdiction. Relied upon to support the interpretation that "final" excludes appeal but not necessarily revision.
Naumal Bros. v. Alihussain Kamarali, 1981 MPLJ 450 (Krishnan J.) Decision holding that an order by the District Judge under the relevant provision was revisable under Section 115. The High Court noted this decision to be correct and consistent with its view that Section 12 orders are revisable under Section 115.
Hiralal v. Parasuramsao, ILR (1941) Nag 581 : (AIR 1942 Nag 5) Held that no revision lay against an order of the District Court under Section 20 of the Relief of Indebtedness Act, 1939, because that section expressly prohibited revision. The Court distinguished this authority on the ground that the legislative provision there contained an express prohibition on revision, unlike Section 12 of the Accommodation Control Act.
Laxmanrao Deshmukh v. Collector, ILR 1945 Nag 399 : (AIR 1945 Nag 146) Held that an order of the President of the Tribunal under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act could not be revised under Section 115 because the Tribunal was not a Court. The Court held the case distinguishable because the question whether a statute making a Court's order "final" ousted revision did not arise there.
Rajaram v. The State, ILR (1951) Nag 741 : (AIR 1951 Nag 443) (FB) Observed that a District Judge's decision in revision under a specific statutory provision was not open to revision under Section 115 where the statute expressly barred revision or review. The Court distinguished it on the basis that Section 83(3) in that Act expressly barred revision/review; Section 12 of the Accommodation Control Act contains no such express bar.
Satyanarayan v. Mallikarjun, AIR 1960 SC 137 Authority cited for the proposition that powers under Article 227 are wide but do not permit the High Court to assume appellate powers to correct every mistake of law. Invoked by petitioners to seek interference under Article 227; the Court rejected this as a ground for interference when an adequate and efficacious alternative remedy (revision under Section 115) was available and not availed of.
Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215 Supreme Court observation that the power under Article 227 must be exercised sparingly and only to keep subordinate courts within bounds of their authority, not to correct every error. Relied upon to demonstrate the limits of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 and to support refusal to interfere where no jurisdictional error or error apparent on the face of the record was shown.
Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee, AIR 1951 Cal 193 (SB) Authority cited regarding the limited scope of superintendence and reliance on prior commentary of High Court judges. Referenced (through Waryam Singh) to illustrate that superintendence is not a license to correct all errors but is to keep subordinate courts within their legal bounds.
Manmatha Nath v. Emperor, AIR 1933 Cal 132 Observations about the legal force of "superintendence" and its proper scope (not omnipotence of the High Court). Used (via authorities cited) to underline that the supervisory power is to ensure legal conduct, not to correct every factual or legal error.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner, applying textual analysis of Section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1955, and established precedents:

  1. Statutory reading of Section 12: The Court observed that Section 12 provides "only one appeal shall lie against the decision given by the Rent Controlling Authority in the Court of the District Judge within thirty days of the decision and the decision of the Appellate Court shall be final." From the language the Court concluded that the appeal is to the Court of the District Judge as an established Court (an ordinary Court), not to the District Judge acting as persona designata.
  2. Application of National Telephone Co. principle: Relying on National Telephone Co. and Privy Council decisions (e.g., Secretary of State v. C. Rama Rao), the Court held that where an appeal is provided to an established ordinary Court, the ordinary incidents of that Court's procedure attach, including the availability of revisional remedies under the Civil Procedure Code.
  3. Rejection of the "special jurisdiction" view: The Court considered and rejected the contrary view expressed in Shrikrishna v. Badrilal (that the appeal created special jurisdiction), finding that the statute did not create a special tribunal and that the appeal was to an already established ordinary Court.
  4. Interpretation of "final": The Court analysed the phrase "the decision of the Appellate Court shall be final" and, following authorities (Shrinivas, Parthasarathy Naidu, et al.), concluded that "final" was intended to mean not appealable, but did not mean that the order was immune from revision under Section 115 of the Code. The Court quoted reasoning that reading "final" to bar revision would defeat the object of Section 115 and allow an ordinary Court to act wholly without jurisdiction.
  5. Distinguishing adverse authorities relied upon by petitioners: The Court considered the cases cited by petitioners (Hiralal, Laxmanrao Deshmukh, Rajaram) and distinguished them on their facts — in particular where the relevant statute expressly barred revision or where the forum was not a Court. The Court emphasized that to bar revision there must be express wording to that effect; Section 12 contained no such express bar.
  6. Conclusion on remedy: The Court concluded that an order of the Court of the District Judge under Section 12 is revisable under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and therefore the petitioners ought to have availed themselves of that remedy instead of invoking Article 226.
  7. On exercise of constitutional supervisory jurisdiction: The Court addressed the petitioners' plea for intervention under Articles 226/227 (relying on Satyanarayan) and observed that the High Court's power under Article 227 is to be exercised sparingly and not as a substitute appellate jurisdiction to correct errors of law or fact. Because there was no shown jurisdictional error or error apparent on the face of the record, and petitioners provided no valid reason for not filing the ordinary revision, there was no justification for interference under Articles 226 or 227.
  8. Procedural directions and consequences: The Court dismissed the application, refused to treat the writ petition as a revision petition, and permitted the petitioners to file a separate revision petition; it ordered return of the certified copy of the District Judge's order and other documents to the applicants, made no order as to costs, and ordered refund of the outstanding amount of security to the petitioners.

Holding and Implications

APPLICATION DISMISSED.

Holding (core rulings):

  • The petition under Article 226 was dismissed on the ground that the petitioners failed to avail themselves of the alternative remedy of filing a revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the decision of the Court of the District Judge given in appeal under Section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act.
  • The Court held that an appeal to the Court of the District Judge under Section 12 is an appeal to an ordinary established Court, and the decision of that Court is open to revision under Section 115 despite the statutory phrase that the appellate decision "shall be final" (which the Court interpreted as barring further appeal, not revision).
  • The Court refused to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226 or 227 because no jurisdictional error or error apparent on the face of the record was shown and because the petitioners had not shown any valid reason for not resorting to the ordinary remedy of revision.

Practical consequences for the parties (direct effects):

  • The writ application is dismissed.
  • The petitioners' request that this writ petition be treated as a revision petition was refused; the petitioners remain free to file a separate revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • The certified copy of the order of the District Judge and other documents filed by the applicants were ordered to be returned to them to facilitate filing of a revision petition.
  • The Court made no order as to costs.
  • The outstanding amount of security shall be refunded to the petitioners.

Broader implications: The opinion does not discuss any broader novel precedent; it applies existing authorities to hold that statutory finality as to appeals does not automatically bar revisional jurisdiction in the absence of express words to that effect.

    Kailashchandra v. District Judge

    1. The petitioners in this case pray that a writ of certiorari be issued for quashing a decision of the Court of the District Judge, Bhopal, in an appeal against an order of the Rent Controlling Authority, Bhopal, fixing the fair rent of two shop premises belonging to the applicants.

    2. A preliminary point has been raised in this case that the petitioners should have filed a revision petition under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code against the decision of the Court of District Judge, and that as they did not avail themselves of the alternative remedy this application under Article 226 should not be entertained. In our opinion, this objection must prevail. Section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1955 says:

    '..... only one appeal shall lie against the decision given by the Rent Controlling Authority in the Court of the District Judge within thirty days of the decision and the decision of the Appellate Court shall be final.' It is clear from the wording of Section 12 that an appeal lies to the Court of the District Judge and not to the District Judge acting as a persona designata. That means, the decision of the Court of the District Judge given in an appeal under Section 12 is open to revision under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.

    3. The law on this point is clearly established by the decisions of the Privy Council in Secretary of State v. C. Rama Rao, AIR 1916 PC 21, Hem Singh v. Basant Das, AIR 1936 PC 93, Adaikappa v. Chandrasekhara, AIR 1948 PC 12 and of the Supreme Court in National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick and Bros. Ltd., AIR 1953 SC 357. In all these cases, the rule laid down in National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. Post Master General, AIR 1913 AC 546, was quoted with approval. That rule was stated by Viscount Haldane L.C. in these terms:

    'When a question is stated to be referred to an established Court without more, it, in my opinion, imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach, and also that any general right of appeal from its decisions likewise attaches.' In AIR 1916 PC 21 (supra) the Privy Council considered a case in which an appeal was provided to the District Court against an order of the Forest Settlement Officer rejecting a claim made to a land in a reserved forest. The Forest Act did not provide for any further appeal. The Privy Council held that when proceedings reached the District Court that Court was appealed to as one of the ordinary Courts of the country with regard to whose procedure, orders, and decrees the ordinary rules of the Civil Procedure Coda applied. This decision of the Privy Council makes it abundantly clear that in the present case also the question of appeal or revision against the order of the Court of the District Judge made under Section 12 of the Accommodation Control Act would be governed by the Civil Procedure Coda. Under Section 12 the appeal that is provided to the Court of the District Judge is to one of the ordinary and established Courts.

    We are aware that in Shrikrishna v. Badrilal, Madh B LR 1953 Cir 144, it was field with reference to the analogous provision contained in Section 9 (3) of the Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan that Section 9 (3) confers special jurisdiction on the Court of the District Judge and that an appeal to that Court was not 'as a part of its ordinary jurisdiction or as an extension of it but as a Court of special jurisdiction'. We do not think this view is sound. The learned Judge of the Madhya Bharat High Court failed to notice that the Sthan Niyantran Vidhan did not create a special Court or tribunal of appeal when it provided that an appeal shall lie against an order of the Rent Controlling Authority to the Court of the District Judge. The appeal was to a Court of ordinary jurisdiction and it was to a Court already established. We have no doubt that the decision given by the Court of the District Judge under Section 12 is one to which the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court apply.

    4. New Section 12 also says that the decision of the Appellate Court shall be final. This only means that the decision of the Court of the District Judge shall not be appealable. It does not imply that it is not open to revision under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. In numerous cases it has been held that whenever it is provided that a decision shall be final all that is meant is that the decision shall not be appealable and not that it would not be open to revision or review: see Shrinivas v. Superintendent, Government Printing Press, Nagpur, ILR (1944) Nag 540 : (AIR 1945 Nag 94), Parthasarathy Naidu v. Koteswara Rao, ILR 47 Mad 369 : (AIR 1924 Mad 561) (FB), Phani Bhusan v. Sanat Kumar, AIR 1935 Cal 773 and Indian Homeopathic Medical Association, Calcutta v. Kanai Lal, AIR 1950 Cal 263, in ILR 47 Mad 369 : (AIR 1924 Mad 561) (FB) (supra) the reason for giving this meaning to the word 'final' was succinctly stated by Schwabe C.J. Under Section 57 of the Madras Local Boards Act, 1920 the decision of the Court of a District Judge or a Subordinate Judge in an election matter was made final. It was urged in the Madras High Court that this finality precluded any revision petition under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. Repelling this contention the learned Chief Justice said:

    'There is really no authority adduced in support of that proposition and, in my judgment, it would be quite contrary to the whole object and intention of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure so to hold. That section only applies where there is no appeal. I know of no better way of directing that there shall be no appeal than by the legislature stating that the decision of a particular Court shall be final. It is the ordinary mode of expression used for the purpose in much of the legislation in England on which this legislation is founded; and, where the whole object of revision is to prevent a Court, from which there is no appeal, acting contrary to its jurisdiction, a finding that it is the law that, because the words used are "the decision shall be final", a Court ordinarily subject to the revisional powers of this Court, should be permitted to act wholly without jurisdiction without the aggrieved party being entitled to any remedy, would in my judgment be untenable, and that would be the effect of deciding this second point in favour of the contention put forward.'

    5. Shri Sen, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, however, referred us to the decisions in Hiralal v. Parasuramsao, ILR (1941) Nag 581 : (AIR 1942 Nag 5), Laxmanrao Deshmukh v. Collector of Nagpur, ILR 1945 Nag 399 : (AIR 1945 Nag 146) and Rajaram v. The State, ILR (1951) Nag 741 : (AIR 1951 Nag 443) (FB), in support of the contention that the decision of the District Judge under Section 12 of the Act could not be revised under Section 115 of the Code. All these eases are clearly distinguishable. In ILR (1941) Nag 581 : (AIR 1942 Nag 5) (supra) it was held that no revision was competent against an order of the District Court made under Section 20 of the Relief of indebtedness Act, 1939. This conclusion was based on the express prohibition in Section 20 that 'no application for revision shall lie against such order'. The decision in ILR (1945) Nag 399 : (AIR 1945 Nag 146) (supra) that an order passed by the President of the Tribunal constituted under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act could not be revised under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure was on the reasoning that the Tribunal was not a Court. The question whether when a provision makes an order of a Court final a revision petition can lie against that order did not arise for consideration in that case.

    The third case, viz. ILR (1951) Nag 741 : (AIR 1951 Nag 443) (FB) (supra), in which it was observed that the decision of the District Judge passed in revision under Section 83 (3) of the C.P. and Berar Panchayats Act, 1946, was not open to revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is also of no assistance. Section 83 (3) expressly says that the order of the District Judge shall be final and no application for revision or review thereof shall lie. On the other hand, the observation in that case that the power under Section 115 'is exercisable only in respect of decisions which have not been given finality by any law in the sense that the jurisdiction of the High Court to question them is not expressly barred' shows that in order to bar a revision under Section 115 there must be in the relevant provision express words to that effect. Here, there are no such words in Section 12 of the Act. In our opinion, an order made by the Court of the District Judge under Section 12 is revisabie under Section 115 of the Code, and the decision of Krishnan J. in Naumal Bros. v. Alihussain. Kamarali, 1981 MPLJ 450, to that effect is correct.

    6. Shri Sen then urged that this was a case in which this Court should interfere under Article 226 or Article 227. He relied on Satyanarayan v. Mallikarjun, AIR 1960 SC 137 as an authority for holding that the powers of the High Court under Article 227 are much wider than under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We see ho ground whatsoever for interfering in the matter under Article 225 or Article 227 when the applicants have not shown any valid reason for not resorting to the ordinary remedy of a revision petition open to them. That remedy was equally efficacious and expeditious.

    In Satyanarayan's case, AIR 1960 SC 137 (supra) what the Supreme Court has said is that however wide the scope of Article 227 may be the High Court cannot in the exercise of its power under that article assume appellate powers to correct every mistake of law. In Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215, the Supreme Court observed that the power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 has to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting their errors. In Waryam Singh's case, AIR 1954 SC 215 (supra) reference was made to the observations of Harries C.J. to that effect in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee, AIR 1951 Cal 193 (SB). Harries C.J. in turn had relied on the observations of Rankin C. J. in Manmatha Nath v. Emperor, AIR 1933 Cal 132, where dealing with the power of the High Court under Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1935 the learned Chief Justice said : (p. 134) '..... superintendence is not a legal fiction whereby a High Court Judge is vested with omnipotence but is as Norman J. had said a term having a legal force and signification. The general superintendence which this Court has over all jurisdiction subject to appeal is a duty to keep them within the bounds of their authority, to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. It does not involve responsibility for the correctness of their decisions, either in fact or law.'

    7. From the petition itself it is clear that there is no question of the exercise or non-exercise of jurisdiction by the Court of the District Judge; and the error that is said to be existing in the District Judge's decision is not one which can be described as an error apparent on the face of the record. The error is not revealed without any effort or arguments by the petitioners. There can therefore be no justification for interfering in this petition.

    8. For these reasons this application is dismissed. The petitioners' prayer that this application itself be treated as a revision petition cannot be granted. It is open to them to file a separate revision petition. For that purpose, the certified copy of the order of the District Judge and other documents filed by the applicants be returned to them. In the circumstances of the case we make no order for costs.

    The outstanding amount of security shall be refunded to the petitioners.

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    Comments

    Kailashchandra v. District Judge
    (Aug 17, 1961)