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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners sought a writ of mandamus directing respondents to admit them to the Basic Training School, Betul for the session beginning 1 June 1961 and ending 30 April 1962. The petitioners alleged that they applied for admission, possessed required qualifications, were selected by Respondent No.1 (the District Inspector of Schools, Betul), admitted in May–June 1961, and had attended classes for about a month. On 1 July 1961 a notice displayed by the Superintendent (Respondent No.3), citing orders of Respondent No.2 (Divisional Superintendent), stated that the admissions of the petitioners and 64 other students had been cancelled. The petitioners challenged that cancellation as illegal and arbitrary and sought quashing of the cancellation and restoration of their admissions.

Respondent No.1's reply did not dispute the basic facts of application, selection and attendance. He stated that he acted pursuant to memoranda from the Director of Public Instruction (dated around May 1961) instructing admissions be made according to memoranda issued in 1959 and 1960, that he selected candidates on those principles and informed the Superintendent, and that on or about 19 June 1961 he received intimation from Respondent No.2 to cancel his selections.

Respondents Nos.2 and 3 contended that Respondent No.1's selections were invalid because, under the relevant memorandum, the Superintendent (not the District Inspector) was the prescribed authority for admission; the District Inspector's role was to prepare and transmit seniority lists to the Superintendent. Their return also contained a statement alleging that the candidates had offered "hush money" to secure admission.

After hearing counsel, the Court rejected the petition and dismissed it, while noting certain aspects of the respondents' conduct and ordering refund of the outstanding security deposit to the petitioners and making no order as to costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioners were entitled to a writ of mandamus directing their admission to the Basic Training School, Betul, after their admission had been cancelled.
  2. Whether the cancellation of the petitioners' admission was valid on the ground that the District Inspector of Schools (Respondent No.1) was not competent under the governing memorandum to admit candidates (i.e., who was the competent authority under the memorandum: the District Inspector or the Superintendent?).
  3. Whether non-observance of the administrative/office instructions regulating admissions (the 1959/1960 memoranda) could be remedied by judicial writs such as certiorari or mandamus.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • They applied for admission to the Basic Training School for the 1961–62 session and possessed the requisite qualifications.
  • They were selected by the District Inspector (Respondent No.1), admitted, and attended classes for about a month.
  • The subsequent cancellation of their admissions (by order attributed to Respondent No.2 and displayed by Respondent No.3) was wholly illegal and arbitrary and should be quashed with restoration of their admission.

Respondent No.1's Reply

  • He did not dispute the petitioners' account of application, selection and attendance.
  • He received memoranda from the office of the Director of Public Instruction instructing admissions be made according to memoranda of 1959 and 1960 and was asked (by letter dated 1 May 1961) to make admissions in accordance with those instructions.
  • Acting on those principles he selected the candidates and informed the Superintendent; subsequently he received intimation from Respondent No.2 to cancel his selections.

Respondents Nos.2 and 3's Arguments

  • The selection made by Respondent No.1 was invalid because, according to the relevant memorandum, the Superintendent of the School was the prescribed authority for admission; the District Inspector's role was limited to preparing and transmitting a seniority list to the Superintendent.
  • They also asserted that the candidates had offered "hush money" and that the petitioners therefore "deserve punishment" for giving bribes to gain admission.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramchandra v. State of M. P., AIR 1961 Madh-Pra 247 That rules or instructions governing admission of students into institutions (here medical colleges as in that case) were executive/administrative instructions without statutory force, and non-observance of those instructions, however regrettable, does not affect the validity of decisions admitting or refusing admission so as to justify quashing by certiorari. The Court applied the same principle to hold that the memoranda regulating admissions to the Basic Training School were merely executive instructions; therefore breach of those instructions did not justify issuing a writ of mandamus to restore the petitioners' admissions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through the following steps of analysis, relying only on the materials in the return and the parties' pleadings:

  1. Fact-finding: The Court accepted that the petitioners applied, were selected by Respondent No.1, admitted and attended, and that their admissions were later cancelled by direction attributed to Respondent No.2 and communicated by Respondent No.3. Respondent No.1's reply did not dispute these points.
  2. Interpretation of the governing memoranda: The Court examined the memoranda (referred to in the returns and communications) which set out principles for admission — allocation of seats (60% to untrained teachers of attached districts on strict seniority, 40% to direct candidates with specified category percentages and merit criteria), the process for preparing seniority lists and the statement that if a senior teacher was to be superseded the District Inspector's opinion would be final.
  3. Competent authority question: From the language of the instructions, the communications from the Director of Public Instruction to the District Inspector, and the clause making the District Inspector's decision on supersession final, the Court concluded that the District Inspector of Schools (Respondent No.1) was the competent authority to select candidates for admission and that the list sent to the Superintendent was intended as an intimation of candidates chosen for admission rather than a list from which the Superintendent must itself choose.
  4. Legal effect of breaching the instructions: Although the Court concluded the cancellation (on the ground that Respondent No.1 lacked authority) was unjustified, it held that the memoranda were merely administrative/executive instructions without statutory force. Citing Ramchandra v. State of M.P., the Court reasoned that breach of such executive instructions, however regrettable, does not entitle the petitioners to the issuance of writs of certiorari (to quash the cancellation) or mandamus (to compel readmission).
  5. Assessment of respondents' allegations: The Court criticised the respondents' return for making unsubstantiated allegations that the petitioners had offered hush money. It noted that a return in Article 226 proceedings should set out facts relied on as constituting valid grounds for refusal of relief, not cast aspersions. The Court observed that if bribery were the ground, respondents should have stated that proceedings had been or would be taken; mere insinuation did not justify cancellation and only served to cast aspersions.
  6. Practical consequences and public perception: The Court commented on the administrative discretion in admissions being regulated by principles that authorities lay down; sudden admissions and cancellations sow bewilderment and convey an impression of arbitrariness or opportunism in treating public institutions.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The petition is dismissed.

Direct consequences (as stated in the opinion):

  • No writ of mandamus is issued to direct readmission of the petitioners despite the Court's view that the cancellation of admissions on the ground of lack of authority of Respondent No.1 was unjustified.
  • The petition is dismissed and the Court made no order as to costs.
  • The outstanding amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioners.

Broader implication stated by the Court:

The Court treated the memoranda governing admissions as administrative/executive instructions without statutory force, and therefore non-observance of those instructions does not, by itself, justify quashing administrative action or commanding reinstatement by writ. The Court applied the principle articulated in Ramchandra v. State of M. P. in reaching this conclusion.

    Gokul Prasad And Others v. M.M Sohani, Betul And Others

    1. In this case the petitioners seek a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to admit them to the Basic Training School, Betul.

    2. According to the petitioners they had applied for admission to the School for the session commencing on 1st June 1961 and ending on 30th April 1962, that they possessed the requisite qualifications, and that the respondent No. 1, the District Inspector of Schools, Betul, by his order passed in May-June 1961 admitted them into the School and thereafter they had actually joined it and attended classes for about a month. They further say that on 1st July 1961 a notice was displayed on the notice-board of the School by the respondent No. 3, the Superintendent of the School, saying that according to the orders of the respondent No. 2, the Divisional Superintendent of Education, Narbada Division, the admission of the petitioners and other sixtyfour students had been cancelled. The petitioners contend that this cancellation order is wholly illegal and arbitrary, and pray that it be quashed and their admission into the School be restored.

    3. In his reply to the petition the respondent No. 1, has not disputed these facts. He has stated that on or about 3rd May 1961 he received a memorandum from the office of the Director of Public Instruction asking him to make the admissions to the Normal School according to two office memoranda issued in 1959 and 1960; that again on 26th May 1961 he was asked to take immediate action in the matter of admissions to the School; that accordingly on the principles laid down in the memorandum regulating the admission of students into the School the petitioners' and other candidates were selected for admission into the Basic Training School, Betul, and the Superintendent of the School was informed accordingly; and that on or about 19th June 1961 he received, an intimation from the respondent No. 2 asking him to cancel the selection of the candidates made by him.

    The answer of the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 is that the selection of candidates made by the respondent No. 1 was invalid as under the relevant memorandum issued regulating the admissions he was not the competent authority for making admissions; that the prescribed authority" for admision was the Superintendent of the School and tile first respondent was only required to prepare a seniority list of untrained teachers of schools in the district attached to the Training School and of the candidates applying for admission and to transmit it to the Superintendent of the School; and that consequently the admissions of the petitioners and other candidates were cancelled. The return of the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 also contains the statement:

    "The very fact that these candidates offered hush money which they themselves accept for getting themselves admitted in Normal School is deplorable and their continuance would have established a precedence for others to follow. As a matter of fact, these petitioners deserve punishment for giving bribes to gain their ends''.

    4. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, we are constrained to reach the conclusion of rejecting this petition. The reason is that though the cancellation of the admission of the petitioners and other candidates into the School was wholly unjustified on the ground that the respondent No. 1 had no authority to admit them yet we cannot do anything in the matter as the principles laid down for regulating the admissions into the School are merely executive instructions. It is not disputed that they are so. The instructions are contained in Rule 1 to the return of the respondents Nos. 2 and 3. The respondent No. 1 was asked by the office of the Director of Public Instruction to make admissions according to these instructions. In regard to the admissions to the Basic Training School, Betul, the following principles were laid down:

    "There shall be no elimination test. Districts are attached to each Normal School as in the Appendix. 60 per cent seats in each of these Normal Schools should be filed by untrained teachers of each district attached to the school, strictly on the basis of seniority. The District Inspectors of Schools concerned will send the list of the senior-most untrained teachers to the Superintendent of the School. If two districts are attached to a school the seats will be divided equally between the two districts. In drawing up the seniority list, the District Inspector of Schools, shall take into account teachers of non-Government Primary School's, Middle schools also. The remaining 40 per cent seats are distributed in each school as follows:

    (a) Scheduled Caste.

    15%

    (b) Scheduled Tribe 15%

    (c) Women candidates 10% 40% The recruitment to these 40 per cent seats should be made from direct candidates. If the required number of direct candidates of a particular category is not available, the deficit should be made up first by admitting more untrained teachers from the attached district and then by direct candidates-first preference being given to Matriculates and next to Middle passed candidates strictly in order of percentage of marks obtained by them at the Middle School examination. In making the selection of the direct candidates, all the applications of the above three categories received by the District 'Inspectors of Schools' of the attached districts will be taken into consideration. Here also if two districts are attached to a school, the direct vacancies, if any should be divided equally between them. It should be borne in mind that the selection of the direct candidates is made strictly on the basis of merit"

    It was further stated in the instructions:

    "If a senior teacher is to be superseded for admission to training, for one reason or the other, this would be stated against his name by the District Inspector of Schools and his opinion will be final"
    .

    5. These directions leave no doubt that the authority competent to select 'candidates for admission was the District Inspector of Schools and the seniority list of 'untrained teachers' and other candidates which he was required to send to the Superintendent of the School was one of the teacher-candidates and other candidates selected for admission and not one from which the Superintendent of the School was required to make the selection himself. The list transmitted to the Superintendent was just by way of intimation that the teachers and the candidates mentioned in that list had been chosen for admission.

    This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the memorandum of instructions was sent to the District Inspector of Schools of the region concerned and he was asked by a letter dated 1st May 1961 of the office of the Director of Public Instruction to make admissions into the School according to the memorandum issued in 1959 and 1960, and by the fact that the instructions themselves made the decision of the District Inspector of Schools with regard to supersession of any teacher for admission final. The language of the instructions and of the various communications addressed lay the office of the Director of Public Instruction to the respondent No. 1 leave no manner of doubt that the competent authority for admission was the respondent No. 1, the District Inspector of Schools.

    6. The cancellation of the admission of the petitioners on the ground that the District Inspector of Schools was not empowered to admit them was. therefore, unjustified. But as the instructions regulating the admissions into the School are merely administrative or executive, their breach even it patent would not justify the issue of a writ of certiorari for quashing the cancellation of the petitioners admissions or for the issue of a writ of mandamus for their readmission into the School. In this respect the present case is no different from the case of Ramchandra v. State of M. P., AIR 1961 Madh-Pra 247 where it has been held by us that the rules governing admission of students into medical colleges are only executive instructions which have no statutory force and that the non-observance of those instructions however regrettable cannot affect the validity of any decision admitting or refusing to admit a student into a college.

    7. It must, however be added that we are unable to appreciate the contacting return of the respondent No. 1 and of the respondents Nos. 2 and 3. The endeavour of the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 to justify the cancellation of the admission of as many as sixty-eignt candidates within one month of their admission into the School appears to us as one bordering on ludicrousness. Their statement in the return that the petitioners gave 'hush money' for securing admissions and that they are themselves accustomed to acceptance of such illegal amounts is wholly unwarranted. The return which is required of a respondent in proceedings under Article 226 is as to the facts relied on as constituting a valid and sufficient ground for refusing the prayer of the petitioner and not of insinuations against the petitioner in the proceedings. It would have been understandable if the said respondents had said that the admissions made into the School were vitiated because they had been procured by offers and acceptance of illegal gratification and the persons concerned had been proceeded against or were about to be proceeded against for offering or receiving bribes. But the statement actually made by the respondents does not carry the matter any further. It only casts aspersions against the petitioners and the respondent No. 1, the District Inspector of Schools. It appears to us to be an undignified and irresponsible statement made by the said respondents to cover up their own mistakes.

    It is no doubt true that admissions into public institutions such as the Basic Training School are in the discretion of the authorities. But that discretion is regulated by the principles which the authorities have themselves laid down. If admissions are made and cancelled soon after for no apparent reason, the public may be pardoned for bewilderment over the kaleidoscopic change. They may justifiably think that such institutions are treated as private properties by the Department and the officers responsible for regulating admissions, and that admission in these institutions is not wholly a matter of following any principles but a matter of tactics or of opportunism.

    8. For all these reasons, this petition is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case We make no order as to costs. The outstanding amount of security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioners.

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    Gokul Prasad And Others v. M.M Sohani, Betul And Others
    (Oct 6, 1961)