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  • sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act (XVIII of 1937,
  • sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937,
  • provisions of Section 2 of the Hindu Widow's Remarriage Act (XV of 1856),
  • provisions of Section 2 of the Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act, 1856,
  • Ss. 2 and 5 of the Hindu Widow's Remarriage Act, 1856 (XV of 1856),
  • Section 3(2) of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937,
  • Section 2 of the Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act, 1856,
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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Advocates
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Acts
  • sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act (XVIII of 1937,
  • sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937,
  • provisions of Section 2 of the Hindu Widow's Remarriage Act (XV of 1856),
  • provisions of Section 2 of the Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act, 1856,
  • Ss. 2 and 5 of the Hindu Widow's Remarriage Act, 1856 (XV of 1856),
  • Section 3(2) of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937,
  • Section 2 of the Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act, 1856,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion (Pande, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Full Bench was asked to answer three questions about the effect of remarriage by a Hindu widow on property she inherited from her son and related points of law under the Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act, 1856 and the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937.

Relevant facts (as given in the order of reference): Sarup held two ancestral occupancy plots (khasra Nos. 188 and 189, village Sasawad). He died in March 1952, leaving his widow Mst. Batni (defendant 2), a son Nathia, two sisters (plaintiff 2 Mst. Jugna and plaintiff 3 Mst. Gulja) and a cousin Bhondu (plaintiff 1). Nathia died on 20-11-1952. On 7-6-1954 Batni (the widow) transferred the occupancy plots by sale deed to Ramdayal (defendant 1) and subsequently remarried. Bhondu, Mst. Jugna and Mst. Gulja sued for a declaration that the sale dated 7-6-1954 was ineffective against them and for possession of the plots. The reference requires consideration of Sections 2 and 5 of the Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act, 1856 and sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, among other points.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the property inherited by a Hindu widow from her son is divested on account of her subsequent remarriage?
  2. Whether the cases of Babulal v. Sher Jamakhand (Second Appeal No. 46 of 1957, Dated 24-9-1954 (Nag)) and Panna v. Mst. Goura (Second Appeal No. 650 of 1951, Dated 19-4-1957 (Madh. Pra.)) on the one hand, or Bisahin v. Gaitri (Second Appeal No. 210 of 1938, Dated 11-10-1940 (Nag)) and earlier cases on the other hand lay down the correct law?
  3. Whether a Hindu widow who has an interest in her deceased husband's property along with her minor son under Section 3(2) of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, gets the property after the death of her minor son by fluctuation of her interest to the full (survivorship), or whether that interest vanishes and she succeeds under general Hindu law as mother of her deceased son?

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Babulal v. Sher Jamakhand (S.A No. 46 of 1947, Dated 24-9-1954 (Nag)) Held (as reported) that a mother, having inherited from her son, would not be divested on remarriage. The Court distinguished this decision on its facts and observed it may have involved property that was self-acquired by the son; not followed as a general rule under Section 2.
Panna v. Mst. Goura (S.A No. 650 of 1951, Dated 19-4-1957 (Madh. Pra.)) Relied upon Babulal and took the view that a mother on remarriage did not forfeit right to remain in possession of husband's property inherited from her son. The Court held this case was not correctly decided in view of Section 2 and the prevailing course of authority.
Bisahin v. Gaitri (S.A No. 210 of 1938, Dated 11-10-1940 (Nag)) Cited among earlier cases taking the view that remarriage could lead to forfeiture under the applicable law. Included among consistent authorities supporting forfeiture under Section 2.
Vithu v. Govinda, ILR 22 Bom 321 (Full Bench) Authority that under Section 2 of the Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act a widow on remarriage forfeits rights in her deceased husband's property. Relied upon as part of the unanimity of High Courts recognizing forfeiture under Section 2.
Ramchandra v. Sakharam, AIR 1958 Bom 244 Support for the view that Section 2 effects forfeiture of a widow's rights on remarriage. Cited among High Court decisions consistent with the forfeiture principle.
Nawab Singh v. Gauri Shankar, AIR 1935 Pat 58 Used as authority on forfeiture under Section 2. Cited by the Court as part of the line of decisions upholding forfeiture.
Suraj Jote Kuer … v. Attar Kumari …, ILR 1 Pat 706 (AIR 1922 Pat 378) Authority cited in support of the forfeiture doctrine under Section 2. Counted among consistent judicial authorities.
Murgayi v. Viramakali, ILR 1 Mad 226 Authority consistent with forfeiture under Section 2. Relied upon as part of the supporting case law.
Tavaramma v. Sivayya, ILR 41 Mad 1078 (AIR 1919 Mad 854 (FB)) Authority affirming that remarriage effects forfeiture of widow's rights in husband's property. Included among decisions supporting Section 2's operation.
Gajapathi v. Jeevammal, AIR 1929 Mad 765 Authority aligned with forfeiture principle under Section 2. Cited as part of the corroborative body of decisions.
Matungini Gupta v. Ram Rutton Roy, ILR 19 Cal 289 (Full Bench) Authority aligned with the forfeiture view under Section 2. Noted among High Court decisions of like view.
Santala Bewa v. Badaswari Dasi, ILR 50 Cal 727 (AIR 1924 Cal 98) Authority cited in support of forfeiture under Section 2. Relied upon as part of judicial consensus referenced by the Court.
Manabai v. Chandanbai, ILR (1954) Nag 727 (AIR 1954 Nag 284) Division Bench review holding a widow on remarriage forfeits right to husband's property, even where caste custom allows remarriage. The Court cited this Division Bench decision as reviewing and aligning case law in favor of forfeiture under Section 2.
Bhola Umar v. Mt. Kausilla, ILR 55 All 24 (AIR 1932 All 617) (Full Bench) A contrary view (earlier authority) to the view that remarriage always causes forfeiture. The Court observed Manabai (Div. Bench) differed from the view taken in Bhola Umar; Bhola Umar's position was not followed.
Sammar v. Mst. Bhago, 5 CPLR 85 (Judicial Commissioner's Court) Leading case of the Judicial Commissioner's Court holding that mother in possession of husband's property by inheritance to her son forfeits it upon remarriage. Counted among older authorities consistently adopting the forfeiture view.
Sitaram v. Laxman, 8 Nag LR 128 Judicial Commissioner's Court authority consistent with forfeiture on remarriage. Cited as part of the Judicial Commissioner's Court line supporting forfeiture.
Kashirao v. Ukarda, 11 Nag LR 116 (AIR 1915 Nag 109) Another Judicial Commissioner's Court authority that a widow in possession under her son's inheritance forfeits on remarriage. Included among consistent earlier authorities relied on by the Court.
Sheobaran Mahto v. Mt. Bhogea, AIR 1918 Pat 590 Bombay/Patna line authority cited in relation to forfeiture doctrine. Referenced as part of the judicial consensus.
Arunachala Mudaliar v. Muruganatha Mudaliar, 1954 SCR 243 (AIR 1953 SC 495) Principle: where son obtained property under a will/gift, question whether it was ancestral or self-acquired is one of the donor's (testator's) intention to be gathered from instrument terms. The Court relied on this Supreme Court authority in explaining why Babulal might have been concerned with a case where the son's property was self-acquired by gift/will; used to distinguish Babulal.
Katama Natchiar v. Raja of Shivagunga, 9 Moo Ind App 539 (Privy Council) Illustrates that a Mitakshara coparcener's interest in joint family property is fluctuating (subject to births/deaths) during lifetime. Used to support the proposition that a widow under s.3(2) takes the same fluctuating interest as her husband had.
Gurudayal v. Sarju, 1949 Nag LJ 119 (AIR 1952 Nag 43) Authority that a widow takes the same interest in joint family property as her husband had under s.3(2) (i.e., fluctuating interest). Cited among numerous High Court decisions adopting the view that s.3(2) vests the husband's fluctuating interest in the widow.
Baburao v. Savitribai, ILR (1952) Nag 578 (AIR 1952 Nag 270) Cited as authority supporting the s.3(2) interpretation that widow takes husband's fluctuating interest. Relied upon as part of the weight of authority.
Hanuman v. Tulsabai, ILR (1955) Nag 1030 (AIR 1956 Nag 63) Authority supporting that widow takes husband's fluctuating interest under s.3(2). Included among consistent High Court decisions.
Ramchandra v. Ramgopal, AIR 1956 Nag 228 Authority cited for s.3(2) interpretation in favor of fluctuating interest vesting in widow. Cited by the Court as part of the established view.
Tukaram Raghoji v. Mt. Gangi, AIR 1957 Nag 28 Authority supporting the view that s.3(2) vests in the widow the same fluctuating interest as husband. Relied on as precedent in that line.
Bhagabai v. Bhaiyalal, AIR 1957 Madh Pra 29 Authority in the same vein for s.3(2) interpretation. Included among supporting cases.
Mt. Jambal v. Mst. Dulaurin, F.A No. 109 of 1952 (Dated 18-9-1957 (MP)) Another decision cited for the principle that the widow takes husband's fluctuating interest under s.3(2). Referred to as part of the consistent holdings.
Bhagwant v. Manmati, AIR 1959 Madh Pra 249 Supportive authority for the s.3(2) position. Listed among the cases adopting the same view.
Laxman v. Gangabai (AIR 1955 Madh B 188) Cited for the s.3(2) interpretation. Counted in the body of supporting authorities.
Nagappa Narayan v. Mukambe Venkatraman, AIR 1951 Bom 309 Authority cited on s.3(2) issues. Included among cited precedents supporting the view.
Seethamma v. Veerana Chetty, AIR 1950 Mad 785 Authority supporting the widow's fluctuating interest under s.3(2). Relied upon as corroborative authority.
Parappa v. Nagamma, AIR 1954 Mad 576 (Full Bench) Authority on s.3(2) consistent with the view that widow gets husband's fluctuating interest. Cited among the High Courts' holdings in support of the Court's analysis.
Kallian Rai v. Kashi Nath, AIR 1943 All 188 Authority cited in the context of s.3(2) jurisprudence. Included in the list of supportive cases.
Sabujpari v. Satrughan Isser, AIR 1958 Pat 405 Authority cited for the s.3(2) proposition. Counted in the line of decisions relied upon.
Nanda Kishore v. Sukti Dibya, AIR 1953 Orissa 240 Authority cited regarding s.3(2) interpretation. Referenced among corroborative authorities.
Harekrishna Das v. Jujesthi Panda, (S) AIR 1956 Orissa 73 Authority in the same group on s.3(2). Included as supporting precedent.
Keluni Dei v. Jagabandhu Naik, AIR 1958 Orissa 47 Authority cited for the s.3(2) position. Relied upon as part of the aggregate authority.
Bhiwra v. Renuka, ILR (1949) Nag 400 (AIR 1952 Nag 215) Decision dealing with the nature/extent of a widow's interest following partition. The Court held that such cases do not support the proposition that a widow's s.3(2) interest lapses when she becomes sole surviving member.
Haraman (or Haraman/Haraman) v. Tulsabai, 1956 Nag LJ 194 (AIR 1956 Nag 63) Decision concerning extent/nature of widow's interest, particularly in partition contexts. Cited and distinguished as not supporting lapse of s.3(2) interest when widow becomes sole survivor.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by close textual and contextual analysis of the statutory provisions and the relevant authorities. The reasoning may be summarized in the principal steps adopted by the Court:

  1. Interpretation of Section 2 (Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act, 1856): The Court read the words of Section 2 as unambiguous and restricted in operation to rights and interests which a widow "may have in her deceased husband's property" by inheritance from her husband or his lineal successors prior to remarriage. The section operates to cause such rights and interests, if already vested in the widow, to "cease and determine" upon her remarriage.
  2. Relationship between Sections 2 and 5: Section 5 preserves rights except as provided in the preceding sections; the Court reconciled the two by explaining that while Section 2 produces forfeiture of rights already vested in the widow by reason of inheritance from husband/lineal successors, Section 5 confirms that remarriage does not bar a widow from inheriting in the future from her husband's lineal descendants (because consanguinity is unaffected by remarriage).
  3. Distinction between property types: The Court emphasized that Section 2 does not extend to the self-acquired property of a lineal descendant (e.g., the son). If the widow inherited the son's self-acquired property before remarriage, that property would not fall within Section 2's ambit. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's holding in Arunachala Mudaliar to stress the centrality of the donor's intent in distinguishing ancestral from self-acquired property when that distinction matters.
  4. Treatment of contrary decisions: The Court reviewed contrary decisions (for example Babulal and the Madhya Pradesh decision in Panna) and explained why they were distinguishable or incorrectly decided. Babulal was said to be distinguishable on its facts (possibly involving property the son had by will/gift); the Madhya Pradesh case was held not correctly decided in view of Section 2 and the prevailing course of opinion.
  5. Analysis under Section 3(2) (Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937): The Court explained that under sub-s. (2) a widow takes the same interest in the joint family property that her husband had at his death — an interest that in Mitakshara law is fluctuating (subject to births and deaths). The Court held that the Act vests in her the undefined and fluctuating interest (not a defined, separated share) — i.e., "unity of ownership" and community of interest and possession.
  6. Survivorship and enlargement of interest: Because the widow takes a fluctuating interest analogous to her husband's, she is capable of acquiring the whole estate by survivorship if other family members die. The Court found no legal basis for the view that the widow's fluctuating interest vanishes when she alone remains; rather, by survivorship she may obtain the whole estate.
  7. Limits on final questions left undecided: The Court expressly declined to decide whether Section 2 of the Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act applies to a widow who takes an interest under sub-s. (2) of Section 3 (i.e., whether remarriage would divest such an interest); the Court noted a Division Bench had taken the view that Section 2 does apply but did not decide that question itself.

Holding and Implications

The Court gave direct answers to the three referred questions. The core rulings are reproduced below (italics and emphasis retained in substance).

Holding (core rulings):

  • On remarriage and property inherited from her son: A Hindu widow is, upon her remarriage, divested of her husband's property which she has already obtained by inheritance to her son. (Answer to question (i))
  • On the conflicting authorities: The decision in S.A No. 46 of 1947 (Babulal) is distinguishable on its facts; S.A No. 650 of 1951 (Panna) was not correctly decided. (Answer to question (ii))
  • On s.3(2) survivorship with minor son: A Hindu widow who, under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, obtained an interest in her husband's estate and holds the estate with her minor (unmarried) son, takes, upon the death of the son, the whole estate by survivorship. (Answer to question (iii))

Implications (direct effects as stated in the opinion):

  • Remarriage will divest a widow of rights in property that she had already inherited from her husband (or through his lineal successors) prior to remarriage; however, the widow does not forfeit the self-acquired property of the son which she has inherited.
  • Where a widow holds a fluctuating interest under s.3(2) together with a minor son, she becomes entitled to the whole estate by survivorship upon the son's death.
  • The Court did not decide whether Section 2 applies to interests taken under s.3(2); that question was left open (not decided) in this reference.
  • The opinion critiques and distinguishes some earlier decisions but does not purport to state any wider rule beyond the answers given; no broader new precedent beyond the Full Bench answers is expansively stated in the text.

Answers were given by the Full Bench in accordance with the above. (Final line in the opinion: "Answers accordingly.")

This summary was prepared strictly from the provided opinion text. No information not contained in that text has been added.

    Bhondu Ganpat Kirad And Others v. Ramdayal Govindram Kirad And Another

    Pande, J.:— The questions referred to the Full Bench are:

    (i) Whether the property inherited by a Hindu widow from her son is devested on account of her subsequent remarriage?

    (ii) Whether the cases of Babulal v. Sher Jamakhand, Second Appeal No. 46 of 1957, D/- 24-9-1954 (Nag) and Panna v. Mst. Goura, Second Appeal No. 650 of 1951, D/- 19-4-1957 (Madh. Pra.), on the one hand or Bisahin v. Gaitri, Second Appeal No. 210 of 1938, D/- 11-10-1940 (Nag) and the earlier cases on the other hand lay down the correct law?

    (iii) Whether a Hindu widow, who has interest in her deceased husband's property along with her minor son under Section 3(2) of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, gets the property after the death of her minor son on account of the fluctuation of her interest to the full or that interest vanishes after her son's death and she succeeds to the property under the general Hindu Law as mother of her deceased son?

    2. The facts of the case, so far as they are relevant for this reference, are these. A genealogical tree will he necessary. We take the one given in the order of reference:

    3. Sarup held, as his ancestral property, two occupancy plots khasra Nos. 188 and 189 of village Sasawad. He died in March 1952, leaving behind him surviving his widow, Mst. Batni (defendant 2), and a son, Nathia, besides two sisters, Mst. Jugna (plaintiff 2) and Mst. Gulja (plaintiff 3), and a first cousin Bhondu (plaintiff 1). Nathia died on 20-11-1952. Thereafter, by a sale deed dated 7-6-1954, Mst. Batni transferred without legal necessity the occupancy plots to Ramdayal (defendant 1). Subsequently, Mst. Batni remarried. Bhondu, Mst. Jugna and Mst. Gulja thereupon brought the suit out of which this reference arises for a declaration that the sale deed dated 7-6-1954 was ineffective against them and for possession of the two occupancy plots. The first two questions involve a consideration of the effect of Ss. 2 and 5 of the Hindu Widow's Remarriage Act, 1856 (XV of 1856), which are as under:

    “2. All rights and interest which any widow may have in her deceased husband's property by way of maintenance, or by inheritance to her husband or to his lineal successors, or by virtue of any will or testamentary disposition conferring upon her, without express permission to remarry, only a limited interest in such property, with no power of alienating the same, shall, upon her remarriage, cease and determine as if she had then died; and the next heirs of her deceased husband, or other persons entitled to the property on her death, shall thereupon succeed to the same.’

    “5. Except as in the three preceding sections is provided, a widow shall not, by reason of her remarriage, forfeit any property, or any right to which she would otherwise be entitled; and every widow who has remarried shall have the same rights of inheritance as she would have had, had such marriage been her first marriage.”

    4. The words of Section 2 of the Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act, 1856, are unambiguous. ‘All rights and interests which any widow may have in her deceased husband's property……by inheritance to her husband or to his lineal successors…. shall, upon her remarriage, cease and determine as if she had then died…….’. The section is restricted in operation to the property of a Hindu which his widow has already inherited either directly from her husband or through his lineal descendants before her remarriage. The self-acquired property of any lineal descendant of her husband which a widow may inherit before her remarriage is not within the ambit of the section.

    5. It would, therefore, appear that, under S. 2, the remarriage of a Hindu widow does not entail forfeiture of the estate which she inherits from he son unless it was initially her deceased husband's, property. Against this, S. 5 of the Act enacts that except as provided in S. 2, ‘a widow shall not, by reason of her remarriage, forfeit any property, any right to which she would otherwise be entitled.’ While, therefore, a widow, upon her ??? marriage, forfeits her rights and interests in he husband's property which is already vested in her, she retains unimpaired the right to inherit, after her remarriage, her husband's lineal descendants.

    6. This is based on the principle that, although the remarriage puts an end to the connubial relationship, it does not affect consanguinity. Consequently, in spite of her remarriage, she does not lose the right to inherit to her son, which is founded on the relationship by blood. Whether this right to inherit to her son after her remarriage also extends to her husband's property devolving upon her son which, if she had inherited from her son before remarriage, she would have forfeited in consequence of her remarriage, does not arise for consideration in this case.

    7. All the High Courts are agreed that, under the provisions of Section 2 of the Hindu Widow's Remarriage Act (XV of 1856), a Hindu widow on remarriage forfeits her rights in her deceased husband's property. The forfeiture enacted in the section extends even to communities in which remarriage is by custom permissible: Vithu v. Govinda, ILR 22 Bom 321 (FB), Ramchandra v. Sakharam, 1958 Nag LJ 74 : (AIR 1958 Bom 244), Nawab Singh v. Gauri Shankar, AIR 1935 Pat 58, Suraj Jote Kuer…Defendant No. 1 v. Attar Kumari…Plaintiff ., ILR 1 Pat 706 : (AIR 1922 Pat 378), Murgayi v. Viramakali, ILR 1 Mad 226, Tavaramma v. Sivayya, ILR 41 Mad 1078 : (AIR 1919 Mad 854 (FB)), Gajapathi v. Jeevammal, AIR 1929 Mad 765, Matungini Gupta v. Ram Rutton Roy, ILR 19 Cal 289 (FB), Santala Bewa v. Badaswari Dasi, ILR 50 Cal 727; (AIR 1924 Cal 98) and Manabai v. Chandanbai, ILR (1954) Nag 727 : (AIR 1954 Nag 284).

    8. In the last-mentioned case a Division Bench of this Court reviewed the case law bearing on the point and, differing from the contrary view taken in Bhola Umar v. Mt. Kausilla, ILR 55 All 24 : (AIR 1932 All 617) (FB), held that both under the Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act and otherwise under the Hindu Law, a Hindu widow on remarriage forfeited her right to her husband's property even though the customary law of the caste to which she belonged permitted such a remarriage. If Section 2 of the Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act, 1856, applies to property in all cases in which a Hindu widow has obtained it by inheritance to her deceased husband, its express terms apply equally to the property of her husband which she has inherited as mother from her son before her remarriage.

    9. The view that a mother, who is in possession of her husband's property by inheritance to her son forfeits it upon remarriage has been consistently taken by the Judicial Commissioner's Court and this Court. The leading case of the Judicial Commissioner's Court is Sammar v. Mst. Bhago, 5 CPLR 85. Other cases are Sitaram v. Laxman, 8 Nag LR 128, Kashirao v. Ukarda, 11 Nag LR 116 : (AIR 1915 Nag 109) and S.A No. 210 of 1938, D/- 11-10-1940 (Nag). The Bombay and the Patna High Courts have also taken the same view: ILR 22 Bom 321 (FB), 1958 Nag LT 74 : (AIR 1958 Bom 244) Sheobaran Mahto v. Mt. Bhogea, AIR 1918 Pat 590(1) and AIR 1935 Pat 58.

    10. A contrary view appears to have been taken in S.A No. 46 of 1947, D/- 24-9-1954 (Nag), which is, however, distinguishable on facts. In that case, a son had obtained his father's property under a will executed by the father. Upon the death of the son, his mother inherited the property and subsequently remarried. The question was whether, upon her remarriage, the mother forfeited the property which she had inherited from her son. Mudholkar and Deo, JJ., observed:

    “Though she has remarried, she would not be divested of the property as she took the estate as her son's heir and not her husband's heir”.

    11. Their Lordships did not consider whether the property which the son had obtained under his father's will partook of the nature of ancestral or self-acquired property. In a recent case, the Supreme Court dealt with, the question in Arunachala Mudaliar v. Muruganatha Mudaliar, 1954 SCR 243 : (AIR 1953 SC 495) and, after a consideration of the texts on the subject and variant opinions of the High Courts, laid down that the question was primarily one of the intention of the donor or the testator to be gathered from the terms of the deed of gift or will the material question in such cases would be whether the grantor really wanted to make a gift of his property to his son or the apparent gift was only an integral part of a scheme to partition the property. There is no presumption that he intended the one or the other.

    12. In Babulal's case, S.A No. 46 of 1947, D/- 24-9-1954 (Nag) (cit sup.), perhaps their Lordships thought, though they have not said so, that the property obtained by the son under his father's will was not his ancestral property and partook of the character of his self-acquired property. If so, on the facts of Babulal's case, S.A No. 46 of 1947, D/- 24-9-1954 (Nag), the decision is distinguishable since, as shown, self-acquired property of the lineal descendants is not covered by Section 2 of the Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act, 1856. However, in S.A No. 650 of 1951, D/- 19-4-1957 (Madh. Pra.), Sen J., relying upon Babulal's case, S.A No. 46 of 1947, D/- 24-9-1954 (Nag), took the view that a mother, upon her remarriage, did not forfeit the right to remain in possession of her husband's property, which she had inherited from her son. We are of opinion, that, in view of the provisions of Section 2 of the Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act, 1856, and the cursus of opinion, that case was not correctly decided.

    13. The third question relates to one of the several aspects of the nature of interest taken by the widow of a Hindu who dies having at the time of his death an interest in joint family property. The provisions made in sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act (XVIII of 1937, as amended by XI of 1938) are in point. The Act was intended to redress disabilities and to give ‘better rights to women’. It is patently ameliorative in character in that it recognizes the claim of women to a fair and equitable treatment in certain matters relating to devolution of property. Since the provisions of the Act touch many branches of Hindu Law and have to be fitted in the context of the law existing at the time it was enacted, it has raised problems which do not admit of logically consistent answers. It is not possible to anticipate all the doubts and difficulties which must arise as to the effect of the provisions of the Act on the rules of Hindu Law as they existed at the time when it was enacted. We would, therefore, deal with only that aspect of the matter which is directly involved in the question referred to us.

    14. When a Hindu governed by the Mitakshara dies, having at the time of his death an interest in a joint family property his widow gets, under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, the same interest in the property as he himself had. Fluctuation by births and deaths is a normal incident of the interest which a Hindu governed by Mitakshara has in his joint family property during his lifetime: Katama Natchiar v. Raja of Shivagunga, 9 Moo Ind App 539. Since his widow takes the same interest in the joint family property which her husband had at the time of his death, it must be of the same nature and character, subject to such limitations as have been expressly or by necessary intendment placed upon it by the Act. If the interest of the husband in the joint family property is a fluctuating interest, the widow too obtains in the property a like interest.

    15. There is nothing in the Act to show that the widow takes in the joint family property the defined and divided interest of her husband as if he had separated from the joint family at the time of his death. The Act puts the widow in the place of her husband and vests in her, immediately upon his death the undefined and fluctuating interest in the joint family property which he himself had till the moment of his death. This has been the view of this Court and nearly all other High Courts. Gurudayal v. Sarju, 1949 Nag LJ 119 : (AIR 1952 Nag 43), Baburao v. Savitribai, ILR (1952) Nag 578 : AIR 1952 Nag 270), Hanuman v. Tulsabai, ILR (1955) Nag 1030 : (AIR 1956 Nag 63), Ramchandra v. Ramgopal, AIR 1956 Nag 228 Tukaram Raghoji v. Mt Gangi, AIR 1957 Nag 28 Bhagabai v. Bhaiyalal (S) AIR 1957 Madh Pra 29, Mt. Jambal v. Mst. Dulaurin, F.A No. 109 of 1952, D/- 18-9-1957 (MP). Bhagwant v. Manmati, AIR 1959 Madh Pra 249, Laxman v. Gangabai, (S) AIR 1955 Madh B 188, Nagappa Narayan v. Mukambe Venkatraman, AIR 1951 Bom 309 Seethamma v. Veerana Chetty, AIR 1950 Mad 785, Parappa v. Nagamma, AIR 1954 Mad 576 (FB), Kallian Rai v. Kashi Nath, AIR 1943 All 188, Sabujpari v. Satrughan Isser, AIR 1958 Pat 405, Nanda Kishore v. Sukti Dibya, AIR 1953 Orissa 240. Harekrishna Das v. Jujesthi Panda, (S) AIR 1956 Orissa 73 and Keluni Dei v. Jagabandhu Naik, AIR 1958 Orissa 47.

    16. Since a Hindu widow, who obtains under sub-s. (2) of S. 3 of the Act the fluctuating interest of her husband, in the joint family property, it would, as in the case of her husband, cease to be fluctuating upon alienation or partition and determine altogether upon her death. Further, as under sub-s. (3) of S. 3 of the Act, the interest which she gets is not an absolute interest but is limited in the manner of a Hindu woman's estate, it will also come to an end by surrender or remarriage. These are the cases in which the fluctuating character of the interest taken by a widow under the Act either ceases or is determined altogether.

    17. The four cases, Bhiwra v. Renuka, ILR (1949) Nag 400 : (AIR 1952 Nag 215), Gurudayal v. Sarju, 1949 Nag LJ 119 : (AIR 1952 Nag 43), Haraman v. Tulsabai, 1956 Nag LJ 194 : (AIR 1956 Nag 63) and Bhagabai v. Bhaiyalal, 1957 MP LJ 180 : ((S) AIR 1957 Madh Pra 29), which have been referred to in paragraph 12 of the order of reference, deal with the nature or extent of interest of a Hindu widow following a suit for partition. These cases do not lend any support for the supposition that, in a case like the one here, the interest taken by a widow under sub-s. (2) of S. 3 of the Act lapses, when she becomes the sole surviving member of the joint family.

    18. It may be that a Hindu widow taking interest under sub-s. (2) of S. 3 of the Act is not a coparcener. But the Act vests in her the fluctuating interest which her husband had in his joint family property at the time of his death ‘notwithstanding any rule of Hindu Law to the contrary’. The essence of this interest is unity of ownership. As observed by the Privy Council in 9 Moo Ind App 539 (PC), at page 611:

    “There is community of interest and unity of possession between all the members of the family, and upon the death of any one of them the others may well take by survivorship that in which they had during the deceased's lifetime a common interest and a common possession”.

    19. The deceased simply disappears and the survivors take, as a kind of accretion to the interest which they already had in the whole property, a larger interest. That being so, it is inherent in the very nature of the fluctuating interest which a widow derives from her husband that it is capable of being enlarged by deaths, and liable to be diminished by births, in the family. There is no basis in law for the supposition that she loses this interest altogether when the only other member of her joint family dies and she is in a position to obtain the whole estate as his heir.

    20. Actually, there is no substantial difference between the nature of the estate which such a widow takes by survivorship and the one which she may take as her son's heir. In either case, it would be a Hindu Woman's estate. There is, therefore, no reason for not allowing her to take the whole estate by survivorship or for supposing that the interest which enables her to do so ‘Vanishes’. In our view, the widow in such a case gets the whole estate by survivorship.

    21. The further question whether Section 2 of the Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act, 1856, applies to a Hindu widow who upon the death of her husband takes interest in joint family property under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, has not been referred to us and we do not propose to decide it. We may, however, mention that a Division Bench of this Court has taken the view that it applies: ILR (1954) Nag 727 : (AIR 1954 Nag 284). Our answers to the questions referred are:

    (i) A Hindu widow is, upon her remarriage, divested of her husband's property which she has already obtained by inheritance to her son. She does not however, forfeit the self-acquired property of the son which she has inherited.

    (ii) S.A No. 46 of 1947, D/- 24-9-1954 (Nag) is distinguishable on facts. S.A No. 650 of 1951, D/- 19-4-1957 (MP), was not correctly decided.

    (iii) A Hindu widow, who has, under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, obtained interest in her husband's estate and holds the estate with her minor (unmarried) son, takes, upon the death of the son, the whole estate by survivorship.

    KC/D.H.Z

    22. Answers accordingly.

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    Bhondu Ganpat Kirad And Others v. Ramdayal Govindram Kirad And Another
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