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  • Section 152 or on review." Rule 4 of Order XX
  • Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Sections 99 and 108, Civil Procedure Code".
  • XX, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code).
  • Rule 3 of Order XX,
  • Order XX, Rule 1,
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • Section 152 or on review." Rule 4 of Order XX
  • Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Sections 99 and 108, Civil Procedure Code".
  • XX, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code).
  • Rule 3 of Order XX,
  • Order XX, Rule 1,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of Opinion — Naik, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit (Civil Suit No. 12-A of 1954) was instituted on 10-9-1954 for recovery of Rs. 16,000. The parties closed their case on 1-12-1956. After arguments the trial Court fixed the case for judgment on 11-12-1956; that date was adjourned to 14-12-1956 on the ground the judgment was not ready. The order-sheet for 14-12-1956 records attendance of counsel and contains the short entry "Judgment delivered."

A draft/typed document purporting to be the judgment appears on the file and bears the typed date 11-12-1956, is unsigned, and concludes with an operative paragraph dismissing the suit with costs and fixing counsel's fee at Rs. 850. The presiding judge, Shri R.L. Gupta, died in late December 1956 — the opinion records his death date as 23-12-1956 in one place and records of others refer to 25-12-1956. On 26-12-1956 the Second Civil Judge, Shri M.M. Dube, found the unsigned judgment in Shri Gupta's office box, sealed it and it was opened on 3-1-1957 in the presence of the District Judge.

Evidence placed before the revisional court included: (a) a note appended by Shri M.M. Dube certifying the finding, sealing and opening of the document and stating the order-sheet shows a judgment was delivered on 14-12-1956 and counsel present confirmed this; (b) evidence of the steno-typist, who said that part of the judgment was dictated and typed on 11-12-1956 (up to para 8) and the remainder was dictated and drafted on 14-12-1956, later corrected and fair-typed after 14-12-1956; and (c) an affidavit by a pleader (Shri Manohardas) stating that on 14-12-1956 the judge uttered that the suit was dismissed with costs and added that the judgment was being typed.

The plaintiff-applicant challenged the validity of the unsigned judgment found after the judge's death. The defendants contended an oral judgment had been pronounced on 14-12-1956 and the non-signing was a mere irregularity that did not render the judgment a nullity.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the document and events surrounding 11–14 December 1956 amounted to a legally valid judgment purportedly delivered by Shri R.L. Gupta on 14-12-1956.
  2. Whether an oral announcement in open court that a suit is dismissed (with the typed judgment remaining unsigned and partly in draft) can constitute a valid judgment in law, or whether the requirements of dating and signing in open court are essential to validity.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff-Applicant's Arguments

  • The unsigned judgment found in the judge's office after his death cannot be a valid or legal judgment in law.
  • There was no proper legal delivery of judgment in the eye of law because the formal requirements (dating and signing in open court and a final crystallised form) were not complied with.

Defendants' (Non-applicants') Arguments

  • The presiding judge announced, orally in open court, that the suit was dismissed with costs; that constitutes pronouncement of judgment.
  • The non-signing of the typed judgment was at most an irregularity which did not affect the substance of the decision and so could not render the pronounced decision a nullity.
  • Supporting evidence included an affidavit by Shri Manohardas describing the oral announcement on 14-12-1956 and his informing the District Judge on 3-1-1957 that the judgment had been announced orally.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Surendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1954 SCR 330; AIR 1954 SC 194 Principles concerning what constitutes a judgment: a draft is not a judgment; judgment must embody the Court's mind when pronounced in open court; judge may amend until signing; once signed it cannot be altered except as permitted; small irregularities may be cured but not defects in the core requirement of formal pronouncement in open court. The court applied these principles to find that much of the document was only a draft, that the judge had not produced a final, crystallised expression on 14-12-1956, and that an oral intimation of intention is not equivalent to the formal pronouncement required to constitute a judgment.
Firm Gokal Chand Jagan Nath v. Firm Nand Ram Das Atma Ram, AIR 1935 PC 292 Observations that the rule requiring signing and dating does not expressly state non-compliance renders a judgment void; courts have inherent jurisdiction to supply defects in authentication where the core pronouncement has occurred; practical considerations may render a defect merely irregular. The court distinguished that authority: in that case the judgment had been actually delivered in open court and both judges concurred, so the 'hard core' requirement was satisfied. The present case lacked such a complete, final pronouncement and therefore could not be cured by analogy to that decision.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying the statutory framework and rules relevant to the form and delivery of a judgment: the definition of "judgment" (Section 2(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure), Order XX Rule 1 (pronouncement in open court after hearing), Order XX Rule 3 (the judgment shall be dated and signed by the Judge in open Court at the time of pronouncing it), Order XX Rule 4 (content requirements), and the Rules and Orders (Civil) Rule 152 which warns that writing a judgment after merely giving an oral judgment is not sanctioned by the Code and that judgments must bear the date on which they are delivered and signed in court.

The Court emphasised that not all formal requirements are of equal weight: some are substantive and essential (the "hard core"), while others are procedural and curable. It relied on the Supreme Court's exposition in Surendra Singh to extract guiding principles: (1) a draft, however fully prepared, is not a judgment unless delivered in open court as the operative decision; (2) until signed, a pronounced judgment may be amended; (3) once signed it cannot be altered save as provided by statute; and (4) minor irregularities are curable but not defects in the essential formal intimation of the decision in a judicial way in open court.

Applying those principles to the factual matrix before it, the Court found that:

  • Only the first eight paragraphs of the typed draft had been given a final shape by the judge at the relevant time; the remainder of the document remained in draft form and the judge had indicated he might correct them.
  • The steno-typist's evidence established that material portions were dictated and typed on different dates (part on 11-12-1956 and the rest as a rough draft on 14-12-1956), that a corrected draft was handed to the typist and fair-typed on 16-12-1956, and that the judge intended to peruse and possibly amend the typed document thereafter but did not do so before his death.
  • The order-sheet entry ("Judgment delivered") and oral statements by the judge that the suit was dismissed with costs were properly viewed as an oral intimation of what his judgment would contain — i.e., an intimation of intention — rather than a formal, crystallised judgment pronouncement satisfying the statutory requirements.

The Court rejected the defendants' contention that the non-signing was merely an irregularity that could be cured by evidence aliunde showing what was orally declared. It relied on the statutory prohibition and the reasoning in Surendra Singh that it is against public policy to ascertain a final judgment by extraneous evidence where the final written judgment as defined by the Code had not been pronounced and finalised in open court. While the Privy Council in Firm Gokal Chand recognised that practical considerations and inherent jurisdiction might cure purely formal defects where the core pronouncement was made, the Court distinguished that case because there the judgment had actually been delivered in open court with concurrence; in the present case that "hard core" requirement was not satisfied.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision is allowed and the Court declared that there has been no valid and legal judgment in Civil Suit No. 12-A of 1954.

Consequent relief and immediate effect:

  • The suit is remitted to the trial Court for a re-hearing of the arguments and delivery of a proper judgment in accordance with law (i.e., pronouncement in open court and dating/signing as required).
  • Counsel's fee awarded by the revisional Court: Rs. 100.

Broader implications: The opinion stresses the distinction between an oral indication of a judge's intended conclusion and a formal judgment as defined by the Code. It emphasises that where the "hard core" requirement — a final crystallised pronouncement in open court that is then dated and signed — is not satisfied, the matter cannot be cured by evidence aliunde. The Court did not purport to create new principles beyond applying established authorities; it remitted the matter for a proper hearing and judgment in conformity with statutory requirements.

    Chowaram Bachan v. Thanuram

    JUDGMENT Naik, J.

    1. This civil revision has been referred to a Division Bench for decision at the instance of V.R. Sen. J. as it involves a point of general importance. The question that arises for consideration is whether a judgment purported to be delivered by Shri R.L. Gupta, Additional District Judge, Durg, on 14-12-1956, in civil suit No. 12-A of 1954, was legally valid in law.

    2. The facts which have given rise to the problem may now shortly be stated. The suit was instituted on 10-9-1954 for the recovery of Rs. 16,000/-. The parties closed their case on 1-12-1956. After arguments, the Court fixed the case for judgment on 11-12-1956. On that date it was adjourned to 14-12-1956, on the ground that the judgment was not ready. The order-sheet of 14-12-1956 reads as follows:

    "Plaintiff by Shri Shukla and Pande and Dass. Defendants 1 to 3 by Shri Patnkar. Defendant No. 4 by Shri Agarwal. Judgment delivered."

    Shri R.L. Gupta, the presiding judge of the Court, died on 23-12-1956. On 26-12-1956, the judgment, which is on record and bears the date, 11-12-1956, was found by the Second Civil Judge, Shri M.M. Dube, in the office box of Shri R.L. Gupta. The judgment was kept in a sealed envelope and opened on 3-1-1957 in the presence of the District Judge.

    3. This 'judgment' does not bear the signature of the judge, bears a typed date, 11-12-1956, and concludes with the paragraph :

    "In the result, the suit fails and it is dismissed with parties costs on the plaintiff. Counsel's fee Rs. 850/-."

    4. On 3-1-1957, Shri M.M. Dube, Second Civil Judge, Durg, appended the following note to the judgment:

    "I certify that this judgment was found in the office box of Shri R.L. Gupta, Additional District Judge (who expired on 25-12-1956) by me on 26-12-1956. I had sealed it and kept it with the Nazir. The envelope is opened today in the presence of the District Judge. The order-sheet of the suit shows that the judgment was delivered on 14-12-1956 in the presence of the counsel (Shri D.P. Agarwal, Shri C. W. Patankar and Shri Manohar Dass), who confirm this fact. The judgment was left unsigned by the judge."

    5. The steno-typist of the judge was examined in this Court on 31-12-1957. His evidence is that a part of the judgment was dictated on 11-12-1950 and the rest on 14-12-1956. After the first part of the dictation was over, it was typed on 11-12-1956. It was up to para 8. The second part of the dictation was typed by him on 14-12-1956. That portion was not typed in continuation of paragraph 8, but was a rough draft. It was prepared at about 4.15 p.m. on 14-12-1.956. It was given by him to the judge along with the judgment which was then typed up to paragraph 8. The judge gave him a corrected draft on 16-12-1956 for typing it fair.

    It was so typed on the same day, he having continued the fair typing after paragraph 8, and handed over the fair judgment and the draft with the corrections to the judge who told him that he would peruse the judgment as typed by him and make corrections if necessary. He did not see the draft thereafter and the judge passed away on 25-12-1956. At the top of the judgment, he had put the date 11-12-1956 thinking that it would be delivered on that date. At the end of the judgment ho should have typed 14-12-1956 instead of 11-12-1956.

    6. He further stated that the judge (Shri Gupta) at the time of delivery of judgment in civil suit No. 12-A of 1954, informed the counsel that the judgment was being typed. Ho, however, announced in open Court in the presence of the counsel for the parties that the suit was dismissed.

    7. On these facts the learned counsel for the plaintiff-applicant contends that there was no delivery of judgment in the eye of law and the unsigned judgment found in the office box of Shri Gupta on 36-12-1956, after his death, could not be said to be valid and legal judgment disposing of civil suit No. 12-A of 1954.

    8. The learned counsel for the non-applicants (defendants), on the other hand, contends that a judgment dismissing the suit with costs was announced orally and consequently the non-signing of the judgment by the presiding judge, Shri Gupta, which in effect dismissed the suit with costs, was a mere irregularity which did not touch the merits of the case and the judgment so pronounced could not be rendered a nullity. Ho also relies on an affidavit dated 19-9-1957 filed by Shri Manohardas, Pleader, Durg, who was present in the Court at the relevant time. The material portion of that affidavit reads as follows:

    "That on 14-12-56 at about 4.55 p.m. the case under reference was called by the Presiding Judge, Shri R.L. Gupta. Shri D.P. Agrawal, Pleader for Chhaganlal defendant, and Shri C.W. Patankar, Advocate, for defendant Thanuram and others, appeared. The record of the case was before the Presiding Judge. While writing the order sheet he uttered that the suit was dismissed with costs. He added that judgment was being typed and parties may see it later."

    The affidavit further added that, when questioned, he had informed the District Judge on 3-1-1957 that the judgment was announced orally.

    9. The relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure bearing on the point may now be noted.

    10. A judgment has been defined in Section 2(9) to mean the statement given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order. Order XX, Rule 1, says :

    ''The Court, after the case has been heard, shall pronounce judgment in open Court, either at once or on some future day, of which due notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders."

    Rule 3 of Order XX, says :

    "The judgment shall be dated and signed by the Judge in open Court at the time of pronouncing it and, when, once signed, shall not afterwards be altered or added to, save, as provided by Section 152 or on review."

    Rule 4 of Order XX prescribes what a judgment, other than judgments of a Court of Small Causes shall contain. It says :

    "(2) Judgments. . . . .shall contain a concise statement of the case, the points for determination, the decision thereon, and the reasons for. such decision."

    rule 152 of the rules and Orders (Civil), dealing with the point, says:

    "Judgments shall be dated and signed by the Judge in open Court at the time of pronouncing them (Order XX, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code). The practice of writing the judgment after deciding the case by an oral judgment is not sanctioned by the Code and must not be resorted to. Judgments must always bear the date on which they are delivered and signed in Court."

    11. From the aforesaid provisions, the following position emerges. There shall be a judgment which shall contain a concise statement of the case the points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for such decision. This judgment shall be pronounced in open Court after due notice to the parties or their pleaders, and then, dated and signed in open Court at the time of pronouncing it, and once so dated and signed, it shall not afterwards be altered or added to, save as provided by Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure or on review.

    12. All the requirements are, however, not equally important or imperative, but some of these are of substance and unless these are complied with there cannot come into existence a valid and legal judgment.

    13. Analysing the position though especially with reference to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure the Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1954 SCR 330 : (AIR 1954 SC 194) has laid down certain basic principles from which the following principles emerge :

    (1) A judgment embodies the expression of the mind of the Court at the time of pronouncing it in open Court. A draft prepared is not a judgment, however heavily or often it may have been signed. It does not become a judgment, unless it is delivered in open Court with the intention of making it the operative decision of the Court.

    (2) Once pronounced, it becomes a judgment; but until signed, the judge may freely alter or amend it or even change it completely without any further formality except notice to the parties and a rehearing on the point of change, should that be necessary.

    (3) But, after it has been signed, it shall not be altered or added to save as provided by Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure or on review.

    (4) Small irregularities in the manner of pronouncement or the mode of delivery, the manner in which it is to be recorded or the ways in which it is to be authenticated, the signing or the sealing, all the rules designed to secure certainty about its content and matter, do not matter. These can be cured. But what cannot be cured is the 'hard core', e.g., the formal intimation of the decision and its contents formally declared in a judicial way in open Court.

    14. It would thus be seen that the declaration by a judge of his intention of what his 'judgment' is going to be, or a declaration of his intention of what final result it is going to embody, is not a judgment until he has crystallised his intentions into a formal shape and pronounced it in open Court as the final expression of his mind,

    15. In the instant case, only the first eight paragraphs of his 'draft judgment' had been given a final shape on the date the Judge purported to pronounce it. The rest of the paragraphs were only in draft form and he had intended to correct them, if necessary. The final draft was prepared and handed over to the steno-typist for typing on the 16th on which date the 'draft judgment', as is now before us was finally typed and handed over to the Judge. It is thus clear that on 14-12-1956, there was no 'final expression of his opinion in a crystallised form' to enable him to formally declare and intimate his 'decision and its contents' in a judicial way in open Court.

    The order-sheet of 14-12-1956 only records that a judgment was delivered and if, as the evidence shows, the presiding Judge gave out his mind that he was dismissing the suit with costs, he was no more than orally intimating the parties in advance what his 'judgment' was going to contain. It could not be construed as a 'judgment' and the substance of the provisions had not been complied with. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in 1954 SCR 330 : (AIR 1954 SC 194) (supra) at p. 338 : (of SCR : at p. 197 of AIR) the difference is fundamental :

    "In the one case, one cannot know, and it would be against public policy to enquire, whether the draft of a judgment is the final conclusion of the Judge or is only a tentative opinion subject to alteration and change. In the second case, the Judge has publicly declared his mind and cannot therefore change it without notice to the parties and without hearing them afresh when that is necessary; and if there is no change the judgment continues in force. By change we mean an alteration of the decision and not merely the addition or subtraction of part of the reasoning,"

    As pointed out in the Rules and Orders (Civil), the Code of Civil Procedure does not envisage the writing of a judgment after deciding the case by an oral judgment and it must not be resorted to, and it would be against public policy to ascertain by evidence aliunde what the 'judgment' of the Court was, where the final result was announced orally but the 'judgment', as defined in the Code of Civil Procedure embodying a concise statement of the case, the points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for such decision, was finalised later on.

    16. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council did not lay down anything to the contrary in Firm Gokal Chand Jagan Nath v. Firm Nand Ram Das Atma Ram, AIR 193S PC 292 at p. 295, when they observed:

    "The rule does not say that if its requirements are not complied with the judgment shall be a nullity. So startling a result would need clear and precise words. Indeed, the rule does not even state any definite time in which it is to be fulfilled. The time is left to be defined by what is reasonable. The rule from its very nature is not intended to affect the rights of parties to a judgment. It is intended to secure certainty in the ascertainment of what the judgment was.

    It is a rule which Judges are required to comply with for that object. No doubt in practice Judges do so comply, as it is their duty to do. But accidents may happen. A Judge may die after giving judgment but before he has had a reasonable opportunity to sign it. The Court must have inherent jurisdiction to supply such a detect. The ease of a Judge who has gone on leave before signing the judgment may call for more comment, but even so the convenience of the Court and the interest of litigants must prevail. The defect is merely an irregularity. But in truth the difficulty is disposed of by Sections 99 and 108, Civil Procedure Code".

    There the 'judgment' was actually delivered in open Court and both the Judges, who constituted the Bench, were present and concurred in it. But, before it could be signed, one Judge went on leave and consequently, as the 'hard core' of the substance underlying the, principle had been satisfied and only the provision how the decision so announced was to be authenticated remained to be done the rights of parties which had arisen from the delivery of the judgment in open Court were not allowed to be affected.

    17. In the result, the revision is allowed. It is hereby declared that there has been no valid and legal judgment in the suit. The suit is consequently remitted to the trial Court for a re-hearing of the arguments and delivery of a proper judgment as required by law. Counsel's fee Rs. 100/-.

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    Comments

    Chowaram Bachan v. Thanuram
    (Jun 26, 1959)