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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondents were claiming to be organising teachers and non-teaching staff of Vidyasagar Tapasili Adibasi Sikshaniketan (the said School) located in Garbeta, District Paschim Midnapore. A sequence of writ petitions and proceedings concerning recognition of the School and approval of appointments began in 1993.

Key procedural milestones recorded in the opinion:

  • Writ petition C.O. 955(5) of 1993: On 3 February 1994 the Single Judge (Justice Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee as he then was) directed the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education (the Board) to grant recognition of the School as an IV Class Junior High School.
  • Order of 25 August 1994: The Single Judge recalled the 3 February 1994 order on an application by Manik Chandra Ghosh; that recall was appealed as FMAT 1474 of 1994 and the Division Bench set aside the recall and directed the Board to consider recognition.
  • Board refusal by Memo No. 6-S dated 3 January 1997 to grant recognition in terms of the Division Bench judgment.
  • Respondents filed WP No. 17429 (W) of 1999 challenging the rejection; upon contested hearing an order dated 29 March 2000 (Justice Lala then) directed the Board to grant recognition within a month and gave directions concerning forwarding names to District Inspectors for approval of services.
  • The Board sought to appeal against the 29 March 2000 order with an application for condonation of delay; the appeal court dismissed the condonation application and consequently dismissed the appeal. A review application also failed.
  • Contempt proceedings were initiated for non-compliance; the Board granted provisional recognition by order dated 10 September 2003 as an unaided IV Class Junior High School for three years with effect from 1 May 2003 "without any financial assistance". In contempt, Justice Lala (order dated 23 June 2004) deleted the words "without any financial assistance" from the recognition order. The Board subsequently reconsidered on 9 November 2005 and informed the respondents that it had no power to grant financial assistance and that grant of financial assistance was for the State Government to consider.
  • Despite these developments, the State did not take steps to release financial assistance or grant approval of appointments; the District Inspector (DI) on representation recorded that services of some staff could be approved with effect from 1 May 2005 but appointment approvals were withheld.
  • The respondents filed the writ petition seeking mandamus/approval of appointments, payment of salaries (from 1 May 2003), certiorari for records, interim orders and consequential reliefs. The Single Judge by judgment dated 2 May 2008 directed the 4th Respondent to approve the appointments within four weeks and held that once approved the petitioners would be entitled to salaries "with effect from the date of recognition of the said High School by West Bengal Board of Secondary Education on 4th January 2003" (quoted in the opinion).
  • The State (appellant) filed an appeal against the Single Judge's order and an application for condonation of delay in filing that appeal; the application alleged delay (variously quantified in the pleadings) and was strongly contested by the respondents. The opinion records contested computations of delay and extensive factual averments relating to communication of the Single Judge's order, obtaining certified copy, changes of counsel, compliance under contempt, and internal State procedures leading to delay.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the delay in preferring the appeal against the Single Judge's judgment dated 2 May 2008 should be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
  2. If condonation of delay is granted, whether the appeal should be admitted and the Single Judge's directions (approval of appointments and entitlement to salaries from date of recognition) be reconsidered on merits.
  3. As part of the merits (as argued by the parties), whether the departmental approval of the appointment of organising teaching and non‑teaching staff was legally valid or whether such approvals are held to be illegal/de hors statutory provision (this issue was advanced by the appellant but the court did not decide it because condonation was rejected).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (State) Arguments

  • The State sought condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and explained the delay as arising from procedural steps within governmental machinery: the impugned order was allegedly communicated to officers on 19 August 2008; application for certified copy filed 28 August 2008; certified copy became ready 18 March 2009; engagement and change of counsel and time taken for drafting led to delay in filing the appeal (appellant asserted about 109 days of delay in one account, although various computations were contested).
  • Reliance on the principle that when an act of compliance is done under threat of contempt, such compliance does not extinguish the right to prefer an appeal; the appellant argued that compliance under threat of contempt therefore did not prejudice the State's right to appeal.
  • The State argued that, because government acts through officials and must follow cumbersome internal procedures (note-making, approvals, file pushing), some degree of latitude should be allowed while applying the 'sufficient cause' test for condonation of delay — invoking State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO and Section 5 jurisprudence.
  • The appellant contended that the appeal had substantive merit on the point that approval of appointments by departmental action was illegal and de hors statutory provision; in support it referred to a list of Supreme Court and High Court decisions (listed in the opinion) which, it was said, held departmental approvals to be illegal or relevant to that proposition.
  • Counsel asserted that the DI and other State officers were not personally interested and that delays were occasioned by institutional processes rather than deliberate neglect.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents contended there was misstatement on oath by the State as to the knowledge of the impugned order: they produced evidence that a letter of 5 May 2008 from the respondents' counsel informing the DI about the order was received on 6 May 2008 (the DI signed receipt), so the State had notice much earlier than alleged.
  • The respondents asserted that a copy of the writ petition had been served upon the DI on 24 April 2008 and that the State was represented in court when the Single Judge heard the matter; hence it was incorrect to claim ignorance of the order.
  • They argued that the impugned judgment and order had been carried out (in the course of contempt proceedings the DI complied and filed a compliance report) and once complied with unconditionally there was no right left to the State to prefer an appeal; accordingly, the question of condoning delay did not arise.
  • The respondents disputed the State's computation of delay (arguing in one place that the delay was at least 340 days) and denied the appellant's explanations; they urged that there was neither sufficient cause nor proof of promptitude by the State.
  • On condonation, the respondents relied on Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields (AIR 1962 SC 361) and related authorities to argue the law on Section 5 and the need to protect accrued rights where limitation has run and rights have vested in the decree‑holder by lapse of time.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court (as recorded in the opinion)
Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields (AIR 1962 SC 361) (also cited as Ramla v. Rewa Coalfields) Construction of Section 5 Limitation Act: two important considerations — (1) expiry of limitation gives decree-holder right to treat decree as binding; (2) Court has discretion to condone delay to advance substantial justice. The court relied on this authority (paragraph 7 quoted) to explain the balancing exercise under Section 5 and to emphasize that limitation gives rise to a vested right which should not be lightly disturbed; this authority formed a principal foundation for the court's approach to condonation (weighing accrued rights versus sufficient cause).
State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO (2005) 3 SCC 752 Interpretation of "sufficient cause" with a pragmatic, justice-oriented approach; factors peculiar to governmental functioning justify some latitude but not absolute exemption from scrutiny. The court discussed and applied the ratio (paragraph 15 reproduced) to hold that while some latitude may be accorded to the State in condonation matters, the State is not on the same footing as an individual and latitude is not absolute; the court used this to assess the State's explanations and to decide that the State had not made out sufficient cause here.
Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi ((2006) 4 SCC 1) Cited by the appellant in support of the contention that departmental approvals/appointments are subject to judicial scrutiny and may be illegal where statutory procedure is not followed. The court recorded that the appellant relied on this and other cases to argue the merits. Because condonation was rejected, the court did not examine the merits on the basis of these authorities in this opinion.
Official Liquidator v. Dayananda ((2008) 10 SCC 1) Cited by the appellant as authority relevant to the asserted illegality of departmental approvals. The court noted the citation by the appellant but did not decide the merits of the appeal (wherein these cases would have been relevant) because the application for condonation of delay was rejected.
State of Haryana v. Narender Singh ((2005) 6 SCC 106) Cited by the appellant in support of the merits argument concerning appointment approvals and their legality. Recorded as cited by the appellant; not applied on merits because condonation was refused.
Aswani Kumar v. State of Bihar (1997) 2 SCC 1 Cited by the appellant in support of the contention regarding illegality/invalidity of departmental approvals. Recorded as cited by the appellant; no substantive application due to dismissal of condonation application.
State of West Bengal v. Gopal Singh & Ors (2008) 1 WBLR 229 Cited by the appellant as supporting authority relevant to appointment/approval issues. Not addressed on merits; recorded as cited by the appellant.
Manindranath Sinha v. State of West Bengal ((2006) 4 CHN ??? as cited in text) Cited by the appellant in support of its submissions on the merits (appointment approval legality). Recorded as cited; the court did not examine merits as condonation application was dismissed.
Headmistress, Garifa Arti Academy v. Gita Banik ((2008) 1 CLJ 453) Cited by the appellant in relation to departmental approvals/appointment issues. Recorded as cited; not applied because the court declined to examine merits after rejecting condonation.
State of West Bengal v. Smritikana Maity ((2008) 1 CHN 582) Cited by the appellant in support of the merits contention on approvals. Recorded as cited; not addressed substantively for reasons stated in the judgment.
M.M. Pathak v. Union of India (AIR 1978 SC 803) Cited by the respondents to support their submissions on the merits and condonation issues. Recorded as relied upon by respondents; the court did not decide merits after rejecting condonation but noted these citations.
A.V. Nachane v. Union of India (AIR 1982 SC 1126) Cited by the respondents on the merit side (and condonation-related submissions). Recorded as cited by respondents; not applied substantively in this opinion due to dismissal of condonation application.
In Re. Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal (AIR 1992 SC 522) Cited by the respondents in support of their submissions on merit and procedural law. Recorded as cited; not applied on the merits because the court did not admit the appeal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first identified that the primary threshold issue was the application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, and in terms of the court's announced procedure the condonation application and the merits of the appeal were to be heard simultaneously: if sufficient cause for delay were shown the court would condone and then proceed to consider the appeal on merits; if not, the appeal would be dismissed without considering merits.

The court analyzed the factual averments and documentary chronology to test the appellant's explanation of delay:

  • The impugned Single Judge judgment was dated 2 May 2008 (the opinion also references receipt/communication in early May); the appellant's pleadings alternatively sought to explain knowledge in August 2008 and cited steps thereafter (application for certified copy, processing delays, changes of counsel, approval to prefer appeal, and eventual filing in April 2009).
  • The respondents produced evidence and averred that a communication (letter dated 5 May 2008) informing the DI of Schools was received on 6 May 2008 (the DI signed), and that a copy of the writ petition had been served earlier (24 April 2008). The respondents also relied on the fact that the State had counsel in court during the contested hearing, which would make the plea of ignorance implausible.
  • The court examined competing computations of delay: the State in some accounts claimed about 109 days' delay; respondents contended delay was at least 340 days. The court concluded that the State's internal computation of 109 days was patently incorrect and that the limitation period ran from 5 May 2008 (the day after the impugned order) and would expire on 5 June 2008; subsequent steps such as applying for certified copy in August 2008 could not retroactively arrest running of limitation.
  • The court found that there was no explanation given for the gap from early May 2008 to August 2008; it observed that the State had not blamed any particular official nor taken action against the erstwhile DI who apparently had received early communication but did not cause the matter to be pursued promptly. The court recorded that the DI's own communications to the Directorate and actions were inconsistent and that the State had not shown adequate promptitude.
  • The court considered the legal principles governing Section 5: it reproduced and applied the two leading approaches — Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields emphasizing protection of rights accrued by lapse of limitation and the discretionary power to condone delay to advance substantial justice, and State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO emphasizing a pragmatic, justice-oriented assessment of "sufficient cause" with some latitude for governmental functioning, but not placing the State on the same footing as an individual nor granting unconditional latitude. The court reconciled these authorities to explain that while courts will lean to substantial justice and may allow some latitude to the State, such latitude is not absolute and is constrained where delay is unexplained and prejudice to decree-holders would be irreversible.
  • Applying these principles to the facts, the court weighed the competing equities: if delay were condoned and the appeal admitted, the earlier accepted judicial pronouncement (the Single Judge's order approving appointments and entitling salaries from date of recognition) would be reopened, thereby creating uncertainty and prejudice to the respondents whose livelihoods depended on the order and whose appointments had been approved and acted upon. The court found that irretrievable prejudice would be caused to the respondents.
  • The court found several adverse factual findings regarding the State's conduct: inconsistent and incorrect statements in pleadings, absence of explanation for the May–August period, no departmental action or disciplinary regard shown towards officials where blame could be placed, and the fact that the impugned order had been carried out (in the course of contempt proceedings compliance was recorded). These factors led the court to conclude that sufficient cause was not established.
  • Given these findings, the court held that condoning delay would work as an injustice to the respondents and that the State had not discharged the burden of proving sufficient cause; consequently the extraordinary jurisdiction to condone delay should not be exercised.
  • Because the court rejected the condonation application, it expressly declined to examine the substantive merits of the appeal (the legality of departmental approvals, etc.).

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The application for condonation of delay is dismissed; in consequence the appeal is also dismissed.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The Single Judge's directions (as set out in the judgment dated 2 May 2008) remain intact and operative: the 4th Respondent was directed to approve the appointments within four weeks and the petitioners were to be entitled to salaries from the date of recognition as ordered by the Single Judge (the court declined to disturb that order by refusing condonation).
  • The court emphasized the protection of the respondents' accrued rights and livelihoods, finding that condoning delay would put their positions into "agonizing uncertainty".
  • No costs order was made: the opinion records "However, without any order as to cost."
  • The court did not consider or decide the substantive merits of the appeal (including the appellant's contention that departmental approvals are illegal) because the condonation application failed; accordingly, no new precedent on the substantive issue was laid down in this opinion and the court explicitly noted that it did not feel the need to examine the merits.

Note: This summary reflects only the allegations, factual findings, arguments, authorities cited and conclusions as they appear in the provided opinion. No external facts or inferences beyond the text of the opinion have been introduced.

Judges recorded in the opinion: Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta, J.; Md. Abdul Ghani, J. (agreeing).

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    Director Of School Education, West Bengal & Ors. v. Tarun Kumar Ghosh & Ors.

    the State/appellant against the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated

    2nd May 2008 passed in the above writ petition. It appears there has been delay for

    about 220 days. This application is strongly contested by the respondents above

    named, hence it was made to understand to both the parties hearing of this 2 application and merit of the appeal is to take place simultaneously; in the event the Court finds sufficient cause having been made out, this delay would be condoned and considering the argument on merit appeal itself would be disposed of and in the event the Court finds none obviously there would be no need to consider the argument on merit, and appeal would be dismissed.

    Hence factual aspect of this matter needs to be stated for which present appeal is intended to be preferred. The respondents above named were claiming to be Organizing Teachers and non-teaching staff of Vidyasagar Tapasili Adibasi Sikshaniketan, Police Station, Garbeta, District: Paschim Midnapore (hereinafter referred to as the said School). The said School though organized, was not being recognized by the State as well as Board of Secondary Education despite repeated representations hence number of writ petitions came to be filed and several orders were passed thereon. First of which was C.O. 955(5) of 1993 and the same was disposed of by the Hon'ble Justice Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee (as His Lordship then was ) on 3rd February 1994 directing the Board of Secondary Education to grant recognition of the said School as IV Class Junior High School. After the said writ petition was disposed of one Manik Chandra Ghosh made an application for addition of parties and modification of the said order dated 3rd February 1994. On that application His Lotrdship Justice Mukherjee was pleased to recall the earlier order dated 3rd February 1994 by order dated 25th August 1994. This order dated 25th 3 August 1994 was appealed against by the present respondents and the same being FMAT 1474 of 1994 was disposed of by the Division Bench of this Court and Their Lordships of Division Bench were pleased to allow the appeal and set aside the order of learned Single Judge dated 25th August 1994 and fresh direction was given by the Appeal Court to the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education (hereinafter in short Board) to consider the application for grant of recognition of the said School. However, the Board refused to grant recognition while considering the application in terms of the Division Bench Judgment and order by a Memo being No. 6-S dated 3rd January 1997.

    Thereafter the respondents herein filed an application before the Division Bench for clarification of the order of the Appeal Court on 27th July 1994 on various grounds and the Division Bench however dismissed the said application observing that in view of order of rejection of the said Board fresh cause of action had arisen. Thereafter the respondents challenged the order of rejection dated 3rd January 1997 in a writ petition being WP No. 17429 (W) of 1999 and the same was disposed of upon contested hearing on 29th March 2000. By order dated 29th March 2000 His Lordship the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Lala (as His Lordship then was) gave direction to the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education to grant recognition to School in question within a month from the date of communication of this order. Further direction was given in the said order to the respondents to forward the names of the respondent to 4 the District Inspectors of Schools within 15 days from the date of grant of recognition of the said School for considering approval of the services of the petitioner after opportunity being given. The Board intended to prefer appeal against the order dated 29th March 2000 with an application for condonation of delay. The appeal Court dismissed the application for condonation of delay consequently appeal was also dismissed. Subsequently a review application was made unsuccessfully in an attempt to upset the order of the learned Trial Judge as well as the order passed by the Division Bench. In spite of the dismissal of the appeal order of the learned trial Judge having not been carried out, a contempt application was filed thence the Board granted recognition by order dated 10th September 2003 as un-aided IV Class Junior High School provisionally for three years with effect from 1st May 2003 without any financial assistance. The contempt application was finally heard out and His Lordship held that contemnors were guilty for not carrying out the order passed in true sense. Hence Justice Lala by an order dated 23rd June 2004 disposed of the contempt application by deleting the word "without any financial assistance" from the said order of recognition. Thereafter the Board reconsidered the matter and in terms of the said order dated 23rd June 2004 deleted the said words "without any financial assistance." This order of reconsideration dated 9th November 2005 was passed informing the respondents herein that the Board had no power to grant financial assistance as the matter of grant of financial assistance is left for 5 consideration of the State Government in compliance with the order of the Hon'ble High Court. Thus the order of justice Lala has been accepted conclusively by the Board and even State of West Bengal did not prefer any appeal against the above order of Justice Lala. In spite of the above orders and communication made, the State Respondent did not take any step for release of financial assistance and also for granting approval of appointment of the present respondents, as such DI on representation being made, had given hearing to the teaching and non-teaching staff and respondent School Authorities, and he came to the conclusion that services of four teaching and two non-teaching staffs could be approved with effect from 1st May 2005 but appointment of the respondents were not accorded approval. In view of the aforesaid rejection the respondents filed the above writ petition praying for following reliefs:

    " a) A writ of and/or in the nature of Mandamus should not be issued

    commanding the Respondent to act and proceed in accordance with Law

    and further commanding the Respondents to approve the service of your

    petitioners as Organiser Teaching and Non-Teaching Staff of Vidyasagar

    Tapasili Adibasi Sikshaniketan forthwith;

    b) A writ of and/or in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents not to withhold the approval of appointment of your petitioners as Organiser Teaching and Non-Teaching Staff of Vidyasagar 6 Tapasili Adibasi Sikshaniketan, Post Office - Manalbendi, Garbeta, District - Paschim Midnapore and pay their salary on and from 1st May, 2003 till date and month by month;

    c) A writ of and/or in the nature of certiorari directing the Respondents to transmit the entire records of the case forming the basis of withholding the approval of appointment of your petitioners as Organiser Teaching and Non-Teaching Staff of Vidyasagar Tapasili Adibashi Sikshaniketan Post Office - Manalbendi, Garbeta, District - Paschim Midnapore till date and also the papers and documents forming the basis of withholding the appointment of your petitioner as Organiser Teaching and Non- Teaching Staff of Vidyasagar Tapasili Adibasi Sikshanikatan, Post Office - Manalbendi, Garbeta, District - Paschim Midnapore till date to this Hon'ble Court and to certify the same and on behalf so certified quash the same;

    d) Rule NISI in terms of prayers (a) to (c) as above;

    e) An order do issue directing the Respondents to approve the appointment of Your petitioners Organising Teaching and Non-Teaching Staff of Vidyasagar Tapasili Adibashi Sikshaniketan Post Office - Manalbendi, Garbeta, District - Paschim Midnapore forthwith;

    7

    f) Ad-interim order in terms of the prayer (e) above till the disposal of the

    Rule;

    g) And pass further order/orders and/or direction or directions, as Your

    Lordships may deem fit and proper;"

    The Learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment and order after hearing the parties and considering the decisions of this Court as well as Apex Court allowed the prayer of the respondents and had given direction in the manner as follows:

    "Thus the respondents particularly the 4th Respondent are directed to approve the appointments of the petitioners within four weeks from the date of communication of the order and once the appointments were approved by the 4th Respondent the petitioners will be entitled to the salaries with effect from the date of recognition of the said High School by West Bengal Board of Secondary Education on 4th January 2003"
    .

    In the application for condonation of delay the petitioner/appellant in order to explain the delay has stated substantially as follows:

    The impugned judgment and order was passed on 2nd May 2008. It was communicated for the first time to the then District Inspector of School concerned by a letter of the learned Advocate of the writ petitioners/ respondents dated 14th August 2008 which was received on 19th August 2008. Thus it was for the first time the appellant is said to have knowledge through its officers on 19th August 2008. 8 Thereafter on 21st August 2008 the then District Inspector of Schools requested the learned Advocate for the State of West Bengal in Original Side to apply for a certified copy of the impugned judgment and order. Pursuant to such request application for certified copy was filed in the Registry of the Hon'ble Court on 28th August 2008. Folio charges/requisites of the said certified copy were notified on 17th which were put in on the same day the certified copy was made ready for delivery ultimately on 18th of March 2009, meanwhile a proposal for preferring appeal was submitted by District Inspector of School concerned. The proposal was approved by the School Education Directorate of the School Education Department Government of West Bengal and ultimately vide Memo dated 17th March 2009, Mr. Saikat Banerjee learned Advocate was engaged in appeal. Thereafter all the papers including the certified copy were handed over to Mr. Banerjee by the Office of the appellant/petitioner No. 1 on 24th March 2009. Upon receipt of the papers Mr. Banerjee thereafter took some time to get the documents prepared for filing the aforesaid appeal which was ultimately filed in 2nd Week of April 2009. In the application it is stated that there has been delay for about 109 days in preferring appeal.

    The aforesaid statements and averments made in the said application were dealt with and/or controverted by the affidavit-in-opposition affirmed by one Mr. Tarun Kumar Ghosh in the manner as follows:-

    9

    Actually the delay was more than 109 days as computation of this period is patently wrong since impugned judgment and order was passed on 2nd May 2008 and admittedly application for obtaining certified copy was made on 28th August 2008 that is to say after expiry of 30 days of period of limitation. According to the respondent the delay would be at least 340 days.

    Immediately after the said impugned order was passed, by a letter dated 5th May 2008 the learned Advocate for the writ petitioner/respondent duly communicated to the District Inspector of Schools by a letter dated 5th May 2008 and the same was received on 6th May 2008, about passing of the order dated 2nd May 2008. Thus the said letter was duly received by DI himself having signed. Thus it is incorrect to say that the appellant for the first time came to know about the order dated 2nd May 2008, in the month of August 2008. Thereafter on receipt of the certified copy of the order on 14th August 2008 the same was communicated by registered post with acknowledgement due and the same was received on 19th August 2008.

    It was found in spite of communication, order was not carried out. Then a contempt proceeding was initiated and the said impugned order was complied with by the then DI of the Schools on 15th December 2008 and such compliance report was submitted before the learned Single Judge without any reservation and hesitation.

    10

    In the affidavit in reply the appellant tried to deal with the statement and averment made in the said affidavit in opposition in the manner as follows:

    The figure of 340 days of delay is fabricated as it will appear that the High Court department concerned has computed the delay of 109 days. In this connection it has been stated that the said letter sent on 5th May 2008 was found in the record book in the office of the DI of School but the same was not brought to the attention of the then DI. It is also stated that the system is, if any letter is addressed to the DI of Schools the same should be received by the Receiving Section of the Inspectorate and thereafter a docket number is allotted to the said document received and then appropriate action is taken. This document being letter dated 5th May 2008 does not bear any such docket number. Therefore, it is sought to be explained, that the said letter is unusually sent and was received by the DI but it was not placed in the proper file. After completion of filing of the aforesaid pleadings namely application, affidavit in opposition and affidavit in reply, two supplementary affidavits were filed by the appellants to advance further explanation. The DI requested the Directorate of School Education by letter dated 4th September 2008 to take step for preferring appeal and it was mentioned in the said letter that no copy of the writ petition was served and the matter was moved in the Original Side jurisdiction. On receipt of the said letter the Directorate of School Education on November 2008 accepted the proposal for preferring appeal thereafter the file was sent to the Legal 11 Remembrancer, West Bengal for necessary approval which was accorded on 20th November 2008 and thereafter Mr. Amar Mitra the learned Advocate was engaged to file appeal. Mr. Mitra then took steps for drafting and preparing memorandum of appeal and the same were handed over to the Legal Remembrancer (hereinafter in short LR) on 11th December 2008. However, the LR's office returned the Memo and the said application to Mr. Mitra on 18th December 2008 without assigning any reason. It is also stated that after considering entire situation Mr. Saikat Banerjee was engaged by the appellant to prefer appeal.

    Unfortunately prior to filing of the appeal the contempt Rule was issued by the Hon'ble Single Judge making returnable date on 12th December 2008. On receipt of the said Rule it appears that the then DI of Schools (SE) Paschim Midnapore appeared in the contempt proceeding and was served with a copy of the contempt application pursuant to the direction of learned Single Judge. Under threat of contempt the said order had to be carried out and compliance report was submitted. All these had been done by the erstwhile DI before he handed over the charges to the present DI on his retirement in the month of January 2009. While hearing contempt application direction was given to the then DI for compliance of the order, and to file report of compliance of the impugned order. Thereafter in the order dated 17th December 2008 the learned Trial Judge recorded compliance of the earlier order by 12 the then DI according approval to the appointments of the organizing teaching and non-teaching staff from the date of recognition.

    In reply to the said supplementary affidavit of the appellants another affidavit was filed on behalf of the writ petitioner/respondent. In this affidavit apart from reiterating the statements made in the affidavit in opposition it was stated additionally that allegations of non-service of copy of the writ petition was not correct as after filing of the writ petition a copy of the same was duly served upon the DI on 24th April 2008. Thereafter at the time of hearing of the said application the learned Advocate Mr. Mitra appeared.

    With the leave of the Court another supplementary affidavit was filed by the writ petitioner/respondent on or about 6th August 2009, in this affidavit the writ petitioner/respondents have brought certain facts namely passing of order dated 17th December 2008 by the learned Single Judge in contempt application wherein the factum of filing report of compliance of the order was recorded and copy of the order dated 17th December 2008 was also annexed.

    Mr. Jayanta Mitra learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant contends that act of compliance does not prejudice the right of the appellant of preferring the instant appeal as this was done under the threat of contempt. It is settled law that whenever any act of compliance is done under the threat of contempt such action does not wash out the right of preferring appeal in accordance with law. 13 According to him the appellant being the State Government is depending upon the act and action of its officials who do not have any personal interest and stake. As such action of the State cannot be as prompt as that of individual litigants. It is clear from the fact aforesaid that the DI was not aware of the order and the moment he came to know he took prompt steps in getting approval of preferring appeal and ultimately approval was granted but the respective departments could not take prompt action as it was required.

    He submits with the support of Supreme Court decision in case of State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO reported in (2005) 3 SCC 752, that while exercising power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the matter of condonation of delay the test of promptitude and diligence should not be the same as in case of private individuals. Some degree of latitude should be allowed as the State Government is to act with the cumbersome procedure of note making, official decision, file pushing and then formal approval. From the facts stated in the application as well as the affidavit it is thus clear the State Government had to be subjected to the aforesaid process.

    He also contends showing relevant portion of the decision of the Supreme Court that if the case is not hopelessly meritless the delay should be condoned to advance substantial justice forsaking technicalities. While strengthening his case for condonation of delay he has hinted how the appeal is meritorious and substantive one. He submits that the order for approval of the appointment of the organizing 14 teacher is wholly illegal as there has been no provision for such unusual method of approval de hors the statutory provision. He also submits that departmental approval of appointment of the teaching and non-teaching staffs are held to be illegal and invalid by the judicial pronouncement of this Court. In support of this contention he has brought the following Supreme Court decisions and decisions of this Court to our notice:

    (2006) 4 SCC 1 Secretary State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi, (2008) 10 SCC 1 Official Liquidator v. Dayananda, (2005) 6 SCC 106 State of Haryana v. Narender Singh, (1997) 2 SCC 1 Aswani Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2008) 1 WBLR 229 State of West Bengal v. Gopal Singh & Ors. , (2006) 4 CHN Manindranath Sinha v. State of West Bengal, (2008) 1 CLJ 453 Headmistress, Garifa Arti Academy v. Gita Banik and (2008) 1 CHN 582 State of West Bengal v. Smritikana Maity.

    Mr Saktinath Mukherjee learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondents submits that there has been misstatement on oath as to the knowledge of the passing of the impugned order as factum of communication of gist of the judgment and order of 6th May 2008 has been suppressed, and there has also been incorrect statement as regard service of copy of the writ petition, because before the said writ petition was moved a copy of the same was received by the DI himself. The impugned judgment and order was passed on contest and on appearance and in presence of the learned Counsel for the State, as such there was no point to urge that 15 State had no knowledge of passing of such order. Moreover when impugned order has been carried out unconditionally, unequivocally there is no reason nor the State has any right to prefer any appeal, as such the question of condoning delay in entertaining instant application does not arise. Besides there has been no sufficient cause either having been stated or proved. Moreover there has been no explanation at all from 6th June 2008 till August 2008.

    He counters the submission of Mr. Mitra on the merit of the appeal contending that the earlier order of granting recognition of the said organizing school and directing consideration of approval to the appointment of organizing teaching and non-teaching has reached its finality. The legality and validity of the same cannot be reopened or questioned any more.

    He has sought reliance on the question of condonation of delay, on the Supreme Court decision reported in case of Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields reported in AIR 1962 SC 361.

    On the merit of the case he has drawn support of the following decisions of the Supreme Court M.M. Pathak v. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 803., AIR 1982 SC 1126 A.V. Nachane v. Union of India and AIR 1992 SC 522 In Re. Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal.

    As we have already recorded in the event the application for condonation of delay is allowed then the matter is to be dealt with on merit also. Therefore it is 16 incumbent on us to consider the application for condonation of delay first. The language of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is very clear and it provides in exercise of discretion in the matter of condonation of delay, there must be some fact apparently acceptable that will lead the Court to believe the same to be probable and acceptable in given facts and situation for which the appellant was prevented from taking steps within the time fixed for preferring appeal and thereafter the proof thereof if controverted. Even after the proof of the said fact it is still for the Court either to exercise discretion or not. To extend the time if the Court wants to exercise discretion by condoning delay then Court shall not only consider fact purporting to constitute sufficient ground, but also the fact and circumstances subsequently took place and that results in accrual of right in favour of the beneficiary of the order. While considering facts and situation if the Court finds condonation of delay would work as gross injustice to the party in whose favour order is passed, the Court will not certainly condone, but if it is found that the appellant would be seriously prejudiced and the degree of the same would be more than that of the respondent the Court will tilt to condone delay.

    In essence as rightly urged by Mr. Mitra the Court would lean to look for a cause of substantial justice rather to bank on the technicalities of the Rule. The approach of the Court to advance substantial justice in the matter of condonation of delay is not recent development. It was explained by the Supreme Court in case of 17 Ramla v. Rewa Coalfields (AIR 1962 SC 361) in paragraph 7 while approving the Madras High Court Judgment (ILR 13 Mad. 269, Krishna v. Chathapan) as follows:-

    "(7) In construing S.5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice."

    From 1962 till today the view of the Supreme Court and also the High Courts have not been changed basically but different approach have been noted under different circumstances. In the case of State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO, (2005) 3 SCC 752 Justice Arijit Pasayat (as His Lordship then was) considering a large number of decisions, of course AIR 1962 SC 361 was not considered, has explained in paragraph 15 what should be sufficient cause:

    18

    "(15)..........The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice- oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-à-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while the State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants."

    We have noted the ratio of both the aforesaid decisions. We think the approach of Court would be broadly to advance substantial justice in considering question of delay, and in fit case application of the Government for condonation of delay should be dealt with little degree of latitude in comparison to private litigant, but not in all cases. In case where the State is proved to be in absolutely helpless condition remaining at the hands of the official, and there was no scope to prefer appeal earlier discretion ought to be exercised in favour of State. In cases where it was possible for the State to take action at any point of time earlier than it has been 19 actually presented before this Court delay ought not to be execused. In this context the statement and averment made out by the State has to be examined carefully, at the same time Court should not be oblivious of the fact whether any irreversible right has been accrued in favour of the respondents by passage of time.

    In this case it appears that State Government has made statement that there has been delay of 109 days as it is much more as rightly pointed out by Mr. Mukherjee. The factum of knowledge of the State through the DI should not be in the month of August 2008 rather it should be in the month of May 2008, viz. two days after passing of the impugned order. Admittedly in spite of having received letter dated 6th May 2008 such fact has not been stated in the application for condonation of delay. According to us computation of period of limitation by the department of this Court is patently incorrect, and the same cannot be an excuse for stating wrong computation of period of limitation. Once period of limitation for preferring appeal runs out the time subsequent difficulty or incapacity does not arrest running out of time. The impugned order was passed on 4th May 2008, hence the limitation of 30 days will start running from 5th of May and will be expiring on 5th June 2008. Subsequent step for making application for obtaining certified copy in the month of August 2008 and even up to the date of preferring appeal rather a month of delay ought not be considered at all. It is thus clear as rightly argued by Mr. Mukherjee from May 2008 till August 2008 there is simply no explanation. The State 20 Government in its affidavit no where blamed any of the officials for not taking any step nor any action has been taken against the erstwhile DI for sitting over the matter despite admitted receipt of communication. It appears that there has been misstatement on oath again as regard service of copy of the writ petition. It appears that a copy of the writ petition was served upon the DI himself and the learned Advocate was instructed to appear at the time of hearing. It could have been open for the State to ask for time to contest the matter but was not done obviously the learned Advocate was not instructed to do so. All through, the case was represented by learned lawyers so knowledge of passing of the order is immaterial. It was rightly submitted by Mr. Mukherjee the respondent/ writ petitioner had no obligation under law to bring to the notice and knowledge of passing of the order when the learned Counsel appeared and represented the State. However, to facilitate to comply with order the gist of the same was communicated in advance followed by supply of certified copy. We, therefore, fail to understand why such plea of knowledge has been taken in this matter. It appears that DI concerned has wrongly communicated to the Director of School Education while seeking advice for preferring appeal that no copy of the writ petition was served. We also fail to understand in spite of all steps being taken why Mr. Amar Mitra was replaced by Mr. Saikat Banerjee Advocate, and thus resulted further delay. In the affidavit or in the petition there is no grievance against Mr. Arun Mitra, nor against any of the officials of the State. Hence in 21 absence of such complaint or allegation against any of its officials or learned Advocate we think that laches and negligence is on the part of the State itself and perhaps for this reason the order was accepted and carried out as it has been recorded in the order of the learned Single Judge while exercising contempt jurisdiction.

    Thus it is clear while looking into the position and status vis-a-vis the right of both the parties we think that in the event delay is condoned then right of the petitioner/respondents would be irretrievably prejudiced as their livelihood would be at stake as order has been carried out fully with issuance of necessary order of approval to their appointment. The order granting recognition to the School has reached its finality in view of dismissal of appeal earlier against order of Justice Lala as rightly argued by Mr. Mukherjee. When order granting recognition with financial aid has now become unavailable, the State does not stand to lose financially as fund has to be released for school in any case naturally the State is not be affected. We are of the opinion when the Court thinks of caring of substantial justice in the matter of condonation of delay, it must weigh the extent of affectation of substantive right nay technical, of the parties. In this case in the event delay is condoned and appeal is admitted then the accepted judicial pronouncement will be put back to debatable area again consequently the fate of these teachers and the staff would be thrown to agonizing uncertainty. We are not satisfied with the cause made out before us and particularly when we find inconsistent, incorrect and suppressive statement having 22 been made out in the pleading. It would not be prudent for the Court to exercise this extraordinary jurisdiction in this situation. Hence we reject this application for condonation of delay. In view of the rejection we do not feel the need to consider and examine respective contention and submission made by the learned Counsel on merit. In the result the application dismissed so also the appeal.

    However, without any order as to cost.

    (Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta, J.) I agree.

    (Md. Abdul Ghani, J.)

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