Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • rule 20-D of the West Bengal Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958. Precisely, sub-rule (1)
  • S. 10(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • rule 20-D of the West Bengal Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958. Precisely, sub-rule (1)
  • S. 10(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute arises between the petitioners (referred to in the opinion as the “management”) and respondent No. 4 (referred to as the “workman” and named Sri Samir Kr. Das). The appropriate Government issued an order of reference dated 5 March 2002, framing two issues for adjudication before the Industrial Tribunal:

  1. Whether the termination of service of Sri Samir Kr. Das with effect from 15 June, 2001 by the management is justified?
  2. What relief, if any, is Sri Das entitled to?

The management contended before the High Court that the workman had abandoned service (i.e., he was never terminated by the management), and therefore the Tribunal should frame issues that permit adjudication of abandonment as an alternative to termination. The workman contended that the management cannot raise the abandonment point before the High Court at this pendency stage and that the Tribunal should decide the matter on merits.

The matter was argued without exchange of affidavits by agreement of the parties. The High Court considered statutory provisions (S.10(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947) and the relevant West Bengal rule (rule 20-D(1) of the West Bengal Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958), heard citation of precedents by both parties, and finally struck out the existing order of reference with directions to the appropriate Government to reframe the issues and re-refer the matter to the Industrial Tribunal within a specified period. The Court explicitly recorded that it did not go into the merits of the substantive dispute.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the termination of service of Sri Samir Kr. Das with effect from 15 June, 2001 by the management is justified (the issue as framed in the order of reference dated 5 March 2002).
  2. What relief, if any, is Sri Das entitled to (the relief question as framed in the order of reference)?
  3. Whether an Industrial Tribunal is confined by S.10(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the points specified in the order of reference and matters incidental thereto, or whether it may decide foundational questions not squarely included in the reference (specifically whether the Tribunal may decide abandonment when the reference is framed only on termination).
  4. Whether the Writ Court (High Court) should intervene during the pendency of Tribunal proceedings to strike down or remit an order of reference to the appropriate Government for reframing issues when the reference does not accommodate both parties' competing contentions (termination vs abandonment).

Arguments of the Parties

Management's Arguments (as represented by Sri Partha Sarathi Sengupta)

  • The workman was never terminated by the management; instead he abandoned service. Therefore the reference and the issues should leave room for adjudication on abandonment as an alternative to termination.
  • The Industrial Tribunal is statutorily confined by S.10(4) to adjudicate only the points specified in the order of reference and matters incidental thereto; it cannot go beyond the scope of the reference to raise a fundamentally different foundational issue (such as abandonment) which is not incidental.
  • If the Tribunal ultimately rules in favour of the management on abandonment, the workman may later contend in writ jurisdiction that the Tribunal exceeded its reference; conversely, if the award favours the workman, the situation would remain the same substantively. A jurisdictional (nullity) question can be raised at any stage because it touches the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
  • The management cited several precedents to support the proposition that where the order of reference postulates the existence of a termination, the Tribunal cannot decide foundationally that there was no termination (i.e., that the employee abandoned service), and that a wrongly framed reference may be susceptible to challenge in writ jurisdiction.

Workman's Arguments (as represented by Sri Madhusudan Dutta)

  • At the belated stage when proceedings are pending before the Tribunal, the management cannot raise the abandonment issue through writ jurisdiction; this question should be decided by the Tribunal itself.
  • The Tribunal should be permitted to hear the matter on merits and consider preliminary issues; the Writ Court should not intervene at this pendency stage to reframe or strike out the reference except in exceptional circumstances.

Management's Reply (summarised)

  • The management asserted it had not omitted to take the point before the Tribunal, but that the central question concerns jurisdiction: if the Tribunal decides a matter beyond the scope of reference the affected party is entitled to approach the Writ Court at the earliest stage.
  • The management emphasised that questions of nullity (jurisdictional error) may be challenged at any stage, including during pendency, because they go to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sabitri Motor Services (Private), Ltd. v. State of West Bengal (1976 (33) F.L.R 14) Illustrates that a Tribunal proceeded on the fact of termination while the real question was the justifiability of termination; also relevant where management denied termination and asserted voluntary leaving. The Court relied on this decision to show that an improperly framed reference can lead the Tribunal to misdirect its focus and to support the proposition that the Tribunal must be confined to the questions referred.
Punjab Khand Udyog, Ltd. v. Labour Court, Bhatinda (1989 (2) L.L.N 666) Holds that an order of reference of the kind questioned postulates the existence of an order of termination. Used to support the contention that a reference framed as to termination presupposes termination and is not suitable to decide whether there was abandonment instead.
Britannia Industries, Ltd. v. Eighth Industrial Tribunal (1994 L & I.C (NOC) 145 (Cal.)) When the order of reference is in terms of termination of service but the true dispute is whether there was termination or a voluntary resignation, the order of reference may be struck down. Cited to show that where a reference fails to accommodate competing foundational contentions (termination versus resignation/abandonment), the reference can be invalidated.
India Tourism Development Corporation, New Delhi v. Delhi Administration, Delhi (1982 (2) L.L.N 762) Full Bench held that where reference is for entitlement to wages for a lock-out period, the Tribunal cannot decide whether there was a closure or a lock-out (i.e., cannot decide the foundation of the dispute beyond the reference). Applied to illustrate the limitation on a Tribunal's jurisdiction to decide matters that would determine the foundation of the question referred.
All K.G Khosla Karamchari Union (Regd.) Deepak Pneumatic (Private), Ltd. I.N.T.U.C Affiliated v. State of Haryana (2002 (1) L.L.N 425) When the order of reference is limited to whether there was a strike, the Tribunal's scope is restricted accordingly; if it is arguable whether there was any strike, an appropriate reference on that basis is required. Used to support the view that when the foundational fact is arguable, the proper course is a suitably framed reference rather than permitting the Tribunal to decide beyond the reference.
Moolchand Kharati Ram Hospital K. Union v. Labour Commissioner and Company (2001 (1) L.L.N 920) Where reference was for entitlement to wages for lock-out period but the real dispute was whether there was a lock-out, the management is entitled to quash the order under writ jurisdiction if basic questions were not referred. Cited to support the proposition that the Writ Court can quash or interfere with a reference that fails to refer the basic question foundational to the dispute.
Anil Kumar v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court No. 2 (2000 (84) F.L.R 522) Illustrates the appropriate form of reference where both abandonment and termination are placed in issue: “Whether….has abandoned his services or his services have been terminated illegally and/or unjustifiably by the management…?” The Court observed that had the reference been framed in that way, the Tribunal would not have faced the present difficulty — used as an example of a correctly framed reference accommodating both possibilities.
Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company, Ltd. v. Workmen (A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 469) The Tribunal must look at pleadings to identify the exact dispute; however, parties cannot be permitted to contend that the foundation of the dispute mentioned in the order of reference was non-existent — S.10(4) limits the Tribunal. The Court relied on this Supreme Court principle to emphasise that the Tribunal cannot entertain questions that go beyond the scope of the order of reference under S.10(4).
State of Madras v. C.P. Sarathy (A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 53) At the time of making a reference the Government performs an administrative act; the Court cannot re-examine whether there was material before the Government as if it were a quasi-judicial decision. Questions of factual existence of an industrial dispute and expediency are matters for the Government. Referred to show that the Court should not sit in review of the Government's administrative decision to refer unless the resulting award shows jurisdictional defect; the Court used it to balance non-interference with protection against jurisdictional error.
Management of Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd., Madras v. Workers (A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 569) The Tribunal has authority to examine preliminarily whether the dispute referred is an industrial dispute; the Writ Court should ordinarily not interfere until the Tribunal has considered the matter. Used to note that preliminary jurisdictional questions are for the Tribunal, but the Court distinguished the present case as one where the reference itself was wrongly framed and required remittance rather than tolerance of a jurisdictional error.
Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay (1964-I L.L.J 351) Where the dispute raises a question of law, the appropriate Government should not purport to reach a final decision of that legal question; ordinarily it lies within the Tribunal's domain. Cited by the workman to argue against the administrative authority deciding matters better left to the Tribunal; the Court accepted the proposition but relied on its view that a glaring mistake in framing a reference may justify early intervention to avoid delay.
Shambu Nath Goyal v. Bank Of Baroda (1978 (1) L.L.N 340) It is open to a party to impugn a reference for absence of material before the Government; the Tribunal can examine but cannot sit in appeal over the Government's decision. Cited to show limits on curial review of the Government’s decision to refer; the Court treated it as supporting management's contention that materiality for reference is not to be lightly reviewed by the Tribunal or the Court.
Aviquipo of India, Ltd. v. State of West Bengal (1994 (1) L.L.N 932) Interference by the Writ Court in the framing of references may cause injustice to workmen, who are typically in a weaker bargaining position. Cited by the workman to caution against premature writ interference; the Court responded that that submission cannot prevail where the framing of issues itself is defective and could cause substantive injustice through delay or misdirection.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a focused statutory and procedural analysis before reaching its decision. The reasoning proceeds in the following steps, as reflected in the opinion:

  1. Statutory focus: The Court identified S.10(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as the “nucleus of the controversy.” It quoted and interpreted Sub-section (4): where the Government specifies points of dispute for adjudication in an order of reference, the Tribunal “shall confine its adjudication to those points and matters incidental thereto.” The Court emphasised the mandatory tenor of the word “shall” and concluded that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is limited by the scope of the reference.
  2. Nature of statutory tribunal: The Court contrasted the Tribunal’s restricted, statutory role with the broader jurisdiction of civil courts, concluding a Tribunal cannot frame issues beyond the four corners of the referred issues unless such issues are incidental or truly arise from the points referred.
  3. Rules subordinate to statute: The Court examined rule 20-D(1) of the West Bengal Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958, which permits the Tribunal to frame issues arising out of the points referred, including incidental or additional or subsidiary issues, but “not enlarging in any way the scope of the points referred.” The Court observed that rules cannot override the statute and that rule 20-D(1) does not grant freedom to the Tribunal to enlarge the reference.
  4. Problem of “extrinsic contentions”: The Court analysed whether the contention of abandonment could be treated as an “extrinsic contention” that the Tribunal might fairly frame as an issue without enlarging the reference. It concluded that framing abandonment as an issue where the reference was framed only on termination would enlarge the scope of adjudication and effectively prejudge the core dispute.
  5. Precedential synthesis: The Court reviewed the authorities cited by both sides and distilled a consistent principle: the Tribunal’s predominant nature of issues must be respected and incidental/additional/ subsidiary issues are permissible only if they do not enlarge the scope of the original reference. The Court found multiple decisions supporting the proposition that if the reference does not encompass foundational alternatives (e.g., abandonment versus termination), the reference is defective and liable to be challenged.
  6. Role of the Writ Court: The Court balanced non-interference with the administrative function of the Government in framing references against the need to prevent proceedings from going forward on a defective foundation. It concluded that while ordinarily the Tribunal should determine preliminary questions, where the order of reference is manifestly mismatched to the dispute (and thus risks jurisdictional error and substantial delay), the Writ Court ought not to assume power to itself enlarge the scope; instead, it should direct the appropriate Government to reframe the reference to accommodate the competing foundational contentions.
  7. Practical conclusion: Applying the above analysis to the facts, the Court held the order of reference was wrongly framed because it did not leave room to adjudicate the question whether there had been abandonment by the workman as distinct from termination by the management. For reasons of convenience and to enable substantive justice without wasted time, the Court decided to strike out the order of reference and direct the appropriate Government to reframe and re-refer the matter within a specified period.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Court struck out the existing order of reference and disposed of the writ petition.

Directions and direct consequences imposed by the Court (explicit from the opinion):

  • The Court directed the appropriate Government to reframe the order of reference so that the issues are at par with the dispute (i.e., to accommodate adjudication of abandonment vis-à-vis termination) and to return the matter to the Industrial Tribunal.
  • The reframing and communication to the Tribunal were ordered to be completed within one month from the date of communication of the High Court's order; the Tribunal was directed to proceed expeditiously thereafter and to avoid unnecessary adjournments.
  • The writ petition stands disposed of; no order as to costs was made by the High Court, but the imposition of costs for unnecessary adjournments was expressly reserved to the Industrial Tribunal.
  • The Court recorded that it had not gone into the merits of the case.
  • Xeroxed certified copies of the judgment were ordered to be supplied to the parties within seven days after formal completion of the order and certified copy process.

Broader implications: The opinion does not announce a novel principle beyond applying settled law on the limits of S.10(4) and the proper scope of an order of reference. The direct effect is procedural: the existing order of reference is struck down and the matter is to be referred again with properly framed issues. The Court did not address substantive merits and did not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond its application of existing authorities.

    Organon India, Ltd. v. State Of West Bengal And Others

    1. A very interesting question of law is involved in this matter which can be dealt with without any exchange of affidavits. Accordingly, the parties have accepted the position and wanted to argue at length. The main contesting parties are the petitioners (hereinafter called as the management) and the respondent No. 4 (hereinafter called as the workman). The issues under the order of reference, dated 5 March, 2002, are as follows:

    “(1) Whether the termination of service of Sri Samir Kr. Das with effect from 15 June, 2001 by the management is justified?

    (2) What relief, if any, is Sri Das entitled to?”

    2. According to Sri Partha Sarathi Sengupta, learned senior counsel appearing for the “management” the respondent No. 4 was never terminated from the service but he abandoned himself from rendering service of the “management.” In such circumstances, if the appropriate Government feels to refer the matter to the Industrial Tribunal the issues should be framed keeping rooms open for both the parties to get an appropriate adjudication on the basis of order of reference. It is well-settled that the Tribunal cannot proceed beyond the scope and ambit of the order of reference excepting the incidental questions connected therewith. The question of abandonment of service of the “workman” cannot be construed as an incidental issue.

    3. On the other hand, Sri Madhusudan Dutta, learned counsel, appearing for the “workman” contended that at this belated stage, i.e, when the proceeding is pending before the Tribunal, the “management” cannot raise this issue by invoking the writ jurisdiction. This question would have been decided by the Tribunal itself.

    4. In reply, Sri Sengupta contended that it is not the fact that “management” has not taken the point before the Tribunal but the question lies elsewhere. The Tribunal will hear out the matter in the merit in respect of all the issues to satisfy the test and come to an appropriate conclusion. If the Tribunal ultimately held in favour of the “management” on the above issue “workman” will be in a position to take the plea before the Writ Court that the Tribunal, in passing such award, proceeded beyond the scope of reference. On the other hand, if the award is passed in favour of the “workman”, the situation would be as of now excepting the seal and signature of the Tribunal. When there is a question of nullity, the affected party is entitled to approach the Writ Court at any stage of the proceeding at the earliest. As the question of nullity can be challenged even after passing an order or award including the stage of execution, similar principle can also be applied during the pendency of the proceeding. In fact it applies at any stage of the proceeding because it touches the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

    5. Before going into the citations made by the learned counsels appearing for both the parties I have to test the scope and ambit of S. 10(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which, according to me is being the nucleus of the controversy. As per Sub-sec. (4) where in an order referring an industrial dispute to a Labour Court or the Tribunal or National Tribunal under this section or in a subsequent order, the appropriate Government has specified the points of dispute for adjudication, the Labour Court or the Tribunal or the National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall confine its adjudication to those points and matters incidental thereto.

    6. The aforesaid underlined portion of the Sub-sec. (4) of S. 10 of the Act gives a clear impression that when a reference is made by the appropriate Government specifying any point of dispute for adjudication by the Tribunal, such Tribunal shall confine its adjudication to those points and matters incidental thereto. The word “shall” is the guiding factor for the purpose of the adjudication by the Tribunal save and except the incidental matters. The Tribunal is a statutory Tribunal under the Act for the purpose of investigation and settlement of industrial disputes referred by the appropriate Government. Therefore, the scope and ambit of the adjudication is restricted unlike the civil Courts having unfettered jurisdiction to settle the issues and go into the controversy in its own way. The Tribunal is guided by the issues framed by the appropriate Government. It cannot frame issues out of its own volition unless and until it is coming under four corners of the referred issues. At times, civil Courts can construe some issues which are hidden issues under an indispensable condition, i.e, sine qua non but such scope is not open for the statutory Tribunal unless and until the hidden issues are hidden within the four corners of the referred issues. The issue as raised by the “management” cannot be said to be incidental issue.

    7. Now I want to proceed one step further. There should be a clear understanding in respect of rule 20-D of the West Bengal Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958. Precisely, sub-rule (1) germane for the purpose is as follows:

    “After the parties have filed their statements, the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court may fix a date for framing, if necessary the issues relating to and arising out of point or points in dispute, as referred, and matters incidental thereto, as well as additional or substantial issues, not enlarging in any way the scope of the points referred for adjudication on the merits, nor adding to their number but required for dealing with extrinsic contentions raised by the parties about the reference and for its hearing.”

    8. Firstly rules cannot override the stature. Secondly if such sub-rule is read carefully it will be seen that the statutory Tribunal is not free in framing issues without following the aforesaid guidelines. Issues can be framed provided those are arising out of point in dispute, either incidental or additional or subsidiary but not enlarging the scope of the point for adjudication on the merits nor adding to their number but with extrinsic contentions raised by the parties about the reference and for its hearing. Therefore, it is a confusing state of affairs. What would be the extrinsic contentions? Can it be said that the “workman” abandoned himself from rendering service of the “management” in extrinsic contentions? If such issue is framed does it not enlarge the scope of the point of adjudication on the merit? This is not an issue of termination simpliciter so that the extrinsic contentions arising out of the same can be adjudged. For an example— “Was the “workman” terminated from service?” In such case there can be two possibilities and issues can be framed without enlarging the scope. But when termination by the “management” is the issue then there is a prejudgment before reference about causing of termination by the “management”. Hence, the extrinsic contention cannot enlarge the scope of the reference on merit. Therefore, discussion can be made about the scope of reference before the Tribunal but the scope cannot be enlarged, suo motu, without getting further reference from the appropriate Government. In such circumstances an incidental question arose as to whether the Writ Court will enlarge the scope and send the matter to the Tribunal or refer the matter back to the appropriate Government to reframe the issues and send it to the Tribunal as expeditiously possible. According to me, it would not be appropriate for the Writ Court to fasten itself with such power but to refer the matter to the appropriate Government to clear up the position so that the Tribunal can render substantial justice in all respects. Principles of unequal bargaining position cannot be the question of framing issues but for the justice.

    9. Sri Sengupta cited several decisions in favour of his case. Firstly, he cited a Division Bench judgment of this High Court reported in 1976 (33) F.L.R 14 (Sabitri Motor Services (Private), Ltd. v. State of West Bengal) wherefrom I find that the referred question was “Is termination of service…… and ……..justified?” The Tribunal proceeded with the fact whether the company had terminated services of the workmen. The Division Bench came to the conclusion that the Tribunal, in fact, proceeded on the fact of termination but the question was about justifiability of the termination which the Tribunal overlooked. It is also important to note here that before the Division Bench the similar question arose where management not only denied the charge of termination of services of two employees but also specifically stated that both the employees of their own accord, left their services under the company. In 1989 (2) L.L.N 666 (Punjab Khand Udyog, Ltd. v. Labour Court, Bhatinda) Punjab and Haryana High Court held that the order of reference of the similar nature postulates the existence of the order of termination. Calcutta High Court in 1994 L & I.C (NOC) 145 (Cal.) (Britannia Industries, Ltd. v. Eighth Industrial Tribunal) of which the entire unreported judgment was placed before this Court held when the order of reference is a termination of service whether the very dispute is whether there is a termination of service or whether the employee submitted resignation voluntarily, the order of reference is liable to be struck down. In 1982 (2) L.L.N 762 (India Tourism Development Corporation, New Delhi v. Delhi Administration, Delhi) a Full Bench of the Delhi High Court held when the order of reference is for entitlement to wages for a period of lock out the Tribunal cannot enlarge the scope of the jurisdiction and decide that there was a closure or not lock out. That would be deciding the foundation of the dispute mentioned in the order of reference. Such jurisdiction is not vested in the Industrial Tribunal. Again Punjab and Haryana High Court held in 2002 (1) L.L.N 425] [All K.G Khosla Karamchari Union (Regd.) Deepak Pheumatic (Private), Ltd. I.N.T.U.C Affiliated v. State of Haryana] that when the order of reference is strike the scope of the Tribunal is restricted on that score alone. In case there is an arguable point as to whether there was any strike at all an appropriate reference is to be made on that score. Supreme Court in 2001 (1) L.L.N 920 (Moolchand Kharati Ram Hospital K. Union v. Labour Commissioner and Company) held that when there is a reference whether the workmen are entitled to wages for the lock out period and the real dispute between the parties as to whether a lock out was presumed and the consequential question was referred but not the basic question the management is entitled for quashing the order under the writ jurisdiction of the Court.

    10. In 2000 (84) F.L.R 522 (Del.) (Anil Kumar v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court No. 2) Delhi High Court held that the appropriate reference should be in the circumstances “Whether….has abandoned his services or his services have been terminated illegally and/or unjustifiably by the management and if so, to what relief is he entitled and what directions are necessary in this respect?”. According to me, had there been the order of reference like above, there would not have any problem for the Tribunal in hearing the matter in merit.

    11. Therefore, from the ratio of the judgments referred as above it is crystal clear that the pre-dominant nature of the issue has to be taken into account for due consideration by the Tribunal and if it is not taken up it can be construed that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in hearing of order of reference. Incidental, additional or subsidiary issues can be available provided there is no enlargement of the scope of reference. In the instant case, the order of reference was wrong in terms of the dispute apparently. The nature of dispute is whether there was an abandonment of service by the workman or there was a termination of service by the management, illegally or unjustifiably? I fail to understand why the appropriate Government does so which cannot give accommodation to both the parties. Social piece of legislation may sometimes go towards weaker section in deciding the merit but not making the order of reference. If it is done then obviously dispute will crop up in hearing such issue when the main matter would be delayed which ultimately frustrate the benefit of the weaker section in getting expeditious adjudication.

    12. Sri Dutta cited various judgments in support of his case. Firstly, he cited A.I.R 1967 S.C 469 (Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company, Ltd. v. Workmen). Although I have taken note of such ratio from the Division Bench judgment reported in 1976 (33) F.L.R 14 (vide supra) cited by the “management” but I have to consider once again in the eyes of learned counsel appearing for the “workman”. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal must, in any event, look at the pleadings of the parties to find out the exact nature of the dispute, because in most cases, the order of reference is so cryptic that it is impossible to cull out therefrom the various points about which the parties were at variance leading to the trouble. But I find even thereunder the Supreme Court held that whether there is any industrial dispute or not which attracts the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal can be raised but parties cannot be allowed to go a stage further and contend that the foundation of the dispute mentioned in the order of reference was non-existent with the true dispute. Under S. 10(4) of the Act the Tribunal is not competent to entertain such a question.

    13. Secondly, he cited A.I.R 1953 S.C 53 (State of Madras v. C.P Sarathy) to establish that at the time of making reference the Government is doing an administrative Act and the fact that forming an opinion as to the factual existence of an industrial dispute is a preliminary step to the discharge of its function does not make it any less administrative in character. The Court cannot, therefore, canvass the order of reference closely to see if there was any material before the Government to support its conclusion as if it was a judicial or quasi-judicial determination. No doubt it will be open to a party seeking to impugn the resulting award to show that what was referred by the Government was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act and that, therefore, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the award. But again in such judgment, I find the Supreme Court held if the dispute was an industrial dispute as defined in the Act its factual existence and expediency of making a reference in the circumstances of a particular case are matters entirely for the Government to decide upon and it will not be competent for the Court to hold the reference bad and quash the proceedings for want of jurisdiction merely because there was, in its opinion, no material before the Government on which it could have come to an affirmative conclusion on those matters.

    14. He further cited A.I.R 1963 S.C 569 (Management of Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd., Madras v. Workers) to establish that Industrial Tribunal has its authority to examine a preliminary issue as to whether the dispute referred to it is an industrial dispute or not and the decision of this question would inevitably depend upon the view which the Industrial Tribunal may make. To that extent, the Writ Court should not interfere with the same unless and until the award comes forward after considering such preliminary issue but, according to me, the question is different here. It is nobody's case as to whether any industrial dispute lies or not. The question is the order of reference should not be called out in a manner which has not been referred by the appropriate Government. Tribunal cannot convert the issue as per the desire of the management and come to an appropriate conclusion unless the scope of the reference is enlarged. If it is done the Tribunal will obviously make a jurisdictional error and in such case interference of the Writ Court will be justifiable.

    15. Thereafter he cited a judgment reported in 1964-I L.L.J 351 (Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay) and contended the dispute in question raises question of law. The appropriate Government should not purport to reach a final decision on the said question of law, because it would normally lie within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal which is also similarly placed with the question of fact. Possibly the learned counsel wanted to say that the representative of the appropriate Government is the administrative authority, therefore, he cannot justify the legality to which the domain lies with the Tribunal. According to me, there is no dispute about such proposition but the question lies with the result. If the result is obvious that the reference is not at par with the dispute, the reference will have to be returned to the appropriate Government to make out proper issues at par with the dispute and again return it to the Tribunal. Therefore, if any one comes forward before reaching its finality upon observing a glaring mistake, the Writ Court can interfere at any stage of the proceeding for the purpose of shortening the time. Thereafter, again he cited a judgment reported in 1978 (1) L.L.N 340 (Shambu Nath Goyal v. Bank Of Baroda, Jullundur) to establish that it would be open to the party impugning the reference that there was no material before the Government, and it would be open to the Tribunal to examine the question, but that does not mean that it can sit on appeal over the decision of the Government and come to a conclusion that there was no material before the Government. I find that this referable part of the judgment is helping the cause of the “management” but not the cause of the “workman” at all.

    16. He lastly cited 1994 (1) L.L.N 932 (Aviquipo of India, Ltd. v. State of West Bengal) to establish that if the interference is caused by the Writ Court it will cause injustice to the workmen as against the management who are not in equal bargaining position. I am sorry to say that such submission cannot be accepted on a question of framing issues and particularly when the “management” itself took the pain of bringing the cause before the Writ Court during the pendency of the proceeding without waiting for final disposal giving clear explanation about the fate of the result either way. Therefore, such action on the part of the “management” is tested as bona fide by the Writ Court. The Tribunal cannot substitute its view holding that there was an abandonment of service by the “workman” in the place and instead of order of reference that termination of service by the management was justified or not. This would have obviously been a jurisdictional error which is the basic issue of consideration by this Court.

    17. Hence, balance of convenience will be subserved if the order of reference is striked out by giving direction upon the appropriate Government to refer the matter back keeping the rooms open for adjudication by the Tribunal in respect of abandonment of service vis-a-vis the termination by the management and that too within a specified period so that the Tribunal will be in a position to proceed with the substantial justice without any wastage of time as expeditiously as possible.

    18. Thus, order of reference is striked out by this Court with a direction upon the Tribunal to return the file to the appropriate Government to reframe the issues at par with the judgment and order passed by this Court within a period of one month from the date of communication of this order positively and send the matter to the Industrial Tribunal forthwith thereafter and in such case it is expected that the Tribunal will proceed as expeditiously as possible with this matter immediately after getting the order of reference without allowing unnecessary adjournments for the sake of justice.

    19. Thus, the writ petition stands disposed of. No order is passed as to costs. But imposition of costs is reserved for the Industrial Tribunal in case of unnecessary adjournments are taken by the parties to delay the proceedings. However, it is recorded hereunder that this Court has not gone into the merit of the case.

    20. Xeroxed certified copies of this judgment will be supplied to the parties within seven days from the date of putting the requisites for drawing up and completion of the order and certified copy of this judgment.

    Writ petition disposed of.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Organon India, Ltd. v. State Of West Bengal And Others
    (Apr 29, 2003)