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  • sub-section (4) of Section 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure Code.
  • provision of Section 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order XXI, Rule 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Sections 38 and 39 of the said Code.5. 38. Court
  • provisions of Section 39 of the said Code
  • Section 38 of the said Code. Provisions
  • provisions of Section 39 Civil P.C
  • Sub-section (2) of Section 39
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
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  • sub-section (4) of Section 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure Code.
  • provision of Section 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order XXI, Rule 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Sections 38 and 39 of the said Code.5. 38. Court
  • provisions of Section 39 of the said Code
  • Section 38 of the said Code. Provisions
  • provisions of Section 39 Civil P.C
  • Sub-section (2) of Section 39
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an execution application in which the judgment debtors — Pradip Kumar Daga, Smt. Asha Daga, Yashwant Kumar Daga and Smt. Nandini Daga — objected to the jurisdiction of the Court. The mode of assistance sought by the decree-holder was an oral examination of the judgment debtors under Order XXI, Rule 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure and directions for the judgment debtors to make and file affidavits stating particulars of their assets.

The judgment debtors' counsel pointed out that the notice in this matter was issued to an address at 5, Merline Park, Calcutta-700019, which lies outside the territorial limits of the Original Civil Jurisdiction of this Court. The jurisdictional objection raised that, in view of Section 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as amended by insertion of sub-section (4)), this Court cannot execute the decree against persons or property outside its local limits. The Court heard submissions from counsel for both sides and reproduced and analysed Sections 38 and 39 CPC before delivering its order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether this Court can proceed with execution of the decree (including oral examination and affidavit directions) against persons who reside voluntarily outside the local limits of this Court's jurisdiction in light of Sections 38 and 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure, including sub-section (4) of Section 39.
  2. Whether the use of the word "may" in Section 39 renders the transfer provision discretionary (permissive) or mandatory in circumstances where the person or property against whom execution is sought is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court which passed the decree.

Arguments of the Parties

Judgment Debtors' Arguments (as presented by Mr. Tilak Basu)

  • The notice was served at an address outside the territorial limits of the Original Civil Jurisdiction of this Court (5, Merline Park, Calcutta-700019), and therefore this Court lacks jurisdiction to execute the decree against those persons.
  • Section 39 (including the recently inserted sub-section (4)) of the Code of Civil Procedure precludes the Court which passed the decree from executing it against persons or property outside its local limits; the word "may" in Section 39 must be read to require transfer in the circumstances envisaged by that section.
  • Relied on judicial authority to support the position that an executing Court must have territorial jurisdiction and otherwise must transfer the decree under Section 39 (cited cases: AIR 1932 Cal 213 — Hari Das Basu… Plaintiff v. National Insurance Company Ltd.…Defendants; AIR 1961 Cal 422 — Benaras Ice Factory Ltd. v. Sukhlal Amarchand Vadnagra; AIR 1985 Bom 79 — Shaba Yeshwant Naik v. Vinod Kumar Gosalia).

Decree-Holder's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Soumen Sen)

  • The jurisdiction to execute a decree primarily emanates from Section 38 CPC, and Sections 38 and 39 must be read together.
  • Section 39 confers a discretionary (permissive) power on the Court which passed the decree to transfer it; the word "may" is discretionary and does not make transfer mandatory in all cases.
  • Relied on authority for the permissive nature of Section 39 (cited case: AIR 1937 Cal 570 — H.N. Dutta & Company v. Smt. Tarubala Dassi) and also referred to an unreported single-judge decision holding that, on facts identical to the present case, this Court had jurisdiction to execute even if the property was situated outside the Court's jurisdiction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
AIR 1932 Cal 213 — Hari Das Basu… Plaintiff v. National Insurance Company Ltd.…Defendants Held that an executing Court must have territorial jurisdiction over the subject matter against which execution is sought; where it lacks such jurisdiction the provisions of Section 39 must apply and the executing Court should send the application for execution to another Court having territorial jurisdiction. The word "may" indicates judicial discretion but the executing Court should send the application when the decree is executable only in another Court. The Court treated this earlier Division Bench decision as authoritative on the point and followed it. The opinion quotes and relies on the passage from page 214 to support the conclusion that the executing Court cannot seize property or proceed where neither the property nor the person against whom execution is sought lies within its territorial jurisdiction.
AIR 1937 Cal 570 — H.N. Dutta & Company v. Smt. Tarubala Dassi Observed that the provisions of Section 39 are permissive and not mandatory (i.e., "may" is discretionary). The Court noted this later Division Bench judgment but observed that it did not cite the earlier Division Bench authority (AIR 1932 Cal 213). Consequently, the Court declined to follow the 1937 decision on the present point and instead followed the earlier 1932 Division Bench decision.
AIR 1985 Bom 79 — Shaba Yeshwant Naik v. Vinod Kumar Gosalia Observed that Section 38 provides who may execute a decree and Section 39 lays down the conditions under which a decree can be sent for execution; the use of "may" shows judicial discretion and prevents abuse (noted that a Court lacking territorial jurisdiction should not attach property outside its area). The Court quoted the Bombay High Court's observations to reinforce that the purpose of the discretion is to avoid abuse and that a Court lacking territorial jurisdiction should not attach property outside its territorial limits. This authority supported the judgment debtors' contention and was used to illustrate consistent judicial thinking on territorial limits and discretion.
AIR 1961 Cal 422 — Benaras Ice Factory Ltd. v. Sukhlal Amarchand Vadnagra Cited by the judgment debtors' counsel in support of the proposition that the executing Court cannot execute against a person or property outside its jurisdiction. The opinion records that this case was cited by Mr. Basu but does not elaborate on its reasoning. It is listed among authorities relied on by the judgment debtors; no further application or specific textual reliance is set out in the opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first identified that the jurisdiction to execute a decree "emanates from Section 38" CPC, which contemplates that a decree may be executed either by the Court which passed it or by the Court to which it is sent for execution. The Court then reproduced Section 39 in full and parsed its sub-sections to explain the transfer mechanism.

The Court's analysis proceeded along these lines:

  1. Section 38 defines which Courts are authorised to execute a decree (the Court that passed it or the Court to which it is sent for execution).
  2. Section 39 lists circumstances in which the Court that passed the decree may, on application of the decree-holder, send the decree for execution to another Court (if the person resides or carries on business there; or has property there insufficient within the original Court's local limits; or the decree directs sale/delivery of immovable property situated in another Court's jurisdiction; or the passing Court records other reasons in writing).
  3. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 enables the passing Court to transfer the decree on its own motion to a subordinate Court of competent jurisdiction; sub-section (3) defines competent jurisdiction for transfer purposes.
  4. The crucial addition is sub-section (4) of Section 39 (a recent amendment), which states: "Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorise the Court which passed a decree to execute such decree against any person or property outside the local limits of its jurisdiction."
  5. On construing Sections 38 and 39 together, and in light of the insertion of sub-section (4), the Court concluded that the passing Court is not authorised to execute a decree against persons or property outside its local limits where the conditions in Section 39 obtain.
  6. The Court reviewed the authorities: it gave precedence to the earlier Division Bench decision in AIR 1932 Cal 213 (Hari Das Basu), which it found directly on point and to be binding on the question of territorial jurisdiction of an executing Court. It observed that a later Division Bench decision (AIR 1937 Cal 570) which characterized Section 39 as permissive did not cite the earlier 1932 authority and therefore could not displace it. Single-judge decisions contrary to the earlier Division Bench were likewise not followed.
  7. The Court also relied on the policy/object of Section 39 — to avoid unduly harassing judgment-debtors by requiring them to litigate or be brought outside their place of residence or business and to enable convenience in executing decrees where property is located within another Court's jurisdiction.
  8. Applying the statutory text and these principles to the facts before it — where the person against whom execution was sought admittedly resided voluntarily outside the local limits of this Court — the Court held that it could not proceed with execution. The Court noted that the term "person" in sub-section (4) encompasses judgment-debtors and third parties alike.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The objection as to jurisdiction was sustained and the application for execution could not be proceeded with by this Court; the application was transferred to the learned District Judge, South 24 Parganas at Alipore, who will place it before the appropriate Court having jurisdiction to execute the decree.

Direct consequences and implementation ordered by the Court:

  • The execution application is transferred to the learned District Judge of South 24 Parganas at Alipore to be placed before the appropriate Court with jurisdiction to execute the decree.
  • The record and the original decree are to be transmitted immediately to that Court after being sent down to the department.
  • The costs of transmitting the records are to be paid by the decree-holder.

Implications (as stated or reasonably limited to what the opinion discusses):

  • The Court treated the insertion of sub-section (4) to Section 39 as removing doubts about whether the Court which passed a decree is authorised to execute it against persons or property outside the local limits of its jurisdiction; the opinion reads Sections 38 and 39 harmoniously to conclude a passing Court cannot proceed with execution where the conditions of Section 39 apply.
  • The Court followed an earlier Division Bench (AIR 1932 Cal 213) on the territorial limitation issue and declined to follow a later decision (AIR 1937 Cal 570) that did not consider the earlier authority. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond applying and following existing Division Bench authority and the statutory amendment.
Order accordingly.

This summary is strictly limited to the matters, authorities and conclusions expressly set out in the provided opinion. No facts, authorities or legal conclusions beyond those contained in the opinion have been added.

    Uma Kanoria v. Pradip Kumar Daga

    1. In this execution application a point has been taken by the judgment debtors on the question of jurisdiction of this Court. The mode of assistance of the claim in this application is for oral examination, of the judgment debtors namely Pradip Kumar Daga, Smt. Asha Daga, Yashwant Kumar Daga and Smt. Nandini Daga under Order XXI, Rule 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Judgment debtors are also directed to make and file their affidavit, stating the particulars of the assets of the judgment debtors.

    2. Mr. Tilak Basu, learned Counsel while opposing his application contends that admittedly the notice from this department has been issued at the address of the judgment debtors situated at 5, Merline Park, Calcutta-700019 outside the territorial limit of the Original Civil Jurisdiction of this Court. Therefore, his contention is that in view of provision of Section 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended this Court has no power to execute this decree against the aforesaid persons who reside outside the local limits of this jurisdiction. He has drawn my attention to the recent amendment byway of insertion of sub-section (4) of Section 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure Code. Even before amendment the judicial pronouncement of this Court was to the effect that the Court, which passed decree, could not have any jurisdiction to execute the same in case of a person against whom the decree is sought to be executed, residing voluntarily or working for gain or the property situated outside its jurisdiction and this was and still is required to be transferred under Section 39 of the said Code. His contention is that the word “may” used in Section 39 of the said Code employs and suggests having regard to the object of the aforesaid section, is mandatory. In support of his submission he has relied on decisions of the Division Bench of this Court reported in AIR 1932 Cal 213 (Hari Das Basu…Plaintiff v. National Insurance Company Ltd.…Defendants) and AIR 1961 Cal 422 (Benaras Ice Factory Ltd. v. Sukhlal Amarchand Vadnagra). He has also relied on decision of the Bombay High Court reported in AIR 1985 Bom 79, (Shaba Yeshwant Naik v. Vinod Kumar Gosalia).

    3. Mr. Soumen Sen appearing for the decree-holder submits that the provisions of Section 39 of the said Code is discretionary power of the Court which has passed a decree. The jurisdiction to execute a decree emanates from Section 38 of the said Code. Provisions of both the Sections are to be read conjointly. It will appear therefrom, that the power of the transfer of the Court which has passed a decree is absolutely optional. Ordinarily the Court should transfer the decree in the event the conditions mentioned in Section 39 having been fulfilled. The word “may” used in Section 39 of the said Code is discretionary. In support of his submission he has relied on a decision of this Court reported in AIR 1937 Cal 570 (H.N Dutta & Company v. Smt. Tarubala Dassi). His further contention is that the aforesaid point has been considered by the learned single Judge of this Court in an unreported in decision and held that on the facts and circumstances which are identical to this one that this Court has jurisdiction to execute the decree even if the property situates outside the jurisdiction of this Court.

    4. Having heard the respective submissions and contentions of the learned Counsels I am of the view that the point has fallen for consideration as to whether having regard to the relief claimed in the column 10 of the Tabular Statement whether this Court can proceed with the execution in this matter or not. I feel it necessary to reproduce Sections 38 and 39 of the said Code.

    5. “38. Court by which decree may be executed. — A decree may be executed either by the Court which passed it, or by the Court to which it is sent for execution.”

    “39. Transfer of decree.— (1) The Court which passed a decree may, on the application of the decree-holder, send it for execution to author of competent jurisdiction,—

    (a) if the person against whom the decree is passed actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business, or personally works for gain within the local limits of the jurisdiction of such other Court, or

    (b) if such person has no property within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court which passed the decree sufficient to satisfy such decree and has property within the local limits of the jurisdiction of such other Court, or

    (c) if the decree directs the sale or delivery of immovable property suitable outside the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court which passed it, or

    (d) if the Court which passed the decree considers for any other reasons, which it shall record in writing, that the decree should be executed by such other Court.

    (2) The Court which passed a decree may of its own motion send it for execution to any subordinate Court of competent jurisdiction

    (3) For the purposes of this section, a Court shall be deemed to be a Court of competent jurisdiction if at the time of making the application for the transfer of decree, to it, such Court would have jurisdiction to try the suit in which such decree was passed.

    (4) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorise the Court which passed a decree to execute such decree against any person or property outside the local limits of its jurisdiction.”

    6. Upon careful scrutiny of both the two Sections it appears to me that the jurisdiction of a Court to execute a decree emanates from Section 38. Primarily, Section 38 contemplates Courts which are authorised to execute the decree and one, which has passed decree or the Court to which it is sent for execution. Section 39 provides for transfer of a decree by the Court which has passed to the Court within whose jurisdiction and having competency to do so the person against whom, the decree is passed quietly and voluntarily resides or carries on business or person works for gain within the local limits of the jurisdiction of such other Court; or his property within the local limits of the jurisdiction of such transferee Court; or the property sale of which or delivery of sale or delivery of which has been asked for, situates within the jurisdiction of the transferee Court or for any reason the Court which has passed decree think fit to transfer the decree for any reason. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 enables the Court to transfer the decree on its own motion for execution to any subordinate Court of any competent jurisdiction.

    7. Before insertion of sub-section (4) the judicial pronouncement of this Court in the decision of the case of Hari Das Basu…Plaintiff v. National Insurance Company Ltd.…Defendants reported in AIR 1932 Cal 213 as cited by Mr. Bose clearly held at page 214 (column I) as follows:

    “The executing Court, like the Court entertaining a suit (except in case of breach of contract) must have territorial jurisdiction over the subject matter against which execution is sought. Where it has no such jurisdiction the provisions of Section 39 Civil P.C must apply, that is to say, the executing Court should send this application for execution to any other Court which has such territorial jurisdiction. The word “may” used in Section 39 does mean that it is in the discretion of the Court which passed the decree either to execute the decree itself or to send this application for execution to another Court where the property against which execution is sought is situated outside the jurisdiction of the Court which passed the decree. The discretion given there indicates that the Court should send the application for execution to another Court where it thinks that the decree is executable in the way prayed for.

    If the movable property such as money against which execution is asked for and not within the territorial limits of the executing Court, the only other way in which that Court may have jurisdiction to execute the decree is when the person against whom execution is sought is or resides within the jurisdiction of that Court. Except these or one of these circumstances exist or exists the executing Court has no jurisdiction to seize property which is not within its territorial jurisdiction and where the person against who execution is sought does, not reside within its territorial jurisdiction.”

    8. In a bench decision of the Bombay High Court as cited by Mr. Basu, reported in AIR 1985 Bom 79, it has been observed in paragraph 12 as follows:

    “Section 38 provides that a decree may be executed either by the Court, which passed it or by the Court to which it was transferred for execution. Section 39 lays down the condition under which a decree can be so sent.”

    In paragraph 13 it has been observed further that:

    “The use of the word ‘may’ in the above provision only shows that a judicial discretion is given in the matter to the Court to prevent and abuse of the remedy sought to be employed either by collusion or by malice or under other considerations. The learned single Judge, therefore, in our opinion rightly held that Margao Court had no jurisdiction to attach the property in dispute being outsider it territorial jurisdiction.”

    9. A later Division Bench judgment of this Court as cited by Mr. Sen reported in AIR 1937 Cal 570 has observed that:

    “The provisions of Section 39 are permissive and not mandatory.”

    10. It appears that in this Division Bench judgment the earlier Division Bench judgment reported in AIR 1932 Cal 213 was not cited. Therefore, the earlier Division Bench judgment, which is discussed on this point precisely, has to be followed in this case. Two decisions of the learned single Judge of this Court are not to be followed in view of the earlier Division Bench judgment, the recent unreported decision of the learned single Judge of this Court though held in favour of the decree holder on the facts and circumstances of that case. However, there was no discussion as to why the earlier judgment of the Division Bench of this Court has not been followed.

    11. Moreover, in view of the aforesaid insertion of sub-section (4) if has been made clear removing all doubts that the Court, which has passed a decree, is not authorised to execute the decree against any person or property outside the local limits of its jurisdiction. Therefore, the doubts, which might or could have arisen on the question of jurisdiction of an executing Court, have been removed. In harmonious reading of both the two sections now it appears to me the Court which has passed a decree cannot have any jurisdiction to proceed with the execution of a decree when circumstances and conditions mentioned in Section 39 exist.

    12. The whole object of making provisions of transfer of a decree is amongst others to see that the judgment debtor (s) is (are) not unduly harassed by bringing them from their place of residence or business to the Court situate outside of the local limit. It is also the object of the aforesaid provision that the decree can be executed conveniently when the properties both movable and immovable situate within the jurisdiction of a particular competent Court.

    13. However, the applicability of the aforesaid provisions would be made when the conditions mentioned in the said Section are fulfilled.

    14. Therefore, having regard to the nature of the relief claimed herein it appears to me the instant decree is sought to be, for the time being, proceeded against a person residing voluntarily outside the local limits of this Court. The word ‘person’ mentioned in sub-section (4) is not only judgment debtor, but includes the third party as well.

    15. Admittedly the person against whom the execution is sought to be levied resides outside the territorial limit of this Court. Therefore, I hold the objection raised by the judgment debtors sustains this application cannot be proceeded with by this Court.

    16. Therefore, this application is transferred to the learned District Judge of South 24 Paraganas at Alipore, who will place it before the appropriate Court having jurisdiction to execute this decree.

    17. Let this record and original decree be transmitted to the aforesaid Court immediately after these records are being sent down to the department, at the costs of the decree-holder.

    Order accordingly.

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    Comments

    Uma Kanoria v. Pradip Kumar Daga
    (Oct 1, 2002)