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  • clause (b) of Order 41, Rule 27(1) CPC. Under Section 20(2) SR Act, Court
  • clause (aa) of Rule 27, sub-rule (1) of Order 41, CPC.8.3
  • clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 20,
  • SECTION 52 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT 1882
  • Section 230-A(1) of the Income-tax Act.13.5
  • SECTION 55 CONTRACT ACT
  • Section 20 SR Act.8.2 Order 41, Rule 27, CPC
  • Section 230-A(1) of the Income-tax Act.
  • SECTION 16 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
  • SECTION 23 INCOME TAX ACT
  • clause (aa) of Section 20(1) SR Act
  • Act:12. Section 16 SR Act
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  • clause (b) of Order 41, Rule 27(1) CPC. Under Section 20(2) SR Act, Court
  • clause (aa) of Rule 27, sub-rule (1) of Order 41, CPC.8.3
  • clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 20,
  • SECTION 52 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT 1882
  • Section 230-A(1) of the Income-tax Act.13.5
  • SECTION 55 CONTRACT ACT
  • Section 20 SR Act.8.2 Order 41, Rule 27, CPC
  • Section 230-A(1) of the Income-tax Act.
  • SECTION 16 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
  • SECTION 23 INCOME TAX ACT
  • clause (aa) of Section 20(1) SR Act
  • Act:12. Section 16 SR Act
  • Order 41, Rule 27, CPC,
  • Section 16 clauses (b)
  • Section 19(b) SR Act
  • Act:17. Section 20
  • Section 16(c)
  • Section 19(b)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (D.K. Seth, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeals challenge the judgment and decree dated 31 August 1999 of the Learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, 8th Court, Alipore in Title Suit No. 33 of 1995, a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale. The plaintiff had obtained a decree for specific performance in respect of 1/7th share of defendant No. 1. During the pendency of the suit, defendant No. 2 purchased part of the property (including the 1/7th share) and became a post‑suit purchaser. Defendant No. 1 (vendor) filed F.A. No. 14 of 2000 and defendant No. 2 (subsequent purchaser) filed F.A. No. 13 of 2000. By consent the appeals were heard together.

Material factual background: the property originally belonged to Satya Prasanna Basu who mortgaged it to Hindustan Insurance Company in 1948. LIC obtained a decree in a mortgage suit (Title Suit No. 53 of 1963). Over the years interest mounted and various execution and appeal proceedings ensued. On 28 March 1994 defendant No. 1 entered into an agreement for sale of his 1/7th share to the plaintiff, with terms making the sale subject to specific encumbrances (including the LIC mortgage, pending execution and pending appeal) and containing time stipulations (three months, with six months maximum and forfeiture clause). Communications between the parties reveal disagreement about whether the plaintiff would accept the share "as is" subject to the encumbrances or insisted on a title free from those encumbrances. During the proceedings the defendant No. 2 paid the mortgage dues and other sums and acquired larger shares, and thereafter the trial court decreed specific performance in favor of the plaintiff (31 August 1999); both defendants appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether additional documents/evidence should be admitted in appeal under Order 41, Rule 27, CPC.
  2. Whether a post‑suit purchaser (defendant No. 2) can contest in appeal the plaintiff's readiness and willingness where, at trial, the law then prevailing (Jugraj Singh) precluded such contest.
  3. Whether the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract as required by Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act (SR Act).
  4. Whether time was made the essence of the contract and consequences of failure to perform within the stipulated time (including application of Section 55, Contract Act).
  5. Whether the appellate court should exercise its discretion under Section 20 SR Act to refuse specific performance on equity grounds (unfair advantage, hardship, or inequity).
  6. Whether the post‑suit transfer to defendant No. 2 is protected as a bona fide transferee for value without notice or is defeated by lis pendens (Section 52 Transfer of Property Act), and effect of lis pendence on Section 19(b) SR Act protection.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (F.A. 13 of 2000) — Ceean International Pvt. Ltd. (defendant No. 2)

  • The plaintiff bore the obligation to redeem the 1/7th share from the LIC mortgage or to purchase subject to the encumbrances stated in the agreement; the plaintiff was not ready and willing throughout to perform his obligations.
  • Time was made the essence of the contract because of urgency (mounting mortgage interest) and the vendor's eagerness; plaintiff failed to adhere to time stipulations.
  • Under Section 16 SR Act readiness and willingness throughout must be proved; any lapse defeats specific performance — authorities were cited to explain this requirement.
  • Defendant No. 2, as a subsequent purchaser, was not entitled to contest readiness and willingness at trial under the law then prevailing and therefore had not adduced evidence earlier; but since law has changed (Ram Awadh), it should now be permitted to tender additional evidence and contest these issues in appeal.
  • The decree for specific performance is discretionary under Section 20 SR Act and the facts warranted exercise of discretion against granting specific performance (K.S. Vidyanandam cited).
  • Application under Order 41, Rule 27, CPC was filed to admit additional documents — many were court records or documents in defendant No. 2's custody and some were not producible earlier due to the then law (Jugraj Singh).

Appellant (F.A. 14 of 2000) — Defendant No. 1 (vendor)

  • Supported the arguments of defendant No. 2 regarding plaintiff's absence of readiness and willingness and insisted that the plaintiff had insisted upon performance at variance with the contract.
  • Pointed to correspondence showing plaintiff admitted time was of the essence but did not act; plaintiff refused to deliver draft conveyance, preventing necessary Income‑tax clearance.
  • Invoked Section 55 Contract Act re: part of the contract not performed within stipulated time making contract voidable at promisee's option.
  • Invoked Section 20 SR Act that the court's discretion should have been exercised to refuse specific performance; relied on authorities cited by defendant No. 2 too.

Respondent / Plaintiff (as argued by counsel for defendants' opponent)

  • Contended that the plaintiff had performed or attempted to perform essential parts and was always ready and willing; the plaintiff had approached LIC for part redemption but LIC declined.
  • Argued that under the agreement only 1/7th share redemption was required and the plaintiff's liability was limited to Rs. 70,000 for redemption; the vendor (defendant No. 1) was responsible for redeeming the property from mortgage in practical terms and thus time could not run against the plaintiff until redemption by vendor was possible.
  • Maintained that time was not made the essence of the contract on the true construction and by surrounding circumstances; if anything, the essence of time was tied to redemption and could not be applied mechanically.
  • Contended defendant No. 2 could not in appeal raise readiness/willingness because it had not contested those grounds at trial and had not cross‑examined witnesses; relied on the then governing decision (Jugraj Singh) and authorities on waiver/presumption from non‑participation.
  • Opposed admission of additional documents under Order 41, Rule 27, CPC on the ground they were either pre‑suit or pre‑hearing documents which could and should have been produced in trial court; sought dismissal of the application with costs.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mst. Sahida Bibi v. Sk. Golam Muhammad, AIR 1983 Calcutta 216 Illustration of Section 16 SR Act: a plaintiff cannot obtain specific performance if he has become incapable or violated essential terms or failed to prove readiness/willingness. Cited as supporting the proposition that a plaintiff must aver and prove readiness and willingness and that failure furnishes ground to resist specific performance; court applied the principle to find plaintiff not ready/willing.
Manik Chandra Bhowmik v. Abhoy Charan Gope, AIR 1917 Calcutta 283 Authority referenced on readiness/willingness and conduct inconsistent with contract obligations. Referred to in discussion of readiness/willingness; court relied on the principle in evaluating plaintiff's conduct.
His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar, 1996 (4) SCC 526 (AIR 1996 SC 2095) Explained meaning of readiness and willingness; distinction between capacity (readiness) and conduct (willingness); time‑essence example where urgency made time essence. Court applied the explanatory distinction to examine plaintiff's financial capacity and conduct and found lack of willingness from conduct.
P.R. Deb & Associates v. Sunanda Roy, 1996 (4) SCC 423 (AIR 1996 SC 1504) Authorities on time being essence and readiness/willingness; guidance on inferring time‑essence from circumstances and conduct. Court relied on these principles in deciding time was essence and in evaluating readiness/willingness of the plaintiff.
Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani, 1993 (1) SCC 519 (AIR 1993 SC 1742) Used to explain that time may be made essence of contract and how to determine that from context. Relied upon for the proposition that time is not prima facie essence for land sales but may be so made; applied in deciding that time was made essence here.
K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy, AIR 1963 SC 1526 Principles on who may cross‑examine and scope of cross‑examination in relation to defences available. Cited in argument about whether post‑suit purchaser could cross‑examine plaintiff's witnesses on readiness/willingness; court referenced it when discussing the position under earlier law.
K.S. Vidyanandam v. Vairavan, 1997 (3) SCC 1 (AIR 1997 SC 1751) Discussed the discretionary nature of relief under Section 20 SR Act and importance of time limits in urban property context. Relied upon to support the proposition that courts should not ignore time limits and may exercise discretion under Section 20 to deny specific performance; applied to exercise discretion against plaintiff.
A.E.G. Carapiet v. A.Y. Derderian, AIR 1961 Calcutta 359 Referenced on readiness/willingness and presumptions when a party does not cross‑examine. Considered by the court in rejecting opponent's contention that defendant No. 2 is precluded by non‑participation; court held inapplicable because law then barred defendant No. 2 from contesting those points.
L.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643 Cited in relation to retrospective operation of changes in law and principles about vested rights. Referenced in argumentation: court held the principle relied on by counsel (no retrospective application) did not apply because the decree had not reached finality and appeal is continuation of proceedings.
Jugraj Singh v. Labh Singh, 1995 (2) SCC 31 (AIR 1995 SC 945) Held (two‑Judge Bench) that a plea regarding plaintiff's lack of readiness/willingness was personal to the vendor and not available to subsequent purchasers. Court noted this was the law prevailing until the decree was passed (31 Aug 1999) and explained why defendant No. 2 had been precluded at trial under Jugraj Singh; subsequently overruled by Ram Awadh (below).
Ram Awadh (Dead) by LRs v. Achhaibar Dubey, 2000 (2) SCC 428 (AIR 2000 SC 860) Three‑Judge Bench overruled Jugraj Singh and held any defendant (including post‑suit purchasers) can contest plaintiff's failure to prove readiness/willingness under Section 16 SR Act; Court must ensure plaintiff met statutory requirement. Crucial to admitting defendant No. 2's challenge in appeal; court held changed law applied at the time of appellate decision and thus defendant No. 2 could contest readiness/willingness and could seek to produce additional evidence.
Arjun Singh v. Kartar Singh, AIR 1951 SC 193 Authority referenced for the appellate court's power to receive additional evidence when necessary for adjudication. Used to support the exercise of power to admit additional documents under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC where those documents are relevant to exercise of discretion under Section 20 SR Act.
Syed Abdul v. Remi Reddi, AIR 1979 SC 553 Cited for the proposition that appellate courts possess power to receive additional evidence under specified conditions. Referred to in justifying admission of additional evidence relevant to the discretion under Section 20 SR Act.
Smt. Ashalata Mitter v. Amiya Kumar Dey, AIR 1958 Calcutta 71 Authority that reception of documents as additional evidence at appellate stage is not intended generally and may pose need for formal proof and opportunity for rebuttal. Court examined and distinguished Ashalata, finding most documents were court records or supported by court records and genuineness was not challenged; therefore Ashalata's restriction was not held applicable.
Sobharam Tikaram v. Rajkumar Munnalal, AIR 1959 MP 118 Test for appellate reception of additional evidence: whether court can pronounce judgment without it; discretion is judicial and may require fresh trial unless documents are conclusive and free from suspicion. Cited and applied in favor of allowing additional evidence because the documents were relevant and did not raise unacceptable issues of proof or rebuttal.
Shiv Chander Kapoor v. Amar Bose, AIR 1990 SC 325 Cited example where additional evidence was rejected because no attempt was made earlier to produce it in earlier courts. Court distinguished the case on facts, noting defendant No. 2 had been unable to produce evidence earlier due to the law then prevailing (Jugraj Singh), so Shiv Chander Kapoor was inapplicable.
Ganesh Shet v. Dr. C.S.G.K. Setty, 1998 (1) WBLR 303 (AIR 1998 SC 2216) Authority cited in support of exercising discretion under Section 20 SR Act (Paras 12 and 13). Relied upon as part of the body of authority explaining discretion under Section 20; court used such authorities to guide its exercise of discretion here.
Ramesh Chandra Chandiok v. Chuni Lal Sabharwal, AIR 1971 SC 1238 Used to show that attempting to redeem and being prevented by LIC could indicate readiness and willingness. Respondent relied on it; court found the authorities did not help because the agreement here provided for purchase "as is" and plaintiff insisted on a title free from encumbrances, contrary to the contract construction.
Sellappa Chetty v. Marappa Gounder, AIR 1965 Mad 37 Defines essential terms of contract — terms vital to the bargain whose violation would alter mutual relations such that specific performance becomes inequitable. Used to identify and characterize essential terms of the sale agreement (time, redemption, draft conveyance) for application of Section 16 SR Act.
Jamshed Khodaram Irani v. Burjorji Dhunjibhai, (1916) ILR 40 Bom 289 Privy Council observations on Section 55 Contract Act and reasonableness of time for performance; equity may disregard literal time limits except where intention to make them fundamental is plain. Quoted to explain the principle that reasonableness of time is to be judged by facts and that explicit language is needed to make time operative as essence; applied in analysis of time stipulation in agreement.
Govind Prasad Chaturvedi v. Hari Dutt Shastri, 1977 (2) SCC 539 (AIR 1977 SC 1005) Guidance on how to determine whether time was made essence of the contract — express terms, nature of property, surrounding circumstances. Applied in the court's multi‑factor inquiry to conclude time was made essence in this case.
Parakunnan Veetill Joseph's Son Mathew v. Nedumbara Kuruvila's Son, 1987 Supp SCC 340 (AIR 1987 SC 2328) Principle that before granting specific performance the court should meticulously consider all facts and ensure relief is not used as instrument of oppression. Invoked to emphasize the need for careful equitable balancing under Section 20 when deciding whether to grant specific performance.
Vidhyadhar v. Mankikrao, AIR 1999 SC 1441 Doctrine that non‑appearance in witness box and failure to be cross‑examined may give rise to presumption that the party's case is not correct. Cited by respondent to argue defendant No. 2's non‑participation precluded now raising issues; court held it did not help because earlier law (Jugraj Singh) prevented defendant No. 2 from contesting those points at trial.
Vijai Nath v. Damodar Das, AIR 1971 All 109; Damodar Mukherjee v. Bonwarilal Agarwalla, AIR 1960 Calcutta 469; Dayawati v. Inderjit, AIR 1966 SC 1423 Principle that appeal is a continuation of original proceedings and is in nature of re‑hearing; rights available in suit are available in appeal. Relied upon to hold that a change in law between trial and appellate hearing means the appellate court must decide the case according to law prevailing when decision is rendered; defendant No. 2 could therefore contest readiness/willingness in appeal after Ram Awadh.
Lakshmi Narayan Guin v. Niranjan Modak, AIR 1985 SC 111; Ram Sarup v. Munshi, AIR 1963 SC 553; Mula v. Godhu, AIR 1971 SC 89; Amarjit Kaur v. Pritam Singh, AIR 1974 SC 2068; Kristnama Chariar v. Mangammal (1902) ILR 26 Mad 91 (FB); Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri, AIR 1941 FC 5 Authorities referenced on the principle that an appellate court may apply the law as it stands at the time of decision, and on continuity of proceedings and relevant precedents. Cited in support of the proposition that a change in law before adjudication in appeal affects rights and remedies available to parties — applied in allowing defendant No. 2 to contest under Ram Awadh.
S.V. Sankaralinga Nadar v. P.T.S. Ratnaswami Nadar, AIR 1952 Mad 389 Discussed in context of K.S. Vidyanandam about need to consider rising land prices and reality when exercising discretion on time stipulations. Used as part of the body of reasoning that courts cannot be oblivious to market realities when considering time limits and Section 20 discretion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by identifying the relevant facts, construing the agreement, and applying the statutory provisions and precedents to the issues framed in the appeals. The analysis unfolded in the following principal steps:

  1. Admission of Additional Evidence (Order 41, Rule 27 CPC): The court examined the application by defendant No. 2 to adduce documentary evidence in appeal. Many documents were court records or related certified copies, some pre‑suit or pre‑hearing and some post‑decree. The court accepted that defendant No. 2 had most documents in its custody but had not produced them earlier because, at trial, Jugraj Singh precluded a post‑suit purchaser from contesting readiness/willingness. Given that the law subsequently changed (Ram Awadh), and given that many documents were court records and their genuineness had not been challenged, the court held the documents relevant to the exercise of discretion under Section 20 SR Act and permissible to be admitted under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC (clause (aa) or clause (b) of Rule 27(1)). The court considered and distinguished authorities that restrict additional evidence at appellate stage (Ashalata Mitter, Shiv Chander Kapoor) and allowed the application.
  2. Change of Law and Rights in Appeal: The court explained the settled proposition that an appeal is a continuation of original proceedings and that rights available in a suit are available on appeal. Because Ram Awadh (Three‑Judge Bench) overruled Jugraj Singh and held that any defendant may contest failure of plaintiff to prove readiness/willingness under Section 16, the court held that defendant No. 2 — although precluded at trial by the earlier decision — could contest readiness/willingness in the appeal. The court rejected the argument that the change had no retrospective effect because the decree had not attained finality.
  3. Construction of Agreement and Identification of Essential Terms: The court closely analyzed the agreement and correspondence. It identified essential terms for performance by the plaintiff: (a) purchase of the 1/7th share subject to specified encumbrances (mortgage, suit, decree and appeal) or, if possible, redemption limited to Rs. 70,000; (b) completion of transfer within stipulated time (three months, with six months maximum and forfeiture clause); and (c) furnishing draft conveyance for Income‑tax clearance. The court treated the redemption obligation and the "as is" clause together with the time stipulation as essential terms, reading clauses and correspondence as supporting that construction.
  4. Application of Section 16 SR Act — Readiness and Willingness: Applying the statutory requirements and authorities, the court examined whether plaintiff had performed or had been always ready and willing to perform essential terms. The court noted plaintiff's correspondence wherein he insisted on title free from encumbrances despite agreement indicating sale 'as is' subject to certain encumbrances and his refusal to hand over draft conveyance. Although plaintiff had attempted to approach LIC for part redemption, LIC declined part redemption. The court concluded that plaintiff had not been ready and willing throughout to perform the essential terms and had insisted on a variance from the contract.
  5. Whether Time Was Essence of the Contract (Section 55 Contract Act, relevant precedents): The court acknowledged the baseline rule that time is not ordinarily the essence for sale of immovable property but that parties can make it so, and courts must infer that from express terms, nature of property, conduct and surrounding circumstances. Noting express contractual stipulations (3 months; 6 months for cancellation and forfeiture) and the vendor's urgent motive (mounting mortgage interest, risk of confirmation of auction sale), the court concluded time was made essence. The court explained that if a plaintiff is not ready and willing, time‑essence considerations become irrelevant in his favor — but here both lack of readiness and time‑essence were present.
  6. Discretion under Section 20 SR Act and Equity Considerations: The court observed that Section 20 confers discretion to refuse specific performance where granting relief would give plaintiff unfair advantage or cause hardship to defendant. Considering admitted additional evidence showing defendant No. 2 had paid off mortgage dues, deposited compensation to auction purchaser, and obtained freedom from mortgage/suit for 5/7th share, the court found it would be inequitable to give the plaintiff the benefit of specific performance for only 1/7th share and thereby enable the plaintiff to appropriate advantages produced by defendant No. 2's efforts. The court held that discretion under Section 20 ought to be exercised against granting specific performance.
  7. Lis Pendence and Transferee Protection: The court held that defendant No. 2's purchase (19 June 1995) was a post‑suit transfer (suit filed 28 April 1995) and thus hit by lis pendens (Section 52 Transfer of Property Act). The post‑suit transferee could not claim protection under Section 19(b) SR Act (which would have been available to a pre‑suit transferee).
  8. Final Synthesis: On the combined application of Section 16 (lack of readiness), Section 55 (time essence), and Section 20 (equitable discretion), along with the admitted additional evidence and construction of contract terms, the court determined that plaintiff was not entitled to specific performance and that granting it would be inequitable.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The court's primary rulings are summarized as follows:

  • Both appeals are allowed.
  • The decree dated 31 August 1999 for specific performance in Title Suit No. 33 of 1995 is set aside.
  • The Title Suit No. 33 of 1995 is decreed for damages against defendant No. 1 (directions to refund earnest money and pay damages) and is dismissed as against defendant No. 2.

Direct consequences and orders made:

  • Defendant No. 1 is directed to refund the earnest money of Rs. 25,000 and to pay damages assessed at Rs. 10,000 (aggregate Rs. 35,000) to the plaintiff by depositing the amount in the Trial Court or by A/c payee demand draft or banker's cheque within two months from the date of the order; in default the amount will carry interest at 9% per annum simple until payment or deposit.
  • Title Suit No. 33 of 1995 is dismissed against defendant No. 2.
  • There is no order as to costs.
  • An urgent xerox certified copy of the order is to be supplied subject to compliance of formalities.

Broader implications:

This judgment applies the changed law (Ram Awadh) in the appellate context to permit a post‑suit purchaser to raise and prove the plaintiff's failure to show readiness and willingness where the law had earlier precluded such defence at trial. The court admitted additional documentary evidence in appeal under Order 41, Rule 27, CPC on grounds indicated in the opinion. The decision applies equitable discretion under Section 20 SR Act to refuse specific performance where granting relief would give the plaintiff an unfair advantage and be inequitable to defendants who removed encumbrances post‑suit.

Note on precedent setting:

The opinion applies and interprets existing authorities and statutes in the circumstances of this case. The direct practical effect is as set out above between the parties. The text of the opinion does not state that it is establishing a novel precedent beyond its application of existing Supreme Court and other authorities.

Concluding Observations (as reflected in the opinion)

- The court permitted additional documentary evidence in appeal because many documents were court records or otherwise supported by court records, their genuineness was not challenged, and because admission was necessary for proper exercise of discretion under Section 20 SR Act.

- The change in the law (Ram Awadh overruling Jugraj Singh) meant the appellate court must decide the appeal according to law prevailing at the time of decision; a party earlier precluded by the law at trial can avail new rights in appeal.

- On construction of the agreement and factual matrix the court found (i) essential terms included the plaintiff's obligation to purchase subject to specified encumbrances or limited redemption liability, furnishing draft conveyance, and completion within stipulated time; (ii) the plaintiff was not always ready and willing; (iii) time was made essence of the contract; and (iv) equitable considerations under Section 20 required refusal of specific performance.

Appeals allowed. (Order as set out above.)

    Ceean International Private Limited v. Ashok Surana And Another

    D.K Seth, J.:— These appeals are directed against the judgment and decree dated 31st August 1999 passed by the Learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, 8th Court, Alipore in a suit for specific performance of contract for sale being in Title Suit No. 33 of 1995. Against the said decree, defendant No. 1, vendor, has filed F.A No. 14 of 2000, while the defendant No. 2, subsequent purchaser, has preferred F.A No. 13 of 2000. Both these appeals, by consent of the parties, have been heard together. We propose to dispose of both the appeals involving common question of fact and law, by a common judgment.

    1.2 The plaintiff had succeeded in obtaining the decree of specific performance of the contract for sale of 1/7th share of the defendant No. 1 in the suit property. The said 1/7th share, however, was purchased by Ceean International Private Limited, appellant, in F.A No. 13 of 2000 during the pendency of the suit.

    Submission on behalf of the appellant in F.A 13 of 2000:

    2. Mr. Sudhir Dasgupta appearing with Mr. Bagchi and Mr. Sanjoy Jain, relying upon the various facts and materials on record contended that it was the liability of the plaintiff to redeem the share of the defendant No. 1 from the mortgage with LIC and also to purchase the property subject to the encumbrances referred to in the agreement. From the records, it was clear that the plaintiff was not ready and willing throughout to perform the essential part of the contract, which was to be performed by him.

    2.1 Referring to the amount due on account of the mortgage, he had pointed out that in order to avoid accrual of further interest, the defendant No. 1 intended to sell the property at the earliest. In that view of the matter, time was made essence of the contract, which has not been adhered to by the plaintiff.

    2.2 According to him, in order to obtain a decree for specific performance in view of Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act (SR (Act), the readiness and willingness throughout is to be proved. If there is any lapse, or intervening period, no specific performance can be granted. He had relied upon the Decision in Mst. Sahida Bibi… v. Sk. Golam Muhammad…., AIR 1983 Calcutta 216, to support his contention and also on Manik Chandra Bhowmik v. Abhoy Charan Gope, AIR 1917 Calcutta 283; His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar., 1996 (4) SCC 526 : (AIR 1996 SC 2095) and P.R Deb and Associates v. Sunanda Roy, 1996 (4) SCC 423 : (AIR 1996 SC 1504), in order to explain the meaning of readiness and willingness.

    2.3 He contended further that time was essence of contract is to be gathered from the surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the parties. At the same time, the readiness and willingness is also to be ascertained from the surrounding circumstances as well as conduct of the parties. In support of his contention with regard to time as essence of contract, Mr. Dasgupta relied on Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani, 1993 (1) SCC 519 : AIR 1993 SC 1742.

    2.4 He further contended that the defendant No. 1, as a subsequent purchaser, was not entitled to contest the suit with regard to the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff in view of the law governing the field when the suit was decreed. Therefore, the defendant No. 2 could not adduce any evidence nor could examine any witness. Neither it could have cross-examined the witnesses of the plaintiff. According to him, the cross-examination relates to the defence of the defendants. As such, if the defence with regard to the absence of readiness and willingness and the plaintiff, is unavailable to the defendant No. 2, it could not have cross-examined the plaintiff's witnesses. Inasmuch as, such cross-examination would be in aid of its such unavailable defence. In support Mr. Dasgupta had relied on K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy, AIR 1963 SC 1526 (Para 19).

    2.5 Relying on Section 20 of the SR Act, Mr. Dasgupta contended that the decree for specific performance is a discretionary power of the Court. According to him, the facts and circumstances of this case are such that such discretion should have been exercised by the Court instead of granting a decree for specific performance. In support he had relied on K.S Vidyanandam v. Vairavan, 1997 (3) SCC 1 : AIR 1997 SC 1751.

    Submission on behalf of the appellant in F.A 14 of 2000:

    3. Mr. S.P Roychowdhury, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant No. 1, being the appellant in F.A No. 14 of 2000 had supported Mr. Dasgupta. He had led us through various clauses of the agreement and had pointed out to the absence of readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff. He had reiterated the contention of Mr. Dasgupta to the extent that the plaintiff had been insisting upon performance at variance of the contract. He had also relied on the same decisions on which Mr. Dasgupta had relied.

    3.1 In his deposition, the plaintiff himself had admitted that time was essence of the contract. But the plaintiff did not take any step despite being asked for by the defendant No. 1 through his letter. Unless a draft conveyance is handed over, the clearance under Section 23-A of the Income-tax Act could not be obtained and that the plaintiff had refused to deliver the draft conveyance. He pointed out that in terms of Section 55 of the Contract Act, if a particular time is stipulated for performance of a particular term of a contract and if such part of the contract is not performed within such time, the contract becomes voidable at the option of the promisee. In this case, according to him, the defendant is the promisee, while the plaintiff was a promisor, who promised to purchase the property on the terms and conditions stipulated in the agreement.

    3.2 Relying on Section 20 of the SR Act, he pointed out that the decree for the specific performance is discretionary. In the present case, the defendant No. 2 had purchased 5/7th share of the property after having got the mortgage released. As such the Court could not grant a decree for specific performance. Mr. Roychowdhury had relied upon the decision in K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy, AIR 1963 SC 1526 (Paragraphs 13 and 16) and Ganesh Shet v. Dr. C.S.G.K Setty. 1998 (1) WBLR 303 : (AIR 1998 SC 2216) (SC) (Paras 12 and 13) in support of his contention in addition to, the decisions cited by Mr. Dasgupta. Therefore, the decree appealed against should be reversed and the suit for specific performance should be dismissed.

    Submission on behalf of the Respondent:

    4. Mr. Bachawat, learned counsel for the defendant/respondent in both the appeals, had pointed out that the plaintiff had already performed the essential part of the contract and was always ready and willing. The plaintiff had approached the LIC, which had declined part redemption. Under the agreement, only 1/7th share of the defendant was required to be redeemed. His liability was confined to a sum of Rs. 70,000/- towards redemption of the mortgage. The agreement clearly stipulated that the plaintiff will purchase the propriety (sic) free from all encumbrances. It was the responsibility of the defendant No. 1 to get the property redeemed from mortgage. Therefore, until the mortgage is redeemed, even though time is made essence of the contract, but the time could neither run nor could be exhausted until the defendant No. 1 could get the property redeemed from mortgage. The plaintiff had never insisted upon performance at variance of the contract. He relied on A.E.G Carapiet… v. A.Y Derderian…., AIR 1961 Calcutta 359 (para 10) and L.C Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643 (paras 46 and 49). He has also relied on Section 16 of the SR Act.

    4.1 Mr. Bachawat contended that in respect of specific performance of a contract for sale of immovable property, time cannot be the essence of the contract. In the present case, from the surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the parties, it appears that the time was never made essence of the contract. Inasmuch as, at one place three months was stipulated and in another place six months was stipulated. In any event, the essence of time is dependent on the redemption of the mortgage. If it takes a longer time, the principle of essence of time cannot be adhered to and implemented.

    4.2 He had distinguished all the decisions cited by Mr. Dasgupta and Mr. Roychowdhury respectively. He pointed out that the defendant No. 2 is not entitled to agitate this point of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff since it had never contested the suit on those grounds. It had also not cross-examined the witnesses of the plaintiff. Therefore, it is precluded from assailing the same on those grounds. He further points out that when the suit was decided, the decision in Jugraj Singh v. Labh Singh, 1995 (2) SCC 31 : (AIR 1995 SC 945) was governing the field. This decision precluded a purchaser from challenging the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff. Therefore, even in appeal, this question is to be decided on the basis of the law that prevailed at that point of time. The action undertaken at that point of time becomes final. It cannot be assailed or resisted in view of any subsequent change in judicial pronouncement. In support, he relied on L.C Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643 (Paragraphs 46 and 49).

    4.3 He contended further that the facts and circumstances of the case are as such that there is no scope for exercising discretion by the Court, since the defendant No. 1 himself had failed and neglected to perform his part of the contract and had sold the property during the pendency of the suit. Therefore, the defendant No. 1 cannot claim to invoke the discretionary power of the Court, particularly, when he has parted with possession and sold the property to some one else. Similarly, the defendant No. 2, a post-suit purchaser, is hit by the doctrine of lis pendence.

    Application for additional evidence by defendant No. 2:

    5. Mr. Dasgupta had filed an application under Order 41, Rule 27, CPC for adducing additional evidence. He had contended that though these documents, which are mostly orders of Courts or such documents, which need not be proved, were in his possession, but he could not adduce the same before the Trial Court because of the decision in Jugraj Singh (supra), by reason whereof the defendant No. 2 was precluded from contesting the absence of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff. But, when the position has changed by reason of the decision in Ram Awadh (Dead) by LRs v. Achhaibar Dubey, 2000 (2) SCC 428 : (AIR 2000 SC 860) the defendant No. 2 was advised to file these documents. According to him, all these documents are relevant for the purpose of deciding the issues involved in the appeal. According to him, these documents are necessary even on the ground of other substantial reasons and that the Court needs those documents to pronounce a judgment in the appeal having regard to the subsequent events.

    Objection of the Respondent:

    6. Mr. Bachawat, however, contended that some of these documents were pre-suit documents and some were pre-hearing documents. These documents could have been produced or attempted to be produced in the trial Court. The plaintiff having not attempted in the trial Court, it cannot avail of the benefit of Order 41, Rule 27, CPC. According to him, the grounds spell out in the application for additional evidence is wholly misplaced and misconceived. He further contends that none of those documents are relevant for the purpose of this appeal. None of these documents could have any bearing either with regard to the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff or with regard to the question that time was essence of the contract or otherwise. Therefore, the application for additional evidence should be dismissed with costs.

    Facts:

    7. Before we address ourselves on the respective questions raised by the learned counsel for the respective parties, we may refer to the relevant facts in order to appreciate the question involved herein. From the materials on record including those sought to be adduced as additional evidence, the facts may be summarized as hereafter.

    7.1 The property originally belonged to one Satya Prasanna Basu, father of the defendant No. 1. The said Satya Prasanna Basu mortgaged the property with Hindustan Insurance Company on 31st May 1948. On 29th of October 1960. Satya Prasanna died intestate leaving behind several heirs including defendant No. 1, who, admittedly, inherited 1/7th share in the property. In 1963, LIC filed a mortgage suit being the Title Suit No. 53 of 1963 before the Subordinate Judge, 3rd Court, Alipore for realization for the mortgage dues then outstanding amounting to Rs. 60,000/- approximately. On 19th of June 1967, a consent decree for Rs. 59,715.81 was passed in a preliminary form with interest @ 7% per annum with quarterly rests against the defendants in the said suit.

    7.2 Subsequently, final mortgage decree was passed. The property was put to sale. One Rameswar Singh purchased the property in auction. On 6th May 1987, an application for setting aside the mortgage decree was filed on the ground that the defendant No. 4 in the said mortgage suit was of unsound mind. On the other hand, LIC prayed for confirmation of sale. On 6th May 1987, the prayer for setting aside the decree was rejected by the Executing Court by an order of the same date-passed in Title Execution Case No. 9 of 1972. The application for confirmation of sale was also rejected on the same date. LIC filed F.M.A 17 of 1988 against the said order refusing confirmation of sale.

    7.3 On 28th March 1994, the defendant No. 1 entered into an agreement for sale with the plaintiff in respect of his 1/7th share in the suit property. On being approached the LIC on 19th April 1994 declined part redemption and informed that a sum of Rs. 5,12,040.72 was due on account of the mortgage decree. On 6th May 1994, the defendant No. 1 by its letter (Exhibit B) asked the plaintiff to send the draft conveyance for obtaining Income-tax Clearance Certificate. In reply, the plaintiff through his letter dated 31st May 1994 (Exhibit 3) asked the defendant No. 1 to get the property free from encumbrance by redeeming the mortgage from LIC. The defendant No. 1 in his reply dated 11th June 1994 (Exhibit ‘B-1’) informed the plaintiff that the plaintiff was satisfied about the title of the defendant No. 1 and it was the plaintiff, who was to pay to LIC a sum of Rs. 70,000/-. On 20th of June 1994, the plaintiff through its letter (Exhibit-4) asked the defendant No. 1 to make out a good and marketable title.

    7.4 On 28th of February 1995, in the said appeal being F.M.A No. 17 of 1988 dated 6th May 1987 rejecting the LIC's application for the confirmation of the sale filed by LIC, this Court had directed the defendant No. 1 to liquidate the entire dues of LIC including interest within one month. On 7th March 1995, a banker's cheque for Rs. 5,40,366.84 in the name of LIC was issued at the instance of the defendant No. 2. This was forwarded to LIC by the defendant No. 1 in terms of the order of the Court on 10th of March 1995. The LIC accepted the cheque against the mortgage decree in terms of the order of this Court on 14th of March 1995 on which date LIC granted receipt to the defendant No. 1.

    7.5 On this 14th of March 1995, the plaintiff filed Title Suit No. 90 of 1995 before the Learned Munsiff, 3rd Court, Alipore against the defendant No. 1 for a declaration and permanent injunction restraining him from transferring the property. This suit, however, was dismissed for default in 1997. On 28th April 1995, the present suit was filed. On 19th of June 1995, the defendant No. 1 sold his right, title and interest in the property to the defendant No. 2, appellant. The defendant No. 2 had purchased 3/7th share by negotiation and 2/7th share by virtue of decree passed in Title Suit No. 146 of 1995 and Title Suit No. 147 of 1995.

    7.6 Subsequently, on 12th of September 1997, this Court modified the order dated 6th May 1987 of the trial Court to the extent that if a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- is paid to the auction purchaser, the matter would stand remitted to the Executing Court and in default, the auction sale would stand confirmed. The auction purchaser was given liberty to withdraw the said amount. On 26th September 1997, the said sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- was deposited in Title Execution Case No. 9 of 1972. Ultimately, on 31st of August 1999, the suit for specific performance filed by the plaintiff was decreed. Against this decree, the defendant No. 1 had preferred F.A No. 14 of 2000, while the defendant No. 2 had preferred F.A No. 13 of 2000.

    Whether the application u/O. 41. R. 27 CPC should be allowed:

    8. The defendant No. 2, appellant, has filed an application under Order 41, Rule 27, CPC. The documents sought to be adduced as additional evidence have been made part of the application. From the said application, it appears that most of the documents related to records of the Court and certain registered documents, receipts and challans in connection with the various suits and execution cases relating to the property. Some of those documents are pre-suit, some are pre-hearing and a few are post decree. Admittedly, majority of these documents were in custody and power of the defendant No. 2. But it had not attempted to adduce the same in evidence.

    8.1 But the facts remain that until the decree was passed, the law was governed by the decision in Jugraj Singh (supra), by reason whereof the defendant No. 2 could not contest the suit on the question of absence of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff. Be that as it may, from a perusal of these documents, it appears that these documents are relevant for the purpose of proving either the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff or with regard to the question that time was essence of the contract. But to our mind, it appears that these documents might have important bearing with regard to the exercise of discretion by the Court, as contemplated under Section 20 SR Act.

    8.2 Order 41, Rule 27, CPC permits additional evidence in appeal on the grounds available thereunder. Under Order 41, Rule 27, CPC, additional evidence is admissible if a party despite exercise of due diligence is unable to produce such evidence at the time of passing the decree or where the Appellate Court requires the document to be produced in order to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. In the present case as discussed above, the defendant No. 2 could not produce evidence in view of the judgment in Jugraj Singh (supra). Now that the law has since changed, the case of the defendant No. 2 may come within the purview of clause (aa) of Rule 27, sub-rule (1) of Order 41, CPC.

    8.3 At the same time, Section 20 SR Act makes the Court's power to grant specific performance discretionary guided by certain judicial principles as provided in sub-section (2) thereof. In order to exercise such discretion, if it appears to the Court that production of certain documents are required for the purpose of pronouncing judgment, the Appellate Court may resort to clause (b) of Order 41, Rule 27(1) CPC. Under Section 20(2) SR Act, Court has to consider whether such grant would allow an unfair advantage to the plaintiff over the defendant or whether such grant could involve some hardship on the defendant, which the defendant did not foresee whereas it's non-performance would not involve such hardship on the plaintiff or where there are circumstances to make specific performance inequitable.

    8.4 In such a case, if such application is made and such documents are produced and leave is sought for, then it is a bounden duty of the Court to examine the said documents and arrive at a conclusion as to whether the Court would require such documents for pronouncing judgment having regard to the discretion cast upon it by statute. Having examined the documents as discussed above, we are of the view that these documents would have some bearing on the exercise of the discretion conferred upon the Court under Section 20 SR Act. That the Court do possesses such power is by now a well-settled proposition. We may refer to few such decisions, one of which is Arjun Singh v. Kartar Singh, AIR 1951 SC 193 : 1951 SCR 258 and Syed Abdul v. Remi Reddi, AIR 1979 SC 553. Having regard to the evidence sought to be adduced, it appears that those have a direct and important bearing on the main issue in the case as to whether the discretion under Section 20 SR Act is to be exercised or not.

    8.5 In the present case, these documents may be accepted either under clause (aa) of Section 20(1) SR Act or under clause (b) the substantial cause clause or necessity of the Court clause. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and, particularly, the facts borne out on record and these documents, it appears that these documents would be relevant and necessary and have important bearing on the issues for the purpose of adjudicating the present appeal.

    8.6 In order to oppose admission of the additional evidence. Mr. Bachawat had relied on Smt. Ashalata Mitter v. Amiya Kumar Dey. AIR 1958 Calcutta 71. In the said case, it was held that it is not the intention of the legislature to allow admission of document as additional evidence at the appellate stage. The reception of such documents at that stage would have led to a formal proof of the documents themselves and an opportunity would have to be given to the appellant to adduce evidence in rebuttal but that was neither possible nor desirable.

    8.7 But Mr. Bachawat has not been able to point out from any of the documents for which a formal proof would be necessary or for which there could be no possibility of rebuttal. Inasmuch as, majority of these documents are related to the certified copies of the orders passed by different Courts and challans issued by Courts. Copy of the application for additional evidence was served upon the Advocate-on-Record for the respondent long ago. No opposition to the same, however, has since been filed. Even at the time of hearing, genuineness or veracity of any of these documents, copies whereof have been annexed, has since been assailed by Mr. Bachawat. The other documents, which are not Court records, do find support from the Court records. Inasmuch las, the Court permitted deposit of the dues of LIC within a particular date and it was so deposited through Banker's cheque. Upon receipt thereof, LIC had issued its receipt. A further order was obtained for deposit of a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- as interest or compensation payable to the auction purchaser. The auction purchaser was allowed to withdraw, the above amount as well as the amount deposited by him. Pursuant to such order, the sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- was deposited within the time stipulated. Thus, having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, the ratio decided in Ashalata (supra) cannot be attracted.

    8.8 Mr. Bachawat had also relied on Sobharam Tikaram v. Rajkumar Munnalal, AIR 1959 MP 118. In the said case, it was held that the reception of additional evidence at appellate stage by the Court depends on the test as to whether the Appellate Court is able to pronounce judgment on the material before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced. Such discretion is not arbitrary but is a judicial one circumscribed by the limitation specified in the rule and that it can be accepted when, on examining the evidence as it stands, some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent, not discovery of fresh evidence. Any other substantial cause confers a wide discretion in the Appellate Court. It might require a fresh trial unless the documents sought to be produced are conclusive and free from suspicion. This decision rather helps the appellant not the respondent having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case.

    8.9 He also relied on Shiv Chander Kapoor v. Amar Bose, AIR 1990 SC 325. But the ratio decided therein has no manner of application in the present case. Inasmuch as, additional evidence was rejected on the ground that no attempt was made to produce such evidence in the High Court nor even before the Supreme Court till conclusion of hearing before the Supreme Court. Such is not the situation in the present case.

    8.10 In these circumstances, the application for additional evidence is hereby allowed and the said documents' genuineness and veracity whereof has not been questioned by Mr. Bachawat, copies whereof are already furnished to him, are admitted into evidence in FA No. 13 of 2000.

    Can defendant No. 2 contest the case on the question of readiness and willingness?

    9. Admittedly, the defendant No. 2 did not adduce any evidence on the question of readiness and willingness or otherwise in the suit, though it had entered appearance and filed written statement. Neither it had cross-examined the plaintiffs witnesses on any of those questions. However, the learned counsel for the defendant No. 2 had argued the case on the basis of the materials available. The suit was decreed on contest as against the defendant No. 2 as well. In this background, the question relating to the right of the defendant No. 2 to contest the case on any of those questions is to be examined. In Jugraj Singh (supra), by two Judges Bench, it was held that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract is specially available to the vend or/defendant. It is personal to him. The subsequent purchasers have got only the right to defend their purchase on the premise that they have no prior knowledge of the agreement for sale with the plaintiff. They are bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration. Though, they are necessary parties to the suit, since any decree obtained by the plaintiff would be binding on the subsequent purchasers, the plea that the plaintiff must always be ready and willing to perform his part of the contract is available only to the vendor or his legal representatives, but not to the subsequent purchasers. Admittedly, this was the law that governed the field till the decree in the instant suit was passed, namely, on 31st August 1999. Therefore, the defendant No. 2 was not entitled to contest the suit on any of these questions. But defendant No. 2 was a necessary party to the suit as subsequent purchaser and was so made a party to the suit and the decree is binding on it. It has preferred the appeal, which is now being heard.

    9.1 Subsequent to the decree but before this appeal is taken up for hearing the law has since changed. The Apex Court in a three Judges Bench in Ram Awadh (Dead) by LRs v. Achhaibar Dubey, 2000 (2) SCC 428 : (AIR 2000 SC 860) the decision in Jugraj Singh (supra) was held to be erroneous and was overruled. In the said decision, it was held that the obligation imposed by Section 16 SR Act is upon the Court not to grant specific performance to a plaintiff, who has not met the requirements of clause (a), (b) and (c) thereof. A Court, therefore, must not grant relief to a plaintiff, who has failed to aver and to prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement, the specific performance whereof he seeks. There is, therefore, no question of the plea being available to one defendant and not to another. It is open to any defendant to contend and establish that the mandatory requirement of Section 16(c) has not been complied with. It is for the Court to determine whether it has or has not been complied with. Depending upon its conclusion, the Court may decree or decline to decree the suit.

    9.2 An appeal is a continuation of a proceeding. It is a settled proposition of law Vijai Nath v. Damodar Das, AIR 1971 All 109. It is a continuation of the proceeding of the original Court and is in the nature of re-hearing Damodar Mukherjee v. Bonwarilal Agarwalla, AIR 1960 Calcutta 469; Dayawati v. Inderjit, AIR 1966 SC 1423. Therefore, at the time of hearing of the appeal, all rights available to a party in the suit would be equally available in the appeal. The fact that on account of a particular proposition of law then governing the field, a right, which might not have been available during the course of the suit, can become available, if the law changes before the appeal is decided. A proceeding is to be decided on the basis of law that governs the field on the date when the decision is arrived at. Therefore, even if such right was not available to a party when the suit was decreed, such party cannot be precluded from availing of such right, which is now available by reason of changed law, in the appeal. Such a question arose in Chowdhury Rohini Kumar Mullick v. State of West Bengal (F.M.A No. 334 of 1990) (Reported in 2002 (4) ICC 18(2)) disposed of on 12th of July 2002. In the said decision we had occasion to deal with this question relying on the decision in Lakshmi Narayan Guin v. Niranjan Modak, AIR 1985 SC 111 (Para 9). The said decision had followed, the decision on this principle in Ram Sarup v. Munshi, AIR 1963 SC 553, followed in Mula v. Godhu, AIR 1971 SC 89 and, Dayawati (supra), while quoting from page 1426 of AIR 1966 SC 1423. In Lakshmi Narayan (supra), the Apex Court had relied upon Amarjit Kaur v. Pritam Singh, AIR 1974 SC 2068, Kristnama Chariar v. Mangammal, (1902) ILR 26 Mad 91 (FB) as well as Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri, AIR 1941 FC 5.

    9.3 Mr. Bachawat, on the other hand, sought to contend that the changed law has no retrospective application. As such the appellant cannot take advantage of the decision in Ram Awadh (supra). He relied on L.C Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643 (Para 49). But that principle has no manner of application in a case where the order has not reached finality. Appeal is a continuation of proceedings, the judgment and decree is subject to appeal and has not reached finality. Therefore, no right appears to have been vested in the plaintiff in order to attract the mischief of affecting vested right.

    9.4 Therefore, the changed law would govern the field. Under the changed law, the defendant No. 2 is equally entitled to resist the decree on all points available to defendant No. 1.

    Can a party in appeal contest an issue not contested in suit?:

    10. It will make no difference in such a case where a party was precluded from contesting the suit on these points/issues on account of being disentitled in law then governing the field. The principle, on which such right is denied to a party in appeal when such party did not contest the suit on particular issue/point, is the principle of estoppel or waiver, as the case may be. Inasmuch as, by not contesting the case on those points, it is deemed that such party had waived his known rights. Once a party has waived his rights or has failed to avail of such rights or espouse such rights, he is estopped from raising such rights in appeal, unless he is able to show that for sufficient reasons he was prevented from raising such points or availing of such rights. In the present case, it was the law that precluded him and it is the law that enables him now. Therefore, this was a reason sufficient to prevent him from agitating those points in the suit. The waiver is giving up of a known right. Here it was not a question that the defendant No. 2 had given up its known right. Therefore, the principle of waiver cannot be attracted in this case. The principle of estoppel can also not be attracted. Therefore, the defendant No. 2 despite having not contested the suit on these points, in view of the changed law, it is now entitled to contest the case on all points, as has been held in Ram Awadh (supra).

    10.1 Mr. Bachawat had relied on Vidhyadhar v. Mankikrao, AIR 1999 SC 1441. In the said decision, it was held that a party to the suit does not appear into the witness box and does not offer himself to be cross-examined by the other side, a presumption would arise that the case set up by him is not correct. Thus, the defendant No. 2 having not participated in the proceedings cannot now agitate those points since it is to be presumed that he had admitted the case of the plaintiff. But, this decision does not help him at all in view of the law as then prevailed on the basis of the decision in Jugraj Singh (supra).

    10.2 We are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the contention of Mr. Bachawat. Mr. Bachawat had relied upon the decision in A.E.G Carapiet… v. A.Y Derderian…., AIR 1961 Calcutta 359 (Paragraph 10) to contend that when a party has declined to avail himself of the opportunity to put his essential and material case in cross-examination, it must follow that he believed that the testimony given would not be disputed at all. It is wrong to think that this is merely a technical rule of evidence. It is a rule of essential justice. It serves to prevent surprise at trial and miscarriage of justice, because it gives notice to the other side of the actual case that is going to be made when the turn of the party on whose behalf the cross-examination is being made, comes to give and lead evidence by producing witnesses. But this decision does not help us in the present case where the defendant No. 2 could not cross-examine because of the law prevailing at that point of time. Mr. Bachawat had also sought to contend that the defendant No. 2 could have cross-examined the witnesses, but Mr. Dasgupta relied on K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy, AIR 1963 SC 1526, in order to contend that no such cross-examination would be permissible since it would touch his defence which the defendant No. 2 was not permitted to defend in view of the law then prevailing.

    Defendant No. 2 transferee for value without notice: Lis pendence:

    11. The ground that the defendant No. 2 was a bona fide transferee for value without notice cannot be available in the facts and circumstances of this case. This principle would have been applicable to him as provided in Section 19(b) SR Act if the transfer was a pre-suit transfer. Admittedly, the transfer was effected on 19th June 1995. Whereas the present suit was filed on 28th of April 1995. Therefore, this transfer is hit by the principles of lis pendence provided in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The principle of lis pendence is excluded in a suit or proceeding which is collusive and where the right to immovable property is not directly and specifically in question. This case does not come under any of the two exceptions. Therefore, the benefit of Section 19(b) of the SR Act is not available to the defendant No. 2 in this case.

    Section 16 of the SR Act:

    12. Section 16 SR Act provided that a specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person (b) who has become incapable of performing or violates any essential term of the contract that remains to be performed on his part or willfully acts at variance with or in subversion of the relation intended to be established by the contract, or (c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him other than the terms performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant clause (c) has since been explained (i) that it is not essential where the contract involves payment of money, to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in Court except when so directed by the Court; and (ii) the plaintiff must aver performance of readiness and willingness to perform the contract according to its true construction.

    12.1 A plain reading of Section 16, SR Act makes it clear that in order to obtain specific performance of a contract, the plaintiff has to show that he has not violated any essential term of the contract that on his part remains to be performed or that he has not acted wilfully at variance with or in subversion of the relation intended to be established by the contract and that he has averred and proved that he has performed and was always ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract to be performed by him unless prevented or waived by the defendant. The ingredients may be specified thus: (1) the plaintiff has become incapable of performing any part of the contract that remains to be performed by him; or (2) he has violated any essential term of the contract that remains to be performed by him; or (3) he acts in fraud of the contract; or (4) her wilfully acts at variance with the relation intended to be established by the contract; or (5) he wilfully acts in subversion of the relation intended to be established by the contract, or (6) he fails to aver that he has performed the essential terms of the contract to be performed by him; or (7) he was always ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract to be performed by him; or (8) he was prevented by the defendant from performing any part of the contract; or (9) the defendant had waived performance of any part of the contract; and (10) he has to prove the conditions contained in (6) to (8). According to the explanation, such readiness and willingness to perform the contract must be according to the true construction of the contract.

    Was the plaintiff ready and willing?:

    13. In this background, now we are to examine whether the plaintiff was ready and willing and was always ready and willing to perform essential part of the contract according to its true construction to be performed by him. Essential terms are those which are absolutely vital to the bargain, a violation whereof will alter the mutual relationship of the parties in such a manner that it would not longer be equitable to decree the specific performance of the contract on the principle of continuation of the mutual relationship as existed at the time when the contract was made (Sellappa Chetty v. Marappa Gounder, AIR 1965 Mad 37). Whether a particular term in an agreement is essential or not depends upon the construction of the term.

    13.1 In this background, we may now analyse what were the essential terms of the contract having regard to the agreement, which is at page 1 of part II of this Paper Book. Admittedly, the property was mortgaged to LIC. The suit filed by LIC was decreed. The property was put to sale. It was purchased by the auction purchaser. Application for setting aside the sale was rejected. At the same time, the confirmation of sale was also refused. Against this order of refusal of confirmation of sale, an appeal preferred by LIC being F.M.A No. 17 of 1988 was pending. The Title Execution Case No. 9 of 1972 for enforcement of the final decree passed in Title Suit No. 53 of 1963 was also pending. The property was sought to be sold free from all encumbrances but subject to the said proceedings and mortgage of LIC and that such representation was relied upon and admitted as true by the purchaser. He agreed to purchase the 1/7th share of the defendant No. 1 in the suit property free from all encumbrances, attachment, trust, charge and/or lis pendens whatsoever but subject to as aforesaid, vis., the mortgage and the pendency of the suit etc. mentioned in the agreement. Thus, one of the essential terms of the contract, according to the true construction of the agreement, is that the plaintiff has agreed to purchase the property free from all encumbrances other than the encumbrance mentioned in the agreement, viz. the mortgage and the resultant suit and decree and the pendency of the appeal of LIC. Therefore, the plaintiff must show that he was ready to perform this essential part of the contract.

    13.2 The other essential part of the contract was the time limit provided therein. The transfer was to be completed within three months from the date of the agreement. In default of completing the transaction within six months from the date of execution of the agreement would render the agreement invalid, and earnest money forfeited. This was so intended as it can be discovered from the terms of the contract that the defendant No. 1 was eager to get the property sold at the earliest or else there was every likelihood of the auction sale being confirmed. Therefore, the performance within the time, stipulated was also an essential part of the terms of the contract.

    13.3 The other essential term was that the property is to be redeemed from LIC by the plaintiff/purchaser while restricting his liability towards payment for redemption of the property to LIC at Rs. 70,000/-. If we read the agreement as a whole, it will be clear and unambiguous that this redemption was a part to be performed by the purchaser and not by the vendor and that the limitation of the liability of the purchaser at Rs. 70,000/- indicates that in case the property is not redeemed, the liability of the purchaser was restricted to Rs. 70,000/- and not more. This again goes to show that the agreement was intended for being sold together with the encumbrances of the said mortgage, suit and the decree with LIC and not free from it.

    13.4 The next essential part of the contract was to furnish to the defendant No. 1 the draft conveyance in order to obtain clearance from the Income-tax Department under Section 230-A(1) of the Income-tax Act.

    13.5 These essential terms of the contract can be found from clauses (xi), (xii) and (xxi) of the recital of the agreement and clauses (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) and (8) of the terms and conditions of the agreement. A true construction of the said agreement, as we have understood, requires the fulfillment of the essential terms of the contract as discussed above. The sum total of the discussion is that it was the plaintiffs liability to redeem the property from the mortgage with LIC so far as the 1/7th part intended to be purchased by him. In case it cannot be redeemed, he was liable to purchase together with these encumbrances and his liability was limited to Rs. 70,000/- and as well as subject to the appeal. Inasmuch as, even if the LIC had agreed to part redemption and redeemed the 1/7th share intended to be purchased by the plaintiff still then the question of confirmation of sale was pending in appeal and such transfer being hit by the principle of lis pendens, was subject to the result of the appeal and the execution. If the sale was confirmed and the appeal succeeded the part redemption would have made the transfer subject to the sale so confirmed and being hit by lis pendence, the plaintiff could not have acquired any title. Therefore, there was no question of making the property free from all encumbrances until the appeal was decided. The plaintiff had agreed to the terms of the contract having notice and knowledge of the said proceedings involved in the mortgage suit of the LIC.

    13.6 From the materials on record, it appears that the suit was decreed in 1963 for a sum of Rs. 59,715.81. In 1994, the amount stood at Rs. 5,12,040.72 and in March 1995, the amount became Rs. 5,40,366.84. This gives an idea that how the interest was mounting. From the materials on record and the terms of the agreement providing stipulation of time making the same essence of contract, it is clearly apparent that the vendor was eager to sell the property at the earliest within a reasonable time or else the interest would go on mounting and the auction sale was likely to be confirmed. Therefore, these were the factors, which had driven the vendor to enter into the contract in order to get rid of the liability of the mortgage with LIC and also to avoid the confirmation of auction sale, which they had unsuccessfully attempted to set aside.

    13.7 The defendant No. 1 through his letter dated 6th May, 1994, being Exhibit ‘B’, requested the plaintiff to forward the draft conveyance in order to enable him to obtain clearance from the Income-tax Department under Section 230-A(1) of the Income-tax Act. In reply, the plaintiff in his letter dated 31st May, 1994 (Exhibit 3) pointed out that the defendant No. 1 should make out a good and marketable title to his satisfaction in respect of the 1/7th share of the defendant No. 1 free from all encumbrances, lis pendence, trust, charge and/or attachment whatsoever subject to what was stated in the said agreement and that the defendant No. 1 had failed and neglected to make out a good and marketable title in respect of the said property and to get the mortgage of LIC released in respect thereof. Therefore, there was no question of sending the draft deed of conveyance. In the said letter, he had insisted that the defendant No. 1 was to make out a good and marketable title to the satisfaction of the plaintiff in terms of the agreement and that he was not obliged to send the draft conveyance neither the defendant No. 1 was obliged to obtain the Income-tax Clearance. The defendant No. 1 in his reply dated 11th June, 1994 (Exhibit ‘B-1’) again requested the plaintiff to handover the draft conveyance within 7 (seven) days in order to enable him to obtain Income-tax Clearance and that the property was intended to be sold on condition ‘as is where is’ basis and the plaintiff had agreed to pay the vendor's share of the liability to LIC. It appears from condition 8 of the agreement that the 1/7th share was intended to be sold in ‘as it is’ condition and that the time was the essence of the contract. The plaintiff was asked to pay the full amount and complete the transaction. The plaintiff in his reply dated 29th June, 1994 (Exhibit 4) reiterated the statements made in Exhibit 3 and once again request the defendant No. 1 to make out good and marketable title to his satisfaction in terms of the agreement.

    13.8 These correspondences show that, the defendant No. 1 was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, whereas the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract to be performed by him. Inasmuch as, he had agreed to purchase the 1/7th share in ‘as it is’ condition (clause 8 of the agreement, page 14, Part II of the Paper Book). The condition of the property was mentioned in the recital, particularly, clauses (xi), (xii) and (xxi) which specifically made it clear that it was subject to the mortgage and suit and the appeal of LIC therein and that the sale was subject to those encumbrances. The property was treated to be free from all encumbrances except those mentioned in those clauses. These essential terms have since been repeated more than once in various clauses and terms and conditions of the agreement. Virtually, it was repeated in each clause dealing with a particular condition.

    13.9 In condition No. 1, the plaintiff was to redeem the property from the mortgage of LIC, limiting its liability to the extent of Rs. 70,000/-. The plaintiff was also given liberty to negotiate with the tenants and obtain possession of the property even before the transaction is complete. There is nothing to show that the plaintiff had ever attempted to negotiate with the tenants or obtained possession as provided in condition No. 7. The time was made essence of contract and that the 3 (three) months was repeated more than once and it had further provided a 6 (six) months limit for cancellation or forfeiture of the contract. The plaintiff was not ready and willing to redeem the mortgage. But that could not have been done by him since part redemption was subject to the agreement of LIC, a third party to the contract. LIC declined part redemption of the mortgage. Therefore, non-compliance of redemption by the plaintiff, would not make him disentitled to obtain specific performance of the contract. But, he cannot insist that the property should be made free from the mortgage when he had agreed to, purchase the property on ‘as it is’ condition subject to the encumbrance mentioned in different clauses, namely, that the property is free from all encumbrances etc. but subject to the mortgage with LIC and the pendency of the execution case and the appeal is disclosed in the agreement.

    13.10 Therefore, the essential part of the contract to be performed by the plaintiff was to complete the transaction and purchase the property with the encumbrances of the mortgage, the suit, the execution and the appeal respectively as mentioned in the agreement on ‘as it is’ condition. However, his liability towards LIC was limited to Rs. 70,000/-. But the plaintiff made it clear that he was not willing to purchase the property until a good and marketable title is made out, viz. until the property is redeemed from the mortgage and freed from the suit, execution and the appeal, as is apparent from the correspondences mentioned above. Therefore, it cannot be said that the plaintiff was ready and willing and had always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. He had made it clear that he would not purchase the property until the property is freed from the mortgage, suit etc. Therefore, he cannot seek enforcement of the contract since he had not been able to prove that he was so ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract to be performed by him.

    13.11 Mr. Bachawat had relied on Ramesh Chandra Chandiok v. Chuni Lal Sabharwal. AIR 1971 SC 1238 and contended that the ratio decided therein squarely applies in the present case. Inasmuch as, in the present case, the plaintiff had attempted to redeem the 1/7th share of the defendant No. 1 from LIC. But LIC had declined part redemption. He was not obliged to redeem the 1/7th share from LIC. Therefore, this shows that the plaintiff was always ready and willing. But the said decision does not help us in the facts and circumstances of this case. Here the property was agreed to be sold on ‘as it is’ basis subject to the mortgage of LIC and the resultant suit, decree etc. On the other hand, the plaintiff was insisting upon purchasing the property free from all encumbrances, which was never intended by the parties in terms of the agreement. The liability was cast upon the plaintiff to redeem the 1/7th share from mortgage and the sale was always subject to those encumbrances mentioned therein.

    13.12 From the above discussion, it appears that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to, perform the essential terms of the contract to be performed by him.

    Was there any absence of readiness and willingness on the part of the defendant No. 1?:

    14. Similarly, from the above discussion, it further appears that the defendant No. 1 was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and that the defendant had never prevented-the plaintiff from performing any essential term of the contract to be performed by the plaintiff. Neither defendant No. 1 had waived any of the terms of the contract.

    14.1 On the question of readiness and willingness, Mr. Dasgupta had relied on Mst. Sahida Bibi… v. Sk. Golam Muhammad…., AIR 1983 Calcutta 216. In the said decision, it was held that one cannot enforce specific performance when he has become incapable of performing or violates any essential term of the contract that on his part remains to be performed, or acts in fraud of contract, or wilfully acts at variance with or in subversion of the relation intended to be established by the contract. This relief would also be barred when he fails to aver and prove that he has performed and was always ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract, which are to be performed by him, other than those prevented or waived by the defendant. A plaintiff who seeks specific performance of contract has to show, first, that he had performed or was ready and willing to perform the terms of the contract on his part to be then performed, and secondly, that he is ready and willing to do all matters and things on his part thereafter to be done. A default on his part in either of these respects furnishes a ground upon which the action may be resisted. It is true that under Explanation (i) to Section 16 SR Act, it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender the money to the defendr ant or deposit in Court any money except when so directed by the Court. Still under Explanation (ii) of Section 16, SR Act, the plaintiff must aver her readiness and willingness to perform the contract according to its true construction. In the said decision, reference was made to Pollock and Mulla's Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts, 9th Edition, at page 855 wherein it was pointed out that Section 16 clauses (b) and (c) together with the explanation merely give effect to the decided cases. Referring to Srish v. Banomali, (1904) ILR 31 Calcutta 584 at page 596 (PC), it was pointed out that the Privy Council dismissed a suit for specific performance as the conduct of the plaintiff was at variance with and amounted to a subversion of the relation intended to be established by the promise. Reference was also made to Manik Chandra Bhowmik v. Abhoy Charan Gope, AIR 1917 Calcutta 283 : 24 CLJ 90, which is also relied upon by Mr. Dasgupta in this case.

    14.2 In His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar., 1996 (4) SCC 526, the meaning of readiness and willingness was explained. In the said decision, it was held that it was a hard fact that the defendant was in dire need of money to celebrate his daughter's marriage on a particular date and the agreement for sale provided for finalization within 7 (seven) days. Time was, therefore, held to be essence of the contract in the said case. Though, approved draft deed was immediately sent but the purchaser did not file the final draft for obtaining income tax clearance. The plaintiff delayed the execution on one pretext or the other. Therefore, it was held that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. In the said judgment, it was further pointed out that there is a distinction between readiness to perform the contract and willingness to perform the contract. By readiness, it may be meant the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract, which includes his financial position to pay the purchase price. In determining willingness to perform his part of the contract, the conduct has to be properly scrutinized. Assuming that he had funds, he has to prove his willingness to perform his part of the contract. This can be ascertained from his conduct. Relying on the facts of the said case, it was found that the plaintiff was not willing to perform his part of the contract. Referring to the conduct of the party and the attending circumstances, the Court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. In P.R Deb and Associates v. Sunanda Roy, 1996 (4) SCC 423 : (AIR 1996 SC 1504) the Apex Court had held relying on Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani, 1993 (1) SCC 519 : (AIR 1993 SC 1742) a Five Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that time was essence of the contract and having regard to the attending circumstances, it was held that he was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.

    14.3 Applying the above principles in the present case, we also find that the facts as disclosed on record are sufficient to demonstrate that the plaintiff was not ready and willing nor he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, though there was no absence of readiness and willingness on the part of the defendant No. 1.

    Was time essence of contract?:

    15. Ordinarily time is not an essence of the contract for specific performance of sale of immovable property. But, when it is specifically incorporated in the terms of the contract, then it has to be gathered from the conduct of the parties and the surrounding circumstances whether time was made essence of the contract. If it is found that it was so made essence of the contract, then what would be the reasonable and proximate time and how far the essence of time can be applied in a particular contract. The answer is to be gathered from the facts of each case. If, there was any urgent need of completing the transaction early on the part of the vendor and he has reflected such urgency in the contract itself and provided for certain time and if it appears that non-adherence to such time would result into inequity in favour of the vendor, then definitely time is to be treated as an essence of the contract. The proximity or the reasonableness of the time is dependent on the facts of each case and it cannot extend beyond a period, which is never intended by the parties, unless the time is extended by consent or by reason of default on the part of the vendor or the transferee, being the defaulting party or on account of prevention of one by the other in performing his part by reason of the other's conduct. The Court has to find out from the conduct of the parties and from the terms of the contract, the attending and surrounding circumstances, the period which is to be excluded for the purpose of assessing the time, which is essence of the contract, in order to ascertain its reasonableness or proximity.

    15.1 In this case, the reasonableness and proximity was expressed by specific and clear terms to 6 (six) months on the expiry whereof not only the agreement was to stand cancelled but also the earnest money was to stand forfeited, while the stipulation of time that was made essence of contract had provided 3 (three) months, from the date of the agreement. The forfeiture clause itself is an indication of making the time essence of the contract. Having regard to the facts that by passage of time, a decree for a sum of Rs. 59,715.81 increased to Rs. 5,12,040.72 in April 1994 and then Rs. 5,40,366.84 in March 1995, it appears that the vendor was eager to complete the transaction at the earliest so as to get rid of the mounting interest being accumulated further. It further appears that the auction sale was sought to be set aside on behalf of the vendor unsuccessfully and that the confirmation of sale, on being opposed by them, was rejected and against which the appeal by LIC was pending. There was every likelihood of confirmation of the sale and thereby the vendor's attempt to sell the property, subject to the encumbrances as stated in the agreement, would be belied, if there was delay.

    15.2 From these attending circumstances, it appears that time was intended to be made essence of the contract and the reasonableness and proximity would be adhered to the time intended by the parties. In the present case, it being mutually agreed for 3 (three) months extendable for another 3 (three) months, i.e, total 6 (six) months, the Court normally ought not to extend it beyond that 6 (six) months. Even if it does so, it cannot extend treble or four times the period originally intended. Even then, if we accept treble, then it would be 9 (nine) months and not beyond. Even then there would be mounting interest and there would have been every likelihood of the sale being confirmed and the right of the vendor being lost forever. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we are not prepared to extend the time beyond it, namely, 6 (six) months from the date of agreement which is double the period stipulated and was agreed to by the parties mutually.

    15.3 But then the essence of time would be relevant if it was shown that the plaintiff was ready and willing, but not otherwise. If it is shown that the plaintiff was not ready and willing, then the question of time being essence would be irrelevant Inasmuch as one has to show that he was ready and willing throughout. If there is a lapsed period in between or it can be shown that for sometime in between the plaintiff was not ready and willing, then it cannot be said that he was ready and willing all through. It is apparent that the plaintiff was not ready and willing throughout. Inasmuch as, in April 1994, through Exhibits 3 and 4, he had made it clear that he has not ready and willing to purchase the property with the encumbrances on ‘as is where is’ basis as was agreed by him. Therefore, the time that was essence of the contract stood forfeited or became operative as soon the time for completing the transaction expired or as soon the willingness of the plaintiff ceased, as we find from his conduct, as is apparent from the materials on record.

    15.4 In Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani, 1993 (1) SCC 519, the Apex Court had held that it is a well-accepted principle that in case of sale of immovable property, time is never regarded as essence of contract. In fact, there is a presumption against time being the essence of contract. Under the law of equity, which governs the rights of the parties in the case of specific performance of contract to sell of real estate, law looks not at the letter but at the substance of the agreement. It is to be ascertained whether the terms of the contract named a specific time for completion of the transaction. In substance whether it is intended that it is to be complete within a reasonable time. But such intention to make time the essence of contract must be expressed in unequivocal language. If expressed in writing the language must be unmistakable. It may also be inferred from the nature of property agreed to be sold, conduct of the parties and the surrounding circumstances at or before the contract. Specific performance of a contract will ordinarily be granted, notwithstanding default in carrying out the contract within the specified period, if having regard to the express stipulation of the parties, nature of the property and the surrounding circumstances, it is not inequitable to grant the relief. If the contract relates to a sale of immovable property, it would normally be presumed that time was not essence of contract.

    15.5 In Jamshed Khodaram Irani v. Burjorji Dhunjibhai, (1916) ILR 40 Bom 289, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council observed that the principle underlying Section 55 of the Contract Act did not differ from those, which obtained under the law of England as regard contracts for sale of land. The Judicial Committee observed that it should take place within a reasonable time. Their Lordships, however, added to the said observation of Lord Cairns in Tilley v. Thomas, (1867) 3 Ch App 61 that the special jurisdiction of equity to disregard the letter of the contract in ascertaining what the parties to the contract are to be taken as having really and in substance intended as regard time of its performance may be excluded by any plainly expressed stipulation. But to have this effect the language of the stipulation must show that the intention was to make the rights of the parties depend on the observance of the time limits prescribed in a fashion, which is unmistakable. The language will have this effect if it plainly excludes the notion that these time limits were of merely secondary importance in the bargain, and that to disregard them would be to disregard nothing that lay as its foundation. Prima facie, equity treats the importance of such time-limits as being subordinate to the main purpose of the parties, and it will enjoin specific performance notwithstanding that from the point of view of a Court of law, the contract has not been literally performed.

    15.6 In Govind Prasad Chaturvedi v. Hari Dutt Shastri, 1977 (2) SCC 539 : (AIR 1977 SC 1005), it was held that the intention to treat time as the essence of the contract may be evidenced by circumstances which are sufficiently strong to displace the normal presumption that the contract of sale of land stipulation as to time is not the essence of the contract. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 4, page 1179, this was dealt with in the following manner, viz; the parties may expressly provide that time is the essence of the contract and where there is provision to determine the contract on a failure to complete by a specified period, the stipulation as to time will be fundamental. Other provisions of the contract may on the construction of the contract preclude and interfere. Even where it is expressly provided that time is the essence of the contract such a stipulation is to be read along with other provisions of the contract. On such construction of the contract, it is to be inferred whether a particular date was intended to be fundamental or where it provided for extension of time or for payment of fine for default. The Apex Court after having analysed various cases had laid down the guide line in the following manner for determining as to whether the time was made essence of the contract, i.e from the expressed terms of the contract, from the nature of the property, from the surrounding circumstances, namely, the object of making the contract. In P.R Deb and Associates (supra) also the same stand was affirmed. Relying on Parakunnan Veetill Joseph's Son Mathew v. Nedumbara Kuruvila's Son, 1987 Supp SCC 340 : (AIR 1987 SC 2328), the Apex Court had observed that before granting specific performance, the Court should meticulously consider all facts and circumstances. The Court has to take care to see that it is not used as an instrument of oppression to have an unfair advantage.

    15.7 Applying the said test in the present case, as discussed, in our view, if we grant specific performance of the contract, then it would be allowing the plaintiff an unfair advantage independent of the contract, inequitable for the defendants.

    Section 55, Contract Act:

    16. Section 55 Contract Act prescribes that if some part of the contract is to be performed within a particular time and if it is not performed, then it becomes voidable at the option of the promisee if the intention of the parties was that the time should be the essence of the contract. In the present case, it was agreed that the plaintiff would perform the contract within the time stipulated and if he was unable to do it then the vendor/promisee would be entitled to opt to make the contract voidable.

    Section 20, SR Act:

    17. Section 20 makes the grant of specific performance of a contract discretionary. The Court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so. However, such discretion of the Court is not arbitrary but be sound and reasonable guided by Judicial principles and capable of correction by Court of Appeal. The conditions under which the Court may exercise such discretion and may not decree a specific performance, are specified in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 20, which are also explained in Explanations (i) and (ii) thereunder. One of the grounds to exercise this discretion is that the plaintiff would get an unfair advantage rover the defendant or that the performance would cause hardship on the defendant and non-performance would not cause such hardship on the plaintiff.

    17.1 In K.S Vidyanandam v. Vairavan, 1997 (3) SCC 1 : AIR 1997 SC 1751, the Apex Court, in the given circumstances where the period of 6 (six) months was specified for the performance of the contract, observed that it has been consistently held by the Courts in India following certain early English decisions that in the case of agreement of sale relating to immovable property time is not the essence of the contract unless specifically provided to that effect. If it is held that any suit for such specific performance if filed within the period of limitation provided in the Limitation Act, in that event, decree is to be passed notwithstanding the time limit stipulated in the agreement, then in such circumstances, it would amount to saying that the time-limits prescribed by the parties in the agreement have no significance or value and that they mean nothing. Even where time is not the essence of the contract, the plaintiff must perform his part of the contract within reasonable time. Reasonable time should be determined by looking at all the surrounding circumstances including the express terms of the contract and the nature of the property. While exercising its discretion, the Court should also bear in mind that when the parties prescribe certain time-limits for taking steps by one or the other party, it must have some significance and that the said time limit cannot be ignored altogether on the ground that time has not been made the essence of the contract relating to immovable properties. In case of urban properties in India, it is well known that their prices have been going up sharply over the last few decades, particularly, after 1973. Court cannot be too oblivious to the reality. It is not possible to agree with the decision of the Madras High Court if the said decision is understood as saying that the said factor is not at all to be taken into account while exercising the discretion vested in the Court by law (S.V Sankaralinga Nadar v. P.T.S Ratnaswami Nadar, AIR 1952 Mad 389). The rigor of the rule evolved by Courts that time is not the essence of the contract in case of immovable properties, evolved in times when prices and values were stable and inflation was unknown, therefore, such rule requires to be relaxed, if not modified, particularly, in the case of urban immovable properties. It is high time the Courts do so.

    17.2 In the present case, apart from rising of price, the defendant No. 1 had two difficulties staring on his face, one that the interest was mounting and the other that the confirmation of sale was awaiting, which prevented the defendant No. 1 from wasting time and waiting for an indefinite period. This was the reason why he had intended to sale the property with the stipulation making the agreement subject to the encumbrances referred to therein and to sale the property ‘as it is’ within the time stipulated and in default of the maximum limit of time, the agreement would stand cancelled and the earnest money would stand forfeited.

    17.3 Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, the conduct of the parties, the expressed terms used in the agreement, the attending and surrounding circumstances at or before the agreement and the materials on record as discussed above, we are of the view that time was made essence of the contract in the present case and that the plaintiff had failed and neglected to perform his part of the contract within the time stipulated and as such it is a case fit where the discretion under Section 20 of SR Act is to be exercised. Inasmuch as, if the claim of the plaintiff is allowed, in that event, it would allow an undue advantage on the plaintiff.

    17.4 Inasmuch as, it appears from the additional evidence produced before this Court that in order to get rid of the mortgage and avoid the confirmation of the sale, the vendor had sold the property along with the other co-sharers to the defendant No. 2 after having redeemed the mortgaged property with the help of the defendant No. 2. It appears that the defendant No. 2 had acquired 5/7th share in the property after paying the entire mortgage dues in respect of a property to LIC as well as a compensation of Rs. 1,50,000/- to the auction purchaser and got the property freed from the mortgage as well as the suit. Thus, the object of sale by the vendor/defendant No. 1 has since been achieved and fulfilled. In case after the vendor/defendant No. 1 and the defendant No. 2 had put their endeavour and invested their substantial effort as well as money to get the property freed from the mortgage and the suit and appeal and the encumbrances subject to which the property was sought to be sold to the plaintiff, it would be allowing unfair advantage to the plaintiff if only 1/7th share is sold to him. This will provide great hardship on the defendant No. 1, who would be bound to cough up the consideration money received by him from the defendant No. 2 and, at the same time, the plaintiff would take advantage of the effort put in by the defendant No. 2 to get the property freed from encumbrances and that the defendant No. 2 having purchased 5/7th share, the plaintiff would be allowed to purchase 1/7th share reducing his interest to 4/7th while the plaintiff had never shown his interest in respect of the other parts of the property.

    17.5 Having gone through the additional evidences produced, we have every reason to hold that it would be inequitable to grant the relief to the plaintiff having regard to the balance of equity in favour of the defendants No. 1 and 2 and particularly, the defendant No. 2. Therefore, having regard to the principle, relating to Section 20, SR Act, we are of the view that the facts and circumstances of the case are fit for exercising the discretion contemplated under Section 20 of the SR Act guided by sound judicial principles as discussed above.

    Conclusion:

    18. For all these reasons, it appears that the plaintiff was not ready an willing to perform the essential part of the terms of the contract as observed earlier and that time was essence of the contract and that it would be inequitable to grant the relief of specific performance to the plaintiff in the facts and circumstances of this case and that the defendant No. 1 never prevented the plaintiff from performing the essential part of the terms of the contract or had never waived any of the defendant's right.

    Order:

    19. In the result, both these appeals succeed. The decree dated 31st August, 1999 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, 8th Court, Alipore in Title Suit No. 33 of 1995 for specific performance is hereby set aside. The said Title Suit No. 33 of 1995 be and the same is hereby decreed for damages against the defendant No. 1 directing him to refund the earnest of Rs. 25,000/- together with damages assessed at Rs. 10,000/- and dismissed as against the defendant No. 2. The defendant No. 1 shall deposit the said sum of Rs. 35,000/- in aggregate in the Trial Court or pay to the plaintiff by A/c payee demand draft or bankers cheque within two months from this date. In default, the said sum of Rs. 35,000/- will carry interest @ 9% per annum simple till deposit or payment as the case may be.

    There will, however, be no order as to costs.

    If an urgent xerox certified copy of this order is applied for, the same is to be supplied to the applicant at an early date, subject to compliance of all the required formalities.

    Joytosh Banerjee, J.:— 20. I agree.

    Appeals allowed.

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