1. By this application the plaintiff has prayed for the following reliefs:—
“a) Injunction restraining the defendants and each of them whether by their servants or agents or assigns or otherwise howsoever from manufacturing or marketing or selling any cassette relating to the inlay card being Annexure “A” hereto or containing any work which is similar and/or identical to the petitioner's work entitled “Tanche Jakhan” and “Tomar Chhoante” in any colourable imitation thereof in any manner whatsoever:
b) Injunction restraining the defendants and each of them whether by themselves or by their servants or agents or assigns or otherwise howsoever from infringing the petitioner's copyright in the numbers originally entitled “Tanche Jakhan” and Tomar Chhoante” in any manner whatsoever;
(c) An order directing the defendants to deliver up all cassettes, inlay cards, labels, cartoons, packing and publicity material relating to the defendants' “Swapno Bikri Aache” cassette and the inlay card being Annexure “A” hereto and destruction upon oath of the defendants that the defendants do not have their in control any of the aforesaid infringing materials;
d) Injunction restraining the defendants and each of them whether by themselves or by their servants or agents or assigns or otherwise howsoever from marketing or distributing the cassettes entitled “Swapno Bikri Aache” in any manner whatsoever;
e) A Receiver be appointed overall the cassettes, inlay cards, labels, carton packing and publicity material relating to the defendants' “Swapno Bikri Aache” cassettes and the inlay card Annexure “A” hereto with a direction upon the Receiver to forthwith take physical possession thereof;
f) Ad-interim orders in terms of prayers above;
g) Costs of and incidental to this application be paid by the defendants;
h) Such further or other order or orders be passed and/or direction or directions be given as to this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper.”
2. The plaintiff filed the present suit thereby praying for the following reliefs:
“a) Declaration that the defendants are not entitled to exploit the copyright in the lyrics, music or literary and dramatic works contained in the songs originally entitled ‘Tanche Jakhan’ and ‘Tomar chhonate’ and now purported to be entitled as ‘Door Bohu Doore’ and ‘Ke Ki Bhabe Nabhabe Janina’ respectively in any manner whatsoever;
b) Permanent injunction restraining the defendants and each of them, whether by themselves or by their servants or agents or assigns or otherwise howsoever from infringing the plaintiffs copyright in the numbers originally entitled ‘Tanche Jakhan’ and ‘Tomar Chhonate’ in any manner whatsoever;
c) Premanent injunction restraining the defendants and each of them whether by themselves or by their servants or agents or assigns or otherwise howsoever from manufacturing or marketing or selling any cassette relating to the inlay card being Annexure “A” hereto or containing any work which is similar and/or identical to the plaintiffs works entitled ‘Tanche Jakhan’ and ‘Tomar chhonate’ or any colourable imitation thereof in any manner whatsoever;
d) Decree for delivery up of all cassettes, inlay cards, labels, cartoons, packing and publicity material relating to the defendants' ‘Swapna Bikri Aache’ cassette and the Inlay care being Annexure “A” hereto and destruction of the same upon oath of the defendants that the defendants do not have in their possession or control any of the aforesaid infringing material;
e) Receiver;
f) Interlocutory injunction;
g) Costs;
h) Such further or other reliefs.”
3. The case made out by the plaintiff is as follows:—
a) the defendant No. 1 is a singer of Bengali Songs. The defendant No. 2 is engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of cassettes, compact discs and other sound recording systems. The defendant No. 3 is a song lyricist and music composer and defendant No. 4 is a relative of the defendant No. 3 and claimed to be a lyricist. The defendant No. 5 is also a lyricist and music composer.
b) In the year 1999 the plaintiff commissioned defendant Nos. 3 and 5 to compose Bengali non-film lyrics and music proposed to be sung by defendant No. 1 and proposed to release those by way of cassettes and other sound recording systems. Pursuant to the request of the plaintiff and on payment of consideration by the plaintiff, defendant No. 3 wrote lyrics and composed the music in respect of a Bengali non-film song subsequently entitled ‘Tanche Jakhan’ similarly, on such consideration paid by plaintiff, defendant No. 5 wrote lyrics and composed the music in respect of another Bengali non-film song ‘Tomar Chhoante’ which was also sung by defendant No. 1.
c) The recording of the aforesaid two songs together with others was conducted at the Presto Digital Audio Recording Centre. At the time of such recording, a master tape thereof owned by the plaintiff was prepared and was retained by the plaintiff.
d) Subsequently, the plaintiff has come to know that defendant Nos. 1 and 2 had released a music cassette containing eight songs sung by the defendant No. 1 and after going through the said cassette it was found that the defendants had infringed the petitioner's copyright in lyrics, music and literary and dramatice works relating to two of the songs entitled ‘Tanche Jakhan’ and ‘Tomar Chhoante’ by making marginal and/or cosmetic changes to the lyrics thereto in a fraudulent attempt to pass off the said two songs as different numbers by purporting to alter the titles of the said two numbers.
e) According to the plaintiff, it is the first owner of the copyright in respect of lyrics, music, literary and dramatic work relating to the aforesaid two songs and in the addition is also the owner of sound recording thereof.
4. On the aforesaid application, this Court initially ex parte appointed a Receiver and also granted ad-interim injunction and directed the plaintiff to give notice to the defendants.
5. Pursuant to the said notice issued by this Court, the defendants have appeared and on the new motion day prayed for vacating interim order.
6. Mr. Chatterjee, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant No. 2 and Mr. Saha appearing on behalf of the defendant Nos. 1 and 3 to 5 have submitted before this Court that even if it is assumed for the shake of argument that the averments made in the application are true, the plaintiff is not entitled to get an order of injunction. According to them, so far lyrics are concerned, the author of the song is the copyright holder according to the Copyright Act, 1957 (‘Act’) and so far music is concerned, it is the composer of the music who has such right. According to them even if it is accepted that the songs were written on the basis of commission given by the plaintiff or that those were composed on the basis of such payment, copyright remains with the lyricist and the composer. According to the defendants unless it is alleged and established that those songs were written and composed in course of plaintiffs employment under a contract of service or apprenticeship as provided in S. 17(c) of the Act, the plaintiff cannot have any copyright over the said songs.
7. As regards copyright of sound recording, the defendants contend that in the absence of any averment showing that the plaintiff is the producer of the sound recording as defined in S. 2(uu) of the Act, the plaintiff cannot claim any copyright even over sound recording. The defendants therefore prayed for dismissal of the application.
8. Mr. Sarkar and Mr. Mukherjee, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff have however opposed the aforesaid contentions of the defendants and have contended that the songs having been written and composed on the basis of payment of commission, it should be presumed that the defendants wrote and composed those songs in course of employment under a contract of service and as such the plaintiff should be held to be the owner of the copyright of lyrics and music as provided in S. 17(c) of the Act.
9. They further contend that as regards sound recording, the averments made in the application clearly indicate that their clients took initiative of the recordings and bore all expenses by making payment of hire charges of the studios and remuneration to the musicians. According to them, although the plaintiff has not averred in so many words that it is the producer of the sound recording but if the entire averments made in the application are read as a whole, it will appear that the plaintiff took initiative and in reality is the owner of the sound recording. In this connection Mr. Sarkar placed strong reliance upon a passage from Copinger & Skone James on Copyright in support of his contention that the person by whom the arrangements necessary for making of the recording are undertaken should be taken to be producer. Therefore, the plaintiff contends that at this stage so long the averments made in the application are not disputed, the plaintiff has made out a strong prima facie case and the ad interim order already granted should not be vacated.
10. Before entering into the respective contentions raised by the parties it will be profitable to refer to the following provisions of the Act which are quoted below:—
“Section 2(d) “author” means,-
(i) in relation to a literary or dramatic work, the author of the work;
(ii) in relation to a musical work, the composer;
(iii) in relation to an artistic work other than a photograph, the artist;
(iv) in relation to a photograph, the person taking the photograph;
(v) in relation to a cinematograph film or sound recording, the producer; and
(vi) in relation to any literary, dramantic, musical or artistic work which is computer-generated, the person who causes the work to be created.”
Section 2(uu) “producer”, in relation to a cinematograph film or sound recording, means a person who takes the initiative and responsibility for making the work.
Section 17. First owner of copyright. Subject to the provisions of this Act, the author of a work shall be the first owner of the copyright therein:
Provided that-
a) in the case of literary, dramatic or artistic work made by the author in the course of his employment by the proprietor of a newspaper, magazine or similar periodical under a contract of service or apprenticeship, for the purpose of publication in a newspaper, magazine or similar periodical, the said proprietor shall, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, be the first owner of the copyright in the work in so far as the copyright relates to the publication of the work in any newspaper, magazine or similar periodical, or to the reproduction of the work for the purpose of its being so published, but in all other respects the author shall be the first owner of the copyright in the work;
b) subject to the provisions of Clause (a), in the case of a photograph taken, or a painting or portrait drawn, or an engraving or a cinematograph film made, for valuable consideration at the instance of any person, such person shall, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, be the first owner of the copyright therein;
c) in the case of a work made in the course of the author's employment under a contract of service or apprenticeship, to which Clause (a) or Clause (b) does not apply, the employer shall, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, be the first owner of the copyright therein;
cc) to e)……………………………….
11. It is apparent from the aforesaid provisions contained in the Act that so far lyrics and musical works are concerned, lyricist and composer respectively are the authors thereof and in view of Section 17 of the Act, the first owner of the copyright of lyrics and musical works shall be the authors unless it is shown that such work was made in course of author's employment under a contract of service or apprenticeship with his employer and there is no agreement to the contrary as regards retention of copyright.
12. Now the plaintiff having admitted in the application that defendant Nos. 3 to 5 are lyricist and composer of the disputed songs, it is for the plaintiff to prove prima facie that those works were made by defendant Nos. 3 to 5 in course of their employment under a contract of service or apprenticeship under plaintiff and that there was no agreement to the contrary as regards copyrights.
13. In Paragraph 5 of the petition, the plaintiff stated that in or about the year 1999 it commissioned defendant Nos. 3 and 5 to compose Bengali non-film lyrics and music for rendition thereof by defendant No. 1 and pursuant to the said request and on consideration thereof paid by the plaintiff, the defendant Nos. 3 and 5 wrote the lyrics and composed the music in respect of those two songs. In Paragraph 6, the plaintiff stated that it engaged defendant No. 1 to sing and/or render the aforesaid two Bengali non-film musical composition or song and “commissioned” the defendant No. 1 to render the aforesaid number with other non-film Bengali songs. In Paragraph 20, it was stated that the plaintiff duly recorded the performance rendered by defendant No. 1 in terms of the arrangement by and between the plaintiff and the defendants after the petitioner had “commissioned” defendant Nos. 3 and 5 to compose the lyrics, tune and music relating to the said songs.
14. The verb ‘commission’ according to Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, Fourth Edition means “give somebody the job of making something”. The following examples are given therein:— “He commissioned a statute of his wife”; “commission an artist to paint a picture”.
15. According to The Wordsworth Dictionary of English Usage, 1995 edition, the verb ‘commission’ means “to give an order (esp. for a work of art) to; The following example has been given therein;— “He was commissioned to paint the Lord Mayor's portrait”.
16. The aforesaid statements made in Paragraphs 5, 6 and 20 make it abundantly clear that the case made out by the plaintiff is that it engaged those defendants for the purpose of writing, composing and singing those two songs on remuneration. In my view, the aforesaid averments make out a clear case of contract for service but not a contract of service. It may not be out of place to mention here that Section 17(b) of the Act specifies the only instances where an author, although engaged under a ‘contract for service’, loses copyright. Those are the cases of taking photograph, drawing painting or portrait, engraving and making cinematograph film. In the present case, the defendants were not engaged for any of the aforesaid jobs.
17. In this connection, all the learned counsel for the parties relied on a decision of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh in the case of Suraiya Rahman v. Skill Development for Under Privileged Women reported in 1997 PTC (17) page 295. In that case, which has been subsequently approved by Privy Council, it was found as a finding of fact that the petitioner therein was an employee from March 1, 1982 to January 31, 1986 of the respondent No. 1 under a contract of service on monthly salary basis and her main duty was to produce artistic works or designs and she produced the disputed designs during the course of her employment with respondent No. 1. In that case, all the authorities negatived the petitioner's claim that she lent her pre-existing designs to the respondent No. 1 on royalty basis or created the designs outside the course of her employment. Such contract, in the fact of the said case, was held to be a contract of service.
18. As pointed out in the case of Market Investigation Limited v. Minister of Social Security reported in (1969) 2 QBD 173, referred to in the said Bangladeshi decision that the fundamental test to be applied in determining whether a person is engaged in “a contract of service” or “contract for service” is “is the person who has engaged himself to perform these services performing them as a person in business on his own account?” If the answer to that question is ‘Yes’, then the contract is a contract for service; on the other hand, if the answer is ‘no’ then the contract is a contract of service.
19. In the instant case it is not the plaintiff's case that the defendant Nos. 1 and 3 to 5 were its employees at any point of time and in course of such employment those songs were written, composed or sung. Under the aforesaid circumstances, in my view, no case has been made out by the plaintiff that the defendant Nos. 1 and 3 to 5 were his employees under a contract of service.
20. If we apply the aforesaid test to the fact of the present case, the answer must be in affirmative and thus no case has been made out to bring the transaction within the purview of ‘contract of service’ as mentioned in Section 17(c) of the Act.
21. Thus, even the plaint averments do not suggest that there existed a case of employment of defendant Nos. 1 and 3 to 5 under a contract of service. Therefore, even on the basis of averments made in the application no case has been made out for copyright over lyrics and musical works.
22. The next question is whether the plaintiff has acquired any right over sound recording. As pointed out earlier, according to the provision of Section 2(d) of the Act, producer of the sound recording is the author thereof and according to Section 17, the copyright of such sound recording vests in such producer. From the averments made in the application, it is clear that the plaintiff paid the hire charges of the studio and made all necessary payment for recording. Those averments make out at the most a case of financing the recording. But there is no averment in the petition indicating that the plaintiff has also taken ‘responsibility’ of such recording. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff placed strong reliance upon the observations in Copinger & Skone James on Copyright where it was stated that the author of sound recording is to be taken to be producer as he is the person by whom arrangements necessary for making the recording are undertaken. They also drew attention to the observations that “the word ‘undertaken’ implies that it is the person directly responsible for such arrangements particularly in the financial sense, who is the author.” It may not be out of place to mention here that previously Section 9(2)(aa) of 1988 English Copyright Act simply defined the author of sound recording as being the person by whom the arrangement necessary for the making of recording were undertaken. The expression ‘producer’ was however introduced into the 1988 Act with effect from December 1, 1996 by the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations, 1996.
23. In my opinion, the aforesaid observations cannot benefit the plaintiff in any way in view of a totally different definition of ‘producer’ in Section 2(uu) of the Act. According to the aforesaid provision, in order to be a producer, a person must take initiative as well as responsibility of the recording. I have already indicated that all that have been stated in the application as regards right over sound recording is that plaintiff paid all the expenses of recording including hire charges of studio and remuneration of the musician. Those averments, in my view, will not bring the plaintiff within the purview of “producer” unless in addition to the aforesaid statements, the plaintiff avers that it has also taken responsibility of such recording. The mere statement that a master tape of recording owned by the plaintiff was prepared and retained by it does not suggest that it has taken responsibility of such recording. If a person bears all the expenses for recording and keep the master tape thereof, such facts do not imply that he has also taken responsibility of the recording and thus cannot be held to be a producer. The word “responsibility” appearing in Section 2(uu) of the Act, in my view, does not refer to financial responsibility, but means “consequential legal liability” for such recording.
24. Therefore, I find substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the defendants that no statement has been made in the application avowing consequential legal liability of the recording and as such plaintiff cannot be held to be the producer of sound recording.
25. Over and above, it appears from Paragraph 12 of the application that the plaintiff stated that it expected the returns from the sale of music cassettes and/or from the sale its right to be well in excess of Rs. 20 lakh. Thus, it has more or less assessed its claim for the alleged violation by the defendants. In such a case, the balance of convenience and inconvenience is also in favour of refusing the prayer for injunction and it cannot be said that plaintiff shall suffer irreparable loss and injury if the injunction is not granted at this stage. The plaintiff's claim can be ultimately compensated in terms of money even if it succeeds in the long run.
26. On consideration of the materials on record I am thus of the view that even if all the averments made in the application are taken to be true, the plaintiff has not made out a prima facie case of copyright and is not entitled to get any order of injunction.
27. The application is thus devoid of any substance and is dismissed. Interim order granted earlier stands vacated. The learned Receiver is directed to return the materials seized by him to the persons from whom those were seized. The plaintiff is directed to pay the final remuneration of the learned Receiver which I assess at 300 Gms. positively within a week from date. The learned Receiver is discharged on returning the articles.
28. No costs.
Petition dismissed.