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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Debiprasad Sengupta, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The case concerns a revisional application seeking quashing of criminal proceeding Case No. C-41 of 1993 under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Opposite party No. 2 (the complainant) filed a complaint before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta alleging that the petitioners (accused) issued cheque No. 156276 dated 10.2.92 for Rs. 7,75,000/- drawn on State Bank of India, Vatva I.E. Ahmedabad. The cheque was presented at State Bank of India, Baghbazar, Calcutta and was returned unpaid. The bank's debit memo dated 25.11.92 indicated the cheque was returned for "Insufficient Funds".

The complainant issued a demand notice dated 2.12.92, which was received by the accused on 10.12.92. On failure to make payment within the stipulated period, the complaint was filed. Cognizance of the offence was taken by the Magistrate on 22.1.93.

The petitioners applied on 25.1.95 for dropping the proceeding on the ground that the complaint was barred by limitation under section 138(b) and (c) of the N.I. Act and that cognizance was taken in violation of section 142. That application was rejected by the Magistrate on 22.6.95. The petitioners' revisional remedy to the City Sessions Judge, Calcutta, was dismissed on 10.7.98. The petitioners then approached this Court for quashing the proceeding.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether cognizance taken by the Magistrate was bad in law because it violated section 142(b) (i.e., that cognizance cannot be taken where the complaint was not filed within the statutory period prescribed by clause (c) of the proviso to section 138 of the N.I. Act).
  2. Whether the complaint was barred by limitation because the demand notice required by clause (b) of the proviso to section 138 was not issued within 15 days of receipt of information of return of the cheque, and consequently whether there was any valid cause of action under section 138.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as presented by Mr. Soumen Ghosh)

  • The cognizance taken by the Magistrate was in violation of section 142(b) of the N.I. Act because the petition of complaint was not filed within the statutory period under the proviso to section 138.
  • The complainant deliberately suppressed material facts: the cheque was presented on 13.2.92 and the complainant received a return memo dated 26.2.92 (received by complainant on 22.3.92) with endorsement "Refer to the Drawer".
  • Since the return memo was received on 22.3.92, the complainant was required to issue the statutory demand notice within 15 days from that date; instead the notice was issued on 2.12.92, well after the 15-day period.
  • The endorsement "Refer to the Drawer" necessarily means insufficient funds; therefore the complainant's delay in issuing the demand notice deprived the complaint of a valid cause of action.
  • The petitioners relied on several authorities (including 1991 Cr. L.J 609 and AIR 1996 SC 2339) to support the proposition that "Refer to the Drawer" indicates dishonour for insufficiency of funds and thus triggered the statutory clock for the demand notice and subsequent limitation periods.

Complainant's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Pradip Ghosh)

  • The endorsement "Refer to the Drawer" can indicate multiple reasons and does not, by itself, establish that the cheque was dishonoured for insufficiency of funds; the complainant therefore sought further verification before issuing the demand notice.
  • After receiving the return memo on 22.3.92, the complainant attempted to clarify the position by telegram and by sending a registered letter to the drawee bank (SBI, Vatva I.E., Ahmedabad) to ascertain whether there were sufficient funds in the account.
  • The complainant received information from the accused's banker only on 25.11.92 confirming that the cheque was dishonoured due to insufficiency of funds; the demand notice was issued on 2.12.92 and received by the accused on 10.12.92, and the complaint was filed after the drawer failed to pay within the 15-day period following that notice.
  • On this basis, the complainant contends the complaint was filed within the statutory period and is not barred by limitation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
1991 Cr. L.J. 609 (Single Judge of this Court) Held that the endorsement "Refer to the Drawer" necessarily means the cheque is returned for want of funds in the drawer's account. The petitioners relied on this authority to argue that the statutory period for sending a demand notice began on receipt of the return memo; the Court observed this decision as supporting the settled meaning of the endorsement.
AIR 1996 SC 2339 Held that endorsements such as "I refer to the drawer", "instructions for stoppage of payment", and "stamp exceeds arrangement" amount to dishonour within the meaning of section 138. The petitioners cited this Apex Court authority to support the proposition that the return memo endorsement amounted to dishonour and activated the timelines under section 138; the Court recorded the reliance on this decision.
1992 Cr. L.J. 1619 (Bombay High Court, Single Judge) Where bank gave reason "suit filed by the Bank against the account holder", that reason was read to indicate the accused had no amount to his credit, attracting section 138. The petitioners cited the case by analogy to show that certain bank endorsements indicate insufficiency of funds; the Court noted the reliance but confined its conclusion to the facts before it.
1998 Cr. L.J. 4066 (Apex Court — cited by parties) Considered whether a payee/holder can initiate prosecution for a second time where earlier cause of action had not been prosecuted; held cause of action under section 142(c) arises only once. The Court reviewed this decision and observed that it was decided on different facts and was not applicable to the issues in the present case.
1991 Company Cases (Vol. 71) p. 273 Held that "Refer to the Drawer" necessarily means the cheque is returned unpaid for want of funds and, prima facie, section 138 was attracted; revisional application dismissed in that instance. The petitioners relied on this High Court decision; the Court recorded the authority and treated it as supporting the view that "Refer to the Drawer" indicates dishonour for insufficiency of funds.
(1998) 3 Supreme Court Cases 249 Held that a cheque dishonoured due to "stop payment" still attracts section 138; the court taking cognizance must be satisfied prima facie and the drawer has an opportunity under section 139; High Court not justified in quashing on 482 at threshold in that case. The petitioners cited this Apex Court ruling; the Court in the present matter reviewed it but concluded that it was not applicable to the specific facts before it.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court reviewed the factual timeline and the statutory provisions cited by the parties. The uncontested factual points relied on by the Court included:

  • The cheque was presented for encashment on 13.2.92.
  • The return memo bearing the endorsement "Refer to the Drawer" was dated 26.2.92 and was received by the complainant on 22.3.92.
  • The complainant issued the demand notice on 2.12.92, which the accused received on 10.12.92.

The Court accepted the settled position reflected in multiple decisions of the Apex Court and various High Courts that the endorsement "Refer to the Drawer" means the cheque was returned for want of funds and thus amounts to dishonour of the cheque. On that basis the Court held that, as per the proviso to section 138 (clause (b)), the payee/holder must give written demand for payment within fifteen days of receipt of information from the bank regarding return of the cheque.

Applying those legal principles to the facts, the Court concluded:

  • The complainant received the return memo on 22.3.92; therefore, as a matter of law the complainant was required to send the statutory demand notice within 15 days from that date.
  • The complainant did not send the demand notice within that period but instead sent it on 2.12.92, which was long after the 15-day period had expired.
  • Paragraph 9 of the complaint, which stated that the complainant first came to know of the dishonour on 25.11.92, was incorrect and amounted to suppression of the earlier receipt of the return memo.
  • The complainant's explanation that further inquiries (telegram and registered letter to the drawee bank) were needed before issuing the demand notice was not a justification for the delay and could not validate the delay in sending the statutory demand in violation of the specific mandatory provision of the Act.
  • From a reading of clause (b) of the proviso to section 138, the Court considered the time fixed by that provision to be mandatory.

On these bases the Court found that the orders of the two courts below (Magistrate and Sessions Judge) suffered from illegality in allowing the proceeding to continue despite the statutory non-compliance.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The revisional application is allowed. The impugned proceeding, Case No. C-41 of 1993 pending before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 11th Court, is hereby QUASHED.

Implications:

  • The direct consequence is that the criminal proceeding under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (Case No. C-41 of 1993) has been quashed and the impugned orders of the Magistrate and the Sessions Judge are set aside.
  • The Court emphasized that the time fixed by clause (b) of the proviso to section 138 is mandatory, and non-compliance with that timeline (sending the demand notice more than fifteen days after receipt of the return memo) justified quashing in this case.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down any broader legal principle beyond applying existing authorities that "Refer to the Drawer" indicates dishonour for insufficiency of funds and enforcing the mandatory time limit in clause (b) of the proviso to section 138; no new expansive precedent is stated in the text beyond the decision as applied to these facts.

Revisional application allowed. Proceeding quashed. (As recorded in the opinion.)

    Maruti Equipments Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. State Of West Bengal & Anr.

    Debiprasad Sengupta, J.:—This revisional application is for quashing of a proceeding being case No. C-41 of 1993 under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

    2. The opposite party No. 2 filed a petition of complaint before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta alleging commission of an offence under section 138 of the N.I Act against the present petitioners. It was alleged in the said complaint that the accused/petitioners No. 2 issued a cheque bearing No. 156276 dated 10.2.92 for Rs. 7,75,000/- drawn on State Bank of India, Vatva I.E Ahmedabad. The said cheque was presented for encashment by the complainant with State Bank of India, Baghbazar, Calcutta. The said cheque was dishonoured by the Bank, which by its debit memo date 25.11.92 informed the petitioner that the said cheque was returned unpaid for the reason of “Insufficient Funds”. The complainant/O.P No. 2 issued a demand notice on 2.12.92, which was received by the accused petitioner on 10.12.92 On failure to make the payment by the accused within the stipulated period of 15 days the petition of complaint was filed.

    On receipt of the said complaint the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence by an order dated 22.1.93

    3. The present petitioners thereafter filed an application before the learned Magistrate on 25.1.95 praying for dropping of the proceeding on the ground that the petition of complaint was barred by limitation as the same was filed beyond the statutory period as provided in section 138(b) and (c) of the N.I Act and the cognizance of the offence was taken in violation of the provision of section 142 of the said Act.

    4. By an order dated 22.6.95 the learned Magistrate rejected the said application for dropping of the proceeding challenging the said order dated 22.6.95 the present petitioners preferred a revisional application before the learned Judge, City Sessions Court, Calcutta. After a contested hearing the said revisional application was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge by an order dated 10.7.98 It is at this stage the petitioners came up before this court praying for quashing of the proceeding.

    5. Mr. Soumen Ghosh, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners submits that the cognizance of the offence taken by the learned Magistrate is bad in law inasmuch as the same was taken in violation of the provision of section 142(b) of the N.I Act, which provides that cognizance of the offence cannot be taken on the basis of a petition of complaint which is not filed within the statutory period of one month from the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138 of the N.I Act.

    6. Mr. Ghosh the learned Advocate of the petitioners further submits that the complainant/opposite party No. 2 deliberately suppressed the material facts in the petition of complaint. He points out that the concerned cheque was presented for encashment by the complainant in February 13, 1992. Thereafter the complainant received the cheque unpaid along with return memo with an endorsement “Refer to the Drawer” from the State Bank of India, Ahmedabad dated 26.2.92 The said memo was received by the complainant on 22.3.92 So, according to Mr. Ghosh the complainant was supposed to send the demand notice within 15 days from the date of receipt of the intimation from the Bank. But in the present case such demand notice was sent to the accused on 2.12.92, i.e, long after expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of the return memo. Mr. Ghosh further submits that when the cheque was returned unpaid with an endorsement in the return memo “Refer to the Drawer”, this was sufficient to indicate that the cheque was dishonoured for insufficient fund in the account of the accused. So the complainant was supposed to send the demand notice to the accused asking him to make the payment within 15 days from the date of receipt of the said notice. But the complainant failed to send such notice within the stipulated period of 15 days and he issued such demand notice long after that. Mr. Ghosh submits that it is now well settled that “Refer to the Drawer” means insufficiency of fund. In support of his contention Mr. Ghosh relied on a judgment reported in 1991 Cr. L.J 609 wherein it was held by the Hon'ble single Judge of this Court that the remark “Refer to the Drawer” necessarily means that the cheque is returned for want of funds in the account of the drawer of the cheque.

    7. The next judgment relied upon by the petitioners learned Advocate is reported in AIR 1996 SC 2339, wherein it was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court as follows:—

    “It would thus be clear that when a cheque is drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with the banker for payment of any amount of money to another person out of the account for the discharge of the debt in whole or in part or other liability is returned by the bank with the endorsement like (I) in this case ‘I refer to the drawer’ (2) ‘instructions for stoppage of payment’ and (3) ‘stamp exceeds arrangement’, it amounts to dishonour within the meaning of section 138 of the Act.”

    8. The next judgment relied upon by Mr. Ghosh is reported in 1992 Cr. L.J 1619. In the said case the accused issued some cheques, of which some were dishonoured by the Bank giving reason “suit filed by the Bank against the account holder”. Suit by the Bank was for recovery of loan amount. In such circumstances it was held by the Hon'ble Single Judge of Bombay High Court that a plain reading of the reason given by the Bank is that the accused had no amount to his credit. There can not be any meaning other than this. So it was held that section 138 of the N.I Act was very much attracted.

    9. Mr. Ghosh cited another judgment reported in 1998 Cr. L.J 4066. I have carefully gone through of the Hon'ble Apex Court and in my opinion the said case was decided in the facts and circumstances of that particular case which is quite different from the present case. In the said case the point for decision was whether the payee or the holder of a cheque can initiate prosecution for an offence under section 138 of the N.I Act for its dishonour for the second time, if he had not initiated such prosecution on the earlier cause of action. It was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that cause of action within the meaning of section 142(c) of the Act arises and can arise-only once.

    10. In the present case, according to petitioners' learned Advocate there is no valid cause of action. As per provision of the statute demand notice is to be sent by the drawee within 15 days from the date of receipt of the return memo from the Bank and the drawer of the cheque is to make the payment within 15 days from the date of receipt of the demand notice. On failure to make such payment within the period the cause of action arises. Petition of complaint is to be filed within one month from the date when cause of action arose. According to Mr. Ghosh there cannot be any cause of action since no demand notice was issued by the drawee(complainant) in time, i.e, within the stipulated period of 15 days from the date of receipt of intimation from the Bank.

    11. Mr. Pradip Ghosh learned Advocate appearing for the complainant/opposite party submits that the endorsement “Refer to the Drawer” means so many things including dishonour of cheque due to insufficiency of fund. So unless it is ascertained that the cheque was dishonoured for insufficiency of fund a demand notice cannot be issued by the complainant. In the present case after receiving the return memo on 22.3.92 from the Bank with the remark “Refer to the Drawer” the complainant wanted to ascertain through a telegram whether there was sufficient amount in the account of the firm. The complainant also wanted to ascertain by sending a letter by registered post with A/D to the S.B.I Vatva, I.E Branch, Ahmedabad as to whether the company was having sufficient fund in its account. The accused/petitioners came to know on 25.11.92 by a letter issued by their Banker that the Cheque was dishonoured due to insufficiency of fund. Thereafter a demand notice was sent on 2.12.92, which was received by the accused/petitioners on 10.12.92 When the petitioners failed to make the payment within 15 days, the petition of complaint was filed in court. According to Mr. Ghosh the petition of complaint was filed within time and it was not barred by limitation.

    12. Mr. Ghosh relied on a judgment reported in 1991 Company Cases (Vol. 71) page 273. It appears from the said judgment that in an application for quashing of the proceeding the ld. Single Judge of this court held that “Refer to the Drawer” necessarily means that the cheque is returned unpaid for want of fund in the account. Prima facie it was found that the cheque bounced because of inadequacy of funds in the drawers account. So, it was held by this court that it would be premature to hold that the accused persons had not committed any offence. Accordingly the revisional application was dismissed.

    13. Mr. Ghosh next relied on a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (1998) 3 Supreme Court Cases 249, wherein it was held by the Apex Court that even if a cheque is dishonoured because of “stop payment” instruction to the Bank, section 138 of the N.I Act gets attracted. It was further held by the Hon'ble court that the court taking cognizance of the offence under section 138 of the N.I Act is required to be satisfied as to whether a prima facie case is made out under the said provision. The drawer of the cheque gets an opportunity under section 139 of the Act and as such it was held that High Court was not justified in quashing the complaint under section 482 Cr. P.C at the threshold. I have gone through the said judgment and in my opinion the said judgment is not at all applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

    14. I have heard the learned Advocates of the respective parties. It appears from the facts of the case that the concerned cheque was presented for encashment by the complainant on 13.2.92 Thereafter the complainant received the cheque unpaid alongwith the return memo with an endorsement “Refer to the Drawer”. Said memo was received by the complainant on 22.3.92 So as per the provision of the Act the complainant was supposed to send the demand notice within 15 days from the date of receipt of such return memo. This was not done by the complainant and he issued the demand notice on 2.12.92, i.e, long after expiry of the said period. It also appears from the petition of complaint that this fact was suppressed by the complainant for the reasons best known to him. In paragraph 9 of the complaint it was stated that for the first time he came to know about the dishonour of the cheque on 25.11.92, which is not at all correct. It has now been well settled in number of decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court and also of other High Courts that the endorsement “Refer to the Drawer” means the cheque returned for want of funds and it amounts to dishonour of the cheque. There was no reason for the complainant to send a letter again to the concerned Bank for further clarification and to ascertain as to whether there was sufficient fund in the account of the accused company. By such an explanation the delay in sending the demand notice in violation of the specific provision of the Act cannot be justified. Clause (b) to the proviso of section 138 of the N.I Act runs as follows:—

    “Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless-

    a) *********

    b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice, in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of receipt of information by him from the bank regarding return of the cheque as unpaid;

    c) **************************

    15. From a reading of the aforesaid provision of the Act of it becomes clear that the time fixed by section 138(i)(b) of the Act is mandatory.

    16. In view of the discussions made above I am of the opinion that the impugned orders of both the courts below suffer from illegality and the same should be set aside.

    17. Accordingly the revisional application succeeds and the same is allowed. The impugned proceeding being Case No. C-41 of 1993 pending in the court of learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 11th Court is hereby quashed.

    Revisional application allowed.
    Proceeding quashed.
    TDN

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    Maruti Equipments Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. State Of West Bengal & Anr.
    (Apr 27, 2000)