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  • Order 39, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure or Order 26, Rule 9 thereof.15.
  • Order 26, Rule 9 or Order 37, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure.17.
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  • Order 39, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure or Order 26, Rule 9 thereof.15.
  • Order 26, Rule 9 or Order 37, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure.17.
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Sudera Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. v. Jute Corporation of India Ltd.

Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment, delivered by S.B. Sinha, A.C.J., disposes together of two inter-related appeals arising from competing suits between Sudera Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. ("Sudera") and Jute Corporation of India Ltd. ("Jute Corporation").

Sudera filed a suit for eviction against Jute Corporation inter alia on the ground that the period of lease dated 5th December, 1970 had expired. The lease contained an express renewal clause permitting the lessee to obtain a renewed lease for a further period of ten years on giving at least two months' notice, provided rent and covenants were duly observed; the renewed lease would be on the same terms and conditions except as to rent, which was to be mutually agreed and with no covenant for further renewal.

Jute Corporation exercised the option to renew within the stipulated period but the parties failed to reach mutual agreement on the quantum of rent. In that situation Jute Corporation filed a suit for specific performance.

Before the trial Judge, five interlocutory applications were filed in the related litigation, including:

  • an application by Sudera for a summary decree under Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules;
  • an application by Jute Corporation for leave to continue depositing month-by-month a stated sum equivalent to rent;
  • a later application by Sudera for appointment of a valuer to compute reasonable market rent;
  • an application by Jute Corporation seeking a mandatory injunction directing Sudera to restore air-conditioning services in the suit premises;
  • another application by Jute Corporation for extension of time for filing a written statement (not in issue on appeal).

The learned trial Judge rejected Jute Corporation's application for leave to deposit and its application to restore essential air-conditioning. The trial Judge also rejected Sudera's application for appointment of a valuer to fix rent. Both parties appealed against those orders; these appeals were heard together and are disposed of by the present common judgment. M.H.S. Ansari, J. concurred.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned trial Judge ought to have appointed a valuer for determination of the quantum of rent?
  2. Whether Sudera can be compelled by mandatory injunction to restore the air-conditioning as prayed for by Jute Corporation?

Arguments of the Parties

Sudera's Arguments (as recorded)

  • Sudera's primary contention was that the sole point of difference between the parties concerned the quantum of rent; that issue was common to both suits (the eviction suit by Sudera and the specific performance suit by Jute Corporation).
  • On that basis, Sudera argued the Court should have appointed a valuer to determine the reasonable market rent and thereby end the controversy between the parties.
  • Sudera (through Mr. Sen and Mr. P. Chatterjee) also characterized air-conditioning as a "luxury" (as later referred to by the Court when describing Mr. Sen's submission on the point).

Jute Corporation's Arguments (as recorded)

  • Jute Corporation (through Mr. Anindya Mitra, Sr. Counsel) contended that determination of the quantum of rent is a matter to be decided upon evidence adduced by the parties in light of the lease agreement, renewal request and surrounding circumstances (including subsequent agreements relating to electricity and air-conditioning charges and their modes of enhancement).
  • It was argued that the issue could not be decided at an interlocutory stage or by appointment of a valuer, because it was a substantive matter in issue in the suits and required judicial adjudication based on evidence.
  • Jute Corporation sought, as an interlocutory relief, leave to deposit monthly an agreed sum equivalent to rent and to have the air-conditioning restored if or when appropriate payments were made.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Martin Burn Limited v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. (reported in (1988) 2 Cal LJ 416) That in a suit for eviction on expiry of a lease containing a renewal clause, if there is disagreement as to the quantum of rent between the parties, the Court has jurisdiction to fix the proper rent. The Court accepted that this decision establishes the Court's jurisdiction to fix rent where parties disagree; it is conceded and relied upon when assessing the proper forum and process to determine rent.
State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari (AIR 1961 SC 221) Held that a Commissioner cannot be appointed for seizure of documents and that for collection of evidence on behalf of the parties no commissioner can be appointed (illustrating limits on delegating judicial functions). The Court cited this authority to support the proposition that judicial functions (including adjudication based on evidence) cannot be delegated to commissioners or similar officers.
Re P. Moosa Kutty (AIR 1953 Madras 717) Holds that adjudication on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties is a judicial function and cannot be delegated under provisions like Order 26, Rule 9 or Order 37, Rule 7 of the CPC. The Court invoked this case to reinforce that appointment of a valuer to decide the substantive issue of rent would amount to impermissible delegation of a judicial function.
Sasanka Sekhar v. Dinanath Goraia (AIR 1952 Patna 271) Similar holding that adjudication based on evidence is a judicial function not delegable under Order 26, Rule 9 or Order 37, Rule 7 CPC. The Court relied on this authority alongside Re P. Moosa Kutty to buttress the rule against delegating judicial adjudicatory tasks to a valuer or commissioner.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court set out the factual matrix and the procedural posture: the parties agreed about renewal but disputed the amount of rent for the renewed term. The trial Judge had refused a Sudera application to appoint a valuer on the ground that he (the trial Judge) did not have jurisdiction to determine the quantum of rent at an interlocutory stage and that the question would arise at the time of ascertaining mesne profits in the eviction suit.

The appellate Court examined the competing submissions. Sudera urged appointment of a valuer because the single issue of dispute between the parties was the quantum of rent and appointing a valuer would expedite final resolution. Jute Corporation opposed delegation, arguing that fixation of rent required judicial adjudication based on evidence—considering the lease terms, the request for renewal, and subsequent agreements concerning electricity and air-conditioning charges and their adjustment mechanisms—and therefore could not be resolved at an interlocutory stage or by a valuer.

The Court observed that nearly five years had elapsed and the renewed term would be for ten years, creating urgency for an early final determination. Despite this urgency, the Court accepted Jute Corporation's submission that the matter must be judicially decided on evidence and is not an appropriate subject for interlocutory determination by a valuer.

The Court emphasised the fundamental legal principle that a court cannot delegate its judicial functions. It held that the appellants themselves were bound by their contention that the quantum of rent is to be fixed by the Court; therefore that judicial power could not be delegated to a valuer under provisions like Order 39, Rule 7, Order 26, Rule 9 or Order 37, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. To support this, the Court relied on the cited authorities (State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari; Re P. Moosa Kutty; Sasanka Sekhar v. Dinanath Goraia), which prohibit appointment of commissioners/valuers for functions that require judicial adjudication on evidence.

On the second issue—restoration of air-conditioning—the Court considered the lease description (demise of a centrally air-conditioned 5th floor) and held that air-conditioning in this factual situation could not be characterized as a mere luxury; it was a feature of the premises and thus prima facie a basic necessity under the terms of the demise. The Court noted that the lessee historically paid rent, service charges and air-conditioning charges and the parties had adjusted the mode of reckoning such charges from time to time. The parties disputed the rates: Jute Corporation suggested Rs. 6.50 per sq. ft. monthly rental; Sudera claimed about Rs. 150 per sq. ft. The Court took judicial notice of increases in electricity tariff and observed it would be difficult to fix a final figure at an interlocutory stage.

The Court also took note of evidence in Sudera's affidavit that different tenants in the same building had paid different air-conditioning rates (for example National Insurance Company paying 9.55 per sq. ft. from October 1997; Export Credit Guarantee Corporation paying 7.14 per sq. ft. from April 1997).

Balancing the need for an interim, practical solution against the principle that the substantive issue must be finally decided by the Court on evidence, the Court directed an ad hoc interim deposit mechanism: Jute Corporation was ordered to deposit arrears at Rs. 10 per sq. ft. from the date of expiry of the lease (subject to adjustments), service charges at Rs. 3.33 per sq. ft., and Rs. 10 per sq. ft. towards air-conditioning charges; and to continue paying current and future monthly charges by the 15th of the succeeding month. Upon deposit of the arrears as directed, Sudera was ordered to forthwith restore air-conditioning facilities to Jute Corporation. The Court made clear this order was provisional and subject to the final judgment and decree in the suits, and that the trial Court could pass consequential orders at final judgment.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appellate Court dismissed the appeal challenging the trial Judge's rejection of the application for appointment of a valuer and affirmed the principle that the fixation of rent where parties disagree is a judicial function that cannot be delegated to a valuer or commissioner. The Court disposed of the two appeals with the interim directions described above, and directed that the two suits be heard analogously and expeditiously. There was no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: Jute Corporation is directed to make specified ad hoc deposits (arrears at Rs. 10 per sq. ft., service charges Rs. 3.33 per sq. ft., and Rs. 10 per sq. ft. for air-conditioning) and continue monthly payments; upon deposit Sudera must restore air-conditioning. The final entitlement to rent and other sums remains to be determined at trial and the interim payments are subject to adjustment in the final decree.
  • On legal principle: the judgment underscores and applies established authorities that adjudication on the basis of evidence is a judicial function which the Court cannot delegate (e.g., to a valuer or commissioner) under the cited provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court therefore refused to appoint a valuer at the interlocutory stage in these suits.
  • No broader new precedent was announced beyond the application of existing authorities and the reiteration of the non-delegation principle; the order provides an interim mechanism to balance fairness and urgency pending final judicial determination.

Order accordingly. S.B. Sinha, A.C.J. delivered the judgment; M.H.S. Ansari, J. concurred.

    Jute Corporation Of India Ltd. v. Sudera Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. .

    S.B Sinha, A.C.J:— These two appeals being inter-related were taken up for hearing together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.

    2. Sudera Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as ‘Sudera’) has filed a suit for eviction against Jute Corporation of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Jute Corporation’) inter alia, on the ground of expiry of the period of lease dated 5th December, 1970. Admittedly, the said indenture of lease contained a renewal clause which is in the following terms:—

    “In case the Lessee shall be desirous of obtaining a renewed lease of the demised premises for a further period of ten years and of such desire shall give at least two months' previous notice in writing to the Lessor and shall have duly paid the rent and complied with the (sic) carried all the covenants and conditions herein contained and on the part of the Lessee to be paid observed and performed then and in such case the Lessor shall at the cost and expense of the lessee grant to the Lessee a renewed lease of the demised premises for a further term of ten years on the same terms and conditions herein contained except as to rent as may be mutually agreed and that in the renewed lease there shall be no covenant for renewal.”

    3. The Jute Corporation has exercised the option to renew the lease within the stipulated period. It is, however, admitted that no mutual agreement could be reached as regard the quantum of rent.

    4. In the aforementioned situation, Jute Corporation also filed a Suit for specific performance of contract. Before the learned trial Judge, five applications had been filed including one by Sudera for passing a decree under Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules for a summary decree. The second application was made by Jute Corporation for grant of leave to continue to deposit month by month by the 15th of every succeeding month, a sum of Rs. 69,642.23 being the sum equivalent to the rent payable by the defendant in respect of the suit premises. When arguments in relation to the aforementioned two applications were going on, Sudera filed a third application for appointment of a valuer for the purpose of computing reasonable market rent. A fourth application was filed by Jute Corporation directing issuance of a mandatory injunction upon the plaintiff to forthwith restore air-conditioning services in the suit premises. We are not concerned with the fifth application herein which was filed by Jute Corporation for extension of time for filing written statement.

    5. The learned trial Judge by reason of the impugned order rejected the application of Jute Corporation for leave to deposit as also the application to restore essential supply of air-conditioning. The learned trial Judge also rejected Sudera's application for appointment of a valuer for fixing the quantum of rent. Both the parties, therefore, had preferred these appeals against the aforementioned orders.

    6. Keeping in view the stand taken by Sudera before the learned trial Judge it now does not lie in its mouth to contend that he is entitled to a decree for eviction.

    7. It has been conceded that in view of the decision of this Court in Martin Burn Limited…Plaintiff; v. Steel Authority Of India Ltd.…Defendant. reported in (1988) 2 Cal LJ 416, in the event of disagreement of the quantum of rent between the plaintiff and the defendant in a suit for eviction on the ground of expiry of the period of lease containing renewal clause, the Court has the requisite jurisdiction to fix the proper rent.

    8. Two questions, therefore, arise for consideration in these appeals:

    1. Whether the learned trial Judge ought to have appointed a valuer for determination of the quantum of rent?

    2. Whether Sudera would be compelled by mandatory injunction to restore the air-conditioning as prayed for by Jute Corporation?

    9. The learned trial Judge rejected the application of Sudera for appointment of valuer on the short ground that he had no jurisdiction to determine the quantum of rent. According to the learned trial Judge, that question would arise in the suit filed by Sudera for eviction while ascertaining mesne profit and the same could not, in the opinion of the learned trial Judge, be ascertained at interlocutory stage.

    10. Mr. Sen, the learned counsel along with Mr. P. Chatterjee appearing on behalf of Sudera, however, submitted that the only point of difference between the parties was as to the quantum of rent and that in short is the only issue in both the suits (i) filed by Sudera for eviction, and (ii) the suit filed by Jute Corporation for specific performance. It was, therefore, urged by Mr. Sen that the Court should have proceeded to appoint a Valuer and thereby give a quietus to the controversy between the parties.

    11. On the other hand, Mr. Anindya Mitra, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Jute Corporation contended that the issue as to the quantum of rent is a matter to be decided upon evidence that may be adduced by the parties in the light of the agreement of lease executed on the basis whereof renewal of the lease has been prayed for and the surrounding circumstances including the subsequent agreements entered into between the parties with respect to the electricity and air-conditioning charges, and the mode and method for enhancement thereof. In short it was the submission of Mr. Anindya Mitra that the matter is not one which could have been decided either at the interlocutory stage or by appointment of a valuer as the same was a matter in issue in the suit and had to be decided by the Court upon the evidence that may be adduced by the parties.

    12. We note that almost five years have elapsed and keeping in view the fact that the renewed term of lease is 10 years, the matter requires to be decided expeditiously. We also take note of the fact that the only controversy or point of dispute between the parties in the two suits is with regard to the fixation of the amount of rent for the renewed period of lease.

    13. Such being the position, we are inclined to accept the submission made by Mr. Mitra that the matter has to be judicially decided and is not one which could be decided at an interlocutory stage. The Court no doubt has issued certain interim direction from time to time directing the Jute Corporation to make certain ad hoc payments to the landlord. But a lasting solution to the problem between the parties lies in early disposal of the two suits by deciding the main issue between the parties as regard the quantum of rent.

    14. It is now a well settled principles of law that a Court cannot delegate its judicial function to any other authority. On its own showing the appellant is bound by its contention that the quantum of rent is to be fixed by the Court. Such a judicial power cannot be delegated to a Valuer either in terms of Order 39, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure or Order 26, Rule 9 thereof.

    15. In State Of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari reported in AIR 1961 SC 221, the Apex Court, inter alia, held that a Commissioner cannot be appointed for the purpose of seizure of documents. For the purpose of collection of evidence on behalf of the parties also no commissioner can be appointed.

    16. In re. P. Moosa Kutty reported in AIR 1953 Madras 717, and Sasanka Sekhar v. Dinanath Goraia reported in AIR 1952 Patna 271, it has been held that adjudication on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties is a judicial function and such judicial function cannot be delegated in terms of Order 26, Rule 9 or Order 37, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    17. So far as the second question is concerned although, according to Mr. Sen, air-conditioning is a luxury but keeping in view the fact that under the terms of the lease the demise is in respect of centrally air-conditioned 5th floor of the premises No. 1 Shakespeare Sarani, Calcutta containing an area of about 191.35 sq. ft. we are of the opinion that having regard to the structures meant for Centrally Air-conditioned buildings, grant of facility of air-conditioning cannot be said to be a luxury. It, in the fact situation of this case, is a basic necessity particularly in view of the fact that the same is the subject of demise.

    18. It has not been disputed before us that lessee used to pay to the lessor not only the rent but also the service charge as also the air-conditioning charges. The parties had also agreed from time to time to fix and refix the mode and manner of reckoning such charges. It is not the case of Sudera that Jute Corporation had not paid such charges to it so far. However, according to the Jute Corporation the monthly rental should be at the rate of 6.50 per square feet whereas according to Sudera the monthly rental would be about Rs. 150 per sq. ft. The Court in a situation of this nature can only take judicial notice of the fact that there had been increase in the electricity tariff. The job of the Court in arriving at a figure, keeping in view the controversy between the parties at an interlocutory stage is a difficult one. However, it appears that Sudera had been realising different rates of air-conditioning charges from different tenants although all of them are occupying the same building.

    19. From the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the Sudera it appears that National Insurance Company had been paying air-conditioning charges at the rate of 9.55 per sq. ft. with effect from October, 1997; whereas Export Credit Guarantee Corporation had been paying 7.14 per square feet with effect from April, 1997.

    20. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that interest of justice will be subserved if on an ad hoc basis the Jute Corporation is directed to deposit the arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 10 per square feet to be calculated from the date of expiry of the lease subject to any adjustment of any amount that might have been made and service charges at the rate of Rs. 3.33 per sq. ft. and Rs. 10 per sq. ft. towards air-conditioning charges and continue to pay the current and further monthly rent by the 15th of the next month succeeding for which the charges fall due. On deposit of the amount towards arrears charges Sudera shall forthwith restore the air-conditioning facilities to Jute Corporation. This order shall be subject to the judgment and decree which may ultimately be passed in the suit and, thus, it would also be open to the learned Court to pass a consequential order at the time of passing the judgment and decree as to him may seem fit and proper.

    21. We accordingly find no infirmity in the order of the learned trial Judge rejecting the application for appointment of a Valuer on the ground as he did. Appeal No. 262 of 1998 in our view, deserves to be dismissed, however, with an observation that the two suits should be heard analogously and expeditiously.

    22. These two appeals are disposed of with the aforementioned directions and observations. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs.

    M.H.S Ansari, J.:— 23. I agree.

    Order accordingly.

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    Jute Corporation Of India Ltd. v. Sudera Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. .
    (Aug 24, 1999)