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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners are importers of spices who challenged Notification No. 29/97 02 dated 17 December 1997, published in the Gazette of India by the Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) and the Ex-Officio, Additional Secretary to the Government of India. The petitioners alleged that the impugned notification granted special favours to National Agricultural Co-operative Marketing Federation of India Limited (NAFED) and Spices Trading Corporation Limited (STCL) illegally and in violation of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.

The writ petition was originally filed against four official respondents (DGFT and other named officers and the Union of India). By order dated 4 February 1998 the court directed that NAFED and STCL be made parties (now respondents Nos. 5 and 6) because any relief would seriously affect them. A preliminary objection was raised by the respondents challenging the territorial jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court to entertain the writ petition.

The jurisdictional issue was heard on 10 February 1998. The petitioners relied on facts said to tie the cause of action to Calcutta: they carry on import business there, had been granted an Import & Export Code by respondent No. 3 (whose office was in Calcutta), claimed prejudice to their Calcutta business including an alleged contract entered into at Calcutta with foreign purchasers, and asserted that the impugned notification was being enforced at Calcutta.

The respondents (Nos. 1–4) contended that an identical issue was pending before the Delhi High Court, that relevant records were at Delhi where the hearing was continuing, and that an application for transfer to the Supreme Court was pending. They also argued that the notification was issued by an authority outside the Calcutta High Court's territorial jurisdiction and that respondent No. 3 (with an office in Calcutta) lacked power to make or withdraw the notification. Respondents Nos. 5 and 6 adopted these submissions and additionally emphasized that the notification became effective upon publication (distinguishing it from cases where service of notice is integral to the cause of action).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Calcutta High Court has territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to entertain the writ petition challenging Notification No. 29/97 02 dated 17 December 1997.
  2. Whether, for the purposes of territorial jurisdiction, a statutory notification issued under a Central Act and applicable nationwide gives rise to a cause of action within the place where the petitioner is affected.
  3. Whether the presence within the Court's territorial jurisdiction of an officer against whom primary relief is sought or the place where a part of the cause of action arose is sufficient to sustain jurisdiction under Article 226(1) or Article 226(2).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners carry on the business of importing spices at Calcutta and have an Import & Export Code number issued by respondent No. 3 at Calcutta.
  • The impugned notification was applied and enforced in Calcutta and caused prejudice to the petitioners' business there.
  • There was a contract entered into at Calcutta with foreign purchasers who threatened action if supplies were not made, tying the cause of action to Calcutta.
  • On these bases, the petitioners sought to attract the territorial jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court under Article 226.

Respondents' Arguments (Nos. 1–4)

  • An identical challenge to the notification was pending before the Delhi High Court and relevant records and proceedings were located in Delhi; an application for transfer to the Supreme Court was also pending.
  • The notification had been issued by respondent No. 1 (DGFT) whose office was outside the Calcutta High Court's territorial jurisdiction, and respondent No. 3 in Calcutta lacked power to formulate, change or withdraw the policy.
  • Mere financial loss or prejudice suffered by the petitioners in Calcutta was insufficient to found jurisdiction in the Calcutta High Court.

Respondents Nos. 5 and 6 (NAFED and STCL)

  • They adopted the submissions of respondents Nos. 1–4 regarding lack of territorial jurisdiction.
  • They emphasized that the notification became effective on publication (i.e., it was statutory and effective immediately upon publication), distinguishing it from situations where service of notice creates the cause of action.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Industrial Fuel Marketing Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1983 Cal 253 That jurisdiction under Article 226(1) may be affirmed where the office of the concerned officer (against whom primary relief is sought) is within the Court's territorial limits. The Court cited this to illustrate that presence of the officer whose orders are challenged within the jurisdiction can found jurisdiction; used as a general proposition when considering presence of respondents within jurisdiction.
Oil & Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994) 4 SCC 711 That if none of the respondents are within the Court's jurisdiction, but the cause of action wholly or partly arises within it, the writ may be entertained under Article 226(2); the place where the impugned act (e.g., non-consideration of a tender) occurred is relevant. The Court relied on this as authority that the issue is factual and to support the proposition that the place where the impugned act takes effect can determine jurisdiction under Article 226(2).
Damomal Kausomal Raisinghant v. Union of India, AIR 1967 Bom 355 Where an impugned order is personal and affects the petitioner alone, the cause of action arises where the order becomes effective or the action is effected. Used to support the proposition that personal orders cause the locus of cause of action to be where their effects are felt (i.e., where proceedings consequent to the order would be taken).
L.V. Veert Chettiar v. S.T. Officer, AIR 1971 Mad 155 Service of a notice to assess (as part of tax/ fiscal machinery) can be part of the cause of action because the machinery of assessment creates effects felt within the territorial limits. Invoked to demonstrate that service of notice initiating fiscal machinery can give rise to a part of the cause of action in the place where the impact is felt.
State of Maharashtra v. Sarvodaya Industries, AIR 1975 Bom 197 In suits for compensation for wrong alleged, the place where loss was suffered is part of the cause of action. Cited to support the proposition that the locus of damage may determine part of the cause of action for jurisdictional purposes.
P.S. Rao v. Union of India, AIR 1974 Mysore 39 Where the basis of relief is related to a post or position located in a particular place, that place can be part of the cause of action and confer jurisdiction. Referred to as an example where the petitioner’s post in Bangalore made that forum appropriate for the writ petition.
Abdul Kafi Khan v. Union of India, AIR 1979 Cal 354 Where disciplinary proceedings are sought to be quashed, the Court within whose territorial limits the proceedings took place is the appropriate forum. Used to show that the place where proceedings occur is an important consideration in determining territorial jurisdiction.
Gurinder Jit Singh v. Union of India & Ors., 1998 (1) CLJ 98 If processing of a complaint or related action plays an important part in the decision, that processing location can form part of the cause of action. Cited to show that even where subsequent processing outside the petitioner’s state matters, the place where the petitioner initiated statutory complaint and where processing occurred may form part of the cause of action.
State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties, (1985) 3 SCC 217; AIR 1985 SC 1289 Mere service of notice within the Court's territory does not necessarily create a cause of action unless service is an integral part of the cause of action; the effectivity of certain statutory notifications may be determined by publication, not service. The Court used this to explain that for some statutory notifications (which become effective on publication) mere service does not create jurisdiction; service must be integral to the cause of action.
Hindusthan Sugar Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1985 Cal 17 Distinguishes between executive circulars and statutory orders/notifications applicable nationwide; for statutory instruments of nationwide application the place where the petitioner is affected may have jurisdiction. Applied to draw a distinction and to support the proposition that a challenge to a central statute or notification of nationwide application may be entertained where the petitioner is affected.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first formulated broad propositions about territorial jurisdiction under Article 226, derived from the authorities cited:

  • If all respondents are within the Court's jurisdiction, Article 226(1) jurisdiction lies.
  • Even if not all respondents are within the Court's jurisdiction, presence within the jurisdiction of the particular respondent against whom primary relief is sought can suffice for Article 226(1).
  • If none of the respondents is within the jurisdiction, but the cause of action wholly or partly arises within it, the writ may be entertained under Article 226(2); determining this requires factual examination of pleadings.
  • The nature of the impugned action or order is relevant in deciding whether the cause of action arises within the forum (for example, whether the order is personal, whether service of notice is integral, or whether the impugned instrument is a nationwide statutory instrument).
  • There is also an overriding judicial discretion to refuse to entertain a writ if another forum is more convenient, although no such argument was pressed in this case.

The Court then analysed the specific statutory and policy framework governing the impugned notification:

  • The notification was issued under Section 5 of the Foreign Trade (Development & Regulation) Act, 1992 ("the Act") read with Paragraph 4.1 of the Export & Import Policy, 1997–2002 ("the policy"). The Court reproduced Section 5 and Paragraph 4.1 to show that the Central Government promulgates export/import policy by notification in the Official Gazette and that exports/imports shall be free except as regulated by the policy or other law.
  • Paragraph 4.14 of the policy expressly provides that any request for relaxation of the policy may be made to the Director General of Foreign Trade (DGFT), who "may pass such orders or grant such relaxation or relief as he may deem fit and proper" and may exempt persons or classes in public interest.
  • The Court observed that neither the Act nor the policy provides for delegation of the DGFT's power to other officers. The DGFT's office is in Delhi, so even if respondent No. 3 had an office in Calcutta, that was immaterial to the locus of the principal authority who could grant the relief sought.
  • Therefore, the Court concluded the principal respondent against whom primary relief was claimed was outside the Calcutta High Court's territorial jurisdiction in the sense of being physically located elsewhere.
  • Given that, the petitioners had to rely on Article 226(2) by establishing that at least a part of the cause of action arose within the Calcutta High Court's territorial limits.
  • The Court then applied the earlier propositions distinguishing types of challenges: since the impugned notification was a statutory instrument issued under a central statute and having nationwide application, the matter fell within the category where, if the petitioner is affected in a particular place (here, the petitioner's place of business in Calcutta), that place has jurisdiction to entertain the challenge (proposition IV(b) as formulated by the Court).

The Court noted other relevant factual points raised by the parties (e.g., pending proceedings in Delhi, an application for transfer to the Supreme Court), but observed that respondents did not press a forum-convenience argument that would engage the Court's overriding discretion to decline jurisdiction.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court rejected the preliminary objection to territorial jurisdiction and held that the Calcutta High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition challenging Notification No. 29/97 02 dated 17 December 1997. The Court decided the preliminary issue in favour of the petitioners and directed that the matter proceed to be heard on merits.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The writ petition will be heard on its merits before the Calcutta High Court; the preliminary jurisdictional bar raised by the respondents was removed.
  • Scope of decision: The Court grounded jurisdiction on the principle that a challenge to a central statutory notification of nationwide application can be entertained where the petitioner is affected (i.e., at the petitioner's place of business). The opinion did not record that it was creating a novel precedent beyond applying and synthesising established principles, and it did not articulate broader changes to jurisdictional doctrine beyond the propositions it set out.

Miscellaneous Order

The Court directed that a xerox copy of the judgment, duly signed by the Assistant Registrar, be given to the parties on their undertaking to apply for a certified copy and on payment of the usual charges.

Prepared strictly from the text of the provided opinion. No information was added beyond the content of the opinion.

    Raichand & Co. & Anr. v. Director General Of Foreign Trade & Ors.

    The judgment of the Court was as follows:—

    1. The petitioners are importers of spices. The petitioners have challenged a notification being No. 29/97 02 dated 17th December, 1997 published in the Gazette of India (Extraordinary) by the Directorate of Foreign Trade and Ex-Officio, Additional Secretary to the Government of India. The grievance of the writ petitioners is primarily that by the impugned notification, special favours had been granted with regard to importation of spices to National Agricultural Co-operative Marketing Federation of India Limited (NAFED) and Spices Trading Corporation Limited (STCL) illegally and in violation of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.

    2. Initially the writ application was filed against four respondents namely; the Director General of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce, having his Office at Udyog Bhawan. New Delhi-11001the Deputy Director General of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce, having his Office at Udyog Bhawan, New Delhi-110011; the Joint Director General of Foreign Trade, having his Office at 4, Esplanade East, Calcutta 700069 and the Union of India, through the Joint Director General of Foreign Trade, having his Office at 4, Esplanade East, Calcutta-700069. On the basis of allegations contained in the petition and as the Court was of the view that any relief granted in the writ petition would seriously affect both NAFED and STCL, by an order dated 4th February, 1998 the petitioners were directed to make them party respondents. Both NAFED and STCL are now respondents Nos. 5 and 6 in the writ petition. NAFED has been described in the cause title as being located at “Ashram Chowk, New Delhi” and STCL has been described as been located at “72, Nandl Durg Road Extension, Bangalore-560046”. A preliminary objection has been raised by the respondents that this Court does not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ application. The matter was taken up for hearing on 10th February, 1998 on the preliminary issue of jurisdiction. The petitioners sought to attract the jurisdiction of this Court on the ground that they carry on the business of importing spices at Calcutta. They had been granted an Import & Export Code Number by the respondent No. 3, who has his Office in Calcutta. According to the petitioners the notification which had been challenged had been made applicable to the petitioners at Calcutta and caused prejudice to the petitioners business here. The petitioners have relied upon a contract stated to have been entered into at Calcutta with the foreign purchasers who were threatening action against the petitioner in the event the petitioner did not make supplies. It has also been argued that the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 had their Office in Calcutta and the impugned notification was being enforced and implemented in Calcutta.

    3. The respondents Nos. 1 to 4 have submitted that an identical issue was pending before the Delhi High Court. A writ application had been Sled by another exporter of spices raising the same contention. It is also stated that all the records relating to the case were therefore at Delhi where the hearing was continuing. It is submitted that an application had been made to the Supreme Court for transfer the proceedings from the Calcutta High Court and the application was pending admission. It is also submitted that the notification had been issued by the respondent No. 1, who had his office outside the jurisdiction of this Court. It is stated that the respondent No. 3 had no power to either formulate or effect change in the policy nor issue any notification nor withdraw the impugned notification. It is submitted that merely because the petitioners might suffer loss and damages in Calcutta was insufficient to found jurisdiction in the Calcutta High Court.

    4. The respondents Nos. 5 and 6 have adopted the arguments of the respondents Nos. 1 to 4. They have also stated that the notification became effective from the date of its publication. This was to be distinguished from cases where service of notice was held by Courts to be sufficient to be part of the cause of action because the notice became effective on communication.

    5. Several decisions have been relied upon by the parties in support of these respective submissions that these facts were either sufficient or insufficient to attract the jurisdiction of this Court.

    6. On a consideration of the cases cited and the language of Article 226(1) would venture to lay down the following broad propositions:—

    (1) If the respondents are all within the jurisdiction of the Court the writ application will lie under Article 226(1)

    (ii) Even if all the respondents are not within the jurisdiction of the Court, the presence of the concerned respondent against whom the primary relief is claimed within the jurisdiction of a Court would be sufficient to clothe such Court with the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ application. Thus in (1) Industrial Fuel Marketing Co.… v. Union Of India…., AIR 1983 Cal 253 the jurisdiction of this Court was affirmed under Art. 226(1) as it was found that the office of the concerned Officer was in Calcutta.

    (iii) If none of the respondents are within the Court's jurisdiction, but if the cause of action wholly or in part arises within its territorial limits, the writ application may be entertained under Art. 226(2). The issue has to be decided on facts established on the entire pleadings and the Court is not limited to the statements contained in the petition (See (2) Oil & Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994) 4 SCC 711).

    (iv) In determining whether the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of the Court, the nature of the impugned action or order is relevant.

    (a) If the impugned order action is personal in the sense that it affects the writ petitioner alone the citus of cause of action will depend upon the relief claimed and would arise where the order becomes effective or the action effected.

    (i) Thus in (3) Damomal Kausomal Raisinghant v. Union of India, AIR 1967 Bom 355 the subject matter of challenge was an order applicable only to the writ petitioner who had been sought to be denied compensation by the impugned order. It was in that context that the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court said:—

    “The petitioner, as it appears, was a rasident of Ullasnagar, a place situated in the District of Thane of Mabaiastra State. The impugned order itself shows that the case was heard in Bombay. It is indeed true that the order on the face of it does not show the place where it was made. Even assuming that this order was made by the third respondent in New Delhi, there can hardly be any doubt that the effect of this order fell on the petitioner at Ullasnagar where he resides. It is also not in dispute that the proceedings that would be taken against the petitioner in consequence of the impugned order would be by Officers located within the territories in relation to which this Court exercises jurisdiction.”

    (ii) Similarly in (4) L.V Veert Chettiar v. S.T Officer, Bombay, AIR 1971 Mad 155, cited by the petitioners the subject matter of challenge was a notice to show cause why they would not be assessed to Sales Tax. That was why the Division Bench of the Madras High Court held:—

    “It is established that in fiscal laws a proposal to assess forms part and parcel of the machinery of assessment and thus understood, the service of notice to assess and calling upon the petitioner to explain has given rise to a cause of action as is popularly and legally understood and the machinery of assessment has been set in motion and the impact of that motion is felt by the petitioners within the territorial limits of this State. We have therefore no hesitation in holding that a part of the cause of action has arisen in the State of Tamil Nadu.”

    (iii) The decision of (5) State of Maharashtra v. Sarvodaya Industries, AIR 1975 Bom 197 was rendered in the context of a suit for compensation for “wrong done” or “complained of” under Section 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The place where loss was suffered was held to be part of the cause of action.

    (iv) In (6) P.S Rao v. Union of India, AIR 1974 Mysore 39 the case of the petitioner was that the Union Government was not competent to promote the respondent No. 2 without considering the case of the petitioner who held the post of Head of Utilisation Research at the Forest Research Laboratory, Bangalore. The very basis for claiming relief in the writ petition was that the petitioner was the bolder of the aforesaid post in Bangalore. This was held to be part of the cause of action and sufficient to allow the writ application to be filed up the High Court at Mysore.

    (v) In (7) Abdul Kafi Khan v. Union of India, AIR 1979 Cal 354 relied on by the respondents disciplinary proceedings were sought to be quashed. It was held that the Court within the jurisdiction of which the disciplinary proceedings took place was the appropriate Court.

    (vi) In (8) Gurinder Jit Singh… v. Union Of India & Ors.…, 1998 (1) CLJ 98 the subject matter of challenge was an endorsement in the confidential report of the petitioner. It was held that as the petitioner had made the statutory complaint against the endorsement in Bengal which was forwarded to Command Headquarters, the processing of the complaint played an important part in the decision ultimately taken and therefore it was a part of the cause of action which arose within the jurisdiction of this Court.

    (vii) In Oil & Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994) 4 SCC 711 the writ petitioner had challenged the non-consideration of his tender. The place where the non-consideration took place was held to be the appropriate Court.

    (viii) In (9) State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties, (1985) 3 SCC 217 : AIR 1985 SC 1289 the jurisdiction of this Court had been sought to be attracted on the ground that a notification issued by the State Government under Section 52(1) of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 was served on the petitioner within the jurisdiction of the Court. The Supreme Court held that mere service of notice under Section 52(2) within the jurisdiction of this Court did not give rise to a cause of action unless the service was an integral part of the cause of action:—

    “The answer to the question whether service of notice is an integral part of the cause of action within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution must depend upon the nature of the impugned order giving rise to a cause of action. The notification dated February 8, 1984 issued by the State Government under Section 52(1) of the Act became effective the moment it was published in the Official Gazette as thereupon the notified land became vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. It was not necessary for the respondents to plead the service of the notice on them by the Special Officer.”

    (b) If the challenge is to the vires of a Central statute or notification or other statutory instrument which is applicable nationwide the place where the petitioner is affected by the implementation of the statute would have the jurisdiction to entertain the challenge. A distinction is to be drawn between circulars which are executive in character and statutes or statutory orders, notifications or other statutory instruments (See (10) Hindusthan Sugar Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1985 Cal 17).

    (V) There is an overriding discretion in the Courts to refuse to entertain the writ application on the ground that another forum having jurisdiction was more convenient. No arguments were made on this basis, nor any authority cited by the respondents. However, the respondents statement regarding the pending proceedings before the Delhi High Court may have been a relevant consideration under this head had such an argument been advanced.

    7. Keeping these propositions in mind, I deal with the facts of this case.

    8. The impugned notification was issued under Section 5 of the Foreign Trade (Development & Regulation) Act, 1992 (referred to as the Act) read with Paragraph 4.1 of the Export & Import Policy, 1997 to 2002 (referred to as the policy).

    9. Section 5 reads:—

    “5. Export and import policy—The Central Government may, from time to time formulate and announce, by notification in the Official Gazette, the export and import policy and may also, in like manner, amend that policy.”

    10. Paragraph 4, 1 of the policy provides:—

    “Exports and imports shall be free, except to the extent they are regulated by the provisions of this policy or any other law for the time being in force. The item wise export and import policy shall be, as stated in columns 3 to 5 of the book, titled “ITC (HS) Classifications of Export and Import Items” published and notified by the Director General of Foreign Trade and as amended from time to time.”

    11. What the petitioners are asking for in this writ application may be granted to them by the Director General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) alone. This is clear from Paragraph 4.14 of the policy itself which reads:

    “Any request for relaxation of the provisions of this policy or of any procedure, on the ground that there is genuine hardship to the applicant or that a strict application of the policy or the procedure is likely to have an adverse impact on trade may be made to the Director General of Foreign Trade for such relief as may be necessary. The Director General of Foreign Trade may pass such orders or grant such relaxation or relief as he may deem fit and proper. The Director General of Foreign Trade may, in public interest, exempt any person or class or category of person from any provision of this policy or any procedure and may, while granting such exemption, impose such conditions as he may deem fit”

    12. Neither the policy nor the Act provides for delegation of power so granted to any other Officer by the DGFT. The DGFT has his Office in Delhi. Therefore even if the respondent No. 3 has its Office within the jurisdiction of this Court it is immaterial.

    13. The respondents are thus correct in their submission that the principal respondent against whom the primary relief has been claimed is outside the jurisdiction of this Court.

    14. The petitioners must therefore fall hack on Article 226(2) and establish that at least part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court so that this Court has the territorial jurisdiction to entertain their petition. The impugned notification is statutory having been Issued in terms of and under Section 5 of the Act. What is being challenged is the constitutional validity of a statutory notification issued under a Central Statute having application throughout the country. The case, in my opinion, would therefore fall within proposition IV (b) above. Therefore, this Court, where the petitioner has its place of business, would have the jurisdiction to entertain the writ application. I therefore reject the preliminary objection raised by the respondents and decide the issue in favour of the petitioner. The matter may now be heard on merits.

    15. Let a xerox copy of the judgment duly signed by the Assistant Registrar of this Court be given to the parties upon their undertaking to apply for certified copy of the judgment and on payment of usual charges.

    16. S.K.G

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    Raichand & Co. & Anr. v. Director General Of Foreign Trade & Ors.
    (Mar 17, 1998)