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citation codes
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  • s. 34 of the Recovery of Debts due to the Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993.
  • Code) Sub-section (2) of s. 22 specifies the applications of Civil Procedure Code
  • Sub-section (1) of s. 22
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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Acts
  • s. 34 of the Recovery of Debts due to the Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993.
  • Code) Sub-section (2) of s. 22 specifies the applications of Civil Procedure Code
  • Sub-section (1) of s. 22
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The matter arises from revisional applications under Article 227 of the Constitution challenging orders dated 3-1-96 and 4-1-96 passed by the Presiding Officer of the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Calcutta in T.A. Nos. 335/94 and 336/94. The Tribunal had dismissed the petitioners' request to decide the question of jurisdiction as a preliminary point before proceeding with the merits. The cases involve proceedings under s. 34 of the Recovery of Debts due to the Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, and the petitioners had contended that a mortgage suit was pending in a Civil Court over the same matter, thereby ousting the Tribunal's jurisdiction unless jurisdiction was decided first.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Debt Recovery Tribunal may or must decide the question of its jurisdiction as a preliminary point when jurisdiction is specifically challenged (particularly where a suit for mortgage is pending in a Civil Court).
  2. Whether the Tribunal's application of sub-section (2) of s. 22 (application of certain Civil Procedure Code provisions) precludes or affects the Tribunal from deciding jurisdiction as a preliminary issue.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (Mr. Anil Mukherjee)

  • The matters fall under s. 34 of the Recovery of Debts Act and a mortgage suit is pending in a Civil Court over the same subject, which, if true, leaves the Civil Court competent and the Tribunal without jurisdiction.
  • The petitioners prayed that the Tribunal decide jurisdiction as a preliminary point before dealing with merits.
  • Sub-s. (2) of s. 22 contemplates application of certain provisions of the Civil Procedure Code (discovery, inspection, evidence on affidavit, examination of witnesses etc.) upon an application of the Bank as envisaged in s. 19, but there is no provision specifying procedure when an application is filed by the respondent.
  • If the Tribunal orders discovery and evidence and later finds it lacks jurisdiction, those orders would be infructuous; no court should pass an ineffective order.
  • Principles of natural justice require that the question of jurisdiction be considered earlier; the Tribunal's finding that there is no power to decide jurisdiction as a preliminary point was a wrong conception/appreciation of law rendering the order illegal and irregular.

Opposite Party's Argument (Mr. Udayan Sen)

  • Did not dispute the legal proposition advanced by petitioners but submitted that accelerating the proceeding (by allowing preliminary decision on jurisdiction) would serve to bring the matter to earlier finality.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court treated the matter as a pure question of law and relied on the text of the Recovery of Debts Act. It analyzed s. 22(1) and s. 22(2) of the Act: s. 22(1) provides that the Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal are not bound by the procedure of the Code of Civil Procedure but shall be guided by principles of natural justice and have power to regulate their own procedure; s. 22(2) lists specific CPC provisions that apply (summoning witnesses, discovery, evidence on affidavit, commissions, review, dismissal for default, setting aside ex parte orders, and other prescribed matters).

The court observed that if the Tribunal orders discovery or evidence and subsequently concludes it lacks jurisdiction, those prior orders would be ineffective, and a court/tribunal should not pass ineffective orders. Because the Act and Rules do not prescribe procedure for a respondent's application raising jurisdiction, the Tribunal must rely on its rule-making/ procedural power under s. 22(1) and the principles of natural justice. Applying those principles, the court held that when jurisdiction is specifically raised, natural justice requires the question of jurisdiction be decided early (as a preliminary point) rather than only at final hearing with all other matters.

The court found the Tribunal's conclusion (that it had no power to decide jurisdiction as a preliminary point) to be legally unsustainable and therefore set aside the impugned order.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The impugned order is set aside and the Debt Recovery Tribunal is directed to decide the question of jurisdiction as a preliminary point.

Implications and direct effects:

  • If, after deciding the preliminary point, the Tribunal finds it has jurisdiction, it must proceed to hear the matter day-to-day and dispose of it within four months from the date of the direction.
  • The Tribunal is directed to allow parties to adduce evidence after the question of jurisdiction is decided.
  • The revisional application is disposed of and parties may obtain certified xerox copies of the order expeditiously.
  • No broader precedent or expansive legal rule beyond the immediate directives to the Tribunal is announced in the opinion; the decision's practical consequence is limited to the parties and the Tribunal's procedure in these proceedings.

    Jitendra Kumar Khan & Anr. v. The Presiding Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal, W. Bengal & Ors.

    N.K Bhattacharyya, J.:—Heard the submission of the learned Advocate for the petitioners Mr. Anil Mukherjee appearing with the learned Advocates Mr. Basudeb Mukherjee, Dilip Chatterjee and the learned Advocate for the opposite party, Mr. Udayan Sen. Considered the materials on record.

    2. In these revisional applications under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have challenged order No. 10 dated 3-1-96 and 4-1-96 passed by the Presiding Officer of the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Calcutta in T.A Nos. 335/94 and T.A No. 336/94 respectively, whereby the learned Tribunal dismissed the petition of the petitioners for deciding the question of Jurisdiction first and then to hear the proceeding.

    3. As this is a pure question of law, we need not go into the facts of the cases but it will suffice to mention that these are cases under s. 34 of the Recovery of Debts due to the Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. It was contended before the Tribunal that as a suit for Mortgage was pending before a Civil Court over the self-same matter, the tribunal has no jurisdiction and authority to adjudicate the matter which remains within the domain of the Civil Court. Accordingly, a prayer was made before the tribunal for deciding the question of jurisdiction earlier before deciding the merits of the case itself.

    4. The learned Tribunal came to a finding that there is no such provision in the Act being the Recovery of Debts due to the Bank and Financial Institutions, 1993 and as such the tribunal had no power to decide the question of jurisdiction as a preliminary point. The Tribunal further held that question is to be decided at the time of deciding the proceeding itself.

    5. Mr. Anil Mukherjee, learned Counsel for the petitioners, inter alia, contended that the application of the Civil Procedure Code as contained in sub-s. (2) of s. 22 of the said Act contemplates the application of certain provisions upon an application of the Bank as envisaged in s. 19 of that Act. But there is no provision in the Act specifying as to the power and method to be followed by the tribunal on an application filed by the respondent before the tribunal. Mr. Mukherjee contended that Sub-s. (2) of s. 22 of the Act, inter alia, provides discovery and inspection of documents, evidence on affidavit, examination of witness etc. etc. According to Mr. Mukherjee if it was found subsequently by the tribunal that the tribunal has no jurisdiction to try the matter, in such circumstances, these orders will be infructuous orders and according to the General Principle of Law, no court shall pass an ineffective order. According to Mr. Mukherjee, in such event, as a matter of usual practice the principle of natural justice should be followed. In sub-s. (1) of s. 22 of the Act, it is provided that the tribunal has power to decide a question as preliminary point and as the tribunal has found that there is no such provision in the Act due to a wrong conception of law or due to wrong appreciation of law, the order suffers from illegality, incorrectness and material irregularity.

    6. Mr. Sen, in his usual fairness does not dispute that proposition of law as putforth by Mr. Mukherjee but submits that he is doing so for accelerating the proceeding itself so that the proceeding can see finality at an earlier date.

    7. Having heard the submissions of the learned Advocates for the parties and considering the materials on record, I dispose of this revision application treating the same as on the day's list by consent of the learned Advocates for the parties by holding that for the reasons as have been advanced by Mr. Mukherjee, the order is not sustainable in law.

    8. Sub-section (1) of s. 22 of the Act, inter alia, envisages that the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and, subject to the other provisions of this Act and of any Rules. The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall have the powers to regulate their own procedure including the places at which they shall have their sittings, (the italicised is by the Code) Sub-section (2) of s. 22 specifies the applications of Civil Procedure Code in the case of—

    (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;

    (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;

    (c) receiving evidence on affidavits;

    (d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents;

    (e) reviewing its decisions;

    (f) dismissing an application for default or deciding it ex parte;

    (g) setting aside any order of dismissal of any application for default or any order passed by it ex parte;

    (h) any other matter which may be prescribed.

    9. In a given case where the Tribunal orders for discovery and production of documents and for receiving evidence on affidavit and thereafter found that it has no jurisdiction to try the matter then the order passed by the Tribunal would be ineffective one. It is a fundamental principal of law that no court or for that a Tribunal, which has all the trappings of Court, shall pass an ineffective order. Sub-section (1) of s. 22 gives power to the Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal to regulate their own procedure. Whether the matter is to be heard early or subsequently is a matter of decision of the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal as the case may be. Act does not specify anything regarding the same. So the Tribunal shall have to fall back upon the power as has been given in Sub-s. (1) of s. 22 which gives the power to the Tribunal that the Tribunal shall regulate its own procedure keeping in view the principles of natural jurisce if there is no other provision in the Act and in the Rules.

    10. There is no such provision either in the Act or in the Rules for hearing an application filed by the respondent either as a preliminary point or at the final hearing of the proceeding. That is to be decided keeping in view of the principles of natural justice, and the anomalies, that may crop up subsequently as has been indicated earlier. So, the natural justice demands that when the question of jurisdiction has been raised before the Tribunal the same should be decided earlier and not along with all other matters in the proceeding.

    11. In that view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the impugned order cannot be sustained.

    12. I, accordingly, set aside the order impugned and direct the tribunal to decide the question of jurisdiction as a preliminary point and then to hear out the matter day-to-day if the Tribunal finds that it has jurisdiction over the matter and shall dispose of the matter at an early date not beyond a period of 4 months from the date. Mr. Mukherjee submits that yesterday was fixed for evidence of the parties and because of some difficulty the matter could not be heard by the Court yesterday. In such circumstances, the Tribunal is directed to allow the parties to adduce evidence after deciding the question of jurisdiction. Mr. Mukherjee and Mr. Sen assure this Court that their clients will not unnecessarily take time before the Tribunal.

    13. The revisional application is thus disposed of.

    14. If certified xerox copy of the order is applied for by any of the parties, the department shall take immediate steps for supplying the same at an early date.

    Application allowed.
    K.G

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    Comments

    Jitendra Kumar Khan & Anr. v. The Presiding Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal, W. Bengal & Ors.
    (Jan 12, 1996)