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  • provisions of S. 80 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
  • provisions of S. 80 of the Motor Vehicles Act
  • Section 47 and Section 57
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  • provisions of S. 80 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
  • provisions of S. 80 of the Motor Vehicles Act
  • Section 47 and Section 57
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion concerns an intra-court appeal against an order dated 20 January 1994 passed by a learned single Judge in C.O. No. 12381(W) of 1993. The writ petitioner, Asis Kumar Roy, sought a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the State Transport Authority, West Bengal (S.T.A.) to issue a permanent stage carriage permit (an offer letter) for the Calcutta–Siliguri route based on his application dated 20 July 1992.

Timeline of key events (as stated in the opinion):

  • 20 July 1992: Petitioner applied to S.T.A. for a permanent stage carriage permit for the Calcutta–Siliguri route.
  • 24 September 1992: Altamas Kabir, J. disposed of an earlier writ by directing S.T.A. to consider and dispose of the petitioner’s application in accordance with Section 80 of the Motor Vehicles Act within two months from communication of the order. That order was communicated to the respondents by letter dated 16 November 1992 (received 18 November 1992).
  • Despite communication, S.T.A. did not act; petitioner’s counsel wrote on 24 May 1993 threatening contempt proceedings if no action taken.
  • 20 August 1993: Petitioner filed a second writ petition; copy served on the Legal Remembrancer on 19 August 1993.
  • 6 September 1993: S.T.A. requested petitioner to appear for hearing scheduled for 17 September 1993.
  • 17 September 1993: Petitioner's counsel appeared and made submissions at S.T.A. meeting; petitioner later sought certified copy of the resolution dated 17 September 1993 (application on 30 September 1993) but it was not issued to him.
  • 20 January 1994: Learned single Judge disposed of the second writ application by directing S.T.A. to issue an offer letter for grant of the permanent permit within four weeks from communication of the order.
  • Respondents (opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3) appealed against that order; this opinion is the judgment on that appeal and ultimately confirms the impugned order and dismisses the appeal with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned Trial Judge was justified in passing the impugned order dated 20 January 1994 directing the State Transport Authority to issue an offer letter for the permanent stage carriage permit.
  2. Whether a High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226, may direct a public authority to issue a permit (i.e., whether the Court could direct issuance of a permit by way of mandamus or similar relief).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Respondents') Arguments

  • It was contended before the High Court that because the route in question was a "notified route" the question of grant of permit did not clearly arise (i.e., S.T.A. argued the notification precluded grant of the permit).
  • Some operators (opposing parties) submitted that the impugned order would infringe their valid rights; that allowing further buses on the route would make their business uneconomical and cause great prejudice (a contention based on financial inconvenience).
  • The appellants' counsel urged that the High Court could not direct the issuance of a permit (i.e., that the Court lacked power to command issuance of the permit itself).
  • The appellants produced an office file and an extract of a resolution dated 17 September 1993 (the extract was communicated to the petitioner by letter dated 12 January 1994), implying administrative action had been taken which the Court should consider.

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner emphasised S.T.A.'s failure to comply with the prior court order dated 24 September 1992 directing consideration and disposal under Section 80 of the Motor Vehicles Act; despite communication of that order, S.T.A. did not act.
  • The petitioner relied on the S.T.A.'s failure to communicate the result of the 17 September 1993 meeting and on the non-issuance of the certified copy of the resolution dated 17 September 1993 (application for urgent certified copy on 30 September 1993) as evidence of administrative neglect.
  • The petitioner suggested the letter of 12 January 1994 from S.T.A. communicating an extract of the 17 September 1993 resolution (received by petitioner on 8 February 1994) might be back-dated to nullify the impugned order; he urged that the resolution was not placed before the Court when the writ was heard.
  • The petitioner sought mandamus relief (an offer letter for permanent permit) on the basis that S.T.A. had failed to exercise its statutory discretion properly and timeously under Section 80 and related provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 443 Establishes that mere financial inconvenience to existing operators or a route becoming slightly uneconomical is not a sufficient ground to challenge issuance of permits; Parliament intended liberalisation of permit grants (reference to Sections 71 and 80 of the Motor Vehicles Act and abolition of prior restrictive provisions such as Sections 47 and 57 of the old Act). Court relied on this decision to reject the operators' contention that their business prejudice or financial inconvenience could justify setting aside an order granting a permit; used to underline the policy of liberal grant of permits.
The Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Gian Prakash, New Delhi v. K.S. Jagannathan, AIR 1987 SC 537 Confirms High Courts' power under Article 226 to issue mandamus or directions where a public authority has failed or wrongly exercised discretion, acted mala fide, or acted on irrelevant considerations; the Court may in a proper case pass orders which the authority should have passed. Court cited this authority to support the proposition that the High Court could direct S.T.A. to issue an offer letter or to give directions which the authority ought to have given had it exercised its discretion properly.
Satyendra Nath Mondal v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., (1994) 1 Cal LT (HC) 184 Example of a Division Bench directing a public corporation (HPCL) to offer the writ petitioner a retail outlet dealership (illustrative of courts directing offers where authorities failed to act properly). Used as local High Court precedent showing that courts have directed public corporations to make offers in circumstances where the authority failed to exercise discretion lawfully; supports the remedy granted in the present case.
Patna High Court — C.W.J.C No. 7686 of 1989 with M.J.C No. 784 of 1991 (as referred) Instance where Patna High Court directed appointment of the second candidate as distributor where the first was not eligible; Supreme Court did not interfere with the order. Referred to by this Court as another instance where courts have given directions to public authorities concerning appointments/allocations when authorities failed to act properly; supports the remedial approach taken.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a stepwise manner based strictly on the factual record and established legal principles:

  1. Factual assessment: The Court recited undisputed facts showing that the petitioner had made a statutory application on 20 July 1992 and that, after a prior court direction (24 September 1992) to consider the application under Section 80 of the Motor Vehicles Act, S.T.A. failed to act within the prescribed timeline. The petitioner threatened contempt proceedings and ultimately filed a second writ when no action followed.
  2. Administrative conduct: The Court found the S.T.A.'s conduct — late engagement, non-communication of the outcome of the 17 September 1993 meeting, and apparent delay in furnishing the resolution — to be deplorable and unacceptable. The Court explicitly characterised the S.T.A.'s functioning in this matter as "utterly deplorable, painfully disappointing and positively disgusting."
  3. Statutory context: The Court examined the relevant statutory provisions: Section 71(1) (the Regional Transport Authority shall have regard to the objects of the Act when considering an application) and Section 80(2) (a Regional Transport Authority shall not ordinarily refuse to grant an application for permit). The Court concluded that the statutory scheme favours grant of permits as the rule and refusal as the exception.
  4. Precedential support: The Court relied on Mithilesh Garg to underscore that policy under the Motor Vehicles Act is to liberalise the grant of permits and that mere economic inconvenience to existing operators is not a valid ground to block a new permit granted by a writ court. The Court also relied on the Gian Prakash v. K.S. Jagannathan decision to confirm that a High Court, in proper cases, can issue mandamus or give directions to compel lawful exercise of statutory discretion, including directing an authority to pass orders it ought to have passed.
  5. Application to present case: Given S.T.A.'s failure to act despite a prior court direction and the statutory command favouring grant of permits, and having found no adequate administrative reason for non-grant (the resolution of 17 September 1993 was not reliably shown to the Court in time and the office file did not contain that resolution), the appellate Court concluded that the learned Trial Judge did not err in directing S.T.A. to issue an offer letter to the petitioner.
  6. On appellants' substantive objections: The Court rejected the contention that the High Court could not direct issuance of a permit, citing the cited Supreme Court authority and analogous High Court decisions which authorised courts to pass such directions in fit cases.

Holding and Implications

Holding:
APPEAL DISMISSED; the impugned order dated 20 January 1994 is confirmed.

Direct consequences and implications (as stated in the opinion):

  • The trial court’s direction that the State Transport Authority, West Bengal, issue an offer letter to the petitioner for grant of a permanent stage carriage permit for the Calcutta–Siliguri route within four weeks from communication of the order is upheld.
  • The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Broader implications:

  • The Court explicitly applied established Supreme Court and High Court authorities to affirm that where a public authority has failed to exercise statutory discretion properly or timely, the High Court may, in a fit case, direct the authority to perform the function it ought to have performed — including directing the issuance of offers or permits.
  • The opinion reiterates the statutory policy under the Motor Vehicles Act favouring liberal grant of permits and confirms that mere economic inconvenience to existing operators is not a sufficient ground to thwart that policy. However, the judgment does not purport to lay down a new, general precedent beyond applying the cited authorities to the facts before the Court.

Final disposition: Appeal dismissed; impugned order of 20 January 1994 confirmed; the decision carries costs against the appellants.

    State Transport Authority, W.B And Others v. Asis Kumar Roy And Others

    Arun Kumar Dutta, J.:— This appeal is directed against the order dated 20th January, 1994 passed by a learned single Judge of this Court in C.O No. 12381(W) of 1993 before him on the grounds made out therein.

    2. By filing the relevant writ application, the writ petitioner Asis Kumar Roy (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner) had prayed the Court for, amongst other reliefs, a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to issue and grant one permanent stage carriage permit for the route Siliguri to Calcutta on the basis of the application for permanent stage carriage permit (Annexure-‘A’ to the petition) forthwith for the reasons stated and on the grounds made out therein.

    3. The learned Trial Judge by his aforesaid impugned order dated 20th January, 1994 has been pleased to dispose of the matter by directing the State Transport Authority, West Bengal (hereinafter referred to as S.T.A) to issue offer letter to the petitioner for permanent stage carriage permit for the route in question in terms thereof for the reasons recorded therein.

    4. Being aggrieved by the order so passed by the learned Trial Judge, the respondents/opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 in the writ application has filed the instant appeal.

    5. The point for consideration here before us is how far the learned Trial Judge was justified in passing the aforesaid impugned order, the way he did.

    6. The facts, as are relevant for the present purpose, may shortly be set out as follows for answering the point posed:—

    The petitioner had made an application for permanent stage carriage permit for the route Calcutta to Siliguri before the Authority concerned on 20th July, 1992. On the failure of the S.T.A to consider the same, the petitioner had moved a writ application before this Court on 24th September, 1992. Altamas Kabir, J. by order dated 24th September, 1992 had disposed of the said writ application by directing the S.T.A to consider and dispose of the petitioner's application in accordance with the provisions of S. 80 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 within a period of two months from the date of communication of the order. The said order was duly communicated to the respondents in the writ application by the learned Advocate for the petitioner by letter dated 16th November, 1992, which was received by them on 18th November, 1992. But despite communication of the aforesaid order of the Court dated 24th September, 1992, the S.T.A had failed and neglected to act in terms thereof. The learned Advocate for the petitioner had thereupon written a letter dated 24th May, 1993 addressed to the respondents for acting in terms of the aforesaid order, mentioning therein that in default of such consideration an application for contempt would be moved before this Court. But even so no action was taken by it, and the aforesaid order dated 24th September, 1992 was not acted upon.

    7. The petitioner had, in the aforesaid circumstances, been constrained to file the second writ petition before this Court challenging the non-consideration of his application by the respondents despite the aforesaid order of the Court dated 24th September, 1992. A copy of the writ petition was served in the office of the legal remembrancer, West Bengal, on 19th August, 1993. The S.T.A had thereafter by letter dated 6th September, 1993 had requested the petitioner to appear for hearing and disposal of his application for grant of permanent permit in its meeting scheduled to be held on 17th September, 1993. The learned Judge in the aforesaid second writ application, which appeared in the list on 16th September, 1993, had passed an order to the effect that the petitioner may appear before the S.T.A in terms of the notice dated 6th September, 1993 without prejudice to his rights and contentions. The petitioner was, accordingly, represented during the hearing before the S.T.A on 17th September, 1993 by his learned Advocate, who had made the relevant submissions on his behalf. But despite such hearing on 17th September, 1993, the result thereof had not been communicated to the petitioner and the aforesaid second writ application before the Court was kept pending to the knowledge of the respondents inasmuch as the aforesaid order dated 16th September, 1993 was passed in presence of the learned Advocates appearing for the respondents in the writ application. The petitioner had also made an application on 30th September, 1993 for issue of urgent certified copy of the resolution dated 17th September, 1993, which had neither been issued to him.

    8. The second writ application had thereafter been taken up for hearing by a learned single Judge of this Court on 20th April, 1994. After hearing the submissions of the learned Advocates appearing for the parties, the learned Judge was pleased to dispose of the (second) writ application by his aforesaid impugned order dated 20th January, 1994 directing the S.T.A to issue offer letter to the petitioner for grant of permanent stage carriage permit for the aforesaid route within four weeks from the date of communication of the order.

    9. It is contended by the petitioner-respondent that the aforesaid impugned order of the Court was communicated to the respondent-authorities by his learned Advocate by letter dated 29th January, 1994. The office of the S.T.A by letter dated 12th January, 1994 had communicated an extract of the resolution of the S.T.A dated 17th September, 1993, received by the petitioner on 8th February, 1994.

    10. As already indicated, the petitioner's application made on 20th July, 1992 for permanent stage carriage permit for the route in question not having been considered, he had to file a writ application before this Court. A learned single Judge of this Court by order dated 24th September, 1992 had disposed of the same by directing the S.T.A to consider and dispose of the same in accordance with the provisions of S. 80 of the Motor Vehicles Act within a period of two months from the date of communication of the order. The said order is stated to have been communicated to the S.T.A on 16th November, 1992. But the latter having failed and neglected to act in terms of the order, the learned Advocate for the petitioner by letter dated 24th May, 1993 had asked the respondents for acting in terms of the aforesaid order, mentioning therein that in default of such consideration an application for contempt would be moved before this Court. But even thereafter the S.T.A had pointedly failed, neglected and ignored to comply with the said order. The petitioner had, accordingly, been constrained to file the second writ application before this Court on 20th August, 1993, copy of which had been served upon the legal remembrancer, West Bengal. It was only then that the conscience of the S.T.A had been shaken, and by letter dated 6th September, 1993 the S.T.A had requested the petitioner to appear for hearing and disposal of his application for grant of permanent permit in its meeting scheduled to be held on 17th September, 1993. The petitioner was duly represented by his learned Advocate in the said meeting. But the result of the said meeting had not been communicated to the petitioner. He had eventually made an application on 30th September, 1993 for issue of urgent certified copy of the resolution dated 17th September, 1993, which was neither issued to him. In the aforesaid circumstances, the learned Judge by his impugned order dated 20th January, 1994 had been constrained to dispose of the second writ application by directing the S.T.A, West Bengal, to issue offer letter to the writ petitioner within a period of four weeks from the communication of the said order for grant of permanent stage carriage permit to him for the route in question. The S.T.A, West Bengal, is stated to have communicated an extract of the resolution dated 17th September, 1993 by a letter dated 12th January, 1994 to the petitioner, which was received by him on 8th February, 1994 after the disposal of the aforesaid second writ application. It would seem significant and observable to note that even though the respondents were aware of the pendency of the second writ application before this Court, the Court was neither intimated about the resolution of the Meeting dated 17th September, 1993 when the writ application was taken up for hearing and disposal on 20th January, 1994. The petitioner's contention that the said letter is a back-dated one to nullify the impugned order dated 20th January, 1994 cannot, therefore, be lightly discarded.

    11. The aforesaid undisputed facts clearly present an unedifying spectacle about the manner in which the S.T.A had functioned utterly deplorable, painfully disappointing and positively disgusting, which cannot but earn frown from the Court.

    12. The Government authorities are expected to act with promptitude and fairness. The case before us is a glaring example of sad departure from the said principle. It further appears from the order dated 20th April, 1994 herein that it was contended on behalf of the S.T.A during the hearing of the stay application that since the route in question is a notified route, the question of grant of permit for the notified route does not and could not clearly arise. It had been observed in the said order that surprisingly, however, despite the relevant notification, the S.T.A did not feel shy in granting permits after permits to operators without any hesitation; and it had taken shelter of the relevant notification only when it was needed for defeating the claim of someone else. The learned Judges had observed in the said order that such attitude of the S.T.A was neither understandable, nor could be appreciated.

    13. It would again oddly appear from the said order that it had been submitted on behalf of some of the operators that the valid rights of their clients would be infringed by the aforesaid impugned order. It was contended on their behalf that if further buses are allowed to be plied on the route, their business would be extremely uneconomical and they would suffer great prejudice. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 443, the learned Judges were of the view that mere financial inconvenience or the route becoming otherwise slightly uneconomical cannot be a ground for challenging the issuance of a permit granted by a writ court in favour of a third party. The Hon'ble Judges had reproduced paragraph 7 of the aforesaid decision which runs as follows:—

    “The petitioners are existing stage-carriage operators on different routes. They hold permits granted by the Regional Transport Authorities concerned. Mithilesh Garg, petitioner in Civil Writ Petition No. 1345 of 1989 has stated that he holds a stage carriage permit and plies his vehicles on the Meerut-Parikshitgarh-Hasifabad-Lal-Iana and allied routes under the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority, Meerut, According to him prior to the enforcement of the Act, 23 permit-holders were operating on the said route but thereafter under S. 80 of the Act, the Regional Transport Authority, Meerut, has issued 272 more permits in respect of the same route. Similar facts have been stated in the other writ petitions. As mentioned above the petitioners are permit-holders and are existing operators. They are plying their vehicles on the routes assigned to them under the permits. They are in the full enjoyment of their fundamental rights guaranteed to them under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. There is no threat of any kind whatsoever from any authority to the enjoyment of their right to carry on the occupation of transport operators. There is no complaint of infringement of any of their statutory rights. Their only effort is to stop the new operators from coming in the field as competitors. We see no justification in the petitioners' stand. More operators mean healthy competition and efficient transport system. Over-crowded buses, passengers standing in aisle, clinging to the bus doors and even sitting on the rooftops are some of the common sights in this country. More often, one finds a bus which has noisy engine, old upholstry, uncomfortable seats and continuous emission of black smoke from the exhaust pipe. It is, therefore, necessary that there should be plenty of operators on every route to provide ample choice to the commuter-public to board the vehicle of their choice and patronize the operator who is providing the best service. Even otherwise the liberal policy is likely to help in the elimination of corruption and favouritism in the process of granting permits. Restricted licensing under the old Act led to the concentration of business in the hands of few persons thereby giving rise to a kind of monopoly, adversely affecting the public interest. The apprehensions of the petitioners, that too many operators on a route are likely to affect adversely the interest of weaker section of the profession is without any basis. The transport business is bound to be ironed-out ultimately by the rationale of demand and supply. Cost of a vehicle being, as it is, the business requires huge investment. The intending operators are likely to be conscious of the economics underlying the profession. Only such number of vehicles would finally remain in operation on a particular route as are economically viable. In any case the transport system in a State is meant for the benefit and convenience of the public. The policy to grant permits liberally under the Act is directed towards the said goal. The petitioners who are already in the business want to keep the fresh entrants out of it, and as such eliminate the healthy competition which is necessary to bring efficiency in the trade.”

    14. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court had further observed in the said decision as follows (para 6 of AIR):—

    “The Parliament in its wisdom has completely effaced the above features. The scheme envisaged under Sections 47 and 57 of the old Act has been completely done away with by the Act. The right of existing-operators to file objections and the provision to impose limit on the number of permits have been taken away. There is no similar provision to that of Section 47 and Section 57 under the Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act shows that the purpose of bringing in the Act was to liberalise the grant of permit. Section 71(1) of the Act provides that while considering an application for a stage-carriage permit the Regional Transport Authority shall have regard to the objects of the Act. Section 80(2), which is the harbinger of liberalisation, provides that a Regional Transport Authority shall not ordinarily refuse to grant an application for permit of any kind made at any time under the Act. There is no provision under the Act like that of Section 47(3) of the old Act, and as such no limit for the grant of permits can be fixed under the Act. There is, however, a provision under Section 71(3)(a) of the Act under which a limit can be fixed for the grant of permits in respect of the routes which are within a town having population of more than five lakhs.”

    15. As noted, Section 71(1) of the Act provides that while considering an application for a permanent stage carriage permit the Regional Transport Authority shall have regard to the objects of the Act. And, Section 80(2) further provides that a Regional Transport Authority shall not ordinarily refuse to grant an application for permit of any kind may at any time under the Act. The aforesaid provisions of the Act being, what they are, there could be little mistaking that grant of permit should be the rule and refusal to grant permit should be the exception. Even so, the S.T.A appears to have refused to grant permit to the writ petitioner for a permanent stage carriage permit for the route in question, communicated to the petitioner on 8th February, 1994 after the passing of the impugned order dated 20th January, 1994. The learned Advocate for the Appellants had produced the relevant office file in connection with the relevant matter for our perusal, but the resolution dated 17th September, 1993 could not be found therein. There is no knowing why the permit, sought for by the petitioner, has not been granted to the petitioner. In the facts and circumstances indicated above, the learned Judge does not seem to us to have erred in passing the impugned order, he did.

    16. Realising the difficulty somewhat tardily, the learned Advocate for the appellants had urged that the High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction could not direct issuance of a permit. But to that we would like to note with a minute of dissent and refer to the following observations of the Supreme Court in The Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Gian Prakash, New Delhi v. K.S Jagannathan, AIR 1987 SC 537 (para 20):—

    “There is thus no doubt that the High Courts in India exercising their jurisdiction under Article 226 have the power to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or to pass orders and give necessary directions where the Government or a public authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised the discretion conferred upon it by a statute or a rule or a policy decision of the Government or has exercised such discretion mala fide or on irrelevant considerations and materials or in such a manner as to frustrate the object of conferring such discretion or the policy for implementing which such discretion has been conferred. In all such cases and in any other fit and proper case a High Court can in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or pass orders and give directions to compel the performance in a proper and lawful manner of the discretion conferred upon the Government or a public authority, and in a proper case, in order to prevent injustice resulting to the concerned parties the Court may itself pass an order or give directions which the Government or the public authority should have passed or given had it properly and lawfully exercised its discretion.”

    17. Following the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, a Division Bench of this Court in Satyendra Nath Mondal v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., (1994) 1 Cal LT (HC) 184, had directed the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. to offer the writ petitioner (therein) Retail, Outlet Dealership (in question) for the reasons discussed therein. It would also appear from the aforesaid decision that a Division Bench of the Patna High Court in C.W.J.C No. 7686 of 1989 with M.J.C No. 784 of 1991 had also directed the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. to appoint the second candidate in the merit list as Distributor at Purnea in terms thereof as the first candidate in the merit list was not found to be eligible for the dealership in question. It would further appear therefrom that the Supreme Court was not inclined to interfere with the aforesaid order passed by the Patna High Court.

    18. In view of the facts and circumstances of the matter discussed above and the decisions hereinbefore referred to, the learned Trial Judge seems to us to have been perfectly justified in directing the State Transport Authority, West Bengal, to issue offer letter to the writ petitioner for grant of permanent stage carriage permit for the route in question within four weeks from the date of communication of the order by passing the impugned order dated 20th January, 1994, which order should have been passed by it (S.T.A) had it properly and lawfully exercised the discretion conferred upon it by the Statute, as indicated above. We, therefore, find nothing to interfere with the impugned order passed by the learned Trial Judge. There seems little substance in the appeal as such.

    19. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The impugned order of the Court below dated 20th January, 1994 be hereby confirmed.

    Prabir Kumar Majumdar, J.:— 20. I agree.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    State Transport Authority, W.B And Others v. Asis Kumar Roy And Others
    (Jan 12, 1995)