AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • sub-section (2) and section (3) of 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code read with Section 401 of that Code
  • Section 120B, 114 and 448 of the Indian Penal Code
  • section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.13.
  • Section 427/403/448/420 of the Indian Penal Code
  • section 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 114 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 120B, 114 & 448 of the Indian Penal Code
  • section 492 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • SECTION 205 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • ARTICLE 21 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Section 205 of the Cr. Procedure Code.
  • section 504 of the Indian Penal Code
  • sub-section (3) of 397 or Section 401
  • sub-section (2) and (3) of section 397
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • sub-section (2) and section (3) of 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code read with Section 401 of that Code
  • Section 120B, 114 and 448 of the Indian Penal Code
  • section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.13.
  • Section 427/403/448/420 of the Indian Penal Code
  • section 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 114 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 120B, 114 & 448 of the Indian Penal Code
  • section 492 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • SECTION 205 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • ARTICLE 21 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Section 205 of the Cr. Procedure Code.
  • section 504 of the Indian Penal Code
  • sub-section (3) of 397 or Section 401
  • sub-section (2) and (3) of section 397
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary: Revision under Section 482 — N.K. Bhattacharyya, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision arises from complaint Case No. C-1526 of 1993 : T.R. No. 302 of 1993 filed in the Court of the learned 10th Judicial Magistrate, 24-Parganas (South). The complaint, lodged by a representative/employee of the New Road Nyas charitable trust, alleged that the accused-petitioner had been the lessee of the 1st floor of premises No. 1A, Lal Behari Shah Sarani; the lease had expired in 1986. The petition alleges that the accused-petitioner left the premises in 1986 and, by her conduct and instigation, others trespassed into the flat and caused damage to trust property (mischief, damage to wooden fittings, parapet iron railings, etc.).

An FIR was lodged on 19 August 1993; a complaint was subsequently filed before the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Alipore, who transferred the case to the 10th Judicial Magistrate by order dated 4 September 1993. The Magistrate issued process against the petitioner under Sections 120B, 114 and 448 IPC by order dated 7 September 1993 (case registered as C-1526 of 1993 : T.R. No. 302 of 1993).

The petitioner sought permission to be represented by a pleader under Section 205 CrPC by filing a petition; that petition was rejected by order dated 29 January 1994. The petitioner filed the present revision under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of the criminal proceeding and setting aside the orders of cognizance and refusal of the Section 205 application.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an application under Section 482 CrPC challenging an entire criminal proceeding (and collateral challenge to magistrate's orders) is barred by sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 397 read with Section 401 CrPC.
  2. Whether the complaint, as framed and read with its annexures, discloses any offence such that the criminal proceeding ought to be permitted to continue (i.e., whether the allegations are legally sufficient to sustain charges under Sections 448, 114 and 120B IPC).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Mr. Banerjee)

  • The bar under sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) of Section 397 read with Section 401 CrPC does not preclude exercise of the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC because the petitioner has challenged the entire proceeding rather than a particular order.
  • Even if the allegations in the complaint remain uncontroverted, they do not disclose any offence warranting trial; therefore the proceeding should be quashed in the interests of speedy justice and to avoid oppressive or vexatious prosecution.
  • Relied on Article 21 of the Constitution (speedy remedy against prosecution) and on Supreme Court authorities (R.P. Kapoor; Madhu Limaye) to support the contention that uncontroverted allegations which do not disclose an offence should not be allowed to result in trial.

Opposite Parties' Arguments (Mr. Sengupta for private opposite party; Mr. Chatterjee for the State)

  • Section 492 CrPC (presumably alternative remedy) will not be available because the petitioner has also challenged the magistrate's order taking cognizance dated 7 September 1993 and the order dated 29 January 1994 refusing permission under Section 205 CrPC.
  • Accordingly, the bar under sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 397 would operate even in an application under Section 482 CrPC and thus the revision should not be maintainable.
  • There are materials on record (even if uncontroverted) disclosing offences against the accused and therefore the proceeding should be permitted to continue; reliance placed on Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar (AIR 1990 SC 494) for the proposition that inherent power to quash is to be used only where complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
R.P. Kapoor v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 Authority cited by petitioner to support the availability of speedy remedy and the proposition that uncontroverted allegations not disclosing an offence should not lead to a trial. The court noted that the petitioner relied on this authority (and Madhu Limaye) for the speedy-remedy line of argument; it considered these authorities in context but primarily relied upon the principles articulated in Dhanalakshmi when articulating the standard for quashing a complaint.
Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 47 Cited together with R.P. Kapoor by the petitioner to support the proposition concerning prompt remedies and that proceedings not disclosing offences should be stopped. The court acknowledged the petitioner's reliance on this decision in support of the speedy-remedy argument; the opinion refers to it as part of the petitioner's authorities but evaluates the sufficiency of the complaint on its own terms.
Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar, AIR 1990 SC 494 Sets out the standard for exercise of inherent power under Section 482 CrPC in complaint cases: quashing is called for where complaint does not disclose an offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive; meticulous pre-trial analysis is not required, but the complaint must be read as a whole to see if ingredients of the offence are disclosed and whether mala fides or vexatiousness exist. The court relied on the ratio in Dhanalakshmi to frame the test to be applied: read the complaint as a whole, determine whether ingredients of the alleged offences are disclosed, and if not, quash the proceeding. The court applied that standard to the complaint before it and found that the complaint did not disclose house trespass (and therefore could not sustain 114/120B), leading to quashing of the proceedings as against the petitioner.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

On maintainability: The court first examined whether provisions in Section 397 (sub-sections (2) and (3)) read with Section 401 CrPC operate as a bar to the present revision under Section 482 CrPC. The court held that sub-section (3) of Section 397 and Section 401 do not contemplate quashing of an entire proceeding; those provisions contemplate setting aside particular orders. Only Section 482 CrPC confers power to quash a proceeding. Because the petitioner has challenged the proceeding for quashing (with collateral challenge to magistrate's orders), the court found the revision under Section 482 to be maintainable and overruled the contention that the bar in Section 397 would preclude the application.

On merits (sufficiency of complaint): Applying the standard articulated in the Supreme Court's decision in Mrs. Dhanalakshmi (read as the controlling test in this opinion), the court read the complaint petition annexed as Annexure 'A' as a whole. The complaint alleges that the petitioner was a lessee under a 21-year lease and that the lease had expired; an ejectment suit was pending in the Civil Court. The complaint also alleges that the petitioner "had left the premises" and that others trespassed and caused mischief at her instigation.

The court focused on the element of possession necessary to sustain an offence of house trespass under Section 448 IPC. It observed that nowhere in the complaint was it alleged that the petitioner had "made over" possession of the premises to the landlord or trustees; only that she had left the premises. The existence of a pending ejectment suit was evidence (in the court's view) that the petitioner had not surrendered possession. Because house trespass (as alleged) presupposes that the accused was not in possession, the court concluded that the complaint did not disclose house trespass by the petitioner. Since the charges of criminal conspiracy (120B) and the aiding provision (114) were intertwined with the alleged house trespass, they could not be sustained if the fundamental allegation of house trespass failed.

On that basis — i.e., that even if allegations remained uncontroverted they did not disclose the offences alleged — the court concluded there was no case for proceeding to trial against the petitioner, and quashing was appropriate in exercise of the inherent power under Section 482 CrPC.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revisional application is allowed. The court ordered that the criminal proceeding in case No. 1526 of 1993 : T.R. Case No. 302 of 1993 pending in the Court of 9th Judicial Magistrate, Alipore, 24-Parganas (South) is quashed as against the petitioner.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The proceedings enumerated above are quashed only as respects the accused-petitioner; the revisional application is allowed in her favour.
  • Reasoning basis: The quashing rests on the court's conclusion that the complaint, read as a whole, did not disclose the essential ingredient of house trespass in respect of the petitioner and therefore the associated charges (Sections 114 and 120B IPC) could not be sustained.
  • Precedential impact: The opinion applies established Supreme Court guidance (notably Mrs. Dhanalakshmi) on the limited circumstances in which inherent power under Section 482 CrPC should be exercised in complaint cases. The judgment resolves the petitioner's case on its particular facts; the opinion does not purport to set any new broad precedent beyond application of the cited authorities and principles.
Application allowed.

K.P

    Smt. Chander Mohini Khuller v. State Of West Bengal & Anr Opposite Parties.

    N.K Bhattacharyya, J.:— By this revision one of the accused persons has challenged the proceeding pending in the Court of the learned 10th Judicial Magistrate, 24-Parganas (South) in complaint case No. C-1526 of 1993 T.R No. 302 of 1993 and also for setting aside the order of taking cognizance and issuance of process against the accused petitioner and others under Section 120B, 114 and 448 of the Indian Penal Code passed by the said learned Magistrate by his orders dated 7th September, 1993 and order dated 29th January, 1994 respectively and also rejection of the petition of the petitioner under Section 205 of the Cr. Procedure Code. The relevant facts for the disposal of this application are delenated hereunder:

    (a) In his petition of complaint the complaint/opposite party No. 2, herein, inter alia, alleged that he is an employee and a reprentative of “New Road Nyas” a public charitable trust located at Premises No. 1A, Lal Behari Shah Sarani, Calcutta within the jursidiction of Alipore Police Station.

    (b) It has further been alleged that the present accused/petitioner was the leassee in respect of the 1st floor of premises No. 1A, Lal Behari Shah Sarani formerly known as New Road, Calcutta and the lease has expired sometime in 1986.

    2. The accused-petitioner left the premises in 1986 giving illegal possession of the 1st floor of the said building to accused No. 2, Baldeb Chowdhury, who had tresspassed into the said 1st floor flat along with some Nepali foreigners and at the instigation of the present accused-petitioner, they are causing mischief to the wooden moveable propesties of the said trust such as windows, bathroom fittings, parapet Iron railings etc.

    3. The trust lodged an FIR before the Alipore Police Station on 19th August, 1993 and as no action was taken on that, a complaint was filed thereafter in the Court of Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Alipore, 24-Parganas (South) by the opposite party No. 2 herein and the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate after taking cognizance on that application transfer the case to the Court of the learned 10th Judicial Magistrate, Alipore by his order dated 4th September, 1993.

    4. The Id. Magistrate after perusing the materials on record and considering the initial depositions of the complaint and his witnesses present directed issuance of process against the petitioner herein and other accused-persons under Section 120B, 114 & 448 of the Indian Penal Code by his order dated 7-9-93 and in that Court the case was registered as case No. 1526 of 93 : T.R Case No. 302 of 1993. Date was fixed for service and appearance on 17-9-93.

    5. On 21-9-94 the other accused persons, who were on bail, appeared before the Court and a petition was filed on behalf of the accused No. 1, petitioner herein, for being permitted to be represented by her pleader as contemplated under Section 205 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

    6. The Id. Magistrate fixed 2-3-94 for hearing of that petition and directed the present petitioner to appear before the Court on the next date in default warrant of arrest would be issued.

    7. It has further been alleged in the revisional petition that earlier the opposite party No. 2 herein made a complaint before the Judicial Magistrate, Alipore against the petitioner and other two persons alleging offence against them under Section 427/403/448/420 of the Indian Penal Code and the case was registered as C-544 of 1993. The learned Magistrate in that case refused to issue any process against the petitioner.

    8. Therefore, the opposite party No. 2, herein made another application against the petitioner and other two persons alleging that the accused persons have committed an offence under section 504 of the Indian Penal Code and the learned 3rd Judicial Magistrate, Alipore directed issuance of process against the petitioner and others under section 504 of the Indian Penal Code by his order dated 16th July, 1994 in case No. C-988 of 1993 and against that a revision has been preferred before this Hon'ble High Court which is still pending.

    9. In this background that revisional petition has been filled for quashing the proceeding in this case and also for setting aside of the order refusing the prayer of the petitioner herein for being represented through her learned Advocate.

    10. Mr. Banerjee contended for the petitioner that bar under sub-section (2) and section (3) of 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code read with Section 401 of that Code will not operate as a bar for exercise of the power under Section 482 of the Code as no particular order has been challenged in reality but the entire proceeding has been challenged.

    11. Mr. Sengupta for the private opposite party and Mr. Chatterjee for the State, on the other hand, contended that section 492 of the Code of Criminal Procedure will not be available in this case inasmuch as the accused petitioner has also challenged the orded of 7th September, 1993 by which cognizance was taken and also the order dated 29th January, 1994 by which the prayer of the petitioner has been refused under section 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for being represented by her pleader

    12. According to Mr. Sengupta and Mr. Chatterjee in such circumstances the bar under sub-section (2) and (3) of section 397 will be operative even in case of an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

    13. I do not subscribe to the view that has been expressed by Mr. Sengupta and Mr. Chatterjee inasmuch as that sub-section (3) of 397 or Section 401 does not contemplate quashing of the proceeding though the Sections contemplate setting of an order. Only under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure a proceeding can be quashed. By the instant application under section 482 the petitioner has challenged the proceeding for quashing and colaterally challenged the order as indicated earlier. So, in my view, the revisional application is maintainable and I accordingly overrule the contenton of Mr. Sengupta and Mr. Chatterjee in this regard.

    14. In the next place Mr. Banerjee contended that the proceeding should not be allowed to be continued inasmuch as the allegations as made in the petitioner of complaint if remain uncontroverted even then there is no case for going into trial.

    15. In this connection, he referred to Article 21 of the Constitution of India where speedy remedy of a proecution has been thought of.

    16. To bring home his contention that uncontroverted allegations against the accused though does not disclose any offence men a proceeding against the accused should not be allowed to continue. He relied on Supreme Court decisions in the case of R.P Kapoor v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1960 SC 866 and also in the case of Madhu Limaye v. State Of Maharashtra. reported in AIR 1978 SC 47 where the decision of R.P Kapoor's case came up for consideration by the Supreme Court.

    17. According to Mr. Banerjee the allegation as has made in the complaint if remain uncontroverted that does not disclose any offence against the accused-petitioner for going into trial and as such, the proceeding against her should be set aside.

    18. On the other hand, Mr. Sengupta and Mr. Chatterjee contended that there are materials on record disclosing offence against the accused even if the same is uncontroverted. There is case against the accused for going into trial. For the proposition that there are materials on record for going into trial even if the allegations remain uncontroverted then quashing of the proceeding is not contemplated under Section 482.

    19. In support of his contention Mr. Sengupta relied on the case of Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar a Supreme Court decision reported in AIR 1990 SC 494.

    20. In Mrs. Dhanalakshmi's Case (Supra) while holding that in a proceeding instituted on complaint exercise of the inherent power to quash the proceeding is called for only in cases where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppresive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance is taken by the Magistrate it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under section 482. It is not, however, necessary that there should be a meticulous analysis of the case, before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or not. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears on a consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement on oath of the complainant that ingredients of the offence/offences are disclosed, and there is no material to show that the complaint is malafide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court.

    21. So, the ratio that has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Dhanalakshmi (supra) and also in other cases that if on a reading of the petition of complaint it appears that the same discloses an offence against the accused no matter whether the trial will end in conviction or acquital the proceeding should not be scuttled and for mat purpose a meticulous study of the complaint is not contemplated of.

    22. A xerox of the petition of the complaint is annexed as Annexure ‘A’ to the revisional, application wherefrom it appears that the present petitioner was a leassee in respect of the premises in question and holding the same under a lease agreement for 21 years. It has further been alleged that even after the expiry of the period of the lease as the premises has not been vacated by the petitioner an ejectment suit has been instituted against her by the trust authorities and the same is pending for disposal in the Civil Court at Alipore. It has further been alleged that during the pendency of the suit the petitioner herein had left the premises and in conspiracy with accused No. 2 & 3, the accused No. 1 trespass into the premises and caused mischief.

    23. So nowhere in the petition of the complaint the allegation has been made that the petitioner in the instant petition had ever made over possession of the premises which was let out to her by the landlords or to the owners of the premises. Only allegation has been made that she had left the premises. This clearly indicates that the accused petitioner had not made over the possession of the premises and she was in possession of the premises in question.

    24. The allegation of mischief, criminal conspiracy and house trespass is intertwined with the offence of house trespass as alleged in the petition of complaint. The question of house trespass will come only in case where the accused is not possession of the property. But in the instant case the petition of complaint does not disclose that the accused petitioner was not in possession of the property and only the allegation has been made that she had left the premises. There was no allegation that she made over the possesion of the property to the landlord or the trustees. On the contrary, there are indications and allegations in the petition of complaint that for her eviction a civil suit is pending in the Alipore Court. So, unless the offence of house trespass is satisfied the other two offences under Section 114 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code cannot be sustained.

    25. As there was no house trespass and as there was no allegation the petitioner had vacated the premises in my view the allegation even remain uncontroverted there is no case for going into trial and the proceeding is liable to be quashed against the accused petitioner. The proceeding in case No. 1526 of 1993 : T.R Case No. 302 of 1993 pending in the Court of 9th Judicial Magistrate, Alipore, 24-Parganas (South) is accordingly quashed against the petitioner. The revisional apflication is accordingly allowed.

    Application allowed.
    K.P

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Smt. Chander Mohini Khuller v. State Of West Bengal & Anr Opposite Parties.
    (May 8, 1995)