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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant (a workman employed as a car driver since 14 November 1967 by Bayer (India) Ltd.) had his service terminated on or about 2 March 1976 (payment of one month's salary in lieu of notice), a termination that became the subject of an industrial dispute. The Labour Court initially held the termination justified by an award dated 28 June 1979. The appellant filed a writ (Civil Rule No. 10419 (W) of 1979) and, by order dated 15 February 1984, the High Court (single Judge) quashed the award holding that the termination simpliciter amounted to retrenchment and was void for non-compliance with S.25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act; the management was directed to pay back-wages, and was observed to be free to retrench the workman lawfully thereafter.

The management's appeal against that writ judgment was dismissed; the management reinstated the appellant by order dated 30 January 1985 with effect from 5 February 1985 and paid Rs.1,57,713.87 (after deductions). On the same date the management issued an order retrenching the appellant effective 5 February 1985 and issued demand drafts for notice pay and retrenchment compensation (one of which the appellant later encashed).

The State Government referred an industrial dispute to the Eighth Industrial Tribunal (order dated 16 December 1986) asking whether the retrenchment of the workman with effect from 5 February 1985 was justified and what relief, if any, he was entitled to. The workman filed an application under S.15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act (as amended by the West Bengal amendment) for interim relief.

The Tribunal rejected the interim relief application (order dated 17 June 1988) on two primary grounds: (1) the management had already paid Rs.1,57,713.87 which was sufficient for maintenance during the dispute, and (2) the workman was not unemployed (he had acquired or used vehicles and been observed driving them). The workman challenged the Tribunal's order by a writ petition (Civil Order No. 1031 (W) of 1989) which the learned trial Judge dismissed on 12 December 1990. The present appeal challenges both the Tribunal's order and the trial Judge's dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the scope and ambit of the Industrial Tribunal's power under S.15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act (as amended by the West Bengal Amendment of 1980) in determining the quantum of interim relief?
  2. Whether the receipt by the workman of back-wages (a lump sum payment) before the retrenchment order can operate as a bar or estoppel to obtain interim relief under S.15(2)(b).
  3. Whether the Tribunal permissibly refused interim relief on the factual findings that (a) the workman had sufficient funds such that he was not unemployed and (b) the workman had been self-employed or earning in other employment.
  4. Whether the Tribunal travelled beyond the permissible scope of S.15(2)(b) by making pre-decisional findings on the merits of the dispute when deciding the interim relief application.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as advanced by Sri Parthasarathi Sengupta)

  • The Tribunal and the trial Judge misconstrued S.15(2)(b); receipt of back-wages before the retrenchment order cannot, as a matter of law, bar relief under S.15(2)(b).
  • The Tribunal's factual finding that the appellant did not remain unemployed was perverse and unsupported by evidence; it was erroneous to conclude the appellant was self-employed simply because he was a driver.
  • The Tribunal committed grave error by making premature findings on the merits of the substantive dispute at the interim stage (pre-decisional stage), which is beyond the scope of S.15(2)(b).
  • The earlier High Court order only said retrenchment in accordance with law would be permissible; it did not immunize any subsequent retrenchment from challenge.
  • The proviso to S.15(2)(b) (equating interim relief in cases of discharge/dismissal/retrenchment to subsistence allowance under the West Bengal Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1969) shows the legislature intended monetary interim relief in retrenchment cases; the Tribunal wrongly applied the proviso and the related proviso to S.3(1) of the Subsistence Allowance Act.
  • Rules of estoppel or waiver ought not to be applied to a retrenched workman who had no practical freedom to refuse a lump-sum payment given his vulnerable financial position; thus accepting retrenchment benefits does not necessarily bar interim relief.

Respondent's Arguments (as advanced by Sri S. Sarka)

  • The management had paid Rs.1,57,713.87 as back-wages; the appellant thereby became a solvent person and could maintain himself, so no interim relief was appropriate.
  • The power under S.15(2)(b) should be invoked only where the workman is unemployed and unable to maintain himself — the circumstances here show otherwise.
  • The Tribunal's factual findings (that the workman had earned from driving and had invested in a vehicle) justified refusal of interim relief; granting relief would defeat the purpose of the Act if the workman was self-employed or had sufficient means.
  • Reliance was placed on the Tribunal's findings and the trial Judge's reasons to oppose interference in the writ jurisdiction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ganges Printing Ink Factory Employees Industrial Co-operative Societies, Ltd. v. Seventh Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal (Division Bench) [1986 — I L.L.N 111] Identified matters that a Tribunal may consider under S.15(2)(b): (a) admissibility, (b) objections to sustainability of reference, and (c) effect of grant/refusal on employer or workman; discussed the meaning of "admissible". The court considered that decision as representing relevant considerations under S.15(2)(b) but rejected the Tribunal's narrow application in the present case when it effectively excluded the statutory entitlement created by the proviso to S.15(2)(b). The present Court held that the Tribunal had gone beyond permissible considerations and misapplied the provision.
A.N. Sehgal v. Raje Ram Sheoran, Supreme Court [1991 — I L.L.N 1055] Principles of interpreting a proviso: a proviso carves out an exception to the main enactment and narrows the scope of the main provision; a proviso cannot be used to nullify the main enactment unless its language necessarily has that effect. The court applied these interpretive rules to hold that the proviso to S.15(2)(b) should be read as specifying the quantum of interim relief (equivalent to subsistence allowance) in retrenchment/dismissal cases rather than as excluding entitlement. The Court used the principle to reject the Tribunal's restrictive reading.
K.C.P Employees' Association v. K.C.P. Ltd., (1978) 2 SCC 42 : A.I.R. 1978 S. 474 In industrial law interpreted in the perspective of Part IV of the Constitution, the benefit of reasonable doubt must go to the weaker section (labour). The court invoked this rule of interpretation to resolve ambiguities in favour of the workman, holding that S.15(2)(b) should be construed so as to protect the workman and not to deny the interim relief provided by statute.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the central statutory provision: S.15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act (as amended by the West Bengal Amendment of 1980), which requires the Tribunal, upon hearing the parties, to determine within 60 days the quantum of interim relief admissible, if any, and contains a proviso that in cases of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination the quantum shall be equivalent to subsistence allowance under the West Bengal Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1969.

The court examined the factual chronology: termination in 1976; litigation leading to a writ that quashed the prior award in 1984; the management's reinstatement and near-immediate retrenchment effective 5 February 1985; payment of back-wages (Rs.1,57,713.87) and retrenchment benefits; and the subsequent reference to the Tribunal in December 1986. It then considered the Tribunal's reasons for rejecting interim relief — (1) the earlier payment sufficed for the workman's subsistence and (2) the workman was not unemployed and was earning (evidenced by driving/vehicle ownership observations) — and the trial Judge's refusal to interfere absent an error apparent on the face of the record.

On law and legislative purpose the court emphasized that the Industrial Disputes Act is social legislation informed by social and economic justice. The amendment introducing S.15(2)(b) was designed to protect workmen who face litigation delays and lack legal aid by ensuring interim relief where a dispute as to discharge/dismissal/retrenchment/termination exists.

The court then analyzed whether the Tribunal's factual findings and legal conclusion were sustainable:

  • The Tribunal's acceptance that a large lump-sum payment had been made and that this alone justified denial of interim relief was found unsatisfactory — the court observed the appellant had been out of service for nine years and that back-wages covering that period did not ipso facto demonstrate continuing solvency or negate the need for interim relief. The court found the Tribunal's rejection of the appellant's account of loans and expenditures to be unreasonable, given the practical realities of prolonged unemployment and lack of documentary evidence in such circumstances.
  • The Tribunal's factual conclusion that the appellant must have been earning (via taxi/Matador/other driving) was held to be unsupported or contradictory; the Tribunal omitted or misread material averments in the management's own pleadings about the Matador being in the brother's name. The court noted the illegality and improbability of benami purchases and criticized the Tribunal's inconsistent reasoning (simultaneously saying the appellant had money and that he had frittered it away).
  • On estoppel/acceptance of benefits, the court held that accepting retrenchment benefits under financial compulsion does not necessarily bar a retrenched workman from claiming interim relief. The court rejected application of ordinary rules of estoppel/waiver against a financially vulnerable, retrenched workman in this context.
  • On statutory interpretation, applying the guidance in A.N. Sehgal regarding provisos and K.C.P. regarding favouring labour on ambiguity, the court concluded the proviso to S.15(2)(b) specifies the quantum of interim relief for retrenchment-type cases (equivalent to subsistence allowance) rather than disqualifying such cases from interim relief. Thus the Tribunal's narrow interpretation was incorrect.
  • Finally, the court found that the Tribunal had gone beyond the limited inquiry appropriate at the interim stage under S.15(2)(b) by deciding pre-decisional merits and making perverse factual findings; such errors warranted interference in writ jurisdiction because the Tribunal's findings were perverse and resulted in substantial failure of justice.

Based on this analysis the court concluded that the Tribunal's order and the trial Judge's order upholding it were unsustainable and set them aside, holding that the appellant was entitled to interim relief under S.15(2)(b) with effect from the date of retrenchment (5 February 1985).

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal is allowed.

Direct effects on the parties:

  • The orders of the Eighth Industrial Tribunal (dated 17 June 1988 in Case No. VIII-22/87) and of the learned trial Judge (dated 12 December 1990 in Civil Order No. 1031 (W) of 1989) are set aside.
  • The appellant (workman) is held to be entitled to interim relief under S.15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, as amended, with effect from the retrenchment date, 5 February 1985.
  • The Court directed that the appellant shall receive the interim relief with effect from 5 February 1985 within three months from the date of the judgment.
  • The appeal was allowed without any order as to costs.

Broader implications (as reflected in the opinion):

  • The Court construed S.15(2)(b) and its proviso in a manner protective of workmen, holding that the proviso prescribes the quantum of interim relief (equivalent to subsistence allowance) in retrenchment/dismissal/termination/discharge cases rather than excluding such cases from interim relief.
  • The decision criticizes undue factual conclusions at the interim stage and affirms that the Tribunal must not travel beyond the narrowly prescribed scope of inquiry under S.15(2)(b); perverse factual findings and reasoning that produce substantial failure of justice justify interference by a writ court.
  • The opinion emphasizes that accepting a lump-sum payment under financial compulsion does not automatically estop a retrenched workman from claiming statutory interim relief; courts must examine the context and evidence rather than apply estoppel mechanically.

The summary above is confined to the content and reasoning contained in the provided court opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond that text.

    Vishan Roy v. Bayer (India), Ltd.

    Bhagabati Prasad Banerjee, J.:— This is an appeal against the judgment and order, dated 12 December, 1990, passed by the learned trial Judge in Civil Order No. 1031 (W) of 1989 dismissing the writ application filed by the appellant-writ-petitioner against the order, dated 17 June, 1988, passed by Sri R.K Ghatak, Judge Eighth Industrial Tribunal, rejecting the application of the workman for interim relief as provided under S. 15(2)(b) of the West Bengal Amendment of the Industrial Disputes Act.

    2. In this appeal the question arose as to the scope and ambit of the power of the Industrial Tribunal under S. 15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as amended by the West Bengal Industrial Disputes (2nd Amendment) Act, 1980. For deciding the issue raised in this appeal it would be necessary for us to refer to the provisions of S. 15(2)(b) of the said Act which is as follows:

    “15(2) Where an industrial dispute has been referred to a Labour Court or Tribunal, it shall—

    (a) after filing of statements and taking of evidence give day-to-day hearing and give its award, upon determination or decision in the manner specified in S. 17-B without any delay;

    (b) upon hearing the parties to the dispute, determine within a period of 60 days, from the date of reference under Sub-sec. (1) of S. 10 or within such shorter period as specified in the order of reference under Sub-sec. (1) of S. 10, the quantum of interim relief admissible, if any:

    Provided that the quantum of interim relief relating to discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of service of workman shall be equivalent to subsistence allowance as may be admissible under the West Bengal Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1969.”

    The facts of this case relevant for the purpose of the appeal are that the appellant-petitioner was employed as car driver under the respondent-company, Bayer (India), Ltd., and was working as such from 14 November, 1967. On or about 2 March, 1976 the service of the appellant-petitioner was terminated by the respondent-company by paying one month's salary in lieu of notice on 2 March, 1976. The service of the appellant was terminated as the appellant-petitioner did not carry out an order of transfer. The said termination of service of the appellant-petitioner was the subject-matter of an industrial dispute and the Labour Court on consideration of the matter passed an award holding that the termination of service of the appellant-petitioner was justified by an award, dated 28 June, 1979. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said award, dated 28 June, 1979, the appellant-petitioner filed a writ application where upon a rule was issued, being Civil Rule No. 10419 (W) of 1979. The said civil rule came up for final hearing before Amitava Dutta, J. (as his Lordship then was) and by an order, dated 15 February, 1984, the learned Judge held that the order of termination of service simpliciter tantamounts to retrenchment and as such the same was void ab initio as the requirements of S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act were not complied with by the management and that the said award was quashed by the said learned Judge. The management was directed to pay the back-wages to the appellant-petitioner on the footing that he had been continuing in service and that the learned Judge also observed in the said judgment that it would be open to the management to retrench the appellant-petitioner after complying with the requirement of S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act and in accordance with law. Against the judgment and order, dated 15 February, 1984, passed in Civil Rule No. 10419(W) of 1979, the management preferred an appeal before the Division Bench of this Court. Ultimately the appeal filed by the management was dismissed. After the appeal was dismissed, the management reinstated the appellant-petitioner by the order, dated 30 January, 1985, with effect from 5 February, 1985 in the service of the company at Calcutta and paid a sum of Rs. 1,57,713.87 after deduction of the provident fund contribution and the income-tax at source and other advances. By another order passed on the same date, the management informed the appellant-petitioner that the management have decided to retrench him with effect from 5 February, 1985 as the management did not have any services to offer to him at Calcutta office and as required under S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act — the two demand drafts one for Rs. 2365.32 which was equivalent to one month's wages in lieu of period of notice and the other for Rs. 22,877.52 being retrenchment compensation were issued. The appellant-petitioner had encashed the demand drafts for back-wages for Rs. 1,57,713.87 but in so far as the retrenchment compensation is concerned the demand drafts were not initially encashed by the appellant-petitioner but he subsequently encashed it. Again an Industrial dispute was referred to by the State Government by an order, dated 16 December, 1986, to the Tribunal. The issue was “Is the retrenchment of Sri V. Roy with effect from 5 February, 1985 justified and lawful? To what relief, if any, is the workman entitled?” The appellant-petitioner who was the workman immediately filed a written statement before the Eighth Industrial Tribunal before whom the dispute had been referred to, disclosing the fact of receiving the back-wages amounting to Rs. 1,57,713.87. Thereafter the appellant-workman filed an application for interim relief under S. 15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act as amended by the West Bengal Industrial Disputes (2nd Amendment) Act, 1980. The said prayer for interim relief under S. 15(2)(b) of the Act was opposed by the management on the ground that the management had paid the said amount as back-wages and that the appellant was all along earning as taxi driver and earning not less than Rs. 35 per day. It was alleged that in 1985 the workman obtained a permit for a Matador van for carrying goods on hire basis and the workman paid Rs. 40,000 for the said vehicle and the balance of Rs. 71,338 was paid by Indian Bank, Bhowanipur Branch, to which bank the vehicle was hypothecated. It was also alleged that the workman paid the money for the said Matador van and the same was registered in the name of Sri Vikaram Roy who was stated to be the elder brother of the workman. In support of the defence, the management examined the Regional Administrative Manager and he deposed before the Tribunal and that he engaged a private detective to verify the information and that it was stated before the Tribunal that he had seen the workman driving the Matador van for which he invested the money to get the ownership. According to him, the appellant workman did not remain unemployed. He also stated that he had on many occasions seen the appellant driving taxi and private car and Fiat car but he had not noted the numbers of the said cars or the taxi or the vehicles and that he was not able to produce any certificate from the Motor Vehicles Department showing the “ownership” of any vehicle registered in the name of the workman. The workman deposed before the Labour Court that money which he had received from the management had been spent since he had to maintain a daughter and a son and that he further stated he opened a fixed deposit of Rs. 40,000 for making provision for his daughter's marriage. He further stated that he had no other income and remained unemployed all through. He also stated that his elder brother was maintaining him and his family during all these years when he was unemployed and for that purpose he gave him Rs. 40,000. He also stated that the rest of the money had been spent on account of loan which he had to incur during his unemployed period during all these years. The Tribunal held that it was clear that after spending Rs. 40,000 for acquiring the Matador van, he still remains in possession of Rs. 1,50,000 (approx.) to fetch him an income of about Rs. 1200 per month at the rate of interest payable by the bank and ultimately the Tribunal held that:

    “I, therefore, hold that he does not remain unemployed because of the action of the company who obtained liberty from the Hon'ble Court to retrench him on payment of that large cash amount. If the case goes against him, at present, he has nothing to stake, but on the other hand the company will suffer irreparable injury since there is no provision in the statute to compensate the company in such event. So, the effect of the interim relief application in favour of the workman will be pernicious and that would therefore, be a repugnant consideration.”

    3. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the order passed by the Eighth Industrial Tribunal, dated 17 June, 1986, rejecting the application for interim relief under S. 15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the appellant-petitioner filed a writ petition before this Court. The writ application ultimately came up for hearing before the learned trial Judge in Civil Order No. 1031 (W) of 1989. The learned trial Judge by order, dated 12 December, 1990, dismissed the writ petition on the facts and circumstances of the matter in issue. The learned trial Judge did not find any infraction of law in the matter in issue. Further it was held that it is well-settled principle that in the event the Tribunal comes to a definite finding on the basis of evidence on record the High Court in its writ jurisdiction ought not to interfere with the same lightly but to deal with the matter more cautiously and only in the event there is a gross miscarriage of justice or there appears to be error apparently on the face of record the writ Court can interfere. It was further observed that on the factual score there exists no error apparent on the face of record, neither the reason given can be said to be patently illegal so as to warrant the writ Court to intervene. Further it was submitted that since the appellant had accepted the retrenchment benefit, the appellant was estopped from challenging the order of retrenchment and consequently not entitled to get any interim relief. On the other hand, Sri Parthasarathi Sengupta submitted that both Tribunal and the learned trial Judge have misconstrued the provision of S. 15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act and that inasmuch as the receipt of back-wages before the order of retrenchment was served does not and cannot stand as a bar to get any relief under S. 15(2)(b) of the said Act. Secondly, it was submitted that the findings of the Tribunal in support of its finding that the appellant did not remain unemployed was perverse. Next it was submitted that the Tribunal had committed grave and substantial error in making a premature finding with regard to merit of the dispute at the predecisional stage. Sri Sengupta further submitted that in terms of the order passed in earlier writ application, this Court only observed that it would be open to the management to retrench the appellant after complying with the retrenchment in terms of the provisions of law and that if such retrenchment is made pursuant to that observation made by this Court in that event it could not be stated that the retrenchment was made pursuant to the order passed by this Court and as such the same could not be called in question. On the question of interpretation of the provision of S. 15(2)(b) of the said Act, Sri Sengupta relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ganges Printing Ink Factory Employees Industrial Co-operative Societies, Ltd. v. Seventh Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, [1986 — I L.L.N 111], wherein it was held by the Division Bench construing the provision of the said Act that the matters can be considered by the Tribunal under S. 15(2)(b) of the said Act were—

    (a) admissibility;

    (b) any objection as to the sustainability of the reference; and

    (c) effect of the grant or its refusal on the employer or the workman

    and that it was further observed that the term “admissible” has a definite and well recognised meaning as a legal concept used primarily with regard to evidence. It means matters which are relevant and not otherwise excluded by law. Admissibility may be one of the considerations in the process of adjudication of interim relief but all the considerations which guide the Tribunal in exercise of the power in that regard are not the tests of admissibility. Sri Sengupta submitted that as to the maintainability of the claim for interim relief is concerned (sic) Sri Sengupta relied on the proviso of S. 15(2)(b) of the said Act which provides that provided that the quantum of interim relief relating to discharge”, dismissal and/or retrenchment or termination of service of workman “shall be” equivalent to subsistence allowance as may be admissible under the West Bengal Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1969. It was further submitted that there are cases where there is no question of grant of any interim monetary relief. With regard to the test of maintainability, Sri Sengupta submitted that it could not be disputed that industrial dispute was not maintainable and that it was submitted that Tribunal was wrong in holding that when the retrenchment order was passed pursuant to the liberty given by this Court in the earlier proceeding the same could not be called in question was perverse view of the matter inasmuch as in the earlier proceeding this Court made it clear that it would be open to the management to retrench the appellant in accordance with law. In the order of retrenchment by the learned trial Judge it was stated that the management did not have any service to offer to Calcutta office or in other words there was no requirement of any driver in Calcutta office. In this connection reference was made to S. 25-F of the said Act which provides

    “that no workman employed in an industry who had been in continuous service of not less than one year shall be retrenched by the employer until the workman had been given one month's notice in writing indicating reasons for retrenchment.”

    And that it is when an industrial dispute has been raised in that event the Tribunal would go into the question whether the reasons given in the order of retrenchment was a good and a valid reason or was a mere device to terminate the service in the garb of retrenchment. So according to Sri Sengupta the Tribunal has misconstrued the order passed in the earlier writ petition as well as the scope and effect of S. 25-F of the said Act while rejecting the said application for interim relief. Lastly, it was submitted by Sri Sengupta that the subsistence allowance as provided under the West Bengal Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1969, would be inadmissible only in case where the workman concerned had accepted the employment in any place other than the establishment where he had been working immediately before his suspension and in this connection he has referred to proviso to S. 3(1) of the West Bengal Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1969, which was referred to Section (sic). Section 15(2)(b) of the said Act “provided further that an employee shall not be entitled to any subsistence allowance if he accepts employment during the period of suspension in any place other than the establishment where he had been working immediately before his suspension. Sri Sengupta submitted that the Tribunal without any evidence on record erroneously held that as a driver he could not remain unemployed, or in other words, he was driving the Matador van and as such he was a self-employed person. Sri Sengupta submitted that on plain reading of the proviso of S. 3(1) of the West Bengal Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1969, an employee is debarred from getting the subsistence allowance if he accepts employment in any other establishment and that one cannot employ himself and accepting of employment must mean accepting employment in any other establishment. Accordingly, the Tribunal rejected the application on total misconception and misreading of the provisions of law. Sri S. Sarka, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent-company, submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case where the management have paid the said sum of Rs. 1,57,713.87 as back-wages he must be taken to be a solvent man and that then the management cannot be asked to pay the interim relief. Reliance was placed on behalf of the management to the finding of the Tribunal as well as reasons given by the learned trial Judge. It was further submitted that the power under S. 15(2)(b) of the said Act could only be invoked only in a case where the workman concerned was unemployed and unable to maintain himself. But in the facts and circumstances of the case when the workman could maintain himself with the money (paid) in that event it will be contrary to the spirit and object of the provisions of law to grant such relief and it was further submitted that in case the dispute is decided in favour of the workman in that event the workman would get the entire benefit but at this stage no interim relief should be granted to the workman on the ground that he was given a lump sum by the management and secondly, the Tribunal found that he was self-employed and as such the purpose of the Act would be defeated if such relief is granted to the workman. Industrial Disputes Act is a piece of social legislation and the Courts have always emphasized on the doctrine of social justice, which is founded on basic ideal of social and economic equality and have given it predominant consideration. Law is a technic for the regulation of social power. This is true of labour law, as it is of other aspects of legal system. The principal purpose of labour law is to regulate, to support and to restrain the power of management and the power of organised labour. The provisions of S. 15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act introduced by the West Bengal Amendment was designed to extend the principles of social and economic justice which the Constitution intends to secure to all its citizens. In the instant case the said provision has been introduced with a view to protect the workman in case a dispute is referred to the Tribunal and Tribunal proceeded to decide such dispute which requires time and money. Uptill now there is no such broad-based legal aid for the labourers and/or workmen and the workmen had to fight and defend such a proceeding before the Tribunal against the management. Under such circumstances the Legislature had enacted a provision so that in cases where a workman is discharged, dismissed, retrenched or his service had been terminated in that event they are entitled to this interim relief so that they can survive and fight out the litigation. Keeping in mind this principle we have to construe the provisions of S. 15(2)(b) of the said Act wherein the Labour Court or the Tribunal have been charged with the duty to determine “quantum of ad interim relief admissible, if any”. Accordingly, the Tribunal has to determine the quantum of ad interim relief wherever it is admissible and that the proviso thereto clearly lays down the amount of relief which should be given by the Tribunal and that in case of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of service the Tribunal has no option to determine the quantum but shall automatically adopt the quantum which should be equivalent to subsistence allowance admissible under the West Bengal Act of 1969, Craies on Statute Law 6th Edn., page 217, stated the rules for construction of a proviso which is

    “the effect of excepting or qualifying proviso (provision), according to the ordinary rules of construction is to exempt out of the preceding portion of the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein, which but for the proviso would be within it; and such a proviso cannot be construed as enlarging the scope of enactment when it can fairly and properly construed without attributing to that effect.”

    Supreme Court in A.N Sehgal v. Raje Ram Sheoran, [1991 — I L.L.N 1055], held that the scope of the proviso, is to carve out an exception to the main enactment and it excludes something which otherwise would have been within the rule. It has to operate in the same field and if the language of the main enactment is clear the proviso cannot be torn apart from the main enactment nor can it be used to nullify by implication what the enactment clearly says nor set at naught the real object of the main enactment, unless the words of the proviso are such that it is its necessary effect. Applying these principles normally proviso narrows down the effect of the preceding words or in other words, the proviso to section narrow the effect of the main provision. On plain reading of the above provision it is clear that it is the duty of the Tribunal to determine the question of quantum of ad interim relief if admissible. There are cases where interim relief admissible save for example if the dispute is with regard to terms and conditions of service or a case of transfer and other dispute not relating to discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of service, only in such four cases the question of granting of ad interim relief could automatically arise. The question that was raised in this case was whether within the scope of this section the Tribunal can refuse the interim relief on the ground stated by the Tribunal upheld by the learned trial Judge. The Tribunal rejected the claim on two grounds. The first was that as the management have paid a sum of Rs. 1,57,713.87 before the retrenchment and that money was sufficient to maintain himself and his family during the period the dispute is pending and secondly, he was a driver and as such he was employed. We have gone through the order with the reasoning given by Tribunal but we are unable to appreciate the reasoning given by Tribunal. In this case the appellant was out of service from 22 March, 1976 and that the back-wages that was paid by the management after the appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court in the earlier proceeding only on 30 January, 1985 or in other words, the appellant was out of service for nine years and that back-wages for nine years was paid and that it does not require any exercise of special skill to appreciate that a workman who was out of service for nine years must have incurred loans from various quarters and that the Tribunal in a most unusual and impracticable manner rejected the claim of the appellant workman regarding the loan in the absence of authenticated documents. In our country an unemployed person has to take loan or temporary accommodation or help for the purpose of survival and that it is not expected that such unemployed person shall be granted loan by the banks and financial institutions on the basis of documents. The reasoning given by Tribunal for not accepting the evidence of the workman is, in our view, contrary to well settled principle and are plainly not good reasons. In our view, the finding of the Tribunal reagarding the existence of Rs. 1,57,713.87 has no actual and factual basis and that the same on the face of it is perverse and not based on any evidence. It is not out of place to mention that the Tribunal proceeded in the matter in a manner which has resulted in substantial failure in justice while passing the said order. Tribunal has made a finding contrary to the case made out by the employer against the employee in so far as owning a vehicle. The management in the written statement stated that the Matador van was purchased in the name of the brother of the workman but in the order this fact was significantly omitted by the Tribunal. Secondly, there cannot be any purchase in a benami inasmuch as benami is prohibited and punishable under law. Further the reasoning given by Tribunal which was accepted by the learned trial Judge was peculiar. The Tribunal has said in one breath that he had sufficient money and that by making investment he could earn his livelihood and also said that a workman who has frittered away such a huge sum of money was not entitled to a relief. In our view, a workman who is out of service for so many years if he gets back-wages that cannot ipso facto stand as a bar to get relief under S. 15(2)(b) of the said Act. Secondly, Tribunal have proceeded on the footing that the entire sum of rupees was by way of retrenchment which was not correct as a matter of fact. Further we are of the view that rules of estoppel or waiver cannot be applied against a retrenched workman who had no freedom to refuse the payment in view of his financial position caused by the earlier termination, keeping him unemployed for so many; years and the issue of order of retrenchment immediately after reinstatement. We are constrained to take exception to the finding of the Tribunal that

    “but it is difficult to decide a to maintainability of the relief in favour of the man who happened to suppress a huge cash relief which he had already obtained by the orders of the Hon'ble High Court modifying the previous award in respect of the same case.”

    The appellant had not suppressed the receipt of the back-wages from the employer and secondly, money was not given pursuant to the order passed by this Court in the previous proceeding modifying the previous award. In the earlier proceeding the termination simpliciter was made as a penal measure under the garb of termination simpliciter and in the instant case the question is whether the retrenchment was made in accordance with law or in other words, whether there are valid reasons for such retrenchment. Accordingly, we are of the view that Tribunal has committed a grave and serious error which calls for intervention by this Court. Tribunal have rejected the application on the ground of suppression made by the appellant regarding the receipt of huge cash relief which was contary to the record and secondly, the Tribunal have travelled beyond the scope or ambit of the S. 15(2)(b) of the said Act. With regard to the rules of interpretation of the provisions of Industrial Dispute we may remind ourselves with the observation made by the Supreme Court in the case of K.C.P Employees' Association v. K.C.P Ltd. [(1978) 2 SCC 42 : A.I.R 1978 S. 474], where it was held that in (if) industrial law interpreted and applied in the perspective of Part IV of the Constitution the benefit of reasonable doubt must go to the weaker section, namely, the labourer. So, this has a clear authority of the proposition that in case of any ambiguity or in case where two interpretations are available the benefit must go to the labourer who are weaker sections of the society. Accordingly applying the rules of interpretation laid down by the Supreme Court we must hold that within the scope of S. 15(2)(b) of the said Act, Tribunal had no option but to decide the quantum straightway in case of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of service in accordance with provision laid down in the provision thereto but only exception is that such interim relief could not be given on the face of it if it transpires that the dispute was not maintainable or in view of the petitioner of the dispute (sic) there was no scope for any interim relief. There may be cases where such interim relief is not admissible. The monetary relief is admissible only in cases where the dispute if decided in favour of the workman, the monetary benefits could be obtained as in the case of dismissal, discharge or retrenchment or termination of service or in similar other cases. Such relief could not be given in case where the workman remained employed and earned his livelihood because of such employment. In such cases it would not be maintainable on the question of fact of grant or refusal of the employer or employee is concerned. In this case, an employee whose service has been terminated and who remained unemployed, in our view, was entitled to get interim relief for his subsistence. In our view, the language of the section does not permit any other interpretation. The language of section does not permit to interpret that the provision of S. 15(2)(b) could only be invoked in a case where the workman concerned was unemployed and could not maintain himself as there was no other condition precedent was imposed under the law. The Tribunal has been given liberty to fix the quantum of the interim relief admissible but in case of retrenchment no discretion is left to the Tribunal regarding fixing the quantum which has to be fixed in accordance with the principles laid down in the proviso. In this connection we may refer to provision of S. 21 of Hindu Marriage Act wherein it is provided that if a party, i.e, if the husband or wife as the case may be, was unable to maintain himself or herself independently he or she was entitled to maintenance pendente lite. There the legislation makes it clear that the Court has gone into the question whether a party applying for maintenance is able to maintain himself or herself independently with his own income or not and if it is found by the Court that if he or she was not able to maintain with his own or her own income only in that event the Court on consideration of the entire matter can pass an order for maintenance. Such view which is not expressly provided could not be imported for construing the provision of S. 15(2)(b) of the said Act. The legislation had clearly provided that in case of retrenchment also the workman concerned was entitled to get interim relief the quantum of which is clearly indicated. The legislation also while enacting the provision was fully aware that in case of retrenchment, the retrenchment benefits are given but in respect of the same the legislation clearly provided that in case of retrenchment also workman will be entitled to get interim relief. Of course the cases of discharge, dismissal and termination of service were quite different from retrenchment yet when the legislation has treated the case of discharge, retrenchment, dismissal or termination of service at par and alike, we are unable to accept the contention that in case of retrenchment and in case where one gets an amount as retrenchment benefit he is disqualified to get such interim relief. This view will be contrary to the plain language used in the section and the same would be contrary to not only the language used but, it would be contrary to the spirit and object of such legislation. Here vires of the provision of the Act for treating the case of discharge, dismissal, termination or retrenchment on the ground of discrimination on the plea that discharge, dismissal and termination cannot be treated at par with the retrenchment and/or legislation made unequals as equal. In the absence of challenge of the vires of such a law, we are unable to hold that in case of retrenchment, an employee is not entitled to such interim relief. Accordingly, we are of the view that the learned trial Judge was wrong in dismissing the writ application on the basis of the finding and/or statement recorded by Tribunal. The finding of the Tribunal in this case in support of rejection of the application was perverse and the reasoning given by the Tribunal was de horse the statutes and was based, on total misconception of the provisions of S. 15(2)(b) of the said Act. We have already held that the order of the Tribunal has resulted in substantial failure of justice in the facts and circumstances of the case. It is not a case of interference with the finding of Tribunal on pure question of fact. It is well settled that when Tribunal being the final Court of fact comes to definite finding such finding could not be interfered with by the writ Court — unless such a finding is perverse. In the instant case we have held firstly the finding of Tribunal is perverse and secondly the Tribunal has travelled beyond the scope of the provisions of the Act and have travelled beyond the statutes in order to find out the meaning while rejecting the application for interim relief. Accordingly, considering the facts of the case, we are of the view that the order of the Eighth Industrial Tribunal, dated 17 June, 1988, in case No. VIII-22/87 and the order of the learned trial Judge, dated 12 December, 1990, passed in Civil Order No. 1031(W) of 1989 is set aside and we hold that the appellant was entitled to get interim relief in accordance with the provision of S. 15(2)(b) of the said Act with effect from the date of retrenchment i.e, 5 February, 1985. Accordingly it is directed that the appellant to get interim relief with effect from 5 February, 1985 within three months from today.

    4. The appeal is allowed without any order as to costs.

    5. Baboolal Jain:— I agree. Appeal allowed.

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