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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Rule 27(2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965.
  • Rule 44(1)(10) of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959.
  • Regulation 58 of the Railway Protection Force Rules.
  • Rule 44(10)(2) of the Railway Protection Force Rules
  • Rule 56 of the Railway Protection Force Rules
  • Rule 22(2) of the Railway Servants Rules
  • Rule 27(2) of the Rules,
  • Clause (c) of Rule 27(2)
  • Rules 22(2) and 18(ii)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Rule 27(2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965.
  • Rule 44(1)(10) of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959.
  • Regulation 58 of the Railway Protection Force Rules.
  • Rule 44(10)(2) of the Railway Protection Force Rules
  • Rule 56 of the Railway Protection Force Rules
  • Rule 22(2) of the Railway Servants Rules
  • Rule 27(2) of the Rules,
  • Clause (c) of Rule 27(2)
  • Rules 22(2) and 18(ii)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was appointed as a Rakshak in the Railway Protection Force in 1956 and promoted to Senior Rakshak in 1958. On the night of 10/11 February 1973, about 23–25 kgs of sugar (with empty bag and wrapper) were recovered in the divisional receiving yard. A charge-sheet dated 17 March 1973 was issued to the petitioner under Rule 44 (charging "gross neglect of duty" for failing to detect and prevent theft of sugar weighing about 25 kgs while on seal checking duty on 11.2.73). The petitioner submitted a reply on 29 June 1973 (in Hindi).

An enquiry officer conducted an enquiry and recorded reasons concluding that the theft took place in connivance with RPF staff posted in the yard and held that the Senior Rakshak (the petitioner) was responsible. The Disciplinary Authority issued a show cause notice under Rule 44(10)(2) of the Railway Protection Force Rules, recorded agreement with the enquiry officer's finding that the charge was established, and proposed removal from service. The petitioner was removed by order dated 25 August 1975.

The petitioner appealed; the Appellate Authority rejected the appeal by an order dated 25 November 1975. The petitioner then filed the present application under Article 226 challenging the disciplinary proceedings, the enquiry findings, the show cause notice, the order of removal and the rejection of his appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the second show cause notice issued by the Disciplinary Authority improperly recorded a final conclusion as to the petitioner's guilt (rather than a tentative finding), thereby violating the procedural requirement under the Railway Protection Force Rules (as articulated in Nripendra Nath).
  2. Whether the enquiry officer's finding — effectively finding the petitioner guilty of theft in connivance — is at variance with the charge actually framed (which alleged gross neglect of duty for failure to detect theft), and if so whether those findings are invalid.
  3. Whether the Appellate Authority complied with the obligations under Regulation 58 (and related rules) to "consider" (i.e., apply its mind to) the specified factors including procedural compliance, justification of findings, and appropriateness of penalty, and whether the appellate order is legally sustainable.
  4. Whether the enquiry report and/or enquiry officer's findings satisfy the requirement of being a reasoned/speaking order (application of mind), particularly when the report is alleged to be an ipso dixit lacking analysis.
  5. Whether, if the appellate order is unsustainable, the order of removal that merged with it must also be set aside and the petitioner restored (with consequential reliefs) consistent with authority such as Tekraj.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The second show cause notice amounted to a final finding of guilt by the Disciplinary Authority (stating the petitioner "was not a fit person to be retained in service"), instead of a tentative finding; this is impermissible under the rules.
  • The enquiry officer's conclusion effectively convicted the petitioner of theft in connivance with others, which is a different and more serious charge than the one framed (gross neglect of duty for failure to detect theft); findings cannot be at variance with the charge.
  • The enquiry report lacked proper analysis of witness depositions and did not deal with petitioner's written statements and issues raised, showing non-application of mind; this was not addressed by the Appellate Authority.
  • The appellate order suffers from infirmities because the Appellate Authority did not indicate that it considered (and was satisfied about) compliance with procedure, justification of findings, or adequacy of penalty as required by the applicable rules.
  • Because the appellate order is unsustainable, the order of removal (which merged with the appellate order) must also fail and the petitioner should be restored with consequential reliefs.

The opinion does not contain detailed statements of the Respondent's arguments in the record provided.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nripendra Nath v. State of West Bengal, 1981 (1) SLR 533 At the stage of the second show cause notice the Disciplinary Authority must come only to a tentative finding and not a firm/positive conclusion that the delinquent is not fit to be retained in service; a positive conclusion at that stage violates Rule 44(1)(10) of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959 (as referred). The court relied on this authority to hold that the second show cause notice in the present case — which stated the petitioner "was not a fit person to be retained in service" — was improper and must be set aside; such a conclusion rendered subsequent proceedings unsustainable.
Ram Chander v. Union of India, (1986) 3 SCC 103 Construction of the word "consider" in rules governing appeals; appellate authority must afford a hearing and pass a reasoned order; the appellate authority should give reasons addressing contentions raised in the appeal (particularly where representation on penalty is the only meaningful opportunity to exonerate). The court cited this decision to support the requirement that the Appellate Authority must give a hearing and pass a reasoned order; used to find the impugned appellate order lacked indication of consideration and reasoning required by the rules.
R.P. Bhat v. Union of India, (1986) 2 SCC 651 The word "consider" implies "due application of mind"; appellate authority must consider (a) compliance with prescribed procedure (and if non-compliance resulted in violation of constitutional provisions or failure of justice), (b) whether findings are justified by evidence, and (c) whether the penalty is adequate. The court relied on this principle to observe that the Appellate Authority in this case gave no indication it satisfied itself as to procedural compliance or whether the findings were warranted by evidence, thereby vitiating the appellate order.
Anil Kumar v. Presiding Officer, (1985) 3 SCC 378 : AIR 1985 SC 1121 Enquiry officers in quasi-judicial disciplinary enquiries must act judicially and produce reasoned/speaking reports; mere ipse dixit without analysis of evidence and reasons is impermissible where livelihood and stigma are at stake. The court used this authority to hold that the enquiry report in the present case failed to analyse depositions or address the petitioner's case; since the enquiry report was not reasoned, the appellate authority's failure to consider this vitiated the appeal decision.
Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, 1966 (1) SCR 466 (AIR 1966 SC 671) Support for the requirement of a speaking/reasoned order: a speaking order should be at least plausible and show reasons for the conclusion. Cited in the court's discussion of the need for reasoned enquiry reports and decisions; used to reinforce that the enquiry report must display application of mind.
Mahabir Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1971 (1) SCR 201 / (1970) 1 SCC 764 : AIR 1970 SC 1302 Reasoned decisions are required to reach satisfactory conclusions on disputed claims; especially where deprivation of livelihood or stigma may result, decisions must be supported by cogent reasons. Relied on to emphasize the necessity for cogent reasons in disciplinary enquiry reports and decisions; supported the court's finding of non-application of mind in the enquiry report here.
Tekraj v. Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC 236 : AIR 1988 SC 469 Where the order of dismissal is set aside and proceedings are restored to the stage of enquiry, the dismissed employee shall be deemed restored to service and entitled to normal reliefs (including salary for the past period subject to conditions); suspension merged into dismissal is vacated. The court applied this principle to hold that because the appellate order was unsustainable, the order of removal (which merged with the appellate order) would not survive; the petitioner would be restored and entitled to consequential reliefs subject to conditions the court specified.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise legal analysis applying procedural and substantive principles reflected in the cited authorities and rules:

  1. Second show cause notice: The court examined the second show cause notice and found that the Disciplinary Authority there recorded a definitive conclusion that the petitioner "was not a fit person to be retained in service" and proposed removal. Relying on Nripendra Nath, the court held that at the stage of the second show cause notice the authority must only arrive at a tentative finding and not a final conclusion on guilt or fitness to retain the delinquent; a final conclusion at that stage violates the proper procedure under the Rules. Consequently, the second show cause notice was objectionable and had to be quashed.
  2. Variance between charge and finding: The charge framed against the petitioner was "gross neglect of duty" for failing to detect and prevent theft (i.e., an omission). The enquiry officer's finding, however, stated that the theft occurred in connivance with staff including the petitioner and effectively found the petitioner guilty of theft — a different and more serious charge not framed in the charge-sheet. The court reiterated the settled principle that findings cannot be at variance with the charge and concluded the enquiry officer's findings were liable to be set aside.
  3. Appellate authority's duty to "consider" and give reasons: The Appellate Authority's order did not indicate that it had satisfied itself whether the procedure laid down in the Rules had been complied with, whether the findings were justified by evidence, or whether the penalty was appropriate. The court drew on Ram Chander and R.P. Bhat (and related rules) to construe "consider" as requiring due application of mind, a hearing, and a reasoned order addressing the points raised in the appeal. The absence of any indication that these considerations occurred vitiated the appellate order.
  4. Enquiry report quality and application of mind: The petitioner had pointed out that the enquiry officer did not analyze witness depositions, did not address petitioner's written submissions, and reached conclusions (that the petitioner was guilty of theft) without furnishing reasons. Applying Anil Kumar and other precedents, the court found that a disciplinary enquiry must be quasi-judicial and that the enquiry report must be a "speaking order" showing reasons; the report in this case disclosed non-application of mind and could not be treated as a valid enquiry report.
  5. Merger and consequences: The court held that the order of removal had merged with the appellate order. Because the appellate order was unsustainable for the reasons above, the order of removal had also to fail. The court relied on Tekraj to justify restoring the petitioner to service and granting consequential reliefs.

On these bases the court concluded that the findings of the enquiry officer, the second show cause notice, the order of removal and the appellate authority's order could not be sustained and must be set aside and quashed.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The writ petition is allowed; the court set aside and quashed the enquiry officer's findings, the second show cause notice, the order of removal and the appellate order. The Rule was made absolute and appropriate writs were to issue.

Immediate Consequences for the Parties

  • The petitioner is to be allowed to resume duties forthwith upon presentation of a xerox/plain copy of the judgment and order (subject to obtaining a certified copy on undertaking), i.e., reinstatement is granted.
  • The petitioner is not entitled to any monetary benefits until May 1986 (when the rule was made absolute), but shall be entitled to full salary from June 1986 onward as admissible.
  • The entire period from the date of removal until resumption of duty shall be treated as a period spent on duty for all purposes, except that arrear salaries up to May 1986 are excluded from payment.
  • Salary and allowances shall be fixed notionally, giving all benefits of scale revision and other incidental benefits the petitioner would have had if he had continued in service.
  • The petitioner shall be paid Rs. 10,000 within two weeks of communication of the order; this amount shall be adjusted against future salary payable in terms of the order.
  • There will be no order as to costs.

The opinion does not purport to lay down any new general precedent beyond applying existing principles from the cited authorities; the effects described are the direct consequences for the petitioner in this matter.

Administrative/Procedural Implication Noted by the Court

The decision reiterates the following procedural/legal requirements (as applied in this case): (1) a second show cause notice must not state a final conclusion of guilt; (2) findings must correspond to the charges framed; (3) enquiry reports must be reasoned/speaking orders showing application of mind; and (4) appellate authorities must "consider" appeals with due application of mind, afford hearing and give reasoned decisions addressing procedural compliance, justification of findings and adequacy of penalty.

End of summary.

    Sri Bishnu Prosad v. Union Of India & Ors.

    1. In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner has challenged the disciplinary proceedings culminated in the order of removal of the petitioner and the order of rejection of the appeal preferred by the petitioner. Shortly stated the facts are that the petitioner was appointed as Rakshak, Railway Protection Force in the year 1956. In the year 1958, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Senior Rakshak. He was charge-sheeted on 1973 and removed from service on 1975. From the report of the R.P.F, Asansol, it appears that in respect of recovery of about 23 Kgs. Sugar along with empty bag and one wrapper in the receiving yard, a charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner. It appears from the report of the Enquiry Officer as to why the said charge-sheet was issued on March 17, 1973. He has recorded as follows:

    “On receipt of the report of OC/RPF/ASN in respect of recovery of about 25 Kgs. Sugar along with empty Jhola and one chnder in the Dn. Receiving yard in the night of 10/11.2.1973 fixing up responsibility on SR 4211 Bishnu Pd. ASO/ASN a charge sheet to the SR vide No. PF/39/73 dt. 17.3.73 under Rule 44 on the charge framed against him as apended below:

    CHARGE

    “For gross neglect of duty in that on 11.2.73 while he was on seal checking duty in Dn. Receiving yard from 11 ms. 1008 co. ims he failed to detect and prevent theft of sugar weighing about 25 kgs which subsequently recovered, during his duty period. The petitioner submitted his reply on June 29, 1973 in Hindi.

    Thereafter, the Enquiry officer enquired into the said allegations made against the petitioner. The reasoning and findings of the Enquiry Officer are as follows:—

    Reasons for finding;

    On scrutiny the statements of P.Ms and D.Ws and going through the available records I am convincted that the theft took place in the year in connivance with the team of R.P.F staff posted in the Dn. receiving yard. The simless and ineffective round in the year by the A.S.I plea of checking the load by the S.R and performance of R.K near the bridge for from the stable wagons with available contents suspected the integrity of the staff.

    Although, S.I/Rajeswar Singh after detection of the case tried to give some benefit to the accused person not preparing seizure list in the spot with the plea of not detection of victimised wagon, it is convinced that the theft took place in the yard in connivance with the A.S.I.S.R and on duty or near Patrol. Therefore, the “S.R was responsible for theft and the charge is established.”

    2. Thereafter the Disciplinary authority issued a show cause notice under Rule 44(10)(2) of the Railway Protection Force Rules and recorded as follows:—

    “Perused the findings of E.O and find that the charge framed against SR/Bishnu Prosad has been established during the proceeding enquiry. I do agree with E.O's finding on hold him guilty and consider that he is not a fit person to be retained in the force and thus be should be removed from service. A show cause notice under rules may be issued to him accordingly.”

    3. The petitioner submitting his reply to the said show cause notice. By the order dated August 25, 1975 the petitioner was removed from service.

    4. An appeal was preferred by the petitioner against the said order of removal before the Appellate authority. In the said appeal the petitioner agitated his grievances against the findings and conclusions of the Enquiry officer. The appellate Authority passed an order on November 25, 1975 which is to the following effect.

    “I have gone through the appeal submitted by SR 4211 Bishnu Prosad Ex. SR/CE/HWH against the order of removal from service passed by the A.S.O(L) HWB on 25.8.75

    I do not find any reason to alter the order passed by the A.S.O(L)/HWH.

    The appeal is therefore rejected.”

    5. At the hearing several contentions have been raised.

    6. Firstly, it has been contended that in the second show cause notice the conclusion arrived at by the Disciplinary authority is not tentative but final as to the guilt of the petitioner. He decided that she petitioner was not a fit person to be retained in service. This contention has some substance. I have already set cut the contents of the second show cause notice. It would be evident from the said show cause notice that the Disciplinary Authority at that stage came to the finding that the petitioner “was not a fit person to be retained in service” and therefore the Disciplinary Authority proposed to impose on him the penalty of ‘removal from service’. This court in the case of (1) Nripendra Nath v. State of West Bengal reported in 1981 (1) SLR 533 held that at the stage of second show cause notice it is obligatory on the part of the Disciplinary authority to come to a tentative finding and not any positive finding and/or firm conclusion that the delinquent is not a fit person to be retained in service. In any such positive conclusion is arrived at that stage, it would be violative of Rule 44(1)(10) of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959. Accordingly she second show cause notice must be set aside and quashed and if it is quashed the subsequent proceedings may not survive.

    7. It is then contended that the petitioner was charged with an offense but he was found guilty altogether on a different court. I have already set out hereinbefore the charge sheet as well as the finding of the Enquiry officer. The charge was gross neglect of duty in a much as the petitioner failed to detect and prevent the theft of sugar weighing about 25 kgs. whereas the finding of the Enquiry officer is that the theft took place in connivance with ASI., Senior Rakshak and others on duty or near Patrol. He concluded that the “SR was responsible for theft and the finding is.”

    8. It is now well settled that the finding cannot be at variance with the charge. The petitioner was not charged with the theft but for neglect of duty as he failed in detecting the theft, whereas the Enquiry officer found his guilty of a new charge not levelled against him that he himself was responsible for theft. According to the Enquiry officer such theft took place in connivance inter alia with him.

    9. Accordingly the findings of the Enquiry officer are liable to be set aside and quashed. If the findings cannot be sustained subsequent proceedings based on such findings cannot be survived.

    10. The last contention is that the appellate order cannot be also sustained as it suffers several infirmities.

    11. The Appellate authority passed an order on November 25, 1985 under Regulation 58 of the Railway Protection Force Rules. The said rule provides that for consideration of Appeal (1) in case of an Appeal against an order of suspension the Appellate authority shall consider whether in the light of the provisions of Rule 40 and having regard to the circumstances of the case, the order of suspension is justified or not and confirm or revoked the order accordingly. (2) In case of an Appeal against an order imposing any of the penalty specified in Rule 41 the Appellate Authority shall consider:—

    (a) Whether the procedure prescribed in these Rules has been complied with, and if not whether such non-compliance has resulted in violation of any provisions of the constitution or in failure of justice;

    (b) Whether findings are justified, and

    (c) Whether the penalty imported is excessive, adequate or inadequate; and pass orders;

    The word ‘consider’ in Rule 56 of the Railway Protection Force Rules implies due application of mind. It, is clear upon the term of Rule 58(2) that the Appellate authority is required to consider (2) whether provisions laid down in the rule has been complied with and if not whether such non-compliance in violation of any provisions of the constitution or in failure of Justice (2) whether the findings are justified and (3) whether the penalty imposed is excessive adequate or inadequate.

    12. There is no indication in the impugned order that the Appellate Authority was satisfied as to whether the procedure laid down in the Rules has been complied with.

    13. Reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (2) Ram Chander v. Union of India reported in (1986) 3 SCC 103.

    14. In that case the Supreme Court was considering Rules 22(2) and 18(ii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968. The said rules provide that the appellate authority must afford an opportunity of hearing and pass a reasoned order. The Supreme Court also construed the word ‘consider’ in that context. The Supreme Court observed that the right to make a representation on the proposed penalty which was to be found in Article 311(2) having been taken away by the Forty Second Amendment, there was a provision of law under which a government servant could claim that right. The only stage at which a government servant gets “a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him”, i.e an opportunity to exonerate himself from the charge by showing that the evidence adduced at the inquiry is not worthy of credence or consideration or that the charges proved against him are not of such a character as to merit the extreme penalty of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank and that any of the lesser punishments. Ought to have been sufficient in his case, is at the stage of hearing of a departmental appeal. That being so, the Appellate Authority must not only give a hearing to the Government servant concerned but also pass a reasoned order dealing with the contentions raised by him in the appeal. Although in the absence of a requirement in the statute or the rules, there is no duty east on an appellate authority to give reasons where the order is one of affirmance. Rule 22(2) of the Railway Servants Rules in express terms requires the Railway Board to record its findings on the three aspects stated therein Similar are the requirements under Rule 27(2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. The word ‘consider’ has different shades of meaning and must in Rule 22(2), in the context in which it appears mean an objective consideration by the Railway Board after due application of mind which implies the giving or reasons for its decision. Reasoned decision by tribunals, such as the Railway Board in the present case, will promote public confidence in the administrative process. An objective consideration is possible only if the delinquent servant is heard and given a chance to satisfy the authority regarding the final orders that may be passed on his appeal. Considerations of fair play and justice also require that such a personal hearing should be given.

    15. Reference may also be made to the decision of the Supreme Court on the case of (3) R.P Bhat v. Union of India reported in (1986) 2 SCC 651. There the Supreme Court observed as follows:—

    “The word “consider” in Rule 27(2) implies “due application of Mind”. It is clear upon the terms of Rule 27(2) that the appellate authority is required to consider (1) whether the procedure laid down in the Rules has been complied with; and if not, whether such non compliance has resulted in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or in failure of Justice; (2) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on record; and (3) whether the penalty imposed is adequate; and thereafter pass orders confirming, enhancing etc. the penalty, or may remit back the case to the authority which imposed the same. Rule 27(2) casts a duty on the appellate authority to consider the relevant factors set forth in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof.

    There is no indication in the impugned order that the Director General was satisfied as to whether the procedure laid down in the rules had been complied with; and if not, whether such non-compliance had resulted in violation of any of the provisions of the constitution or in failure of justice. We regret to find that the Director General has also not given any finding on the crucial question as to whether the findings of the disciplinary authority were warranted by the evidence on record. It seems that he only applied his mind to the requirement of Clause (c) of Rule 27(2) viz. whether the penalty imposed was adequate or justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case. There being non-compliance with the requirements of Rule 27(2) of the Rules, the impugned order passed by the Director General is liable to be set aside.”

    16. There is another aspect of this matter. In the appeal the writ petitioner categorically pointed out that the Enquiry Officer without analysing the deposition of the witness and without considering the case for and against the petitioner and the issues highlighted by the petitioner in the written statement came to the conclusion that the petitioner was guilty of the charges not framed against him. This was not considered by the appellate authority at all, which has vitiated the appellate order. Reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in (4) Anil Kumar v. Presiding Officer reported in (1985) 3 SCC 378 : AIR 1985 SC 1121, where the Supreme Court observed as follows:—

    “We have extracted the charges framed against the appellant. We have also pointed out in clear terms the report of the Enquiry Officer. It is well settled that a disciplinary enquiry has to be a quasi judicial enquiry held according to the principles of natural Justice and the Enquiry Officer has a duty to act judicially. The Enquiry Officer did not apply his mind to the evidence. Save setting out the names of the witnesses, he did not discuss the evidence. He merely recorded his ipso dixit that the charges are proved. He did not assign a single reason why the evidence produced by the appellant did not appeal to him or was considered not credit worthy. He did not permit a peep into his mind as why the evidence produced by the management appealed to him in preference to the evidence produced by the appellant. The enquiry report in a quasi judicial enquiry must show the reasons for the conclusion. It cannot be an ipso dixit of the Enquiry Officer. It has to be a speaking order in the sense that the conclusion is supported by reasons. This is too well settled to be supported by a precedent. In (5) Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, 1966 (1) SCR 466 (AIR 1966 SC 671), this Court observed that a speaking order will at best be a reasonable and at its worst be at least a plausible one. The public should not be deprived of this only safeguard. Similarly, in (6) Mahabir Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1971 (1) SCR 201 ((1970) 1 SCC 764 : AIR 1970 SC 1302), this court reiterated that satisfactory decision of a disputed claim may be reached only if it be supported by the most cogent reasons that appealed to the authority. It should all the more be so where the quasi judicial enquiry may result in deprivation of livelihood or attach a stigma to the character. In this case the enquiry report is an order sheet which merely produces the stage through which the enquiry passed. If clearly disclosed a total non-application of mind and it is this report on which the General Manager acted in term innating the service of the appellant. There could not have been a gross case of non-application of mind and it is such an enquiry which has found favour with the Labour Court and the High Court.

    Where a disciplinary enquiry affects the livelihood and is likely to cast a stigma and it has to be held in accordance with the principles of natural justice, the minimum expectation is that the report must be a reasoned one. The court then may not enter into the adequacy or sufficiency of evidence. But there the evidence is annexed to an order-sheet and no correlation is established between she two showing application of mind, we are constrained to observed that it is not an enquiry report at all. Therefore, there was no enquiry in this case worth the name and the order of termination based on such proceeding disclosing non application of mind would be unsustainable.”

    17. The last contention is that the order of removal having been merged with the order of the appellate authority, if the appellate order is found to be unsustainable by law because of the infirmities and illegalities mentioned hereinbefore, in the event, the order of removal must also fail as it is merged with the appellate order. In my view, this contention has substance. The order of removal has merged with the order of the appellate authority dismissing the appeal. Apart from the fact that the earlier stages of proceedings including the findings of the Enquiry Officer and the second show cause notice are illegal which would make the subsequent proceedings also illegal and bad, because the appellate authority's order is unsustainable, the order of removal would no longer survive. Reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in (7) Tekraj v. Union of India reported in (1988) 1 SCC 236 : AIR 1988 SC 469, where the Supreme Court observed as follows:—

    “Now that the order or dismissal is set aside and the proceedings have been restored to the stage of enquiry, the appellant shall be deemed to have been restored to service. The appellant would have become entitled to the normal relief available in such a situation. He should be deemed to be in service and we do not agree with Dr. Ananda Prokash that the suspension would continue. His suspension which had merged into dismissal has been vacated. It shall, however, be open to the employer to make any direction as is deemed appropriate in that behalf in future. The appellant therefore, becomes entitled to a salary for the past period subject to his satisfying the authority that he has not earned any other income during the period.”

    18. In my view the findings of the Enquiry Officer and the second show cause notice as well as the order of removal based on the findings of the Enquiry Officer and the order of the appellate authority cannot be sustained and must be set aside and quashed. This application is, therefore, allowed. The Rule is made absolute, let appropriate writs be issued. The only question is what relief the petitioner is entitled to at this stage. The petitioner came to this court long after five years from the date of his removal or from the date of the rejection of his appeal against his removal by the appellate authority. He has given reasons for the delay and this court issued the rule nisi on 16th December, 1980. At this stage, therefore, this delay will not bear Bar in considering the case of the relief. In my view, the petitioner shall be entitled to the following reliefs only:—

    (a) Since the order of removal as well as the order of the appellate authority are set aside and quashed, the petitioner shall be allowed to be resume his duties forthwith on a xerox/plain copy of the Judgment and order.

    (b) The petitioner shall not be entitled to any monetary benefits until May, 1986 when the rule was made ready. He shall, however, be entitled to full salary from June, 1986 as would have been admissible.

    (c) The entire period from the date of his removal till the date of his resumption of duty shall be treated as the period spent on duty for all purposes excepting for the purpose of arrear salaries upto May, 1986.

    (d) The salary and allowances shall be fixed notionally, giving all benefits of the scale and revision and all other incidental benefits which the petitioner would have been entitled to had he continued in service.

    (e) The petitioner shall be paid a sum of Rs. 10,000 (Rupees Ten thousand only) within two weeks from the date of communication of this order, which shall be adjusted against his future salary payable to she petitioner in terms of the order.

    (f) There will be no order as to costs.

    19. Let a Xerox copy of this Judgment and order, counter signed by an officer of this court, be supplied to the petitioner on payment of the usual charges and upon the undertaking of the petitioner to apply for and obtain a certified copy.

    A.N.S

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    Sri Bishnu Prosad v. Union Of India & Ors.
    (Jun 26, 1990)