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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • S. 115(1)(c) of Civil P.C The provisions of S. 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act
  • S. 168 of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908,
  • S. 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act
  • S. 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act,
  • S. 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act
  • Amendment Act of 1976,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • S. 115(1)(c) of Civil P.C The provisions of S. 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act
  • S. 168 of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908,
  • S. 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act
  • S. 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act,
  • S. 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act
  • Amendment Act of 1976,
Smart Summary

Legal Opinion Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

An order for maintenance pendente lite was made under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act in favour of the wife against the husband. The husband moved the High Court in revision against that order. The Court noted the general principle that pendente lite maintenance orders under S. 24 should be sustained where possible and interfered with only when the law irresistibly warrants intervention. In the present case the High Court entertained the husband's revision and ultimately allowed it, set aside the impugned maintenance order and remitted the application to the trial court for rehearing according to law.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a court, in making an order under S. 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act for pendente lite maintenance, is bound to have regard to the actual incomes of the applicant and the non-applicant spouse.
  2. Whether the learned trial Judge acted "illegally" within the meaning of Section 115(1)(c) of the Civil Procedure Code by not considering the parties' actual incomes and by relying on the husband’s potential earnings.
  3. Whether statements in the wife's affidavit, affirmed "to the best of my knowledge and belief" but without stating which parts were on knowledge and which on belief or the grounds of such belief, were admissible under Order 19, Rule 3(i) of the Civil Procedure Code for the purpose of the interlocutory application for maintenance.
  4. The effect of the 1976 amendment to Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act on the availability of appeal from interlocutory orders such as those under S. 24, and the scope for revision under S. 115 CPC notwithstanding the absence of an appeal provision.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant / Husband (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The husband applied for permission to cross-examine the wife on the facts stated in her affidavit and to adduce evidence in support of his case (order No. 28, dt. 14-7-84).
  • He contended (implicitly, by seeking revision) that the trial court had not ascertained or considered his actual income and had instead based the maintenance order on what he could earn by "more application of industry".

Respondent / Wife (as reflected in the opinion)

  • In her application for pendente lite maintenance the wife stated that the husband was a medical practitioner with a lucrative practice earning at least Rs. 8,000 per month and that he owned a large house in Calcutta capable of fetching income.
  • These statements were affirmed in an affidavit as "true to the best of my knowledge and belief" but without specifying which statements were on knowledge and which on belief or stating the grounds of such belief.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
N.S. Venkatagiri Ayyangar, AIR 1949 PC 156 When Legislature does not provide for an appeal, the intention is that the order shall be final; interpretation of "acted illegally or with material irregularity" in S.115 CPC (\"acted illegally\" = breach of law; \"material irregularity\" = procedural error affecting decision). Used to explain that absence of appeal under amended S.28 suggests finality of many interlocutory orders, but also to adopt the S.115 test and to justify revisional intervention where the trial court "acted illegally".
Keshardeo Chamaria, AIR 1953 SC 23 Supreme Court quoted and approved the Privy Council's construction of \"acted illegally\" and \"material irregularity\" in the context of S.115 CPC. Quoted as authority approving the interpretation of S.115 relied upon to decide whether the trial Judge acted illegally.
M.L. Sethi, AIR 1972 SC 2379 Later decision relying on the S.115 construction (as quoted above). Cited as one of the subsequent authorities that have relied on the S.115 interpretation in revision matters.
Sher Singh, AIR 1978 SC 1341 Later decision applying the S.115 construction and principles of revisional jurisdiction. Referenced as another case following the S.115 interpretation relied upon by the Court.
Ryots of Garabandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi, AIR 1943 PC 164 Interpretation of the phrase \"having regard to\" — requires that specified provisions or matters must be taken into consideration. Applied to hold that S.24's mandate to have regard to parties' incomes requires the court to take those incomes into consideration when making pendente lite maintenance orders.
Mysore State Electricity Board, AIR 1963 SC 1128 Supreme Court quoted with approval the Privy Council's interpretation of \"having regard to\". Relied upon to support the interpretation that \"having regard to\" means the court must take the specified matters into account.
V.K. Verma v. Radhey Shyam, AIR 1964 SC 1317 Where law requires the court to have regard to certain provisions and the court does not, the trial cannot be said to be according to law. Applied to conclude that failure to have regard to parties' incomes under S.24 amounts to acting contrary to law.
Patiala Bus Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1974 SC 1174 Authority must take specified matters into consideration under statutory provision (example under S.47 Motor Vehicles Act); failure to do so vitiates the order. Used to reinforce the principle that statutory prescriptions to \"have regard to\" certain matters must be complied with and that failure to do so can vitiate an order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by acknowledging the general policy that pendente lite maintenance orders under S. 24 should be sustained where possible and that interference is only warranted when the law "irresistibly" demands it. The Court then examined the statutory framework and precedents to identify the correct standard for revisional interference.

The Court noted that after the 1976 amendment to S. 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act appeals are available only from final orders under S. 25 and S. 26, implying that many interlocutory orders are not appealable. The Privy Council's observations in N.S. Venkatagiri Ayyangar and subsequent Supreme Court authorities on S.115 CPC were relied upon to frame the scope of revision: a revision is justified where the court has \"acted illegally\" (i.e., breached a provision of law) or with a material irregularity.

The Court then analyzed the text of S. 24, emphasizing that the power to order pendente lite maintenance is triggered when it appears that a spouse has no independent income sufficient for support, and that any order must be made \"having regard to\" the petitioner's and respondent's incomes. Drawing on Ryots of Garabandho and related authorities, the Court interpreted \"having regard to\" as a mandate to take the parties' actual incomes into consideration.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found that although the trial court may rightly have assumed jurisdiction under S. 24, the impugned order showed that the learned Judge did not consider the actual incomes on record. Instead, the Judge based the maintenance figure on:

  • a perceived present requirement of Rs. 400 per month for the wife due to escalation of prices, and
  • the Judge's belief that the husband \"by more application of industry\" could earn sufficient money to pay that sum.

The Court held that S. 24 requires regard to the income actually earned and not potential earnings by greater industry or capital; thus the Judge's approach amounted to acting in breach of S.24 and therefore \"illegally\" within S.115(1)(c) CPC.

On the evidentiary point, the Court observed that the wife's affidavit supporting her application contained statements affirmed \"to the best of my knowledge and belief\" but without distinguishing which parts were on knowledge and which on belief or stating grounds for such belief. The Court held that under Order 19, Rule 3(i) of the Civil Procedure Code, statements of belief are admissible only if the grounds of belief are stated; hence the wife's affidavit could not be legally taken into account.

The Court also noted procedural lapses: the record showed the parties were directed to file documents and had done so, but the learned Judge made no reference to or consideration of those documents; additionally, after ordering that the wife's affidavit would be treated as non est if she failed to appear for cross-examination, the Judge later proceeded to hear the matter and reserved order without giving effect to that direction. These failures further supported the conclusion that the learned Judge had acted illegally or with material irregularity.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court allowed the revision, set aside the impugned maintenance pendente lite order, and remitted the application to the trial court for rehearing according to law.

Implications:

  • The impugned pendente lite maintenance order in favour of the wife was set aside and the matter remitted for reconsideration by the trial court.
  • The trial court is directed to decide the application on the materials on record and any further evidence (oral or documentary) that the parties may adduce, and to dispose of and decide the pendente lite application before the final disposal of the original matrimonial proceeding.
  • No order as to costs was made.
  • The decision's immediate effect is the vacation of the specific maintenance order and remand for proper consideration; the opinion does not purport to lay down a new rule of law beyond applying existing authorities (i.e., it applies established principles regarding S.24, the meaning of \"having regard to\", the admissibility requirements under Order 19 R.3(i), and the test for revisional interference under S.115 CPC).

Order pronounced: Revision allowed. (Sukumar Chakravarty, J. concurred.)

    Ashit Mukherjee v. Smt. Susmita Mukherjee (Nee Roy) And Another

    A.M Bhattacharjee, J.:—An order of maintenance pendente lite having been passed under S. 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act in favour of the wife against the husband, the latter has moved this Court in revision against the said order. In view of the nature, object and duration of a pendente lite maintenance order under S. 24, such an order should be sustained, wherever possible, and should be interfered with only when the law irresistibly warrants intervention.

    2. Under S. 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, as it stood before the Amendment Act of 1976, there was a view that such an order was appealable thereunder, though a contrary view was also maintained. But S. 28, as it now stands after the 1976 - Amendment, makes it abundantly clear that only final orders under S. 25 and S. 26 of the Act relating to permanent alimony, maintenance and custody of children etc. are but no other order is, appealable. When the Legislature does not provide for an appeal against an order, then, as pointed out by the Privy Council in N.S Venkatagiri Ayyangar, AIR 1949 PC 156 at p. 158, the intention of Legislature is taken to be that the order, right or wrong, shall be final. And such a Legislative intent would be more manifest in case of an order of maintenance pendente lite under S. 24, if the Legislature having provided an appeal therefrom under S. 28 as originally enacted, has now taken away the same by amending that section in 1976. But after hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, we are, however, satisfied that the instant case warrants our intervention in revision. In N.S Venkatagiri Ayyangar (supra at p. 158) Sir John Beaumont, speaking for the Board, while interpreting the expression “acted illegality or with material irregularity” in S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, construed the expression “acted illegally” to mean to have acted “in breach of some provisions of law” and the expression “with material irregularity” to mean “by committing some error of procedure in the course of trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision”. These observations have been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Keshardeo Chamaria, AIR 1953 SC 23 at p. 28 and have also” been fully relied on in a number of later decisions, e.g, in M.L Sethi, AIR 1972 SC 2379 at p. 2384; in Sher Singh, AIR 1978 SC 1341 at pp. 1344, 1345. We are satisfied that the learned Judge in making the impugned order in the exercise of the jurisdiction vested in him under S. 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, acted illegally within the meaning of S. 115(1)(c) of Civil P.C The provisions of S. 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act are reproduced hereunder:—

    “Where in any proceeding under this Act it appears to the Court that either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, has no independent income sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding, it may on the application of the wife or the husband, order the respondent to pay to the petitioner the expenses of the proceeding, and monthly, during the proceeding, such sum as, having regard to the petitioner's own income and the income of the respondent, it may seem to the Court to be reasonable”.

    3. It is, therefore, clear that the factor which entitles the court to exercise jurisdiction under S. 24 is it appearing to the Court that the applicant-spouse has no independent income sufficient for her or his support but such jurisdiction is to be exercised and the resultant order is to be made by the Court “having regard to” the applicant-spouse's own income and the income of the non-applicant-spouse. Assuming that it rightly appeared to the court in this case that the applicant-wife had no independent income of her own sufficient for her support and, therefore, the trial court was right in assuming and proceeding to exercise jurisdiction under S. 24, we are afraid that in making the impugned order of maintenance the court did not have regard to the income of the applicant wife and the non-applicant husband, which the court was bound to have under the law.

    4. The expression “having regard to” in S. 24 conveys a mandate that the Court shall have regard to the income of the parties. The expressions “having regard to”, “have regard to” and other allied expressions have been the subject of judicial interpretation by our apex Courts. The expression “having regard to” in S. 168 of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, came up for consideration in the leading case of the Privy Council in Ryots of Garabandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi, AIR 1943 PC 164. The view taken by the majority of the Collective Board of Revenue in that case was that “the requirement ‘have regard to’ the provisions in question has no more definite and technical meaning than that of ordinary usage and only requires that those provisions must be taken into consideration”. Their Lordships approved this view (at p. 180) which appeared to their Lordships to be “fairly clear as a matter of English” also. These observations of the Privy Council have been quoted with approval by the majority of the Supreme Court in Mysore State Electricity Board, AIR 1963 SC 1128 at p. 1136. In V.K Verma v. Radhey Shyam. AIR 1964 SC 1317, the Supreme Court has observed (at p. 1320) that “where the law requires the court to have regard to certain provisions and the Court does not pay that regard, it cannot but be said that the trial has not been according to law”. In Patiala Bus Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1974 SC 1174, when it was urged before the Supreme Court that since S. 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act requires that the Regional Transport Authority, in considering an application for stage carriage permit, shall have regard to certain matters, the Authority must take them into consideration and that failure to do so would be “clearly in breach of S. 47” and would vitiate the order, the Supreme Court, while accepting the argument, observed that “there is great force in this contention”. In this view of the law, we have no doubt that the Court having been required by S. 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act to have regard to the income of the parties in ordering payment of pendente lite maintenance by one spouse to the other, must take into consideration such income in making such order and if the court does not do so or does not pay that regard, then it cannot but be said that the Court has acted in breach of the relevant provisions of law and has, therefore, “acted illegally” within the meaning of S. 115(1)(c) of Civil P.C to warrant intervention in revision.

    5. It appears from the order-sheet that the learned Judge directed both the parties to file documents in support of their respective cases and it further appears from order No. 46. dt/- 8-2-85, that “necessary papers have been filed by the respondent-wife and the petitioner-husband already filed documents”. The learned Judge, however, has not even remotely referred to or considered any of those papers or documents. If the learned Judge considered the materials legally brought on record and then came to a finding as to the maintenance, then obviously it would not have been open to us, while sitting in revision, to reassess and consider those materials. But the impugned order would clearly show that the learned Judge did not ascertain or consider the actual income of the husband but the basis of his order was the income which the husband could earn by more application of industry. The learned Judge has concluded that “it is quite reasonable to believe that the petitioner (i.e the husband), by more application of industry, could earn sufficient money to provide the respondent, his wife, with Rs. 400/- per month, which is required in view of the fact of the present day escalation of prices by way of maintenance pendente lite”. The impugned order, therefore, demonstrates that the basis of the order is the belief of the learned Judge that at least a sum of Rs. 400/- is required by the wife for her maintenance in view of the present escalation of prices and his further belief that the husband “by more application of industry could earn sufficient money”. Under S. 24, however, the matter which must be considered by the Court is the income actually earned by the parties and not what a party could have earned by putting in more labour, capital and all that. It is, therefore, manifest that the learned Judge did not pass the order “having regard to” the actual income of the husband, though under S. 24 he was obliged to have regard to the same. The impugned order, therefore, was passed not in accordance with the provisions of law, but in breach thereof.

    6. It is true that the wife in her application for pendente lite maintenance has stated that the husband “is a medical practitioner and has got a lucrative practice and earns at least Rs. 8,000/- per month” and that he also “owns a fairly big house at Calcutta” which fetches and is capable of fetching decent income”. But in the affidavit in support of this application all the statements in the application have been affirmed as “true to the best of my knowledge and belief”, without specifying in any way which statements are true to her knowledge and which are true to her belief and also without stating the grounds of such belief. Under the provisions of O. 19, R. 3(i) of Civil P.C, in affidavits relating to interlocutory applications, statements of the deponent's belief may be admitted, provided however, “the grounds thereof are stated”. The statements in the affidavit of the wife, therefore, could not in law be taken into consideration.

    7. It further appears from order No. 28, dt. 14-7-84, that the husband filed an application praying for permission to cross-examine the wife on the facts stated in her affidavit and also to adduce evidence in support of his case. The learned Judge was also obviously satisfied that in the interest of justice such cross-examination was necessary and accordingly ordered attendance of the wife for cross-examination. On repeated failure of the wife to appear for cross-examination, the learned Judge finally ordered by his order No. 31, dt. 22-8-84, that “in the event of the wife's failure to appear in person in Court on 10-9-84, her affidavit in support of her application for alimony will be treated as non est and in that case the application will be disposed of on the materials placed on record”. But on 10-9-84, as it appears from the order of that date, the learned Judge appeared to have forgotten all about it and proceeded with the hearing of the application and reserved his order.

    8. In our view, the impugned order was passed without having any regard to the income of the parties, though under S. 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the learned Judge was mandated to consider the same and, therefore, in making the impugned order the learned Judge “acted illegally” within the meaning of S. 115(1)(c) of Civil P.C The learned Judge also acted illegally in taking into consideration the statements of the wife in her application, as the affidavit in support thereof was not in accordance with the relevant provisions of O. 19 of the Code.

    9. We accordingly accept the revision, set aside the impugned order of maintenance pendente lite and send back the application to the court below for rehearing according to law in the light of the observations made herein. The court below shall decide the application on the materials on record and such further evidence, oral or documentary, as the parties may adduce before him, The court below shall note that it must dispose of and decide the application before the original matrimonial proceeding between the parties, now pending before it, is finally disposed of. No order as to costs. Let a copy of this order go down at once.

    Sukumar Chakravarty, J.:—10. I agree.

    Revision allowed.

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    Comments

    Ashit Mukherjee v. Smt. Susmita Mukherjee (Nee Roy) And Another
    (May 13, 1986)