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Summary of Judicial Opinion — N.C. Mukherjee, J. (with concurrence of Monoj Kumar Mukherjee, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Two applications were filed under Sections 401 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:

  • Criminal Revision 1408 of 1980 sought quashing of C. Case No. 2050 of 1980 under Section 341 IPC. By order dated 5.7.80 the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Alipore issued process against the petitioner under Section 341 IPC. The underlying complaint (paragraph 5 of the petition) alleged that on 25.5.80 at about 8:30 p.m. the accused locked one of the two leaves of the main entrance gate of the petitioner's tenanted premises thereby wrongfully restraining the petitioner and members of his family; the other accused and a servant stood/occasionally sat and were alleged to have been wrongfully restraining the petitioner and his family.
  • Criminal Revision 1501 of 1980 sought quashing of C. Case No. 750 under Sections 341 and 380 IPC. In that matter, after receipt of the police report under Section 202 CrPC the learned Magistrate allowed the complainant's prayer for a judicial enquiry and fixed 27.11.80 for further evidence (i.e., a second enquiry was directed after receipt of the police report).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the facts alleged (one door leaf closed but the other open, persons standing/sitting) constitute "wrongful restraint" under Section 341 Indian Penal Code.
  2. Whether a Magistrate, under Section 202 CrPC, may direct more than one enquiry/investigation (i.e., whether the Magistrate may order a second enquiry after receipt of a police report or first enquiry), given the phrasing "either direct an enquiry or investigation".

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant / Petitioner's Arguments (Mr. Dilip Kumar Dutt)

  • In Criminal Revision 1408/1980: Even if the complaint's allegations are taken at face value, the restraint was only partial (one door leaf was closed but the other leaf was open). Because there was sufficient space to pass, there was no wrongful restraint within the meaning of Section 341 IPC.
  • In Criminal Revision 1501/1980: The phrase "either direct an enquiry or investigation" in Section 202 CrPC means the Magistrate may employ only one alternative — either an enquiry or an investigation — and not more than one. Thus, after an investigation or first enquiry, the Magistrate cannot lawfully direct a further enquiry. Reliance was placed on a Division Bench decision in Criminal Revisions 157 & 223 of 1961 (Netai Sen v. J.B. Ghosh and J.B. Ghosh v. Nitai Charan Sen), where the Bench held that only a single direction for enquiry or investigation is permissible under Section 202.

Opposite Party's Arguments (Mr. J.N. Ghosh)

  • In Criminal Revision 1408/1980: Although one door leaf was closed (accepting that fact), that still amounted to partial restraint and, according to the opposite party, partial restraint is wrongful restraint. Any obstruction that prevents a person from proceeding smoothly along a passage can constitute an offence under Section 341 IPC.
  • In Criminal Revision 1501/1980: Reliance on three Single Judge decisions — Manohardas Babaji v. Khandu Dutt (AIR 1966 Cal 633), Kshitish Chandra Shome v. The State (AIR 1967 Cal 114) and Sunil Majhi v. The State (AIR 1968 Cal 238) — which were said to have rightly distinguished the Bench decision and to permit, in appropriate factual settings (for example, where a naraji petition is involved), a fresh enquiry under Section 202. It was submitted that the present Court should consider whether the Division Bench principle should be followed or whether the Single Judges' approach should control in such circumstances.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Netai Sen v. J.B. Ghosh (Cr. Rev. 157 of 1961) and J.B. Ghosh v. Nitai Charan Sen (Cr. Rev. 223 of 1961) — Division Bench The Magistrate under Section 202 CrPC can either enquire himself or direct an investigation; the language "either ... or" permits only one direction for enquiry or investigation — a second direction for further enquiry is prohibited. The Court accepted and followed the Division Bench's interpretation and held that a second enquiry under Section 202 is illegal. The Court applied this rule to set aside the order for a second enquiry in Criminal Revision 1501 of 1980.
Manohardas Babaji v. Khandu Dutt, AIR 1966 Calcutta 633 (Single Judge) Held that a Magistrate was not prohibited from ordering a second enquiry under Section 202; "direct an enquiry or investigation" does not mean only one enquiry/investigation. The Court reviewed this Single Judge decision, observed that the Judge did not address the concluding portion of the Division Bench findings and did not clearly distinguish the Bench decision on facts, and declined to accept this Single Judge's approach in preference to the Division Bench.
Kshitish Chandra Shome v. The State, AIR 1967 Calcutta 114 (Single Judge) Held that where a naraji petition (request to proceed) is filed after the police report, the Magistrate could direct a fresh enquiry under Section 202; the order for fresh enquiry was held valid. The Court noted that the Single Judge distinguished the Division Bench yet did not refer to the Division Bench's final conclusion; the present Court did not accept this decision over the Division Bench authority.
Sunil Majhi v. The State, AIR 1968 Calcutta 238 (Single Judge) Addressed the power to direct fresh enquiry (noting facts such as a naraji petition) and distinguished the Division Bench decision on facts. The Court observed the Single Judge's distinction but found that the points of distinction were not clearly stated; the Court declined to follow this line in preference to the Division Bench view.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion contains two distinct lines of analysis corresponding to the two Criminal Revisions.

Analysis in Criminal Revision 1408 of 1980 (Section 341 IPC)

  • The Court examined the essential element of the offence under Section 341 IPC: the complainant must have been obstructed from proceeding along a particular direction.
  • On the facts as pleaded in the complaint, one of the two leaves of the main gate was closed but the other leaf remained open. Therefore, the Court found that the complainant was not wrongfully obstructed from passing along the passage in a manner that would constitute the offence of wrongful restraint.
  • Because the necessary element of obstruction in a particular direction was absent on the complaint's own allegations, the Court concluded the complaint failed to make out an offence under Section 341 IPC.

Analysis in Criminal Revision 1501 of 1980 (Section 202 CrPC)

  • The Court undertook a textual and precedential reading of Section 202 CrPC, focusing on the phrase "either direct an enquiry or investigation".
  • It explained the mutually exclusive alternatives: if the Magistrate makes an enquiry himself he cannot thereafter direct an investigation; conversely, if he directs an investigation he cannot then himself enquire — these are separate alternatives under the section.
  • The Court relied on the Division Bench decisions (Netai Sen and J.B. Ghosh cases) that concluded there can be only one direction for enquiry or investigation under Section 202. The Court found this interpretation to be the correct exposition of the statutory language.
  • The Court reviewed the Single Judge decisions that had reached different conclusions (permitting a second enquiry in some factual contexts such as a naraji petition) and observed that those judgments did not refer to the Division Bench's ultimate conclusion or did not clearly distinguish it on the facts. Consequently, the Court rejected the Single Judges' approach in favor of the Division Bench's interpretation.
  • Applying that legal principle to the present case, the Court held that the learned Magistrate's order directing a second enquiry after receipt of the police report under Section 202 was illegal.
  • Importantly, the Court made a procedural distinction: although the order for a second enquiry was set aside as illegal, the Court did not quash the entire proceeding. Instead, the Magistrate was directed to proceed with the case on the basis of the first enquiry report and other material on the record in accordance with law.

Holding and Implications

The Court rendered the following final decisions and directives:

  • Criminal Revision 1408 of 1980 — Result: The application succeeds. The proceeding (C. Case No. 2050 of 1980 under Section 341 IPC) is quashed. The Rule was made absolute.
  • Criminal Revision 1501 of 1980 — Result: The application succeeds in part. The Court set aside the impugned order directing a second enquiry under Section 202 CrPC as illegal. The learned Magistrate was directed to proceed with the case on the basis of the first enquiry report and the other material on the record; the impugned order for second enquiry was set aside and the application disposed of. The Court ordered that the records be sent down early.

Implications: The direct consequences for the parties are (1) complete quashing of C. Case No. 2050/1980 (Section 341 matter), and (2) setting aside of the order for a second enquiry in C. Case No. 750 with directions to proceed on the basis of the first enquiry report. The Court expressly applied and followed the Division Bench interpretation of Section 202 CrPC and did not accept the contrary Single Judge decisions in this context. The opinion does not assert that it is creating a novel, separate precedent beyond applying the Division Bench authority; it enforces the Division Bench rule and gives directions for further conduct of the subordinate court.

Concurrence: Monoj Kumar Mukherjee, J. agreed with the conclusions (impugned order set aside; direction given).

    Sankar Chandra Ghose v. Roopraj S. Bhansally

    N.C Mukherjee, J.:— These two applications have been filed under Ss. 401 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Criminal Revision 1408 of 1980 is for quashing a proceeding being C. Case No. 2050 of 1980 under S. 341 of the Indian Penal Code. In the said proceeding by order dated 5.7.80 the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Alipore issued process against the petitioner under S. 341 of the Indian Penal Code.

    2. Criminal Revision 1501 of 1980 is for quashing a proceeding being C. Case No. 750 under Ss. 341 and 380 of the Indian Penal Code pending in the Court of the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Alipore. In this proceeding, the learned Magistrate after receipt of the report of the Police Officer under S. 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allowed the complainant's prayer for judicial enquiry and fixed 27.11.80 for further evidence.

    3. We shall first take up Criminal Revision 1408 of 1980. The proceeding, namely, C. Case No. 2050 of 1980 was started on a petition of complaint filed by the opposite party No. 1 against the petitioner complaining that the petitioner had committed an offence under S. 341 of the Indian Penal Code. The details of the allegations have been narrated in paragraph 5 of the petition of complaint. It has been stated that on 25.5.80 at about 8-30 p.m the accused No. 1 locked one of the door leaves of the main entrance gate of the petitioner's tenanted premises thereby wrongfully restraining the petitioner and the members of his family from entering into the tenanted premises. The accused No. 2 with the servant of the accused No. 1 had been constantly standing and occasionally sitting along with the accused No. 3 and they had been wrongfully restraining the petitioner and his family members.

    4. Mr. Dilip Kumar Dutt, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner contends that on the allegations made by the complainant referred to above, it must be said, even assuming the allegations are correct, that the restraint, if any, was partial restraint. Admittedly, according to the complainant himself, one of the door leaves was closed. That being so, as the other door leaf was open, there was sufficient space for the petitioner and his family members for passing along the passage. In such circumstances, Mr. Dutt contends with much emphasis that there cannot be any wrongful restraint so as to attract S. 341 of the Indian Penal Code.

    5. Mr. J.N Ghosh, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the opposite party on the other hand, submits that when in the petition of complaint it has been stated that one of the door leaves was closed, this position must be accepted as correct. But Mr. Ghosh contends that even then, it must be said that there was partial restraint and, according to Mr. Ghosh, partial restraint is also wrongful restraint. Every person, according to Mr. Ghosh has a right to proceed in a manner he is entitled to proceed and, as such, if there be any sort of obstruction which prevents a person from smoothly passing along a passage, then if must be said that the person who has made obstruction is guilty of an offence under S. 341 of the Indian Penal Code.

    6. Considering the elements necessary to constitute an offence under S. 341 of the Indian Penal Code, we cannot accept the contention raised by Mr. Ghosh. In order to constitute an offence under S. 341, IPC it must be established that the complaint was obstructed from proceeding along a particular direction. When admittedly one of the door leaves was not closed, it cannot said that the complainant was obstructed wrongfully from passing along the passage.

    7. This being the position, we are of the opinion that the complaint has failed to establish that the petitioner has committed an act which amounts to an offence under S. 341, IPC.

    8. In the result the application succeeds. The proceeding is hereby quashed.

    Rule made absolute. Proceeding quashed.

    9. Now we take up Criminal Revision 1501 of 1980. This case arises, as has been stated earlier, for quashing a proceeding being C. Case No. 750 under Ss. 341 and 380 of the Indian Penal Code. In this proceeding, the learned Magistrate after receipt of the report of the Police Officer under S. 202 of the Code allowed the complainant's prayer for judicial enquiry and fixed 27.11.80 for further evidence.

    10. Mr. Dilip Kumar Dutt, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, contends that the expression “either direct an enquiry or investigation” means either an enquiry or an investigation. It means only one enquiry or one investigation. The Section does not provide that after an investigation is made, it is open to the Magistrate to direct a further enquiry. In support of his contention, Mr. Dutt relies on an unreported decision in Criminal Revision 157 of 1961 (Netai Sen v. J.B Ghosh) and Criminal Revision 223 of 1961 (J.B Ghosh v. Nitai Charan Sen). It is a Bench decision. A.N Ray, J., as His Lordship then was, held as follows:

    “The present S. 202 empowers the Magistrate either to enquire into the case himself or to allow the enquiry to be made by one of the persons mentioned in the Section. The fact that after receipt of the report a fresh enquiry was directed to be made by the same Enquiring Magistrate does not, in my opinion, make any difference. It is the second enquiry which is, in my opinion, prohibited by the language of S. 202.”

    11. Amaresh Roy, J. in a separate judgment held as follows:

    “That Section (meaning S. 202) empowers the Magistrate either to enquire into the case himself or direct an enquiry or investigation to be made by a Magistrate subordinate to him or by a Police Officer or by such other person as he thinks fit. The question is—can the Magistrate take recourse to all these alternatives one after the other or whether the power is limited to one or the other of four alternatives? The legislature has not used ‘or a simplicitor’ but has taken precaution in using the words ‘either — or’. In my view, this clearly indicates that the intention is to empower the Magistrate to employ one or the other of the alternatives. He cannot employ two or more of the alternatives one after the other and he cannot employ two or more of the alternatives simultaneously.”

    12. In conclusion, His Lordship held:

    “I would, therefore, hold that there can be only one direction for an enquiry or investigation under S. 202 Cr. P.C and the second direction for further enquiry to be held by the same Magistrate cannot be held.”

    13. Mr. Dutt is conscious of the fact that there are some decisions of Single Judges which have distinguished the above Bench decision. Mr. Dutt submits that with respect he disagrees with the decisions of the Single Judges and fully relies on the principle laid down by the Bench decision. In conclusion, Mr. Dutt submits that the Magistrate was wrong to pass an order for second enquiry and as such the proceeding should be quashed.

    14. Mr. J.N Ghosh, learned Advocate on behalf of the opposite party on the other hand, submits that in the three case, namely, (i) AIR 1966 Calcutta 633 (Manohardas Babaji v. Khandu Dutt), (ii) AIR 1967 Calcutta 114 (Kshitish Chandra Shome v. The State) and (iii) AIR 1968 Calcutta 238 (Sunil Majhi v. The State), the Single Judges have rightly distinguished the facts of the Bench decision referred to earlier and as such it is for this Court to consider whether the principle as laid down in the Bench decision should be accepted.

    15. In AIR 1966 Calcutta 633 A.K Das, J. held that a Magistrate was not prohibited in ordering a second enquiry under S. 202. The clause—“direct an enquiry or investigation” does not mean one enquiry or one investigation only and it would be wrong to interpret it as limiting to one such enquiry or investigation.

    16. It is, however, seen that in paragraph 6 the learned Judge has referred to some of the findings of the Division Bench but the concluding portion of findings of the learned Judges where they have clearly held that a second enquiry is prohibited under S. 202 of the Code has not been referred to. It is not also followed how the Bench decision was distinguished on facts.

    17. In AIR 1967 Calcutta 114 it was held by A.K Das, J.:

    “When a complainant files a petition naraji after the police officer submits his report on completion of enquiry on the complaint, the Magistrate can direct fresh enquiry under S. 202 Criminal Procedure Code for ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint. Even treating the naraji petition as a fresh complaint, the Magistrate is entitled under the section to send it for enquiry. His order directing such fresh enquiry is, therefore, valid.”

    18. In this case also, the learned Judge has distinguished the Bench decision. In this case also, we find that the learned Judge referred to only some portions of the observations of A.N Ray, and Amaresh Roy, JJ. Their final conclusion was not referred to.

    19. In AIR 1968 Calcutta 238 T.P Mukherjee, J. has held similarly on the question where a naraji petition is filed. His Lordship has also distinguished the Bench decision on facts, but the points of distinctions have not been clearly stated.

    20. On going through the provisions of S. 202 of the Code, we are of the opinion that in a particular case if a Magistrate postpones the issue of summons then two courses are open to him. He can either make an enquiry into the case himself or direct that an investigation be made. The Magistrate can direct an investigation to be made either by a Police Officer or by such other person as he thinks fit if he makes an enquiry himself, he cannot direct investigation. Again, when he directs an investigation, he cannot enquire into the matter himself. This is exactly what has been found by their Lordships in the Bench decision referred to above in interpreting the provision of S. 202 of the Code. In view of the clear finding of the Division Bench, we cannot accept what has been laid down in the three decisions of the Single Judges. In the result, it must be held that the order for second enquiry in the present case is illegal and, that being so, the impugned order must be set aside. But simply because the order for second enquiry is set aside, we are not quashing the entire proceeding. The learned Magistrate will proceed with the case on the basis of the first enquiry report and the other material on the record in accordance with law.

    21. In the result, Criminal Revision 1501 of 1980 succeeds. The proceed is quashed.

    22. In Criminal Revision 1501 of 1980 the impugned order is set aside. The learned Magistrate is further directed to proceed with the case as directed above. The application is thus disposed of. Let the records go down early.

    23. Monoj Kumar Mukherjee, J.:— I agree.

    Impugned order set aside Direction given.

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    Comments

    Sankar Chandra Ghose v. Roopraj S. Bhansally
    (Apr 30, 1981)