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  • provision of S. 3(5) of the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972.
  • Section 3(5) of the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972
  • S. 3(5) of the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972
  • Section 6(1) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941,
  • provisions of Article 304(b) of the Constitution
  • provision of Article 304(b) of the Constitution.
  • provisions of Article 301 of the Constitution.
  • S. 86 of the Bengal Exeise Act, 1909
  • Bengal Finance Sales Tax Act, 1941
  • provision of Article 304(b)
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citation codes
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  • provision of S. 3(5) of the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972.
  • Section 3(5) of the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972
  • S. 3(5) of the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972
  • Section 6(1) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941,
  • provisions of Article 304(b) of the Constitution
  • provision of Article 304(b) of the Constitution.
  • provisions of Article 301 of the Constitution.
  • S. 86 of the Bengal Exeise Act, 1909
  • Bengal Finance Sales Tax Act, 1941
  • provision of Article 304(b)
Smart Summary

Comprehensive Summary of the Opinion — M.M. Dutt, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeals concern the constitutional validity of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980. The respondents (except respondent no. 1 in one listed matter) were retail vendors of country liquor operating under excise licences. Section 6(1) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 exempted certain goods listed in Schedule 1 (Entry 25 included country liquor). Section 3(5) of the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972 omitted Entry 25 from Schedule 1, thereby making sales of country liquor chargeable to sales tax.

The respondents challenged the imposition of sales tax (6%) on country liquor by filing writ petitions in this Court and obtained Rules Nisi. They contended that their gross profits from country liquor ranged between 5.7% and 7.8%, so a 6% sales tax would make the business unprofitable; that the tax impeded the freedom of trade in breach of Article 301 of the Constitution; and that Section 3(5) was ultra vires Article 304(b) because its preconditions were not complied with.

A learned Judge who heard the primary writ (CR No. 6862(W) of 1972 leading to FMA No. 761 of 1974) held Section 3(5) ultra vires Article 304(b) for directly restricting freedom of trade and for lack of compliance with the procedural proviso. That judgment was followed in two other related matters and the Rules were made absolute. The Taxing Authorities appealed.

While the appeals were pending, the Governor of West Bengal promulgated the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980—published January 8, 1980—after obtaining the President's instructions under the proviso to clause (1) of Article 213. Paragraph 2 of the Ordinance omitted Entry 25 of Schedule 1 of the Bengal Finance Sales Tax Act, 1941 with retrospective effect from August (date in the opinion contains unspecified characters).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980 (which omits Entry 25 from Schedule 1 of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941) is constitutionally valid.
  2. Whether Section 3(5) of the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972 (which omitted Entry 25) is ultra vires Article 304(b) of the Constitution for want of the proviso's required Presidential sanction and/or on grounds of unreasonableness.
  3. Whether trade or business in liquor (country liquor) is covered by the protection of Article 301 and Article 304(b), or whether liquor is res extra commercium (outside commerce) and therefore not protected.
  4. Whether a sale of liquor, if liquor is regarded as extra commercium, can nevertheless be a "sale" chargeable to sales tax under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Taxing Authorities') Arguments

  • The learned Judge's ground for holding Section 3(5) ultra vires (lack of Presidential sanction under the proviso to Article 304(b)) is no longer available because the Governor promulgated the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980 after obtaining the President's instructions as required by the proviso to Article 213; Paragraph 2 of the Ordinance omits Entry 25 with retrospective effect from August 7, 1972 (the opinion records retrospective effect but some date characters are unspecified in the text).
  • Although the proviso to Article 304(b) has now been complied with, the court must still consider whether the restriction imposed is a "reasonable" one under Article 304(b). Given that dealers' gross profits were found to be between 5.7% and 7.8%, charging sales tax at 6% could be unreasonable unless dealers are entitled to pass on the tax to customers.
  • Reference was made to Explanation II to Section 86 of the Bengal Excise Act, 1909 (introduced by the Bengal Excise (Amendment) Ordinance, 1974) which provides that the price of an intoxicant shall be deemed to have always been exclusive of any tax or impost; appellants contend this entitles dealers to pass the tax to customers (though practical retrospective recovery for sales prior to Explanation II is another issue).
  • Alternatively, it was argued that the trade or business in country liquor is res extra commercium (outside commerce), and therefore the respondents are debarred from challenging the Ordinance under Article 301 or Article 304(b).

Respondents' Arguments

  • The imposition of sales tax on the sale of country liquor impedes the freedom of trade contrary to Article 301 of the Constitution.
  • Section 3(5) of the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972 (which made sales of country liquor taxable) was ultra vires Article 304(b) because the requirement of the proviso (prior sanction of the President) was not complied with when it was enacted.
  • Given the very low gross profit margins (between 5.7% and 7.8%), a 6% sales tax would make the respondents' business unprofitable; such a fiscal measure (a tax) differs from regulatory measures and falls within the protection of Article 304(b) if unreasonable.
  • Distinguished earlier Supreme Court authority on intoxicants by contending that prior decisions involved regulatory import duties for control, not fiscal measures; where the imposition is fiscal and unreasonable it should be susceptible to challenge under Article 304(b).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Har Shankar v. The Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, AIR 1975 SC 1121 Holds there is no fundamental right to do trade or business in intoxicants; State may prohibit manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession of intoxicants as a regulatory power. The court relied on Har Shankar to support the proposition that trade in liquor can be treated like gambling—extra commercium—and therefore not protected by Article 301 or Article 304(b).
Sat Pal and Co. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, AIR 1919 SC 1550 Applied the view that trade in intoxicants is not within the protected freedom of trade; supports the regulatory power of the State over intoxicants. The court cited Sat Pal alongside Har Shankar to confirm that decisions treating trade in liquor as not protected by the constitutional guarantee are authority for treating liquor as extra commercium.
State of Bombay v. R.M. Chamarbangwala (R.M.D. Chamarbagwala), AIR 1957 SC 699 Held gambling activities are extra commercium and not protected by Article 19(1)(g) or Article 301; used to illustrate activities outside the scope of constitutional trade protections. The court quoted and relied on the observations in this case (Das, C.J.) to analogise liquor to gambling—concluding liquor is extra commercium for the purposes of Articles 301 and 304(b).
Kochan Velayudhan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1961 Kerala 8 (Full Bench) Full Bench held that the protection of Article 301 is confined to trading activities; liquor is not a legitimate article of trade and freedom of trade in liquor is not protected by Article 301. The court cited this Kerala Full Bench decision as supportive authority for the view that liquor is not covered by Article 301 and that the respondents therefore cannot invoke Article 304(b) against the impugned Ordinance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by first identifying the constitutional framework (Part XIII: Articles 301 and 304(b)) and by reproducing Article 304(b) including the proviso that prior Presidential sanction is required for Bills or amendments introduced for the purposes of clause (b).

It noted that while the Governor had promulgated the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980 after obtaining the President's instructions (thus addressing the procedural proviso), compliance with the proviso is not the only requirement under Article 304(b). The Article also requires that any restriction on freedom of trade must be a "reasonable" restriction in the public interest.

The court examined the competing contentions about reasonableness: appellants pointed to retrospective compliance with the proviso and to Explanation II to Section 86 of the Bengal Excise Act (argued to permit passing on the tax), while respondents emphasized that the 6% tax could render their businesses unprofitable given the low gross margins.

The court then turned to the threshold question whether trade or business in liquor is the kind of commerce protected by Articles 301/304(b). Relying on precedent (Har Shankar; Sat Pal; State of Bombay v. R.M. Chamarbangwala) and the reasoning of Das, C.J., the court accepted the analogy that activities such as gambling—and by extension liquor—are extra commercium. The court also relied on the Kerala Full Bench decision in Kochan Velayudhan to the effect that Article 301's protection is confined to legitimate trading activities and that liquor is not a legitimate article of trade for that purpose.

From this legal synthesis the court concluded that liquor is extra commercium and therefore not protected by Article 301 or Article 304(b). Consequently, the respondents could not challenge the constitutional validity of the Ordinance (West Bengal Ordinance No. IV of 1980) on the ground that it offended Article 304(b).

The court also addressed the respondents' subsidiary contention that if liquor is extra commercium then the sale could not be a "sale" under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941. The court rejected this argument: even if trade in liquor is not trade as contemplated by Article 19(1)(g) or Article 301, a sale of liquor that has all the incidents of "sale" within the meaning of clause (g) of Section 2 of the Sales Tax Act can be chargeable to sales tax.

The opinion contains textual gaps or unspecified date characters in places (recorded in the source as "???"); the court's analysis proceeds on the available material and the Ordinance's retrospective omission of Entry 25 as described in the source text.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeals are allowed; the judgments appealed from are set aside and the Rules Nisi are discharged.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The prior orders (where the writ rules were made absolute) are set aside and the Rules discharged.
  • There will be no order as to costs.
  • Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 134A sought by the respondents is refused.
  • The court ordered a stay of operation of its judgment for a period of four weeks from an unspecified date (the source text contains unspecified characters for the start date).

Implications:

  • Because the court concluded that liquor is res extra commercium and not protected by Article 301 or Article 304(b), respondents cannot rely on those constitutional provisions to challenge the impugned sales-tax amendment/ordinance. The court did not purport to establish a broader new principle beyond applying existing precedents that treated liquor akin to activities outside constitutional trade protection.
  • The opinion does not discuss any broader policy or open-ended precedent beyond applying and following the cited authorities; its effect is limited to setting aside the earlier High Court judgments and upholding the validity of the Ordinance as against the respondents' challenges under Articles 301/304(b).

This summary has been prepared exclusively from and adheres to the language of the provided opinion. No information beyond the opinion's text has been added or inferred.

    The State Of West Bengal & Ors. v. Jagmohan Lal Gupta

    M.M Dutt, J.:—The only question that is involved in all these Appeals relates to the constitutional validity of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980.

    2. The respondents, except the respondent no. 1 in FMA No. 781 of 1974, carry on the business of retail vend of country liquor under Excise licenses. Section 6(1) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, exempts payment of tax on the sale of goods specified in the first column of Schedule 1 to the Act. Entry 25 of Schedule 1 specified certain intoxicants including country liquor. Section 3(5) of the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972 omitted Entry 25 from Schedule 1. The edict of such omission was that sale of country liquor became chargeable to sales tax. The respondents felt aggrieved by the imposition of tax on the sale of country liquor by the impugned provision of S. 3(5) of the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972. They filed Writ petitions in this Court and obtained Rules Nisi out of which these appeals arise. It was the common case of the respondents that gross profits earned by the licencess from the sole of the country liquor varied between 5.7% and 7.8%. The imposition of sales tax at 6% would render their business so unprofitable that it would not be possible for them to carry on such business. It was contended by them that the imposition of sales tax impeded the free flow of trade contrary to the provisions of Article 301 of the Constitution. Further it was contended that S. 3(5) was ultra vires the provision of Article 304(b) of the Constitution inasmuch as the requirement of that provision was not complied with.

    3. The contentions of the respondents were upheld by the learned Judge who heard CR No. 6862(W) of 1972 out of which the said FMA No. 761 of 1974 arises. It was held by him that imposition of tax on the sale of country liquor by S. 3(5) of the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972 directly restricted the freedom of trade and as the requirement of Article 304(b) of the Constitution was not admittedly complied with S. 3(5) was ultra vires Article 304(b). Accordingly, by his judgment, the learned Judge made the said Rule absolute. In the other two Rules, namely CR No. 7414(W) of 1972 and CR No. 7228(W) of 1972 out of which FMA No. 876 of 1977 and FMA No. 877 of 1977 respectively arise the said judgment was followed and relied on and there Rules were also made absolute. Hence these three appeals by the Taxing Authorities.

    4. Part XIII of the Constitution deals with trade, commerce and intercourse within the territory of India. Article 301 provides that subject to the other provisions of this Part, trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free. Article 304(b) is at follows:

    “Notwithstanding anything in Article 301 and 303, the Legislature of a State may by law—

    (b) impose such reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse with or within that State as may be required in the public interest:

    Provided that no Bill or amendment for the purposes of clause (b) shall introduced or moved in the Legislature of a State without the provisions sanction of the President.”

    5. During the pendency of the appeals in this Court, the Governor of West Bengal promulgated the impugned Ordinance being the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980 (West Bengal Ordinance No. IV of 1980 published in the Calcutta Gazette, Extraordinary, dated January 8, 1980, after obtaining the instructions of the President under the proviso to clause (1) of Article 213 of the Constitution. By paragraph 2 of the Ordinance. Entry 25 of Schedule 1 of the Bengal Finance Sales Tax Act, 1941 has been omitted with retrospective effect from August ???, 1972.

    6. It is contended by Mr. Arun Prakash Chatterjee, learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellate, that the only ground upon which S. 3(5) of the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972 has been held by the learned Judge to be ultra vires the provisions of Article 304(b) of the Constitution is no longer available after the promulgation of the impugned Ordinance whereby Entry 25 of Schedule 1 of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 has been omitted with effect from August, 7, 1972 after obtaining the prior sanction of the President of India as required by the proviso to Article 304(b) of the Constitution. There can be no doubt that the requirement of the proviso to Article 304(b) has been complied with, but that is not the only requirement of that Article. The further condition that has to be fulfilled is that the restrictions sought to be imposed on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse must be reasonable restrictions. In view of the fact that the gross profits of the dealers in country liquor vary between 5.7% and 7.8% as found by the learned Judge, it is difficult to hold that the imposition of sales tax at the rate of 6% is a reasonable ??? unless the dealers can pass on the tax to their customers. Out attention has been drawn by Mr. Chatterjee to the introduction of “Explanation II” to S. 86 of the Bengal Exeise Act, 1909 by paragraph 7 of the Bengal Excise (Amendment) Ordinance, 1974 (West Bengal Ordinance No. IV of 1974) which was published in the Calcutta Gazette, Extraordinary dated June 6, 1974. The Explanation. II inter alia provides that the price of an intoxicant shall be deemed to have always been exclusive of any tax, surcharge, additional surcharge or any other impost on sale or purchase of such ??? levied under any law for the time being in force. It is contended on behalf of the appellants that in view of the Explanation II, a dealer in country liquor is entitled to pass on the tax to his customers, ??? past and present. Though Explanation II has been introduced with retrospective effect, it is ??? to realise sale tax from customers in respect of sales of intoxicants effected prior to the enactment of Explanation II. But that is a different matter. We are now concerned with the constitutional validity of the West Bengal Ordinance No. IV of 1980.

    7. It is, however, contended by Mr. Chatterjee that even assuming that imposition of tax on sales of country liquor puts an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of the alleged trade or business in country liquor, still the respondents are debarred from challenging the vires of the impugned Ordinance on the ground that by such imposition it contravenes the provision of Article 304(b) of the Constitution. He submits that the so-called trade or business in country liquor is res extra commercium and does not fall within the category of trade or commerce as mentioned in Article 301 or Article 304(b) of the Constitution. In support of his contention Mr. Chatterjee has placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Har Shankar v. The Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, AIR 1975 SC 1121 and Sat Pal and Co. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi AIR 1919 SC 1550. In Har Shankars's case, it has been held by the Supreme Court, after reviewing all earlier decisions on the point that there is no fundamental right to do trade or business in intoxicants, and that the State under its regulatory powers, has the right to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants—its manufacture storage, export, import, sale and passession. In this connection we may refer to the following observation of Das, CJ in the State of Bombay v. R.M Chamarbangwala AIR 1957 SC 699 which has been relied on in Har Sankar's case (supra).

    “We find it difficult to persuade outselves that gambling was ever intended to form any part of this ancient country's trade, commerce or intercourse to be declared as free under Art. 301. It is not our purpose nor is it necessary for us in deciding this case to attempt an exhaustive definition of the word ‘trade’, ‘business’, or ‘intercourse’. We are, however, clearly of opinion that whatever else may or may not be regarded as falling within the meaning of those words, gambling cannot certainly be taken as one of them. We are convinced and satisfied that the real purpose of Arts. 19(1)(g) and 301 could not possibly have been to guarantee or declare freedom of gambling. Gambling activities from their very nature and in essence are extra commercium although the external forme, formalities and instruments of trade may be employed and they are not protected either by Art. 19(1)(g) or Art. 301 of our Constitution”.

    After referring to the above observation, it has been held in Har Shankar's case that the reasons mentioned by Das, C.J for holding that there can be no fundamental right to do trade or business in an activity like gambling apply with equal force to the alleged right to trade in liquor and these reasons may not be brushed aside by restricting them to gambling operations. The same view has also been taken in Sat Pal's case (supra).

    8. Mr. R.C Deb, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents, submits that what has been laid down in Har Shankar's case and in Set Pal's case referred to above, is that as nobody has a fundamental right to carry on the trade or business in liquor, the Government is entitled to impose restriction as a regulatory measure. It is contended by him that there is a fundamental difference between imposition of restriction as a regulatory measure and where such imposition is made for fiscal purpose. As there is no fundamental right to carry on trade or business in liquor, one cannot complain against any regulatory measure that may be taken by the Government. But imposition of tax on the sale of country liquor for fiseal purpose, as has been made by the impugned Ordinance interfering with the freedom of trade or business of the respondents in country liquor, comes under the protection afforded by Article 304(b) of the Constitution. He submits that to the aforesaid Supreme Court decisions import duty was imposed on intoxicants for the purpose of controlling or regulating the trade or business in intoxicants and not for fiscal purpose and so it was held that the Constitutional validity of such imposition could not be challenged. Accordingly, it is contended by him that although the respondents have no fundamental right to carry on the trade or business in country liquor, yet they are entitled to ??? the protection of Article 304(b) of the Constitution as the impugned Ordinance has imposed an unreasonable restriction on the freedom or trade or business in country liquor.

    9. It is true that both in Har Shankar's case and in Sat Pal's case, import duty was imposed on intoxicants as a regulatory measure, but at the same time, in Har Shankar's case the alleged trade or business in liquor has been equated with gambling activities. In the State of Bombay v. R.M.D Chamarbagwala (supra) gambling activities have been held to be extra commercium and not protected either by Article 19(1)(g) or Article 301 of the Constitution. Thus it follows that liquor is also extra commercium. It is unthinkable that liquor will be extra commercium for the purpose of Article 19(1)(g) and res commercium for the purpose of Article 301 or 304(b) of the Constitution, Liquor’ not being an article of trade of commerce, there cannot be a lawful trades or business in liquor as contemplated by Article 19(1)(g) or Article 301 of the Constitution, although the forms in which it is being dealt with by persons under licenses from the Government may resemble trade or business, in our view; in order to avail of the protection of Article 301 or Article 304(b) of the Constitution, the commodity in which the right to trade, business or intercourse is claimed should be the subject matter of lawful trading activities. The view which we take finds support from a Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in Kochan Velayudhan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1961 Kerala 8 F.B It has been held in that Full Bench case that the protection afforded by Article 301 is confined to trading activities. ‘Liquor’ is not a legitimate article of trade and freedom of trade in liquor is not protected by Article 301. In the circumstances, the respondents are not entitled to challenge the constitutional validity of the impugned Ordinance being the West Bengal Ordinance No. IV of 1980 on the ground that it offends against the provision of Article 304(b) of the Constitution.

    10. Before we part with these cases we may dispose of another contention made on behalf of the respondents. It is said that if liquor is extra commercium, the sale of it cannot be a sale with the meaning of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 and so no tax can be imposed on tales of liquor under the said Act. We are unable to accept the contention. Trade or business in liquor may not be trade or business as contemplated by Article 19(1)(g) or Article 301 of the Constitution, but sale of liquor having all the incidents of ‘sale’ within the meaning of clause (g) of S. 2 of the said Act, we do not find any reason why such sale cannot be chargeable to sales tax. This contention therefore, fails. No other point has been urged on behalf of either party.

    11. For the reasons aforesaid, the judgements appealed from are set aside and the Rules Nisi are discharged. The appeals are allowed, but there will be no order for costs.

    12. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 134A of the Constitution is prayed for on behalf of the respondents, but refused. There will, however, be stay of operation of this judgment for a period of four weeks from ???.

    Sharma J.:—I agree.

    Appeals allowed.

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    The State Of West Bengal & Ors. v. Jagmohan Lal Gupta
    (Mar 6, 1980)