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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • section itself, rules 67 and 68 of the Companies (Court) Rules 1959
  • liquidation) u/s. 391(1), 392 and 393 of the Companies Act
  • Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 in rules 67
  • Indian Companies Act, 1913
  • Indian Companies Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • section itself, rules 67 and 68 of the Companies (Court) Rules 1959
  • liquidation) u/s. 391(1), 392 and 393 of the Companies Act
  • Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 in rules 67
  • Indian Companies Act, 1913
  • Indian Companies Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion (A.N. Sen, J. & B. C. Basak, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from an application made by the contributories of Tatanagar Iron Foundry Co. Ltd. (in liquidation) under section 391(1), 392 and 393 of the Companies Act for framing a scheme and for convening separate meetings of unsecured creditors and shareholders. The learned Judge below (Salil K. Roy Chowdhury, J.) dismissed the application on 13 July 1976. The trial Judge gave two principal reasons for dismissal: (1) as a matter of construction of section 391(1), the application by the contributories was not maintainable once the company was in liquidation because, in the view of the trial Judge, only the Official Liquidator could make such an application; and (2) the application was not bona fide and no proper case on the merits had been made out. The appellants (contributories) challenged that dismissal by way of this appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under section 391(1) of the Companies Act, contributories or creditors of a company in liquidation retain the right to apply to the Court for sanctioning a compromise or arrangement, or whether that right is exclusively vested in the Official Liquidator once winding up has commenced.
  2. Whether, on the materials and merits placed before the trial Judge, the application by the contributories should have been rejected independently of the question of who is entitled to make the application.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Mukherjee)

  • On a true construction of section 391(1), the Liquidator is not the only person competent to make the application if the company is in liquidation; contributories and creditors also retain the right to apply.
  • Support for this construction was drawn from the text of section 391 itself, rules 67 and 68 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, and the prescribed forms (Form Nos. 33 and 34) under those rules.
  • Reliance was placed on judicial authority including: In Re: Travancore National & Quilon Bank Ltd. v. L. Raghuraja Bharathi (AIR 1939 Mad. 318) and Mohammed Abdulla v. Gopala Pillai (AIR 1952 Travancore Cochin 243), as well as a relevant passage in Sircar & Sen's commentary on the Indian Companies Act, 1913, indicating that contributors/creditors may make the application and that the Official Liquidator is an additional applicant when a company is being wound up.

Position of the Trial Court (as summarized by the appellate court)

  • The trial Judge dismissed the contributories' application mainly on the ground that, by true construction of section 391(1), when a company is in liquidation the application for sanction of a scheme can only be made by the Official Liquidator and not by contributories or creditors.
  • As a second ground, the trial Judge found that the application was not bona fide and that, on the merits, the contributories had not made out a proper case for the scheme to be considered.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In Re: Travancore National & Quilon Bank Ltd. v. L. Raghuraja Bharathi, AIR 1939 Mad. 318 Holds that after an order for winding up is made a creditor or member can still move the Court under the corresponding statutory provision; the presence of "in the case of a Company being wound up, of the liquidator" adds the liquidator as an additional applicant but does not exclude creditors or members. The appellate court agreed with and relied on this decision to conclude that contributories and creditors remain entitled to apply under section 391 even when the company is in liquidation.
Mohammed Abdulla v. Gopala Pillai, AIR 1952 Travancore Cochin 243 Interprets the corresponding provision of the 1913 Act to mean that the addition of the Official Liquidator as an applicant is supplemental and not exclusive; members and creditors retain their competence to apply even after winding up. The appellate court relied on this authority to support the view that the Official Liquidator's right is additional and does not oust the right of creditors/contributories to present an application under the statutory provision.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate court conducted a textual and purposive analysis of section 391. The court set out the operative language of sub-section (1), which authorizes the Court, on application by the Company or any creditor or member of the Company, or in the case of a Company being wound up, of the liquidator, to order meetings to consider a proposed compromise or arrangement.

The court reasoned that a plain reading of section 391 indicates the Legislature's intention that when a compromise or arrangement is proposed the Company, any creditor or member may apply; where the company is being wound up, the Official Liquidator is an additional person who may apply because the board has ceased to function and the company is represented by the liquidator. The court emphasized that the statutory right conferred on contributories and creditors is not taken away by liquidation; rather, liquidation confers an additional right on the liquidator.

The court relied on several textual clues to support this interpretation:

  • Sub-section (1)'s express enumeration of possible applicants (Company, creditor, member; and liquidator when being wound up) shows a legislative design to expand—not restrict—applicants in winding up situations.
  • Sub-section (2), which makes an approved compromise or arrangement binding even in a winding up on the liquidator and contributories, indicates that the Legislature contemplated creditors' and contributories' involvement even after liquidation.
  • The Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 (rules 67 and 68) and the prescribed forms (Form Nos. 33 and 34) corroborate that contributories and creditors are contemplated as persons entitled to make applications under section 391 even when a company is in liquidation.
  • Judicial authorities (the Madras decision in Travancore National & Quilon Bank and the Travancore Cochin decision in Mohammed Abdulla) interpret the corresponding provision in the predecessor Act consistently with the above reasoning, treating the liquidator as an additional and not exclusive applicant.

On these bases the appellate court held that the trial Judge's legal conclusion that only the liquidator could apply after winding up was incorrect. The court explicitly agreed with the authorities cited by the appellant and with the textual commentary quoted from Sircar & Sen.

However, after resolving the legal question in favour of the appellants on the maintainability point, the court proceeded to examine the merits on the record before the trial Judge. The appellate court accepted the trial Judge's factual findings (recorded in the judgment) that a substantial portion of the company's assets had already been sold, that the landlord refused to renew the lease of the land where the factory was located and had instituted suit, and that the proposed scheme (as placed before the trial Judge) was not viable in those circumstances. The appellate court concluded that, on the materials and for the reasons the trial Judge recorded, dismissal on merits was justified even before any meetings of creditors or contributories could be convened to consider the scheme.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was dismissed. The appellate court stated as its core ruling: APPEAL DISMISSED.

Immediate consequences and orders given in the judgment:

  • All interim orders were vacated.
  • The Official Liquidator shall retain his costs out of the assets.
  • The appellants (the contributories who filed the application) shall pay and bear their own costs.

Implications: The court concluded that contributories and creditors retain the statutory right to apply under section 391 even when a company is in liquidation and that the Official Liquidator's right is additional and not exclusive. Nevertheless, in the present case the court refused relief on the merits because of the factual circumstances (sale of assets, landlord's refusal to renew lease and pending suit) and therefore dismissed the appeal. The opinion did not purport to set a novel legal precedent beyond applying existing textual analysis and earlier authorities; it applied those authorities to the facts to reach its outcome.

    Rajendra Prasad Agarwglla & Ors. v. The Official Liquidator, High Court

    A.N Sen, J.:— This appeal arises out of the judgment and order passed by Salil K. Roy Chowdhury, J. on the 13th day of July 1976 in an application by the contributories of Tatanagar Iron Foundry Co. Ltd. (In liquidation) u/s. 391(1), 392 and 393 of the Companies Act for framing of a Scheme and for convening separate meetings of the unsecured creditors and shareholders of the Company.

    2. The learned Judge dismissed the said application. It appears that the learned Judge dismissed the said application mainly on two grounds. Firstly, the learned Judge held that on a true construction of S. 391(1), the said application by the contributories of the company was not maintainable as the Company was in liquidation. It is the view of the learned Judge that when the Company is in liquidation, an application for sanction of a Scheme can only be made by the Official Liquidator. The second ground of dismissal of the said application by the learned Judge was that the said application was not bona fide and on the merits no proper case has been made out.

    3. Mr. Mukherjee, learned Counsel appearing in support of this appeal has contended before us that the views expressed by the learned trial Judge are not right. He has submitted that on a true construction of S. 391(1), it cannot be said that if the Company is in liquidation, the Liquidator is the only person competent to make the application and the shareholders and the creditors do not have any right to make any application for sanction of a Scheme. In support of this submission Mr. Mukherjee has drawn our attention to the said section itself, rules 67 and 68 of the Companies (Court) Rules 1959 and the prescribed forms under the rules bearing Form Nos. 33 and 34. Mr. Mukherjee has also relied on the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of In Re: Travancore National & Quilon Bank Ltd. v. L. Raghuraja Bharathi, Applicants, AIR 1939 Madras 318, and also on the decision of the Travancore Cochin High Court in the case of Mohammed Abdulla v. Gopala Pillai reported in AIR 1952 Travancore Cochin 243. Mr. Mukherjee has also drawn our attention to a passage at p. 398 in the Indian Companies Act, 1913 by Sircar & Sen. The passage relied on by Mr. Mukherjee reads as follows:—

    “The application for the holding of a meeting as contemplated in sub-section (1) may be made, either by the Company or by any member or creditor of the Company. Where the Company is being wound up, the application may be made also by the Official Liquidator.”

    4. The material portions of section 391 may be set out:

    “391.-Power to compromise or make arrangements with creditors and members: (1) Where a compromise or arrangement is proposed—

    (a) between a Company and its creditors or any class of them; or

    (b) between a Company and its members or any class of them;

    the Court may, on the application of the Company or of any creditor or member of the Company, or, in the case of a Company which is being wound up, of the liquidator, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, or of the members or class of members, as the case may be, to be called, held and conducted in such manner as the Court directs.

    (2) If a majority in number representating three-fourths in value of the creditors, or class of creditors, or members, or class of members, as the case may be, present and voting either in person or, where proxies are allowed under the rules made under Section 643, by proxy, at the meeting, agree to any compromise or arrangement, the compromise or arrangement shall, if sanctioned by the Court, be binding on all the creditors, all the creditors of the class, all the members, or all the members of the class, as the case may be, and also on the Company, or, in the case of a Company which is being wound up, on the liquidator and contributories of the Company:…………….”

    5. A plain reading of the section clearly indicates that the Legislature intended that if any compromise or arrangement is proposed, the Company or any creditor or any member of the Company will be entitled to make the necessary application an in case where the Company is being wound up, as the board has ceased to function and is no longer there and the Company is represented by the liquidator, the liquidator will also be entitled to make the necessary application. The right which is conferred on the contributories or the creditors is not intended to be taken away when the Company has gone into liquidation and in such a case an additional right is also conferred on the liquidator. The provisions contained in sub-s. (2) which require the approval of the majority of the creditors or class of creditors or members or class of members in case of any compromise or arrangement for the same being sanctioned, even when the Company is in liquidation, clearly go to indicate that the Legislature never intended that the wishes of the creditors or contributories would be ignored. In our opinion, in case of a Company in liquidation apart from the rights which are conferred in the creditors or contributories of a Company an additional right is also conferred on the liquidator. The passage in Indian Companies Act by Sircar and Sen which we have earlier quoted, in our view, correctly represents the legal position.

    6. The provisions contained in the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 in rules 67 and 68 and the forms prescribed under the said Rules also clearly go to indicate that even in the case of a Company in liquidation the contributories and the creditors of the Company are entitled to make an application under S. 391.

    7. This identical question came up for a consideration before the Madras High Court in the case of In Re: Travancore National and Quilon Bank Ltd. v. L. Raghuraja Bharati, AIR 1939 Mad. 318 and Venkataramama Rao J. held at pp. 322-323:

    “It is finally conceded by the learned advocates who appeared for most of the creditors that after an order for winding up is made, this Court will have jurisdiction to entertain this application, but the objection that was raised as to the maintainability of the petition was that the application after a winding up order could only be made by the liquidator and not by a creditor of a Company, and this argument is based on the language of S. 153, namely ‘in the case of a Company being wound up, of the liquidator.

    There does not seem to be much substance in this argument. The section was intended to confer rights both on the Company and on the creditors and members of the Company. When it is a going concern the object will be to avert a winding up. Even after an order for winding up is made, an application can be made to cancel a winding up by the sanction of a scheme and allow the Company to resume its normal business. The creditors & members are the persons vitally interested in the life of a Company and are the best judges of their interests. It could not have been therefore the intention of the Legislature to deprive the creditors of the right once an order for winding up is made and place them at the mercy of the liquidator who may or may not choose to move in the matter. All that is intended by this section is that the liquidators should also have the right to make the application. At any rate, this is the view taken by Palmer on the corresponding section of the English Act. In his book on winding up, he observes thus at page 899:

    ‘A proposal for an arrangement or compromise is not confined to the Company or its liquidator if any. It is open to any creditor or member to take the initiative. The Act expressly provides that the Court may on the application, in a summary way of the Company, or of any creditor or member of the Company, or in the case of a Company being wound up, of the liquidator, order a meeting.’

    I think the same view must be adopted in the interpretation of the Indian Act and I have therefore no hesitation in holding that even after an order for winding up, a creditor or member can move the Court under S. 153 of the Act”.

    8. We are in agreement with the view expressed by the learned Judge.

    9. In the case of Mahammed Abdulla v. Gopalla Pillai, AIR 1952 Travancore Cochin 243, a Division Bench of the Travancore Cochin High Court while construing the provisions contained in S. 153(1) of the Act of 1913, which is more or less similar to S. 391 of the present Act, held:

    “The introduction of the words, ‘in the case of a Company being wound up, of the liquidator’ is intended to provide an additional and not an exclusive person who could make the application. If a company, or a member, or a creditor may make the application under S. 153(1) proposing a compromise or arrangement in the case of a Company which is not under liquidation, there is no reason why any of them should not be competent to make the application in the case of a company which is being wound up.

    The interest that entitled the Company, member or creditor to make the application in the case of a going concern subsists even after an order for winding up is made to sustain a similar application even at that stage.

    ‘The application for the holding of a meeting as contemplated in sub-section (1) may be made, either by the Company or by any member or creditor of the Company. Where the Company is being wound up, the application may be made also by the Official Liquidator.”

    10. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the view expressed by the learned trial Judge that the contributories and the creditors have no right to make the application when the Company is being wound up and the liquidator alone is competent to present the petition is not correct. This contention of Mr. Mukherjee, therefore, succeeds.

    11. Though this contention of Mr. Mukherjee succeeds, we are, however, of the opinion that on a proper consideration of the materials which were placed before the learned trial Judge the learned Judge was right in rejecting the said application on merits. The learned Judge has already noted in his judgment that a good part of the assets had already been sold and the landlord has refused to grant any renewal of the lease of the land on which the factory site of the Company is situate. The landlord in fact has already instituted a suit. We have also carefully considered the provisions of the scheme which the contributories seek to propound and to place at the meetings of the creditors and also of the contributories. Without going into the question of bona fides, we are of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case the learned Judge was right in dismissing the said application even before the scheme had been considered at any meeting of the creditor or the contributories.

    12. This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. All interim orders are vacated. Official Liquidator will retain his costs out of the assets. The appellants will pay and bear their own costs.

    Bimal Chandra Basak, J.:— I agree.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Rajendra Prasad Agarwglla & Ors. v. The Official Liquidator, High Court
    (Aug 12, 1977)