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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • S. 6(2) of the Land Acquisition Act read with S. 3(31) of the General Clauses Act. Section 29 of the Bombay State Road Transport Act, 1950
  • S. 31(3) of the Land Acquisition Act and Rule 18 of the Rules
  • Land) Contral Act, 1965. Under S. 3(2) of the 1972 Act,
  • WEST BENGAL SOCIETIES REGISTRATION ACT 1961
  • provisions of S. 29. As the Bombay Act
  • S. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • S. 3(31) of the General Clauses Act
  • Development Authority Act, 1972
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT
  • S. 31(3) nor Rule 18
  • Area Act, 1972,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • S. 6(2) of the Land Acquisition Act read with S. 3(31) of the General Clauses Act. Section 29 of the Bombay State Road Transport Act, 1950
  • S. 31(3) of the Land Acquisition Act and Rule 18 of the Rules
  • Land) Contral Act, 1965. Under S. 3(2) of the 1972 Act,
  • WEST BENGAL SOCIETIES REGISTRATION ACT 1961
  • provisions of S. 29. As the Bombay Act
  • S. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • S. 3(31) of the General Clauses Act
  • Development Authority Act, 1972
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT
  • S. 31(3) nor Rule 18
  • Area Act, 1972,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges the judgment of M.N Roy J. which discharged a Rule Nisi obtained by the appellant under Article 226 of the Constitution. The appellant, a tenants' association at 12, I.C Bose Road, contested the declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which followed a notification under Section 4 published on December 2, 1974. The notification stated that lands at premises nos. 12 and 16, I.C Bose Road were likely to be needed for a public purpose, specifically for constructing the northern approach road related to the reconstruction of the Buckland Bridge at Howrah, funded by the Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority (C.M.D.A). After hearing objections under Section 5A, the declaration under Section 6 was published on December 29, 1975, also stating the acquisition would be at the expense of the C.M.D.A.

The appellant argued that the C.M.D.A was neither a local authority nor a company, and the funds used did not form part of the public revenues as required by the second proviso to Section 6(2), rendering the acquisition illegal. The respondents raised preliminary objections that the appellant lacked locus standi and that the members had waived their right to challenge by filing claims under Section 9. The trial judge upheld the objections, held the C.M.D.A to be a local authority under Section 3(31) of the General Clauses Act, and discharged the Rule Nisi, prompting this appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant (a tenants' association) has locus standi to maintain a writ petition under Article 226 challenging the declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act.
  2. Whether the C.M.D.A qualifies as a "local authority" under the second proviso to Section 6(2) of the Land Acquisition Act read with Section 3(31) of the General Clauses Act.
  3. Whether the acquisition declaration under Section 6 is valid if the compensation is to be paid by the C.M.D.A, considering its legal status and fund management.
  4. Whether the appellant is entitled to alternative accommodation under the Land Acquisition Act or related rules.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The C.M.D.A is neither a local authority nor a company, and the funds used do not form part of the public revenues, making the acquisition illegal under the second proviso to Section 6(2).
  • The appellant, as a tenants' association, challenges the acquisition on behalf of tenants affected by the land acquisition.
  • Reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Jyoti Chit Fund to support locus standi.
  • Claim for alternative accommodation based on Section 31(3) of the Land Acquisition Act and Rule 18 of the Rules framed thereunder.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The appellant lacks locus standi to maintain the writ petition as it has no legal right or interest in the land.
  • Majority of the appellant’s members filed claims under Section 9, thereby waiving their right to challenge the acquisition.
  • The C.M.D.A qualifies as a local authority under Section 3(31) of the General Clauses Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mani Subrat Jain v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 276 Requirement of a legal right and locus standi to seek mandamus under Article 226. Reinforced that the appellant must have a judicially enforceable right, which was held absent here.
Union of India v. Jyoti Chit Fund and Finance, AIR 1976 SC 1163 Government as trustee and locus standi in relation to provident fund dues. Distinguished as irrelevant to the appellant’s locus standi in this case.
Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram, AIR 1975 SC 1331 Interpretation of "other authorities" under Article 12 of the Constitution. Supported the view that C.M.D.A is an authority within the meaning of Section 3(31) of the General Clauses Act.
Valjibhai Muljibhai v. The State of Bombay, AIR 1963 SC 1890 Definition of "local authority" under Section 6(2) of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 3(31) of the General Clauses Act. Distinguished on facts; unlike the transport corporation, C.M.D.A is a statutory authority with control over local funds.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first examined the appellant’s locus standi and found it lacking. The appellant, a tenants’ association formed after the Section 4 notification, had no personal or legal right in the land and thus was not a person aggrieved under Article 226. Additionally, as a registered society under the West Bengal Societies Registration Act, 1961, the society itself cannot sue except through authorized office-bearers, which was not done here.

Regarding the respondents’ contention of waiver by members filing claims under Section 9, the court noted conflicting decisions but declined to decide the issue since locus standi was already absent.

On the substantive issue of whether the C.M.D.A is a local authority within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act, the court interpreted the second proviso to Section 6(2) and Section 3(31) of the General Clauses Act. It held that the C.M.D.A, created by statute with powers to control and manage its own fund for development within a defined metropolitan area, qualifies as a local authority. The court distinguished the Supreme Court’s decision in Valjibhai Muljibhai, noting the factual differences and the statutory entitlements of the C.M.D.A.

The court rejected the appellant’s claim for alternative accommodation, holding that neither Section 31(3) of the Land Acquisition Act nor Rule 18 of the Rules provides for such relief.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED

The court affirmed the trial judge’s decision to discharge the Rule Nisi and dismiss the writ petition. The appellant, lacking locus standi and legal right, cannot challenge the acquisition declaration. The C.M.D.A is legally recognized as a local authority for purposes of the Land Acquisition Act, validating the acquisition declaration. The appellant’s claim for alternative accommodation was rejected as unsupported by law. No costs were awarded. This decision resolves the dispute between the parties without setting new precedent beyond the facts of this case.

    12, I.C Bose Road Tenants' Association v. Collector Of Howrah & Ors.

    M.M Dutt, J.:— This appeal is directed against the judgment of M.N Roy J. whereby the Rule Nisi obtained by the appellant on its application under Article 226 of the Constitution was discharged.

    2. The appellant who is described as “12, I.C Bose Road, Tenants' Association” challenged a declaration under S. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which was preceded by a notification under S. 4 of the said Act. The notification under S. 4 was published on December 2, 1974. It was inter alia stated therein that the lands comprised in the premises nos. 12 and 16, I.C Bose Road were likely to be needed for a public purpose, namely, for the construction of the northern approach road in connection with the re-construction of the Buckland Bridge at Howrah at the expenses of the Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as the C.M.D.A). After hearing the objections filed by the interested persons including the tenants of the said premises under S. 5A of the said Act, the declaration under S. 6 was published on December 29, 1975. In the declaration also it was stated that the acquisition would be made at the expenses of the C.M.D.A

    3. It was contended by the appellant in the writ petition that the C.M.D.A was neither a local authority nor a company, nor the money that would be spent by it for the acquisition of the lands comprised in the said premises formed part of the public revenues of the State Government as contemplated by the second proviso to S. 6(2) of the said Act and accordingly, the acquisition sought to be made by the declaration under S. 6 was illegal, inoperative and void. At the hearing of the Rule Nisi, two preliminary objections were taken on behalf of the respondents, namely, that the appellant had no locus standi to maintain a writ petition challenging the declaration under S. 6 and that a majority of the members of the appellant having filed claims under S. 9 of the said Act, they had waived their right to call in question the legality of the acquisition. The learned Judge upheld the preliminary objections of the respondents and held that the appellant had no locus standi to maintain a writ petition and that as most of its members filed claims for compensation under S. 9, they had forfeited their right to challenge the acquisition. He also held that the C.M.D.A was a local authority within the meaning of the second proviso to S. 6(2) of the said Act read with S. 3(31) of the General Clauses Act. Upon the said findings, he discharged the Rule and hence this appeal.

    4. We may first of all consider the locus standi of the appellant to maintain a writ petition. After the notification under S. 4 was published on December 2, 1974, the tenants of the said premises formed themselves into an Association which is the appellant before us. The appellant has been registered under the West Bengal Societies Registration Act, 1961 and its registered office is at 12, I.C Bose Road, Howrah. Article 226 provides for remedy for the infringement of a fundamental or legal right of a person. The condition precedent to the granting of any relief under Article 226 is the existence of a fundamental or legal right of a person and the infringement of such right. The right which is the foundation of an application under Article 226 is a personal and individual right. The legal right may be a statutory right or a right recognised by the law. The principles of law in this regard have been recently restated by the Supreme Court in Mani Subrat Jain v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 276. In that case, the Supreme Court has observed that it is elementary that no one can ask for a mandamus without a legal right. There must be a judicially enforceable right as a legally protected right before one suffering a legal grievance can ask for a mandamus. A person can be said to be aggrieved only when a person is denied a legal right by some one who has a legal duty to do something or to abstain from doing something. In the instant case, the persons who will be affected by the acquisition of the lands comprised in the said premises are the tenants occupying the same besides the owner thereof, but surely not the appellant. The appellant has no legal right and therefore there is no question of the infringement of a legal right. The appellant has no interest in the land and premises sought to be acquired and is not, therefore, a person aggrieved. The learned Judge has rightly held that the appellant has no locus standi. The decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Jyoti Chit Fund and Finance, AIR 1976 SC 1163 has been relied on by the appellant. In that case, it was held that Government was a trustee in regard to the provident fund dues, pensions and other compulsory deposits till they were paid to the Government servant and the Government was entitled to maintain an objection to the attachment made of such dues, pensions, deposits, etc. under S. 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In our view, that case has no bearing on the question of locus standi of the appellant to maintain a writ petition.

    5. Apart from what has been stated above, the appellant has another difficulty in regard to its locus standi. It has been already noticed that the appellant is a registered Society under the West Bengal Societies Registration Act, 1961. Under sub-s. (1) of S. 19 of the said Act every Society may sue or may be sued in the name of the President, the Secretary, or any office-bearer authorised by the Governing Body in this behalf. In view of S. 19(1), the Society itself has no locus standi to maintain an action and consequently a writ petition. The writ petition was filed by the appellant as the petitioner and not by the President, Secretary or any office-bearer authorised by the Governing Body of the appellant. The appeal also has been filed by the appellant in its own name. On this ground also the writ petition is not maintainable, though this point has not been taken by the respondents either before the learned trial Judge or before us.

    6. So far as the other preliminary objection against the maintainability of the writ petition founded on the forfeiture or waiver of the rights of the members of the appellant by asking for payment of compensation is concerned, it may be pointed out that there are some conflicting decisions of this Court on the point. We do not think that it is necessary for us to decide the same, for it has been already held by us on other grounds that the appellant had no locus standi to ask for any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution.

    7. In spite of the above finding as to absence of locus standi of the appellant we propose to consider the contention of the appellant that the C.M.D.A is not a local authority and accordingly, the declaration under S. 6(1) is illegal and inoperative. The second proviso to S. 6(2) provides as follows:

    “Provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some funds controlled or managed by a local authority”.

    Under the proviso, therefore, a declaration can only be made if the compensation is paid by a company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. It is not disputed that the C.M.D.A is not a company and the money that may be paid by it on account of compensation does not form part of the public revenues. Unless therefore, the C.M.D.A is a local authority the declaration under S. 6(1) will not be a valid one. The term “local authority” has not been defined in the Land Acquisition Act, but it has been defined in S. 3(31) of the General Clauses Act which is as follows:

    “(31). The “local authority” shall mean a municipal committee, district board, body of port commissioners or other authority legally entitled to, or entrusted by the Government with, the control or management of a municipal or local fund.”

    There can be no doubt that the C.M.D.A is an authority and comes within the expression “other authority” under S. 3(31). In interpreting Article 12 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court in Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram, AIR 1975 SC 1331 observed that the expression “other authorities” in Article 12 was wide enough to include within it every authority created by a statute and functioning within the territory of India, or under the control of the Government of India. Further it was observed that the expression ‘other authorities’ would include all constitutional authorities on whom powers were conferred by law. It is also not disputed by the appellant that the C.M.D.A is an authority or “other authority” within the meaning of S. 3(31). It has, however, been strenuously urged on behalf of the appellant that the C.M.D.A is not legally entitled to, or entrusted by the Government with the control or management of a municipal or local fund. It is also argued that the fund in the hands of the C.M.D.A is not a local fund. In support of its contention that the C.M.D.A is not a local authority, strong reliance has been placed on behalf of the appellant on a decision of the Supreme Court in Valjibhai Muljibhai v. The State of Bombay, AIR 1963 SC 1890. In that case, the question that came up for consideration was whether the Bombay State Transport Corporation was a local authority within the meaning of the second proviso to S. 6(2) of the Land Acquisition Act read with S. 3(31) of the General Clauses Act. Section 29 of the Bombay State Road Transport Act, 1950 provides that the corporation shall for all purposes be deemed to be a local authority. It was held by the Supreme Court that the Bombay State Transport Corporation was a company and not a local authority in spite of the provisions of S. 29. As the Bombay Act did not receive the President's assent it could not override the definition of ‘local authority’ as contained in S. 3(31) of the General Clauses Act. It was observed by the Supreme Court as follows:

    “It will be clear from the definition that unless it is shown that the State Transport Corporation is an ‘authority’ and is legally entitled to or entrusted by the Government with control or management of a local fund it cannot be regarded as a local authority. No material has been placed before us from which it could be deduced that the funds of the Corporation can be regarded as local funds. It was no doubt submitted by the learned Attorney General that the Corporation was furnished with funds by the Government for commencing its business; but even if that were so, it is difficult to appreciate how that would make the funds of the Corporation local funds.”

    Relying on the said observation of the Supreme Court, it has been urged on behalf of the appellant that the fund of the C.M.D.A does not constitute a local fund.

    8. The C.M.D.A is a statutory authority and has been created by the Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority Act, 1972 which is an Act to provide for the establishment of an Authority for the formulation and execution of plans for the development of the Calcutta Metropolitan Area, for the coordination and supervision of the execution of such plans and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Under the Act of 1972, the C.M.D.A is to act within an area as described in the schedule of the Calcutta Metropolitan Planning Area (Use and Development of Land) Contral Act, 1965. Under S. 3(2) of the 1972 Act, the C.M.D.A is a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal with power to acquire, hold and dispose of property, and to contract, and may sue and be sued in its name. Under S. 6 it may with the previous approval of the State Government borrow any money for carrying out the purposes of the Act or for servicing any loan obtained by it. Section 7 provides that there shall be a fund for the C.M.D.A to which shall be credited such monies as may be paid to it by the State Government under the Taxes on Entry of Goods into Calcutta Metropolitan Area Act, 1972, and all monies borrowed by the C.M.D.A and such other monies as may be paid to it by the State Government or any other authority or agency. Section 8 provides for the sinking fund of the C.M.D.A Under clause (c) of S. 15, it will be responsible for the supervision of the execution of any project for the development of any area within the Calcutta Metropolitan area, the expenses of the whole or any part of which are met from its fund. The C.M.D.A is, therefore, a statutory authority which has power to act within a specified area for the development of that area. Under the statute by which it has been created it is legally entitled to the control or management of its fund. In our view, if a statutory authority which has power to act within a specific or local area for the development of that area, which is one of the governmental functions ordinarily entrusted to a municipality or a corporation by a statute, with power to control and manage its own fund, such fund must be held to be a local fund within the meaning of S. 3(31) of the General Clauses Act. In Valjibhai's case referred to above, the Supreme Court found that the said transport corporation was not an authority within the meaning of S. 3(31) and there was no material before the Supreme Court to show that the fund of the corporation was a local fund. In our view, the said decision of the Supreme Court does not help the contention of the appellant. In the view which we take, there can be no doubt that the fund in the hands of the C.M.D.A is a local fund within the meaning of S. 3(31) of the General Clauses Act and the C.M.D.A is a local authority. The learned Judge in our opinion, has rightly overruled the contention of the appellant that the C.M.D.A was not a local authority.

    9. Lastly, it is contended on behalf of the appellant that the respondents are to provide the members of the appellant with alternative accommodation. We are afraid, there is no provision in the Land Acquisition Act in regard to alternative accommodation. Reliance has been placed on behalf of the appellant on S. 31(3) of the Land Acquisition Act and Rule 18 of the Rules framed thereunder in support of its contention for alternative accommodation. In our opinion, neither S. 31(3) nor Rule 18 can, by any stretch of imagination, be said to provide for alternative accommodation in cases of acquisitions under the Land Acquisition Act as contended on behalf of the appellant. No other point has been urged on behalf of the appellant.

    10. For the reasons aforesaid, the judgment of the learned Judge is affirmed and this appeal is dismissed, but in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order for costs.

    Sharma, J.:— I agree.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    12, I.C Bose Road Tenants' Association v. Collector Of Howrah & Ors.
    (Sep 7, 1977)