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Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion — Title Appeal No. 37 of 1960

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal is by some defendants against the judgment of the 1st Additional Court of the Subordinate Judge, Burdwan in Title Appeal No. 37 of 1960, which affirmed the decree of the Munsif at Kalna in Title Suit No. 31 of 1958. The plaintiff, Kalipada Tah, alleged that two shop-rooms on 0.06 acre in C.S. Plot No. 850 (khatian No. 342, Mouza Madhupur) were his and that he had constructed and occupied them. The landlords originally were Manmatha Chatterjee and others; subsequently defendant No. 25 purchased the landlords' interest and became landlord. The plaintiff asserted he let the two rooms to defendants Nos. 1 and 2 (at specified times in B.S.), they paid rent initially but later stopped in collusion, and that defendants Nos. 1 and 2, in conspiracy with defendants Nos. 3–25, falsely claimed to be tenants under defendants Nos. 3–24. The plaintiff served a notice to quit, which was refused, and brought suit for eviction of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and for recovery of rent arrears. Defendants contested the suit, asserting among other things that (a) the plaintiff had abandoned his tenancy earlier, (b) defendant No. 25 acquired the Mahal and possession and had settled shares of the Mahal to various defendants by registered deeds dated 5 Chaitra, 1350 B.S., (c) parts of the land were settled to defendants Nos. 1 and 2 at certain rents and that those two constructed the rooms themselves and ran shops therein, and (d) some defendants were in khas possession of other portions. The Munsif found for the plaintiff on possession and disbelieved the defendants' settlement and abandonment claims, but did not find that the plaintiff had proved induction of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 as tenants under him; the Munsif held defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were trespassers. The Subordinate Judge (first appellate court) dismissed the appeal and agreed with the Munsif on key factual findings and decreed eviction of defendants Nos. 1 and 2; no decree for arrears of rent was given because tenancy under the plaintiff was not proved. The present (second) appeal challenges those conclusions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the courts below were correct in decreeing recovery of khas possession in favour of the plaintiff where the plaintiff's pleaded case was that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were tenants whose tenancy had been terminated by notice to quit (i.e., whether the court could grant possession on the basis that the defendants were trespassers when the plaintiff's case was framed as a claim based on termination of tenancy).
  2. Whether the concurrent findings of fact by the trial and first appellate courts — that the plaintiff had title and possession up to end of 1352 B.S., that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 occupied in 1353 B.S., and that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were trespassers — are perverse or without evidence and therefore liable to interference in this second appeal.
  3. Whether, given the pleadings and evidence, the court was justified under Order 7, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure in granting relief (declaration of title and recovery of possession) even though the pleaded ground emphasised termination of tenancy rather than a pure trespass claim.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Case (as pleaded)

  • The plaintiff alleged ownership/possession of two shop-rooms on specified land in C.S. Plot No. 850 and that he had constructed those rooms.
  • He alleged that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had been let the rooms by him and were tenants who paid rent initially but later stopped paying in collusion.
  • He claimed to have terminated the tenancy by notice to quit; the notice was refused, and he sought eviction and arrears.
  • The plaintiff alleged defendants Nos. 1 and 2 fraudulently obtained revisional settlement records in their favour and that those records were incorrect.

Defendants' Case (as pleaded)

  • Defendants asserted that defendant No. 25 purchased the Mahal (including the suit land) and obtained possession; the suit land had been lying fallow and covered with shrubs.
  • They claimed plaintiff had abandoned his prior tenancy and that defendant No. 25 entered in 1344 B.S.
  • Defendant No. 25 purportedly settled one-third and two-thirds shares of the Mahal to various defendants by registered deeds dated 5 Chaitra, 1350 B.S., which included the suit property.
  • They alleged defendants Nos. 3–24 possessed the suit land and that portions were settled to defendant No. 2 and to defendants Nos. 1 and 2 at annual rents; defendants Nos. 1 and 2 then raised one room each at their cost and ran shops in those self-constructed rooms.
  • They alleged some other constructions (e.g., a dochala built by defendant No. 25) and maintained that the plaintiff's shop had been closed earlier, fallen down, and the land remained fallow.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abdul Ghani v. Musammad Babni, (1903) ILR 25 All 256 (Full Bench) That a plaintiff may obtain a decree for possession even if the specific pleaded tenancy is not proved, where the plaintiff is shown to be the owner and the defendants have no right to remain (i.e., relief can be granted in substance under Order 7, Rule 7 of the CPC). The court relied on this Full Bench decision as analogous: in the present case the plaintiff proved title and the defendants were found to have no right, so the court was justified in granting declaratory and possessory relief despite technical defects in the specific pleaded theory (tenancy termination).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by reviewing the findings of both the trial court (Munsif) and the first appellate court (Subordinate Judge), noting that both courts reached concurrent factual conclusions. The analysis unfolded in the following steps:

  1. Concurrent Findings of Fact: Both courts concluded that the plaintiff's shop-rooms existed and that the plaintiff was in possession of the rooms up to the end of 1352 B.S.; defendants Nos. 1 and 2 occupied the rooms in 1353 B.S.; the alleged settlement, surrender or abandonment asserted by the defendants was disbelieved; and defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were held to be trespassers without title or right.
  2. Standard of Interference in Second Appeal: The Court stated it would not interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless they were perverse or without evidence. The court found the concurrent findings supported by the record and therefore declined to disturb them.
  3. Substantive Relief vs. Pleaded Theory: The appellants' counsel argued that because the plaintiff had pleaded termination of tenancy and sought khas possession on that basis, it was incorrect for the courts to award khas possession on the separate factual finding that defendants were trespassers. The Court considered Order 7, Rule 7 CPC, which requires a plaint to state specifically the relief claimed but allows the court to grant other reliefs as it thinks just.
  4. Application of Order 7, Rule 7 and Authority: The Court observed that both parties litigated the question of title with full knowledge of their cases and adduced evidence accordingly. Given that the plaintiff proved title and the defendants were shown to have no right, the court found it permissible under Order 7, Rule 7 to grant appropriate reliefs (declaration of title and recovery of khas possession) even if the plaintiff’s pleading emphasised termination of tenancy. The Court referred to Abdul Ghani v. Musammad Babni (Full Bench) where similar reasoning allowed possession despite tenancy not being proved.
  5. Justice and Technicalities: The Court emphasized that mere ineffective or unsubstantial technicality in pleading should not prevent a party from getting a proper decision on the merits when the parties had litigated the relevant issues and ad valorem court-fees had been paid. The Court concluded no injustice was occasioned to any party by granting the relief consistent with the factual findings.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is dismissed. The concurrent findings of the courts below (that the plaintiff had title and possession up to the relevant date and that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were trespassers) are upheld and the decree for recovery of khas possession in favour of the plaintiff is sustained. The appeal is dismissed with costs assessed at hearing fees of 5 gold mohurs.

Implications

  • Direct effect: The decree of the lower courts in favour of the plaintiff (eviction of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and declaration of the plaintiff's title) is affirmed; no decree for arrears of rent was made below because the plaintiff did not prove induction of the defendants as tenants under him, and that state of affairs remains.
  • Procedural implication: The Court accepted that under Order 7, Rule 7 CPC a court may grant reliefs necessary to do justice on the facts actually proved even when the precise pleaded theory (e.g., tenancy termination) is not established, provided the parties have fully litigated the factual issues and no party is prejudiced.
  • Costs: The appellants were ordered to pay costs; hearing fees were fixed at 5 gold mohurs.
  • Scope of precedent: The opinion relies on an earlier Full Bench decision (Abdul Ghani v. Musammad Babni) for the proposition that relief may be granted on substantive rights proved even if a particular pleaded tenancy theory fails; the judgment does not purport to lay down a new broad principle beyond applying established authority to the facts before the Court.

    Amulya Ratan Mukherjee And Others v. Kali Pada Tah And Others

    1. This appeal is by some of the defendants against the decision of the 1st Additional Court of the Subordinate Judge, Burdwan in Title Appeal No. 37 of 1960 affirming the judgment and decree passed by the Court of the Munsif at Kalna in Title Suit No. 31 of 1958 in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants.

    2. In short, the plaint allegation is that on .06 acre of land appertaining to C.S plot No. 850 under khatian No. 342 in Mouza Madhupur, the plaintiff Kalipada Tah constructed two shop rooms which are the subject-matter of the suit. The landlords in respect of the land in C.S plot No. 850 were Manmatha Chatterjee and others. Subsequently the defendant No. 25 purchased the interest of the landlords and became the landlord of the plaintiff. The plaintiff had his own shops in the two rooms on the land in plot No. 850 upto 1340 B.S Later on he let out the suit rooms to one Kalipada Mukherjee who carried on his sweetmeat shop there upto Chaitra, 1354 B.S Thereafter, Kalipada left the rooms and plaintiff took possession of the same and let out the eastern room to the defendant No. 1 in Aswar, 1355 B.S at a monthly rental of Annas 8 and in Aswin 1355 B.S he let out the western room to the defendant No. 2 at the same monthly rental of Annas 8. According to the plaint, they occupied the rooms as tenants and paid rents to the plaintiff. Subsequently they stopped paying rents in collusion with each other. The allegation is that in conspiracy with defendants Nos. 3 to 25, the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 set up a false claim that they were tenants under the said defendants Nos. 3 to 24. The plaintiff, therefore, determined the tenancy of the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 by a notice to quit which was refused. Thereafter, the present action for eviction of the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and for realisation of arrears of rent was started. It has been alleged by the plaintiff that the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 fraudulently got the current revisional settlement records in their favour and that the same are incorrect. This suit was contested by all the defendants and their defence is more or less the same. The defendants' case is that the defendant No. 25 purchased the Mahal including the suit land and obtained possession thereof. The suit land was lying fallow and covered with shrubs. The plaintiff had already abandoned his former tenancy and the defendant No. 25 entered into the suit land in 1344 B.S Subsequently, he settled ⅓rd share of the Mahal including the suit property to defendants Nos. 15 to 19 and 21 by a registered deed dated 5th of Chaitra, 1350 B.S and that ⅔rd share of the Mahal also including the suit property to defendants Nos. 3 to 5 and 8 to 13 by another registered deed of the same date. The defendants' case further is that the defendants Nos. 3 to 24 possessed the suit property by virtue of the settlement and they settled a part of the lands in the north-western portion of the suit property with defendant No. 2 in Aswin, 1353 B.S at an annual rental of Rs. 4 and another portion lying to the contiguous north with defendants Nos. 1 and 2 in Baisak, 1353 B.S at an annual rental of Rs. 2, Annas 8. Thereafter, the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 raised one room each on the land settled at their own costs and they had been running their shops in their own rooms thus constructed. It has been further stated that to the south of the rooms built by the defendants Nos. 1 and 2, the defendant No. 25 raised a dochala about four years back from the filing of the written statement for accommodating some Santal labourers. It is stated that defendants Nos. 3 to 24 are in khas possession of the suit property not settled with the defendants Nos. 1 and 2. The defence allegation is that the plaintiffs shop was finally closed in 1336 B.S, and that his room fell down within 3 or 4 months of the closure of the shop and that since then the suit land had been lying fallow.

    3. The learned Munsif after hearing the parties and on consideration of the evidence on record, held that the plaintiff's rooms are still in existence and on the question of possession he found that plaintiff was in possession of the rooms. The question of abandonment by the plaintiff of the suit land or falling down of the rooms as alleged by the defendants has been disbelieved by the learned Munsif. The story of settlement in favour of the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 alleged to have been given by the defendants Nos. 3 to 24 has also been disproved. The trial court, however, did not find that the plaintiff's case of the tenancy of the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 under him had been proved. According to the trial court, the clear finding is that defendants Nos. 3 to 25 could not prove their possession of the suit property and that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were possessing the suit property before 1353 B.S According to the learned Munsif, the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were trespassers and not tenants under the plaintiff.

    4. Against that decision, an appeal was taken to the Court of the District Judge and the said appeal has been dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge. On consideration of the materials on record, the first appellate Court also held that when the defendant No. 25 acquired the landlord's interest of the suit land by a kobala, the tenancy and the shop rooms of the plaintiff were there as they were mentioned in the kobala itself. The said Court also disbelieved the defence version that the suit rooms were constructed by the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and that the original rooms of the plaintiff fell down. On hearing the parties, the learned Subordinate Judge also held in agreement with the learned Munsif that the plaintiff failed to prove the induction of the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 as tenants under him in respect of the suit rooms as there was no corroboration in support of the testimony of the plaintiff. The story about the jungly shrubs on the suit land has also been disbelieved by the learned Subordinate Judge. It was also found by the appellate Court below that the story of khas possession by the defendants Nos. 3 to 25 had not been proved at all. According to the court below, there was no evidence on record to prove that any of the defendants had any manner of possession upto the end of 1352 B.S The story of tenancy given by the defendants Nos. 3 to 24 to the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 has not been accepted. It has been found that plaintiff's possession continued in the suit property upto 1353 B.S when according to the defence version, the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 came into possession of the disputed property though as trespassers having no lawful title or right. On the question of adverse possession also the courts below did not come to the finding in favour of the defendants since it has been held that within 12 years prior to the institution of the suit, the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had started occupying the suit rooms as trespassers. In this view of the finding, the appellate Court also gave a decree for eviction of the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 as the Munsif did. As the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were not found tenants under the plaintiffs, no decree was passed in respect of any arrears of rent.

    5. In this second appeal this Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by both the courts below unless the said findings are perverse or without evidence. In this case it has been found by both the courts that the plaintiff had been in possession of the disputed property upto the end of 1352 B.S and upto the time when the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 as admitted by themselves occupied the disputed rooms in 1353 B.S The courts have found that the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are trespassers in respect of the suit properties. The alleged settlement set up by the defendants in favour of the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 has been disbelieved. The story of surrender of plaintiffs tenancy alleged by the defendants has also been disproved admittedly on the findings of the courts below. The present suit was filed by the plaintiff within 12 years from the dispossession by the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 in respect of the suit property.

    6. Now, the point of law canvassed before me by Mr. Dilip Mukherjee, the learned Advocate on behalf of the appellants is that although the plaintiff wanted to have a decree for recovery of khas possession on the allegation that the defendants' tenancy was terminated by a notice to quit, the courts were wrong to hold that the plaintiff was entitled to get khas possession on the ground that the defendants 1 and 2 were rank trespassers which is nobody's case. In the present suit the plaintiffs allegation was that the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were tenants and that their tenancy was determined by a notice to quit. It has been stated that the said defendants had become trespassers after determination of tenancy. The plaintiff has paid ad valorem court-fees on the value of the properly. It has also been found that the plaintiff has title to the property but has been dispossessed by the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 for a period not more than 12 years. My attention has been drawn to Order 7, Rule 7 of the CPC which runs as follows:—

    “Every plaint shall state specifically the relief which the plaintiff claims either simply or in the alternative and it shall not be necessary to ask for general or other relief which may always be given as the court may think just to the same extent as if it has been asked for and the same Rule will apply to any relief claimed by the defendant in his written statement.”

    7. In this case according to the allegation of the plaint the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were trespassers in possession of the disputed property, may be after termination of the tenancy but still in character the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have been described as trespassers. The finding of the courts is that the said defendants had no right, title and interest to remain in the property. The prayer for recovery of possession is there. The plaintiff wants a declaration of his title and also injunction against the other defendants so that they may not disturb his possession. In this case, there was an issue framed by the court which runs as follows:—

    8. Has the plaintiff, has alleged right, title and interest in the suit property and can he get a decree for recovery of khas possession as prayed for?

    9. It appears that both the parties knew that they were to establish their respective title to the suit property. The parties adduced evidence with their eyes open and with the full knowledge of their respective case. The defendants knew that they were to show and prove that the plaintiff's tenancy right was terminated by surrender or abandonment and the plaintiff knew that he had to prove his subsisting title to the suit property. After this open contest, the courts below came to the findings that the plaintiff had his right, title and interest in the property and that the other defendants had no right, title or interest in the property as alleged by them. It has further been found that the plaintiff is entitled to get recovery of possession by evicting the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 who have been proved to be trespassers. In view of these circumstances, the court is justified to award proper and necessary decree as the facts would demand. In this case, the court felt that justice demanded that the plaintiff should be given possession of the disputed property by evicting the trespassers viz. the defendants Nos. 1 and 2. Under Order 7, Rule 7 the court is justified to pass suitable decrees. The case of Abdul Ghani v. Musammad Babni decided by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court reported in (1903) ILR 25 All 256 (FB) may be referred to in this connection. In that case the plaintiff claimed possession against the defendant on the allegation that the defendants' tenancy under him was terminated by a notice to quit. The defendant denied tenancy and asserted her title by adverse possession. It was held that the plaintiff was the owner of the house but the defendants' tenancy was not proved. It was found that the defendants occupied the house with the permission of the plaintiff. The Court, therefore, allowed a decree for possession in spite of the fact that the case of tenancy had not been proved. The principles laid down in that case may be applied here. In the instant case before me, the parties fought out the case on the question of title and they led evidence at length knowing their own cases.

    10. A relevant issue as to the question of title was also framed. Plaintiffs title has been proved but the defendant has been proved to be trespasser. By the findings of the courts and also by the decree passed, the cases of the parties were not prejudiced in any manner but on the other hand proper justice has been done. Mere ineffective and unsubstantial technicality will not prevent any party from getting proper decision from the Court. No injustice has been done to any of the parties. Ad valorem court-lees were paid. There is no difficulty in passing the decree for declaration of plaintiff's title and for passing a decree for recovery of khas possession of the suit property by evicting the defendants Nos. 1 and 2.

    11. In the result, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs against the contesting respondents. I assess hearing fees at 5 gold mohurs.

    12. Appeal dismissed.

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    Amulya Ratan Mukherjee And Others v. Kali Pada Tah And Others
    (Feb 18, 1975)