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  • Section 111(e) or Section 111(f) of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Section 2(5) of the Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act
  • Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act
  • WEST BENGAL PREMISES TENANCY ACT 1956
  • Non-agricultural Tenancy Act.
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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  • Section 111(e) or Section 111(f) of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Section 2(5) of the Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act
  • Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act
  • WEST BENGAL PREMISES TENANCY ACT 1956
  • Non-agricultural Tenancy Act.
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Two suits between the same parties gave rise to these two appeals. In Title Suit No. 55 of 1962 the predecessor of the present respondents (Gour Chandra Das) was the plaintiff and the present appellant (Prabhu Dayal Marwari) was the defendant; in Title Suit No. 86 of 1963 the positions were reversed. Both suits concerned the same disputed property.

The undisputed historical facts recorded in the opinion are: Gour Chandra Das originally owned the suit land and inducted Prabhu Dayal Marwari as a tenant under a tenancy contract (Exhibit F) that contemplated construction of a hut at the tenant's initial expense and a rent which would be adjusted until the construction expense (described as a "loan") was repaid. There was a later increase in monthly rent to Rs. 16, and a dispute arose as to whether the area of the tenancy had been increased from 22 cubits x 17 cubits to 30 cubits x 19 cubits.

By a registered sale deed dated 13 August 1958 (Exhibit D) the landlord sold the suit property to the tenant. On the same date the tenant executed an agreement (Exhibit 3) to reconvey the property to the landlord if the landlord repaid Rs. 4,000 within a specified period. Title Suit No. 55 of 1962 (landlord's suit) sought specific performance of Exhibit 3 and related reliefs (including Khas possession and mesne profits). Title Suit No. 86 of 1963 (tenant's suit) sought specific performance of an alleged permanent lease or, alternatively, declaration of a non-ejectable non-agricultural tenancy and to restrain the landlord from pursuing Title Suit No. 55.

The trial Court heard both suits analogously and granted partial relief to the landlord in Title Suit No. 55 of 1962 (decree for specific performance of reconveyance, Khas possession and mesne profits) and dismissed Title Suit No. 86 of 1963. On appeal the Appellate Court affirmed both decrees. Two second appeals were then filed in this Court: Second Appeals Nos. 1034 and 1035 of 1966 (arising from Title Appeals Nos. 199 and 198 of 1964 respectively).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sale (Exhibit D) and the contemporaneous agreement for reconveyance (Exhibit 3) resulted in a legal merger of the tenant's and landlord's interests so that Exhibit 3 operated to reconvey the entire property (both landlord's and tenant's interests) to the landlord;
  2. What was the nature of the tenancy created by Exhibit F — specifically, whether it was a non-agricultural tenancy (and thus governed by the Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act) or a tenancy governed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, and incidentally what was the area of land comprising the tenancy;
  3. Whether the tenant established the alleged agreement for a permanent lease (as pleaded in Title Suit No. 86 of 1963) and whether the second appeal on that point (Second Appeal No. 1035 of 1966) is concluded by concurrent findings of fact of the courts below.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Mr. S.C. Dasgupta)

  • The courts below erred by assuming that the sale (Exhibit D) caused a merger of the landlord's and tenant's interests and that Exhibit 3 reconveyed the entire interest (both landlord's and tenant's) to the landlord.
  • The decree for Khas possession and mesne profits was erroneous if merger did not occur, and those parts of the decree should be set aside even if specific performance of reconveyance is upheld.
  • The tenancy was a non-agricultural tenancy governed by the Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act (or otherwise not governed by the Premises Tenancy Act) — the courts below erred in holding otherwise.
  • The courts below wrongly passed decree for Khas possession without deciding contested issues about the area included in the tenancy.
  • The courts below should have accepted the tenant's contention that there was an agreement on 26 July 1962 to grant a permanent lease, and consequently Title Suit No. 86 of 1963 should have been decreed for specific performance for a permanent lease over the larger area (30 x 19 cubits) at Rs. 16 per month.

Respondents' Arguments (Mr. Dhruba Kumar Mukherjee)

  • On the proved facts there was legally a merger of the landlord's and tenant's interests by operation of the sale and reconveyance transactions, so Exhibit 3 reconveyed the entire property (including the tenant's interest) and the decree for specific performance, Khas possession and mesne profits was correct.
  • Conceded omission: the courts below omitted to decide the exact area of tenancy; however this omission was of no consequence if merger had obliterated the tenancy.
  • If the merger argument failed, then the area of the tenancy would have to be decided and the decree for Khas possession and mesne profits might require revision.
  • As to the tenant's claim for a permanent lease (Title Suit No. 86 of 1963), the concurrent adverse findings of fact by both courts below disbelieving the tenant's story conclude Second Appeal No. 1035 of 1966 and should not be reopened by this Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Badri Narain Jha v. Rameshwar Dayal Singh, AIR 1951 SC 186 General principle that when the landlord's interest in the whole and the tenant's interest in the whole coalesce in the same person by purchase the tenant's lesser interest ordinarily merges in the landlord's superior interest. The Court acknowledged this ordinary principle but distinguished the present case on the basis of the parties' contemporaneous intention (as shown by Exhibit 3). Thus the Court held that merger did not occur here despite the general rule stated in this case.
Suraj Chandra Mondal v. Beharilal Mondal, (AIR 1943 Cal 692) (43 Cal WN 1126) Interpreting Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, the Division Bench (Mukherjea J.) emphasized that the intention of the parties is the crux for deciding whether merger under Section 111(d) occurs. The Court followed this Division Bench decision and treated intention as essential for merger under Section 111(d); applying that principle, the Court found the contemporaneous documents showed an intention to preserve the tenant's interest, so no merger.
Reoti Saran v. Hargu Lal, AIR 1964 All 542 Division Bench of Allahabad High Court held that intention is not material for obtaining the result of merger under Section 111(d) (i.e., merger can occur irrespective of intention as interpreted by that Bench). The Court noted the conflict between this view and Suraj Chandra Mondal but expressly preferred and followed the Calcutta Division Bench decision (Suraj Chandra Mondal). The Court therefore did not follow Reoti Saran's contrary approach.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured manner, focusing on three principal questions identified in the opinion. The reasoning as set out in the opinion is summarized below without addition or inference beyond the text.

  1. Merger Issue (Exhibits D and 3):

    Both lower courts had found that the sale deed (Exhibit D) and the agreement for reconveyance (Exhibit 3) were contemporaneous and part of the same transaction; the Court accepted this factual finding. The Court examined whether, as a legal consequence, the tenant's and landlord's interests merged under Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act.

    The Court analyzed authorities on the interpretation of Section 111(d) and identified a conflict of views among High Court Division Benches. The Court expressly followed the Calcutta Division Bench decision in Suraj Chandra Mondal (Mukherjea J.) that treats the intention of the parties as the essential element for merger under Section 111(d). The Court observed textual indications in Section 111(d) that support the centrality of intention.

    Applying that principle to the contemporaneous documents, particularly Exhibit 3, the Court found clear evidence of an intention by the parties to keep the tenant's interest distinct rather than to cause it to merge. Therefore, the Court held that merger did not occur: Exhibit 3 was an agreement to reconvey the landlord's interest only, not the tenant's interest. As a legal consequence the tenant's interest remained with the tenant.

    Outcome on this point: the decree for specific performance in favor of the landlord remains but must be limited to reconveyance of the landlord's interest only; the parts of the decree granting Khas possession and mesne profits to the plaintiff (landlord) must be set aside because those remedies assumed reconveyance of the entire property including the tenant's interest.

  2. Nature of Tenancy (Exhibit F) and Statutory Application:

    The Court examined the creation of tenancy under Exhibit F. Although the tenancy originally involved open land, the document contemplated construction of a structure on the land by money advanced by the tenant (described as a "loan") which the landlord would be treated as having received and would repay by adjustment with rents. The tenancy was therefore of land with a structure to be erected.

    The Court applied the statutory definition of "non-agricultural tenant" from Section 2(5) of the Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act. That definition excludes a person who holds land on which premises are situated if such premises have been erected or are owned by the person to whom the occupier would be liable to pay rent (i.e., owned by the landlord). The Court concluded that because the structure on the land was erected and owned by the landlord (even though erected by agency of the tenant and financed initially by the tenant as a loan), the tenant did not fall within the definition of a "non-agricultural tenant."

    Outcome on this point: the tenancy is not a non-agricultural tenancy under the Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act; rather, the tenancy is governed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.

  3. Area of Tenancy:

    The factual dispute over whether the tenancy area had been enlarged from 22 cubits x 17 cubits to 30 cubits x 19 cubits (and the corresponding rise in rent from Rs. 9-8 annas to Rs. 16) was addressed. The Court found the tenant's contention that the additional area was included within the tenancy and that the rent increase related to the enlarged area to be more reliable and acceptable on the materials than the landlord's contrary contention.

    Outcome on this point: the Court agreed with the concurrent findings of the courts below that the tenancy area had been increased to 30 cubits x 19 cubits, and this finding was not disturbed in the second appeal.

  4. Permanent Lease Claim (Title Suit No. 86 of 1963 / Second Appeal No. 1035 of 1966):

    The Court noted the tenant's claim for specific performance of an alleged agreement for a permanent lease. The Court accepted the respondents' position that concurrent adverse findings of fact in the two courts below disbelieving the tenant's story conclude the Second Appeal on that issue, and the Court did not reopen those findings.

    Outcome on this point: Second Appeal No. 1035 of 1966 (challenging the dismissal of the tenant's suit) failed in its entirety and was dismissed without costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Second Appeal No. 1035 of 1966 is dismissed in its entirety; Second Appeal No. 1034 of 1966 succeeds in part.

Direct Consequences and Relief:

  • The Court held that Exhibits D and 3 are contemporaneous parts of the same transaction but that there was no legal merger of the tenant's interest into the landlord's interest because the parties manifested an intention to keep the tenant's interest distinct; accordingly Exhibit 3 is a reconveyance of the landlord's interest only.
  • As a consequence, the decree portions granting Khas possession and mesne profits to the plaintiff in Title Suit No. 55 of 1962 are set aside; those parts of that decree are modified.
  • The tenancy is not a non-agricultural tenancy under the Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act because the structure on the land was erected and owned by the landlord; therefore the tenancy is governed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.
  • The Court affirmed the factual finding that the area of the tenancy was increased to 30 cubits x 19 cubits and that the rent had increased to Rs. 16 per month.
  • Second Appeal No. 1035 (tenant's appeal) is dismissed without costs; in Second Appeal No. 1034 (landlord's appeal) there is no order as to costs.
  • The application for interim injunction and related rules are disposed of and discharged; leave under clause 15 of the Letters Patent was refused.

Broader Legal Implications:

The opinion applies and prefers an existing Division Bench authority of the Calcutta High Court on the interpretation of Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act emphasizing the parties' intention as the decisive factor for merger; the Court expressly declined to follow a contrary Division Bench view from the Allahabad High Court. The Court did not purport to lay down a novel principle of law beyond applying those precedents and the relevant statutory definitions. In that sense no new broad precedent was fashioned by this judgment; the decision resolves the parties' rights by application of existing authorities and statutory text to the contemporaneous documents and factual findings.

    Prabhu Dayal Marwari v. Tinkari Bala Dassi

    1. There are two appeals. These two appeals arise out of two suits between the same parties. In one, which was Title Suit No. 55 of 1962, the predecessor of the present respondents was the plaintiff and the present appellant was the defendant. In the other suit, which was Title Suit No. 86 of 1963, the present appellant was the plaintiff and the predecessor of the present respondents was the defendant. Both the suits were over the dispute between the parties regarding a property which was the common disputed property in both the suits. The background of that dispute was the undisputed fact that Gour Chandra Das, who was the predecessor of the present respondents was the owner of the suit land and he inducted the present appellant Prabhu Dayal Marwari into possession of the suit land as a tenant by a contract of tenancy which has been brought in the evidence in the case as Exhibit F. In it there was a stipulation that the tenant will pay a monthly rent at first fixed at Rs. 9-8 annas per month and a hut will be constructed costs of which construction will be initially borne by the said tenant Prabhu Dayal Marwari, but the amount of the expenses of the construction will be adjusted with the rents payable by him and so long as the expenses of that construction are not wiped off the landlord would not get any cash rent but will be entitled to payment of rent only after the amount of the expenses for the construction which was described in that document as loan () was repaid to the tenant. There was also a stipulation therein for increasing the monthly rent payable in certain circumstances. That document was executed by the said Gour Chandra Das on 11th Jaistha, 1348 B.S It is also the common case of both the parties that during the time after that contract of tenancy and before the suit there had been an increase of rent to a rate of Rs. 16/- per month. According to the defendant that increase was because of the increase in the area of the land which was mentioned in that document Exhibit F to be an area measuring 22 cubits X 17 cubits to an area of 30 cubits X 19 cubits. The additional area, according to the defendant tenant, be added for enabling him to construct a proper structure to serve the purpose for which the tenancy was created. According to the landlord, he, however, did not admit that the additional area of land was included in the tenancy at all and according to him the increase in the rent was for other reasons and not for the reason of addition to the land in the area of the tenancy. However that may be, while the tenant was remaining in the occupation as such of the suit property there were monetary transactions between the landlord and the tenant which were said to be transactions of loan advanced by the tenant to the landlord. Thereafter, by a registered Kobala dated 28th Sraban, 1365 B.S (13th August, 1958) the landlord sold the suit property to the tenant. This sale deed is Exhibit D in the case. On the same date the tenant executed an agreement by which he contracted to convey the property to the landlord if the latter repays the entire sum of Rs. 4,000/- which was the consideration money mentioned in the sale deed Exhibit D before the expiry of the month of Sraban, 1369 B.S This agreement for re-conveyance is Exhibit 3 in the case.

    2. Title Suit No. 55 of 1962 was instituted by plaintiff Gour Chandra Das for a decree for specific performance of the contract for re-conveyance of the suit property evidenced by Exhibit 3 on the averment that he had repeatedly requested the tenant to execute a deed of re-conveyance by accepting the money that was offered, but the latter on various grounds and pretexts delayed the matter and ultimately gave out that unless the landlord would execute a deed of permanent lease in respect of the suit property in favour of the tenant he would not re-convey the property. In that suit a decree for specific performance of the contract for re-conveyance of the property was prayed for and also there was a prayer for Khas possession thereof and for recovery of a sum of Rs. 90/- as expenses incurred by the plaintiff for purchasing the stamp paper for the deed of re-conveyance and also for mesne profits.

    3. The other suit, Title Suit No. 86 of 1963 was instituted by Prabhu Dayal Marwari for a decree for specific performance of the contract of an alleged permanent lease relating to the suit property and in the alternative for declaration that he had acquired non-eject-able non-agricultural tenancy right in respect of the suit land and also for a declaration that the landlord was not entitled to the reliefs prayed for in Title Suit No. 55 of 1962. There was also a prayer for permanent injunction restraining the landlord from proceeding with his suit.

    4. In the trial Court the two suits were heard analogously. The decision in the trial Court was that the Title Suit No. 55 of 1962 was decreed in part on contest with proportionate costs to the plaintiff granting the plaintiff in that suit a decree for specific performance of contract for re-conveyance of the suit property. It was also decreed that the plaintiff shall get mesne profits from the date of the suit till the recovery of possession. It was also found by the learned Subordinate Judge in his judgment that the plaintiff is also entitled to get Khas possession on the basis of the deed of re-conveyance to be executed by the defendant. Title Suit No. 86 of 1963 that was instituted by the tenant Prabhu Dayal Marwari was dismissed on contest. Both the parties were directed to bear their respective costs in that suit.

    5. Against the above decisions the tenant Prabhu Dayal Marwari preferred two appeals in respect of the decisions of the two suits. Title Appeal No. 198 of 1964 was against the decree passed in Title Suit No. 86 of 1963 and Title Appeal No. 199 of 1964 was against the decree of dismissal of the Title Suit No. 55 of 1962. These two appeals were also heard analogously and had been disposed of by the learned Additional District Judge, Hooghly by one judgment by which both the appeals were dismissed on contest with costs and the decrees of the trial Court in both the suits were affirmed. Against that decision of the appellate Court two second appeals have been preferred in this Court being Second Appeals Nos. 1034 and 1035 of 1966 arising out of Title Appeals Nos. 199 and 198 of 1964.

    6. Mr. S.C Dasgupta appearing on behalf of appellant in both the appeals has raised mainly three questions, first of which is that the two courts below have committed an error of law by assuming that by the sale of the property effected by the sale deed Ext. D there was a merger of the whole of the landlord's interest with the whole of the tenant's interest and the agreement for re-conveyance Ext. 3 was in respect of the entire interest in the suit property both of the landlord and of the tenant as a consequence of such assumed merger.

    7. From that stems out another contention of Mr. Dasgupta, learned Advocate for the appellant. He urges it also as a point of law that the decree for Khas possession and for mesne profits till the recovery of possession passed in favour of the landlord has been erroneous. The second contention of Mr. Dasgupta is that the courts below have committed error of law by holding that the nature of the tenancy which Mr. Dasgupta's client held under the respondents was not that of a non-agricultural tenancy, implying there-by that the tenancy was of a nature that would be governed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. The third important contention of Mr. Dasgupta for the appellant is that the courts below have committed an error of law by passing a decree for Khas possession of the suit property without adverting to the controversies in the pleadings and evidence and deciding the dispute as regards the area of the land comprised in the tenancy. The fourth and the last important contention of Mr. Dasgupta for the appellant is that there has been an error of law committed by the two courts below by refusing to accept the tenant's contention that there was an agreement by the landlord to grant a permanent lease in favour of the tenant on 26th July, 1962. By raising these contentions Mr. Dasgupta submitted that the decree passed in Title Suit No. 86 of 1962 which was affirmed by the first appellate Court's decree in Title Appeal No. 198 of 1964 should be modified by setting aside the decree for Khas possession and mesne profits passed against the tenant even if the decree for specific performance of the agreement for re-conveyance may be affirmed, but at the same time Mr. Dasgupta contends that the dismissal of the suit instituted by his client, that is, Title Suit No. 86 of 1963 should be set aside and a decree for specific performance of the alleged contract of a permanent lease should be passed against the landlord in respect of the suit property comprising in the tenancy an area of 30 cubits X 19 cubits with structures thereon at a monthly rent of Rs. 16/- per month.

    8. On behalf of the respondents in both the appeals Mr. Dhruba Kumar Mukherjee, learned Advocate has contested Mr. Dasgupta's contention by urging that on the facts proved and found it should be held that there was in law a merger of the landlord's interest with the tenant's interest and what was stipulated to be re-conveyed by the document Ext. 3 was the entire property including the interest of both the landlord and tenant. That being so, according to Mr. Mukherjee the learned courts below were right in passing the decree for specific performance of that contract Ext. 3 and also in passing the decree for Khas possession and mesne profits till the recovery of possession. But, Mr. Mukherjee, in his accustomed fairness did concede that there has been an omission by the courts below to decide on the question of the area of tenancy which omission, however, according to Mr. Mukherjee was of no consequence because of what he contended to be the merger having obliterated the tenancy. Mr. Mukherjee, however, reasonably foresaw that if his contention in support of the theory of merger would not succeed, then the true area of the land of the tenancy need have to be decided and also the decree for Khas possession and mesne profits will have to be revised. On the question of the specific performance of a contract for a permanent lease that has been the basis of the tenant's suit being Title Suit No. 86 of 1963 Mr. Mukherjee urged that the concurrent findings on issues of fact arrived at by the two courts below having been against the tenant by disbelief of his story in support of that agreement for permanent lease the Second Appeal No. 1035 of 1966 is concluded by findings of fact which cannot be re-opened in this Court.

    9. For deciding the points thus raised by the learned Advocates for both the sides most important questions are (1) did the transactions of sale evinced by Ext. D and the agreement for re-conveyance evinced by Ext. 3 were such as resulted as a legal consequence in the merger of the tenant's interest with that of the landlord and consequently the agreement for re-conveyance Ext. 3 was in spite of that nature of interest of the landlord and the tenant was merged together, (2) what was the nature of the tenancy which was created by the stipulation in Ext. F, was it a non-agricultural tenancy or was it a tenancy to which the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 should apply; incidentally what was the area of the land comprising the tenancy and (3) whether the tenant has succeeded in establishing as a fact the agreement for a permanent lease as pleaded by him in Title Suit No. 86 of 1963 and whether on that question the Second Appeal No 1035 of 1966 is concluded by concurrent findings of fact arrived at in the courts below. When these questions were decided one way or the other, the other ancillary questions which were argued on both sides before me with commendable thoroughness and grit are resolved by the result of the decisions on the main points abovenoted will therefore take up those three questions in seriatim.

    10. It appears from the judgments of the two courts below that both the courts were agreed that the transaction evinced by the deed of sale Ext. D was inextricably connected with the transaction evinced by the agreement for re-conveyance Ext. 3, so much so that the two together should be viewed as one and the same transaction. This is undoubtedly a finding on an issue of fact on which both the courts are agreed. On hearing the learned Advocates on both the sides I also agree with that view and hold that the two documents were part and parcel of the same transaction. That being so, although the language in the sale deed Ext. D is bearing the character of absolute transfer of the entire interest of the landlord in the land and the structures including the possession of the property, that must have to be taken in conjunction with the language that has been employed in the other document Ext. 3 which is the agreement for re-conveyance executed on the same date by the same parties. The language in that document Ext. 3 is clearly the language of a stipulation by which the agreement was to re-convey what was being sold by Ext. D. There is no doubt at all that the property sold by Ext. D was only the landlord's interest and therefore the agreement for re-conveyance Ext. 3 was not only intending to be an agreement for, re-conveyance of that interest of the landlord, but also that intention is clearly, expressed by the Bengali words used in that document Ext. 3 which reads

    11. Looked that way. which is the only reasonable and legal was to understand the intention of the parties to the transaction, there is no doubt at all that though ordinarily when the landlord's interest in the whole and the tenant's interest in the whole coalesce in the same head by purchase the lesser interest of the tenant merges in the superior interest of the landlord to lose its identity and separate existence as was pointed out, in Badri Narain Jha v. Rameshwar Dayal Singh, AIR 1951 SC 186, yet in the present case by the conjunction of the agreement for sale which was a contemporaneous transaction with the transaction evinced by the deed of sale, Ext. D there was a clear intention of the parties to keep in existence the separate identity of the tenant's interest, so much so that there was no merger and what was being stipulated in the agreement for re-conveyance Ext. 3 was re-conveyance of the landlord's interests only.

    12. In answer to that contention of Mr. Dasgupta, Mr. Mukherjee learned Advocate for the respondents has contended that Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act should govern this case. That clause is in these terms:

    “111. A lease of immoveable property determines—

    (a) …………………………

    (b) …………………………

    (c) …………………………

    (d) in case the interests of the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property become vested at the same time in one person in the same right.”

    13. Mr. Mukherjee has relied on several decisions of many High Courts in India. Of those decisions some are not decisions on Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, but are decisions either on Section 111(e) or Section 111(f) of the Transfer of Property Act and therefore would not be helpful. It is to-be noticed that two of the decisions cited by Mr. Mukherjee are decisions pronounced upon interpretation of Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act and I will make reference to those two decisions only. In one of those two decisions given by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Suraj Chandra Mondal v. Beharilal Mondal, 43 Cal WN 1126 : (AIR 1943 Cal 692) Mukherjea J. has observed that the intention of the parties is the crux of the effect contemplated by Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act. As against that we have to notice that a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Reoti Saran…Plaintiff- v. Hargu Lal…Defendant-Respdt., AIR 1964 All 542 observed that intention is of no import at all for obtaining the result of merger under Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act. This conflict of views between two Division Benches of the two High Courts is remarkable indeed. But for the purpose of decision of the present case not only a Division Bench decision of this High Court is binding on me, more stronger reason in my mind is that I respectfully agree with and follow the decision of the Division Bench of this Court emanating from the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mukherjea (as his Lordship then was) in preference to the contrary view of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court for which also I have profound respect. I may add that the importance of the intention of the parties to the transaction is emphasized in the language in Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act by three phrases at three different places in one sentence which are j “in case” at the beginning, “in the whole” in the middle and “become vested” at the end. This clamour of past participle of necessity envisages that the factual event contemplated in that language has a possibility as happened in fact by the intention of the parties to the transaction. However that may be, on the authority of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court abovementioned I feel safe to hold that intention is the essential element for obtaining the result of merge and in the present case absence of the intention is clearly apparent by the contemporaneous document Ext. 3, the particular language of which I have quoted above. I therefore hold that the courts below were in error in proceeding on the footing that there was in fact a merger by the transaction which is evinced by the deed of sale Ext. D and the agreement for re-conveyance Ext. 3 both executed by the same parties on the same date. In law there was no merger and what was stipulated by Ext. 3 to be re-conveyed was the landlord's interest which was being sold by Ext. D. Mr. Dasgupta, learned Advocate for the appellant is therefore right in his contention that the decree for specific performance can only be of the contract and that what will be reconveyed is the landlord's interest The tenant's interest shall remain in the hands of the tenant. To that extent the decree passed in Title Suit No. 55 of 1962 must be modified. As a consequence the plaintiff in Title Suit No. 55 of 1962 is not entitled to Khas possession of the suit property nor to mesne profits. Those parts of the decree passed in Title Suit No. 55 of 1962 must be set aside.

    14. The next question of importance that remains to be decided is what was the nature of the tenancy that was created by the letter of tenancy Ext. F. It is true that only open land was existing when the contract of tenancy was being entered into, but the terms in Ext. F make it clear that the tenant was being inducted to be a tenant not of the land alone but also of a structure that will be constructed on the land and the rent will be for the land and the structure. It is again true that Ext. F clearly states that the expenses for construction of the structure on the land will be provided by the tenant at the first instance. But the document also makes it clear that that advanced money was to be advanced as “loan” to the landlord which loan will be repaid by adjustment with rents payable by the tenant and until the entire “loan” is repaid the landlord will not receive any cash rent. That being so, the question whether the tenant is a non-agricultural tenant has to be examined by reference to the definition of non-agricultural tenant. Section 2(5) of the Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act defines a non-agricultural tenant thus:—

    “(5) “non-agricultural tenant” means a person who holds non-agricultural land under another person and is, or but for a special contract would be, liable to pay rent to such person for that land but does not include any person who holds any such land on which any premises occupied by such person are situated if such premises have been erected, or are owned, by the person to whom such occupier is, or but for a special contract would be liable to pay rent for such occupation.”

    15. As in the present case the structure on the land cannot be said to have either been erected or owned by the tenant, but erected and owned by another person, that is, the landlord, (though such erection was through the agency of and by the money advanced as loan by the tenant) it comes within the negative part of the definition that non-agricultural tenant does not include a person in the position of the present tenant. Therefore it must be held that the courts below were right in their decision that the tenancy was not a non-agricultural tenancy. That is so not for the reason that has prevailed with the courts below, but for the reason that the tenant does not come within the definition of the non-agricultural tenant as contemplated in the Non-agricultural Tenancy Act. The result is that the nature of the tenancy must be held to be one governed by West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.

    16. On the question of the area of the tenancy it was pointed out by Mr. Mukherjee for the respondents that the original area of 22 cubits X 17 cubits had been increased to an area of 30 cubits X 19 cubits and the rent had also increased from Rs. 9-8 annas per month to Rs. 16/- per month. But, on that issue, the contention of the tenant that the additional area was added in the tenancy and for that reason the rent was increased is more reliable and acceptable upon the materials in the case than the contrary contention on behalf of the landlord that though the rent increased, it had no connexion with the increase in the area of the land and the extent of the tenancy remained at that lesser area as fixed originally by Ext. F. The contention of the defendant appellant therefore stands as found by the courts below and I agree with that finding and therefore it cannot be disturbed in this Second Appeal.

    17. In the result the Second Appeal No. 1035 of 1966 fails in its entirety and is dismissed without costs. Second Appeal No. 1034 of 1966 succeeds in part.

    18. The decrees passed in Title Suit No. 55 of 1962 and in the appeal arising out of the said suit being Title Appeal No. 199 of 1964 are modified to the extent indicated above.

    19. In the circumstances of the case in Second Appeal No. 1034 of 1966 there will be no order as to costs.

    20. The appeals having been disposed of the application for interim injunction is disposed of and no further order is necessary on this application.

    21. The Rules which were issued upon the applications for interim injunction are disposed of and are discharged without any order as to costs.

    22. Leave under clause 15 of the Letters Patent is prayed for and is refused.

    23. Order accordingly.

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    Prabhu Dayal Marwari v. Tinkari Bala Dassi
    (Jul 28, 1972)