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  • Sections 65 and 70 of the Indian Contract Act.12.
  • Sections 65 and 70 of the Indian Contract Act
  • Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act.
  • Sections 65 and 70 of the Contract Act,
  • Section 54 of the Arbitration Act.2.
  • SECTION 34 ARBITRATION ACT
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  • Sections 65 and 70 of the Indian Contract Act.12.
  • Sections 65 and 70 of the Indian Contract Act
  • Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act.
  • Sections 65 and 70 of the Contract Act,
  • Section 54 of the Arbitration Act.2.
  • SECTION 34 ARBITRATION ACT
Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application for stay of a suit under the Arbitration Act. The petition alleges that the petitioner and respondent entered into an indent No. W/2419 dated 29th June 1962 for purchase of 12 Metric Tonnes of Marg-O-Dark "HC" at Rs. 1000 per Metric Tonne, on terms that included an arbitration clause: "Any dispute arising out of this indent shall be subject to the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry's arbitration."

By a letter dated 5-9-62, the quantity was allegedly amended and raised to 24 Metric Tonnes (12 immediate, 12 as required). The petitioner claims certain materials supplied by the respondent did not conform to the sample and were rejected; the respondent sued for recovery of Rs. 25,254 as price. The petitioner seeks a stay of that suit, asserting the disputes are covered by the arbitration clause and stating willingness to arbitrate. The respondent does not dispute the indent or that materials were supplied pursuant to it, but denies the materials were defective and contends the petitioner accepted the goods before later rejecting them. The respondent also asserts that the indent was subsequently substituted by a fresh order altering price and that delay by the petitioner would prejudice the respondent and risk the claim being barred.

Note: The opinion's opening sentence refers to an application "under Section 54 of the Arbitration Act," while the petition and later discussion consistently address stay under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether there exists a valid arbitration agreement between the parties based on the indent and surrounding correspondence.
  2. Whether the subject-matter of the respondent's suit (including alleged defects in quality and claims about price) is covered by the arbitration clause in the indent.
  3. Whether the Court should exercise its discretion under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act to stay the suit and refer the dispute to arbitration, having regard to considerations of readiness to arbitrate and potential prejudice (including the risk of the plaintiff's claim becoming barred by limitation).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented)

  • The indent (No. W/2419 dated 29-6-62) contained a wide arbitration clause covering "any dispute arising out of this indent," which fully covers the subject-matter of the suit.
  • The materials supplied did not conform to the samples and were rightfully rejected; the respondent's suit for price is in violation of the arbitration agreement.
  • The petitioner has always been ready and willing to go to arbitration and therefore prays for a stay of the suit under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
  • Counsel for the petitioner (Mr. Sarkar) argued that although the plaint did not expressly refer to the indent, the annexed bills and other pleaded material make clear the suit arises from the indent.

Respondent's Arguments (as presented)

  • The respondent denied that the materials were not according to sample and contended that the petitioner had accepted the materials without objection and later purported to reject them on frivolous grounds.
  • The respondent denied that the disputes between the parties are entirely covered by the arbitration clause and contended that, in any event, the claim in the suit is not entirely within that clause.
  • The respondent contended the indent may have been substituted by a fresh order for delivery (and an increased price), implying a distinct arrangement that might not be covered by the original arbitration clause.
  • The respondent argued that the petitioner was not ready and willing to arbitrate at the commencement of proceedings and that staying the suit would cause irreparable prejudice because the respondent's claim could be barred by limitation.
  • Specific legal contentions advanced by respondent's counsel (Mr. Bachawat) included: (i) there was no valid arbitration agreement because the indent was merely an offer not shown to have been accepted; (ii) disputes as to quality are excluded by Clause 6 of the indent (the works manager's decision as to quality and quantity is final); and (iii) the court should not stay the suit because arbitration would lead to prejudice (limitation) to the plaintiff.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Andhra Co-operative Spinning Mills Ltd., Guntakal v. Srinivasan (AIR 1958 Andh Pra 158) Relied on by respondent to argue that certain specified disputes (such as quality disputes) were expressly exempted from arbitration in that case because the arbitration clause itself recorded exceptions. The Court held this authority was not of assistance here because the language of the arbitration clause in the Andhra case differed: in that case the arbitration clause itself excluded specified disputes, whereas in the present indent the arbitration clause was very wide and contained no such exception.
Seth Thawardas Pherumal v. Union of India (AIR 1955 SC 46S) Cited for the observation: "If parties choose to add a fresh contract in addition to or in substitution for the old then the arbitration clause cannot cover the new contract." The Court held the principle did not apply on the facts: the plaintiff's pleading at most alleged a modification (price) of the indent, not a fresh contract in substitution; therefore any dispute about price still arose out of the indent and fell within the wide arbitration clause.
Johurmull Parasram & Ors. v. Louis Dreyfus & Co. Ltd. (52 Cal WN 137 : AIR 1949 Cal 179) Referred to by respondent's counsel in support of the argument that subsequent/alternative agreements may fall outside an earlier arbitration clause. The Court stated that the cases referred to (including this one) were of no assistance on the facts; the present dispute arose out of the indent and was covered by its broad arbitration clause.
Bengal Jute Mill Co. Ltd. v. Lalcliand Dugar (AIR 1963 Cal 405) Referred to in the same context as the above Calcutta decisions concerning scope of arbitration clauses relative to subsequent agreements. The Court found this case was of no assistance to respondent's contention that the present dispute lay outside the indent's arbitration clause.
Rungta Sons (P) Ltd. v. Jugometal Trg. Republike (63 Cal WN 527 : AIR 1959 Cal 423) Authority where the plaint alleged abrogation/supersession of an arbitration agreement by an oral agreement, but the court held the arbitration clause remained valid and covered the disputes; language of clause was similar ("any dispute arising out of the contract"). The Court noted the similarity of language and treated the Rungta decision as supportive of holding that disputes arising out of the indent (including alleged modifications) are covered by a broad arbitration clause.
Anderson Wright Ltd. v. Moran & Co. (AIR 1955 SC 53) Interpreted as laying down conditions to be satisfied to enable a court to grant a stay under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act (the Court here sets out four conditions derived from this authority). The Court applied the four conditions enumerated from this authority to the facts: it found the first two conditions clearly satisfied but concluded that, on the facts, there was a sufficient reason (including lack of readiness to arbitrate and risk of limitation) not to refer the matter to arbitration.
Union of India v. Sitaram Sankarlal (Matter No. 68 of 1964) (unreported; decision of S.P. Mitra, J.) Referred to by respondent's counsel: on similar facts the judge refused to stay because the respondent faced the possibility of the claim being barred by limitation where no arbitrator had been appointed. The Court considered the unreported decision persuasive on the point that the possibility of a claim being barred by limitation if referred to arbitration is a relevant consideration; it treated that consideration as material in exercising discretion under Section 34.
Tona Jute Co. Ltd. v. Bilas Roy & Co. (Commercial Cause Suit No. 8 of 1955) and appeal (Appeal No. 119 of 1955) Referred to by respondent's counsel: the learned judge refused to stay because arbitration then would lead to the claim being barred by limitation; the appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal (which did not discuss this aspect). The Court referenced this authority to support the proposition that the risk of limitation defeating a party's claim is a material consideration in refusing to exercise discretion to stay a suit under Section 34; the present Court agreed that such a possibility is relevant and, on the facts, sufficient to refuse the stay.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded to examine the respondent's three core contentions: (1) there was no valid arbitration agreement; (2) the subject-matter of the suit was not covered by the arbitration clause (with a specific sub-argument that Clause 6 excluded quality disputes); and (3) the Court should exercise its discretion under Section 34 to refuse a stay because the plaintiff would suffer irreparable prejudice (limitation).

On the existence of an arbitration agreement, the Court concluded there was a valid contract incorporating the indent and its arbitration clause. The Court relied on the correspondence, the bills annexed to the plaint (which referred to the indent), and the absence of a specific denial in the respondent's affidavit of supply pursuant to the indent. The Court therefore found the arbitration agreement existed in Clause 8 of the indent.

On whether quality disputes were excluded from arbitration by Clause 6 ("The decision of our works Manager in respect of both quality and quantity must be accepted as final"), the Court rejected the argument that Clause 6 excluded quality disputes from arbitration. The Court distinguished the Andhra Co-operative Spinning Mills case (where the arbitration clause itself expressly excluded specified disputes) and held there was no such express exception in the instant indent. The Court reasoned that although Clause 6 provides for the works manager's decision to be accepted as final, a party unwilling to be bound by that decision who raises disputes about supplies nonetheless raises a dispute "arising out of the indent" and such disputes were within the ambit of the wide arbitration clause.

On the contention that the plaint made alternative averments (including an alleged oral agreement altering price) and thus parts of the claim lay outside the arbitration clause, the Court held that the pleaded alternative amounted at most to a modification (as to price) of a term of the indent rather than an entirely new contract. The Court relied on the cited authorities (notably Seth Thawardas Pherumal) but concluded that the principle that a fresh/substitution contract falls outside the arbitration clause did not apply in the present case where the dispute about price still arose out of the indent.

The Court then applied the four conditions (derived from the Supreme Court authority cited) which must be satisfied to grant a stay under Section 34:

  1. The proceedings must be commenced by a party to an arbitration agreement against another party to the agreement.
  2. The legal proceeding to be stayed must be in respect of a matter agreed to be referred.
  3. The applicant for stay must be a party to the legal proceedings and must have taken no steps in the proceedings after appearance, and must satisfy the court that he was ready and willing to take necessary steps for proper conduct of the arbitration.
  4. The court must be satisfied there is no sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement (a discretionary evaluation).

The Court found that the first two conditions were clearly satisfied and that the applicant had not taken steps in the suit after appearance. However, on the third and fourth conditions the Court concluded there was a sufficient reason not to refer the matter to arbitration: namely, it did not appear that the applicant was "ready and willing" at the commencement of proceedings to do everything necessary for arbitration. The Court emphasized that no suggestion to refer disputes to arbitration had been made in the correspondence; notably, the plaintiff had sent repeated demands and a final solicitor's letter on 23rd August, 1963 warning of legal proceedings, and no reply or willingness to arbitrate had been indicated by the applicant. Further, the Court accepted that if the plaintiff's claim were referred to arbitration at that stage the claim would likely be barred by limitation, thereby causing the plaintiff complete loss of remedy and irreparable prejudice.

The Court expressly considered and endorsed the view that the possibility of a claim being barred if referred to arbitration is a material and relevant consideration when exercising discretion under Section 34, but clarified that such a possibility does not automatically require refusal of a stay in every case: the weight of that consideration depends on the facts. Applying that evaluative discretion to the facts before it, the Court held that the risk of the plaintiff's claim being barred constituted a sufficient reason to refuse the stay.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Petition dismissed. The interim order staying the suit was vacated and the application for a stay under the Arbitration Act was refused. The Court directed that each party shall pay and bear its own costs of the application.

Implications and consequences:

  • Direct effect on parties: The respondent's suit is not stayed and may proceed in court; the petitioner is not permitted to compel arbitration under the circumstances addressed in this opinion.
  • Procedural principle articulated: The Court held that when applying the discretionary power under Section 34, the court must consider whether the applicant was ready and willing at the commencement of proceedings to take necessary steps for arbitration and whether there are sufficient reasons not to refer the matter to arbitration; the possibility that a claim will be barred by limitation if referred to arbitration is a relevant and potentially decisive consideration depending on the facts.
  • No sweeping rule created: The Court made clear it did not lay down an absolute rule that a stay must always be refused where there is a possibility of limitation; rather, that consideration is fact-sensitive and may or may not be sufficient to refuse a stay in other cases.

Final line of the opinion: "Petition dismissed."

    Shalimar Paints Ltd. v. Omprokash Singhania .

    1. This is an application for stay of the suit under Section 54 of the Arbitration Act.

    2. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner had entered into a transaction with the respondent on the basis of an indent bearing No. W/2419 dated 29th June, 1962 for purchase of 12 Metric Tonnes Marg-O-Dark ‘HC’ as per sample at the rate of Rs. 1000/- per Metric Tonne on terms and conditions contained in the said indent. The said indent contains an arbitration clause to the following effect:—

    “Any dispute arising out of this indent shall be subject to the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry's arbitration.”

    3. According to the petitioner by a letter dated 5-9-62 the quantity mentioned in the said indent was amended and raised to 24 Metric Tonnes out of which delivery of 12 Metric Tonnes was to be immediate and of the balance 12 Metric Tonnes, as and when the same would be required. It is the petitioner's further case that certain materials supplied by the respondent pursuant to the indent, did not conform to the samples and was duly rejected by the petitioner. The petitioner contends that in violation of the arbitration agreement the respondent has instituted this suit for recovery of the sum of Rs. 25,254/- as the price of the materials supplied and that the disputes and differences are completely covered by the arbitration agreement. The petitioner states that the petitioner has always been ready and willing to go to arbitration and prays for stay of this suit under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. In the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the respondent the respondent does not dispute the indent or the terms and conditions contained therein. The respondent also does not deny that the materials were supplied pursuant to the indent. The respondent denies that the materials supplied were not according to sample. It is the case of the respondent that the petitioner after having accepted the materials without any objection, wrongfully purported later on to reject the same on frivolous grounds. The respondent denies that the disputes and differences between the parties are entirely covered by the arbitration agreement and it is the respondent's case that, in any event the claim in suit is not entirely covered by the arbitration agreement. The respondent in the affidavit also makes a case that the order was subsequently substituted by a fresh order for delivery of 12 Metric Tonnes immediate and 12 Metric Tonnes as and when required and the price for the supply was increased at the rate of Rs. 80/- per Metric Ton. The respondent finally contends that in view of the inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner the respondent will be irreparably prejudiced if the suit is stayed and the claim of the respondent is likely to be barred.

    4. Mr. Sarkar, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the arbitration clause is very wide and completely covers the entire subject matter of the dispute in suit. Mr. Sarkar has drawn my attention to the plaint filed herein. He has argued that although in the plaint, no reference is made to the said indent or the arbitration clause, it is quite clear from the bills annexed to the plaint and on the basis of which the claim in the suit is made, that the claim in the suit arises out of the indent. According to Mr. Sarkar there is no reason why the suit should not be stayed.

    5. Mr. Bachawat, learned counsel for the respondent opposing this application has raised the following contentions:—

    (i) There is no valid arbitration agreement between the parties;

    (ii) Even if it be held that there is a valid arbitration agreement between the parties, the subject matter of the suit is not covered by the arbitration clause;

    (iii) In any event, in the facts and circumstances of the case the suit should not be stayed as the same will cause irreparable prejudice to the plaintiff-respondent.

    6. In support of the contention that there is no valid arbitration agreement between the parties Mr. Bachawat has argued that the indent is nothing but an offer and there is nothing to show that the offer was accepted and a valid agreement was concluded on the basis of the said indent. He further contends that even in the petition for stay there is no averment that the said indent had been accented by the respondent or that a valid contract on the basis of the said indent had been concluded between the parties. I am unable to accept this contention. Apart from the fact that no such case has been made in the affidavit-in-opposition, the correspondence and the conduct of the parties clearly establish that there was a valid contract between the parties on the basis of the said indent. It is to be noted that in paragraph 3 of the petition, the petitioner specifically alleges that the materials were supplied pursuant to the said indent. The said allegation that the materials were supplied pursuant to the indent is not denied in the affidavit-in-opposition. The bills annexed to the plaint refer to the indent. The correspondence clearly establish that the said indent had been accepted by the respondent and the transaction between the parties had been on the basis of the indent. I am therefore of the opinion that there was a valid arbitration agreement between the parties and the said agreement is contained in Cl. 8 of the said indent which has already been set out. Mr. Bachawat has next contended that the disputes in suit are not covered by the arbitration clause. He has drawn my attention to Clause 6 of the terms and conditions contained in the said indent and the said clause reads as follows:

    “Clause 6 — The decision of our words Manager in respect of both quality and quantity must be accepted as final.”

    7. He has argued that the disputes in suit according to the petitioner relate to quality of the goods. According to Mr. Bachawat such a dispute does not come within the arbitration clause as it is specifically covered by Cl. 6 of the terms and conditions and it is the contention of Mr. Bachawat that by virtue of the provisions contained in Cl. 6 such a dispute is excepted and is outside the purview of the arbitration agreement. He contends that in view of the specific agreement between the parties contained in Cl. 6 of the terms and conditions of the agreement, any dispute relating to quality cannot be said to have been intended to be referred to arbitration. In support of this contention Mr. Bachawat has referred to and relied on the decision in the case of Andhra Co-operative Spinning Mills Ltd., Guntakal v. Srinivasan reported in AIR 1958 Andh Pra 158. In my view, the said decision is not of any assistance in the facts of the present case, particularly in view of the fact that the language used in the arbitration clause in the Andhra case referred to by Mr. Bachawat is quite different from the language used in the arbitration clause in the instant case. In the case of Andhra Co-operative Spinning Mills Ltd., AIR 1958 Andh-Pra 158, certain specified disputes were exempted from the scope of arbitration and were kept outside the scope of arbitration by express agreement recorded in the arbitration clause itself; in other words the arbitration clause itself made it clear that such disputes were exempted and were not to be referred to arbitration. In the instant case it is to be noted that the arbitration clause is very wide and no such exception in respect of any dispute is contained in the arbitration clause. It is undoubted true that Clause 6 provides that the decision of the works Manager with regard to quality must be accepted as final, but if any party chooses not to be bound by the decision of the works Manager and to act in accordance with such decision and to raise disputes with regard to supplies made on the basis of the indent, such a dispute certainly arises out of the indent, in my view such a dispute is covered by the arbitration clause and cannot be contended to be exempted from the operation of the arbitration clause.

    8. Mr. Bachawat has next argued that in any event, the entire subject matter of the dispute in suit is not covered by the arbitration clause. He has contended that for the purpose of finding out whether the disputes in suit are matters agreed to be referred to arbitration or not, the court should consider only the averments made in the plaint and the arbitration clause, and the Court should not go into the merits or otherwise of the case made in the plaint. Mr. Bachawat submits that the case made in the plaint may be good or bad and the averments made therein may be correct or fake, but the court in considering an application for stay of the suit under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act cannot go into the merits of the allegations and case made, and must proceed only on the basis of the allegations in the plaint. Mr. Bachawat has drawn my attention to the plaint and has placed particular reliance on paragraphs 3 and 12 thereof. He has argued that in the plaint itself there is no reference to the indent at all and on the basis of the averments in the plaint the court should not come to the conclusion that the materials had been supplied on the basis of the indent. According to him it is quite possible that the materials had been supplied on the basis of some other arrangement and in the absence of any reference to the indent itself in the plaint, the court will be speculating, if the court has to come to the conclusion that the materials had been supplied on the basis of the indent containing the arbitration clause. This argument of Mr. Bachawat does not appeal to me. It is to be noted that no such case is made in the affidavit-in-opposition. It is not the case made that apart from the materials supplied on the basis of the indent, the materials had been supplied by the respondent on the basis of any other arrangement or agreement. The bills on the basis of which the claim in the suit is made, are annexed to the plaint and the said bills themselves refer to the said indent No. W/2419 dated 29-6-62. The plaint itself, in my view, therefore clearly refers to the indent which brings the arbitration clause into the picture. There is no question, therefore, of the court making any speculation as to the nature of the claim or the nature of the dispute and on a construction of the plaint there is no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the materials supplied were on the basis of the indent containing the arbitration clause. Mr. Bachawat has further argued that in any event the allegations made in paragraph 3 of the plaint with regard to the further agreement between the parties regarding payment of extra price is not in any event covered by the arbitration clause. According to him the said agreement is a distinct oral agreement and the arbitration clause cannot be said to apply to the said agreement. Mr. Bachawat has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Seth Thawardas Pherumal v. Union Of India, reported in AIR 1955 SC 46S and has placed particular reliance on the following observations at page 477 (paragraph 29):

    “If parties choose to add a fresh contract in addition to or in substitution for the old then the arbitration clause cannot cover the new contract.”

    9. Mr. Bachawat has also referred to the case of Johurmull Parasram & Ors.… v. Louis Dreyfus & Co, Ltd.…* reported in 52 Cal WN 137 : (AIR 1949 Cal 179) and to the decision in the case of Bengal Jute Mill Co. Ltd. v. Lalcliand Dugar, reported in AIR 1963 Cal 405.

    10. In my view the cases referred to by Mr. Bachawat are of no assistance to him in the facts of this particular case. There can hardly be any dispute with regard to the principles laid down or enunciated in the aforesaid cases. But it is to be noted that in the facts of the present case there is no question of the parties choosing to add a fresh contract in addition to or in substitution for the old. The allegations in paragraph 3 of the plaint at the most make the case of modification of one of the terms, namely, the terms as to price of the materials mentioned in the indent. There is, therefore, no question of adding a fresh contract in addition to or in substitution for the old. The dispute with regard to the price if there be any, in respect of materials alleged to have been supplied, arises out of the indent and in view of the very wide language used in the arbitration clause such a dispute will also be covered by the arbitration clause.

    11. In the case of Rungta Sons (P) Ltd. v. Jugometal Trg. Republike, reported in 63 Cal WN 527 : (AIR 1959 Cal 423), there was an allegation in the plaint that the arbitration agreement had been abrogated and superseded by express oral agreement and an application for the stay of the suit had been resisted on the ground amongst other grounds, that there was no valid and binding arbitration agreement between the parties. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Anderson Wright Ltd. v. Moran and Co., AIR 1955 SC 53 Bachawat, J. decided the issue on the application and held on a construction of the arbitration clause in the contract that the disputes in the suit were covered by the arbitration clause which was valid and subsisting. It is also to be noted that the language of the arbitration clause in the contract was very much similar. In the arbitration clause in the said contract as also in the arbitration clause in the present contract, the language used, is ‘any dispute arising out of the contract’. Mr. Bachawat has further contended that in view of the alternative case made in paragraph 12 of the plaint under Sections 65 and 70 of the Contract Act, the disputes can never be said to be covered by the arbitration clause, as the allegations therein are de hors the contract and on the footing or basis that there is no contract between the parties. In my view, there is no substance in this contention of Mr. Bachawat. It is to be noted that this is a case made in the alternative and this part of the case becomes really meaningless and useless as soon as it is held that there is a valid contract between the parties. It is open to the court to decide the question of the validity of the arbitration clause on an application under S. 34, and to come to the decision, the Court has further to decide that there is a valid contract between the parties in which the arbitration clause is contained. As soon as it is held that there is a valid contract containing an arbitration clause covering subject matter of dispute in the suit the claim in the alternative under Sections 65 and 70 of the Indian Contract Act becomes nugatory and is of no consequence. If this contention of Mr. Bachawat be accepted, it will then be possible in every case to defeat and circumvent the provisions and effect of an arbitration agreement in every case by introducing in the plaint an alternative case under Sections 65 and 70 of the Indian Contract Act.

    12. Mr. Bachawat has next contended that the discretionary power conferred under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act should not be exercised in this particular case, as in that event the plaintiff in the suit will suffer irreparable prejudice. Mr. Bachawat submits that if this suit is stayed and the plaintiff has to take recourse to arbitration, the plaintiff's claim will be completely defeated, and the claim of the plaintiff will then become barred. Mr. Bachawat has drawn my attention to paragraph 8 of the plaint in which it has been alleged that the goods had been supplied on or about 23rd February, 1963 and it is Mr. Bachawat's contention that if the claim has to be referred to arbitration now, the claim will be completely barred by limitation and the plaintiff's claim will be wholly defeated and the defendant will enjoy the plaintiff's goods without paying for the same. In support of the contention that the court should not exercise its discretion in staying a suit in a case where there is a possibility of the claim being barred if the suit be stayed and the disputes' be referred to arbitration. Mr. Bachawat has referred to two unreported decisions of this Court. Mr. Bachawat has referred to the judgment of S.P Mitra, J. in Matter No. 68 of 1964 (Re: Arbitration — Union of India v. Sitaram Sankarlal), delivered on the 2nd June, 1964 (Cal) (unreported). The facts of the case before S.P Mitra, J. were as follows:—

    13. The plaintiff was the lessor and the Union of India was the lessee in respect of two godowns in Calcutta. The agreement for lease dated 19th January, 1960 contained an arbitration clause which provided that all disputes and differences between the parties would be referred to the sole arbitration of a person nominated by the Ministry of the Government of India administratively dealing with the contract at the time of such nomination. On the 9th July, 1960 Union of India gave notice to the respondent that the godowns would be vacated on the 11th October, 1960. The lessor claimed rent for the period of 1 st. September, 1960 to 11th October, 1960 and bills for rent for the above period had been sent. On the 9th March, 1961, the Regional Director (Food) stated in a letter that the matter had been referred to the Ministry for arbitration to settle the disputes in terms of the arbitration clause obtained in the agreement. Repeated reminders thereafter had been sent by lessor for settlement of his claim but the same had evoked no response. The suit was instituted on the 11th November, 1963, as the claim would otherwise become barred and up to the date of the institution of the suit, no intimation had been received from the appropriate authorities as to the appointment of any arbitrator. On these facts the learned Judge refused to exercise his discretion under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act to stay the suit and the learned Judge observed:

    “In any event it would be improper to compel the respondent to go to arbitration at this stage inasmuch as the respondent may be faced with the possibility of his claim being held to be barred by limitation.”

    14. He has also referred to the judgment of Bachawat, J. delivered on the 29th June, 1955 in the matter of Commercial Cause Suit No. 8 of 1955 (Cal), Tona Jute Co. Ltd. v. Bilas Roy and Co. and in the matter of arbitration agreement dated 21st November, 1951 between the Bilas Roy & Co. v. Tona Jute Co. Ltd., Award Case No. 50 of 1955 (Cal). The learned Judge refused to stay the suit and had observed:—

    “I have also taken into account the fact that if arbitration proceedings are commenced now, the claim will be barred by limitation.”

    15. It is to be noted that an appeal was preferred from the judgment of Bachawat, J. being Appeal No. 119 of 1955 (Appeal from Original Order — Bilas Roy and Co v. Tona Jute Co. Ltd. (Cal)). By a judgment delivered by the Court of Appeal on the 5th June, 1956, the said appeal was dismissed. The Court of Appeal, however, had no occasion to discuss this aspect of the learned Judge's judgment. Mr. Sarkar, appearing in support of this application has argued that the Court had refused to exercise its discretion in the peculiar facts of those cases and it cannot be laid down as a general principle of law, that whenever there is any possibility of the claim being barred, the court should refuse to exercise its discretion to stay the suit. Mr. Sarkar contends in that event to get round the provisions of the arbitration clause the parties will file the suit at a late stage and will resist every application for stay on the ground that the discretion should not be exercised in favour of stay, as the claim would possibly become barred.

    16. On a construction of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act the Supreme Court in the case of AIR 1955 SC 53 lays down that the following conditions should be fulfilled to enable the court to grant the stay under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.

    (1) The proceedings must be commenced by a party to a arbitration agreement against another party to the agreement.

    (2) The legal proceeding which is sought to be stayed must be in respect of a matter agreed to be referred.

    (3) The applicant for stay must be a party to the legal proceedings and he must have taken no steps in the proceeding after appearance. It is also necessary that he should satisfy the court not only that he is but was at the commencement of the proceedings ready and willing to do everything necessary for the proper conduct of the arbitration.

    (4) The court must be satisfied that there is no sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement. In the instant case, in my view, the first two conditions are clearly satisfied. It is also correct that the applicant for stay is a party to the legal proceedings and the applicant has not taken any step in that proceeding.

    17. In my view, however, there is sufficient reason for not referring the matter to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement in the facts and circumstances of this case. It does not appear from the facts and circumstances of the case that the applicant was ready and willing at the commencement of the proceedings to do everything necessary for the proper conduct of the arbitration. It is to be noted that no suggestion was ever made by the petitioner in any of the correspondence carried on between the parties that the disputes should be referred to arbitration for adjudication in accordasce with the provisions contained in the arbitration clause. The plaintiff had made various demands and had sent letters of demands even through its solicitor. In the last letter of demand sent on behalf of the plaintiff on the 23rd August, 1963, by its solicitor, the solicitor writes as follows:—

    “Please note that in view of wrongful attitude taken up by you, our clients have been advised to adopt legal proceedings for recovery of their just dues and you will be held responsible for all costs and consequences thereof.”

    18. No reply had been sent to the said letter and even at that stage no willingess or preparedness to go to arbitration had been indicated. In any event in the facts of this case and particularly taking into consideration that the claim of the plaintiff, if referred to arbitration, will be completely barred, I do not consider that it will be just for me to exercise my discretion in favour of the applicant. It cannot be contended in the facts of this case that the plaintiff acted mala fide in not referring the isputes to the arbitration. It is quite possible that the plaintiff was under the impression that the disputes in the suit might not be covered by the arbitration clause. The applicant also has never raised the contention that the disputes are covered by the arbitration clause and should be referred to arbitration. The plaintiff has been compelled to file the suit as the claim of the plaintiff would otherwise become barred.

    19. In this application I am not concerned with the merits of the claim made. The claim in the suit may be good or bad but in the facts of this case, in my view, it cannot be contended that the plaintiff has filed the suit at late stage with any intention of defeating the provisions of the arbitration clause. In respectful agreement with the observations of S.P Mitra, J., and Bachawat, J., which I have already quoted, I hold that the question whether the claim in the suit is likely to be defeated under the provision of the Limitation Act if referred to arbitration, is a material consideration for the Court in the matter of exercise of its discretion under Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act. In my view, such a consideration really comes within condition No. 4 laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of AIR 1955 SC 53. I, however, make it clear that I do not hold that stay must be refused as a matter of course in each and every case, where there is the possibility of the claim being barred, if referred to arbitration. I agree with the contention of Mr. Sarkar that it cannot be contended to be the absolute principle of law that stay of suit under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act must necessarily be refused as a matter of course, whenever there is any possibility of the claim being barred by limitation, if the suit is stayed and the disputes are referred to arbitration. In my view, the possibility of a claim being barred if referred to arbitration on stay of the suit, is a relevant and material consideration in exercising the discretion conferred on the Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. Whether such a possibility amounts to a sufficient reason for refusing to stay the suit, is a question which depends on the facts of each case. In the facts of the instant case, I am of the opinion for reasons already indicated, that the consideration that the plaintiff's claim will be barred, if the suit is stayed and the disputes have to be referred to arbitration, constitutes a sufficient reason for refusing to exercise the discretion in favour of the applicant. Staying this suit now, will, in my view, amount to a complete denial of justice to the plaintiff-respondent and will enable the applicant to retain the goods alleged to have been rejected, without making any payment for the same. As I have already indicated, I do not see anything particularly wrong with the conduct of plaintiff-respondent which should entail such a punishment as to deprive the plaintiff of a proper hearing and adjudication of the disputes on the merits. I, therefore, refuse to make any order staying the suit. The interim order is vacated. This application is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of this case, I direct that each party shall pay and bear its own costs of this application.

    HJ/NRK/G.G.M

    20. Petition dismissed.

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    Shalimar Paints Ltd. v. Omprokash Singhania .
    (Jun 24, 1966)