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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Delivered by Sinha, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (Sri Santosh Kumar Dutta and Sri Nandalal Dutta) owned a cinema house at 61 Chintamoni Dey Lane, Howrah. By a registered lease dated 11th September 1948 the premises were leased to the third respondent, Kanti Bhusan Bose, for five years from 1st September 1948. Kanti Bhusan Bose was the Managing Director of the appellant company, Biswabani Private Ltd., which by mutual consent became the company's tenant and paid rent.

Disputes arose in 1953. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 filed an ejectment suit (T.S. No. 68 of 1953) and the appellant filed a Rent Control case (No. 114 of 1953). The parties later filed a compromise petition in T.S. No. 68 of 1953 on 26th February 1955 (the "solenama"). The compromise provided for a five-year tenancy from 1st March 1955 at a reduced rent (Rs. 1,000 per month), payment of municipal taxes by occupier, a Rs. 20,000 deposit by respondent No. 3 as surety, and an agreement that a written lease would be executed and registered. Critically, the solenama also stipulated that there would be no extension of the lease after February 1960 and the appellant would be treated as a trespasser if it remained in possession thereafter.

No formal written and registered lease was ever executed in accordance with the solenama. The appellant continued in possession. On 14th March 1960 the appellant company sued (Title Suit No. 10 of 1960) in the Subordinate Judge's Court seeking declaration of tenancy rights (claiming a month-to-month tenancy), injunctions (including removal of locks allegedly put on 29th February 1960) and other reliefs, asserting applicability of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and the Rent Control Act, 1950.

The trial Court (Subordinate Judge, First Court, Howrah) on 30th September 1961 decreed the suit, holding that a month-to-month tenancy had arisen and granting declaratory and injunctive relief. The defendants appealed. The District Judge (learned Additional District Judge, Howrah) on 30th March 1963 allowed the appeal, set aside the trial Court's decree and dismissed the suit against contesting defendants Nos. 1 and 2 with costs, holding that on expiry of the solenama-term the appellant's possession became wrongful (trespass) and that respondents were entitled to re-enter.

The present opinion is from the court hearing a further appeal (second appeal) against the District Judge's judgment; the appeal was dismissed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in the absence of a registered written lease (as contemplated by the solenama), a contractual tenancy of five years was created or, alternatively, whether the appellant's occupation became a tenancy from month to month by operation of law.
  2. Whether Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act operates to protect the appellant's possession and, if so, whether such protection converts the appellant into a tenant (contractual or statutory) or merely gives an equitable right of possession for the agreed period.
  3. Whether, upon expiry of the solenama term (end of February 1960), the appellant became a statutory tenant protected by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (or the Rent Control Act, 1950), or whether the appellant became a trespasser and thereby lost entitlement to the declaratory and injunctive relief claimed.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as pleaded in Title Suit No. 10 of 1960)

  • The appellant contended that because the written lease was not executed and registered as contemplated by the solenama, the appellant became a tenant from month to month.
  • It was argued that the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and the Rent Control Act, 1950 applied to protect the appellant's continuing possession.
  • The appellant alleged forcible actions by defendants (locking of premises) which disturbed its possession and sought declaratory and injunctive reliefs accordingly.

Respondents'/Defendants' Arguments

  • The respondents contended that under the solenama the appellant would become a trespasser after expiry of February 1960 and denied that any month-to-month tenancy had arisen.
  • They denied entitlement to protection under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act or the Rent Control Act and argued that respondents lawfully re-entered and obtained vacant possession by amicable arrangement at the expiry of the period.

Advocate General's Submission (before the court hearing the second appeal)

  • He accepted there was a compromise decree providing for a five-year tenancy ending February 1960 and that no registered agreement in terms of the solenama was executed.
  • He argued that, absent a registered lease, the appellant's tenancy could at best be month-to-month and such tenancy could only be determined by notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • He further argued that under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 the appellant would become a statutory tenant and be protected from eviction (i.e., that statutory protection would operate despite absence of a registered lease).
  • He admitted Section 53-A might not alter the position materially; even if Section 53-A applied to bar eviction during the five years, thereafter the Premises Tenancy Act would protect the appellant.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Walsh v. Lonsdale, (1882) 21 Ch D 9 English equity principle that where parties act on an agreement for a lease not reduced to a formal lease, equity may treat parties as if the lease had been executed (basis for part-performance doctrine). Used to explain the doctrinal foundation of Section 53-A and how equity treats part-performed contracts for immovable property; supported the view that equitable protection may follow even where registration is absent.
Ram Pratap Kayan v. National Petroleum Co. Ltd., 54 Cal WN 58 : AIR 1950 Cal 23 Clarification of Section 53-A: that it imposes an estoppel on the transferor and protects possession but does not create a proprietary right or tenancy in rem; protection is equitable and personal. Applied as leading authority to hold that the appellant's right under Section 53-A was an equitable estoppel (not a tenancy) and that such protection ended when the agreed period expired; therefore appellant was not a tenant after expiry.
Probodh Kumar Das v. Dantamara Tea Co. Ltd., 66 Ind App 293 : AIR 1940 PC 1 Authority for the proposition that Section 53-A does not create a title in rem but is an equitable bar on the transferor; protection is not effective against bona fide transferees for value without notice. Cited to support the characterization of the protection under Section 53-A as an equitable estoppel and not as creating a real right enforceable against third parties.
S.N. Banerjee v. Kuchwar Lime and Stone Co. Ltd., 46 Cal WN 374 : AIR 1941 PC 128 Observation (Lord Atkin) that the section creates an estoppel and not a transfer of property; it does not exempt transfers from registration. Quoted to emphasize that Section 53-A confers only an equitable right (estoppel) and does not create a registrable title or tenancy in rem.
Ram Kumar Das v. Jagdish Chandra Deo, AIR 1952 SC 23 Supreme Court decision on a factual scenario where the court inferred that parties had entered into a fresh tenancy; used in discussion of when a fresh contractual tenancy (month-to-month) may be found. Distinguished by the court: the present case differed because here the protection under Section 53-A (part performance) and absence of a fresh contractual tenancy meant statutory tenancy could not be inferred; thus the Ram Kumar Das decision did not change the outcome here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeded in the following analytical steps, based strictly on the material in the opinion:

  1. Identification of the bargain: the solenama (compromise decree) created a contractual arrangement that the parties intended to operate as a five-year tenancy from 1st March 1955 ending February 1960, with the further term that there would be no extension and the appellant would be treated as a trespasser if it remained in possession thereafter.
  2. Effect of non-execution and non-registration: because the contemplated formal lease was not executed or registered, Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act (which requires registration for leases of immovable property for a term exceeding one year) meant there was no valid registered lease in existence; therefore, strictly speaking, no lease for five years had come into legal existence by a registered instrument.
  3. Application of Section 53-A (part performance): the court held that Section 53-A applied because the essential terms of the lease were in writing (the solenama), the appellant was in possession and had acted in furtherance of the contract (payment of rent, occupation), and thus the transferor (respondents) were estopped from asserting rights inconsistent with the contract during the period covered by the solenama. The court explained that Section 53-A is grounded in equity (similar to Walsh v. Lonsdale) and was supplemented by amendment to Section 49 of the Registration Act to permit the unregistered document to be used as evidence for Section 53-A claims.
  4. Nature of the protection under Section 53-A: drawing on the Division Bench decision in Ram Pratap Kayan and other authorities (Probodh Kumar Das; S.N. Banerjee), the court emphasized that the protection under Section 53-A is an equitable estoppel — a personal right against the transferor and those claiming under him, not a proprietary right or registered tenancy. It does not convert the appellant into a lessee in the legal sense where registration is required.
  5. Interaction with statutory tenancy law (West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956): the court analyzed the definition of "tenant" under Section 2(h) of that Act and held that statutory tenancy protection arises when a contractual tenant, upon termination of his tenancy, continues in possession without any hiatus. In the present case, because the appellant's right during the five-year period was only an equitable estoppel (not a contractual tenancy), there was no contractual tenancy that could terminate and convert into a statutory tenancy by mere continuation. Continuity without a hiatus is essential; where the right was one of equitable protection under Section 53-A (and not a tenancy), the appellant could not claim statutory tenant status after expiry.
  6. Consequence upon expiry: once the period agreed in the solenama expired (end of February 1960), the equitable estoppel created by Section 53-A ceased to operate. At that point the appellant's continued possession was wrongful and amounted to trespass. As a trespasser, the appellant could not maintain a suit for declaration of tenancy or for injunction restraining the respondents.
  7. Distinguishing contrary authorities: the court considered the Supreme Court decision in Ram Kumar Das v. Jagdish Chandra Deo and explained that that decision turned on facts from which the court inferred a fresh contractual tenancy; it therefore did not govern the present case where no fresh contractual tenancy had been shown to exist and the appellant's right was purely equitable under Section 53-A.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Appeal dismissed. The court affirmed the decision of the learned District Judge and held that the appellant was not entitled to the declaratory and injunctive reliefs claimed.

Implications (direct consequences):

  • The appellant's protection under Section 53-A (equitable estoppel) extended only for the duration agreed in the solenama (five years) and ceased on expiry of that period.
  • Because no registered lease had been executed, no legal lease for five years existed; the appellant's position during the period was not that of a contractual or statutory tenant but of a person protected by equitable estoppel.
  • After expiry of the agreed period (end of February 1960) the appellant's continued occupation was wrongful (trespass), and as such the appellant could not maintain the suit seeking a declaration of tenancy and injunctive relief against the respondents.
  • The suit was dismissed as against contesting defendants Nos. 1 and 2 with costs, and the second appeal failed.

Broader legal development: the opinion applies established principles (Section 53-A, Section 107, and the definition of "tenant" under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act) and relies on existing precedents; it does not purport to lay down a novel principle of law beyond the application and clarification of those authorities to the facts before the court.

Disposition: Appeal dismissed.

    Biswabani Private Ltd. v. Santosh Kumar Dutta And Others

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Sinha, J.:— This is an appeal against a judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Howrah, dated 30th March, 1963 by which he allowed an appeal from the judgment and decree passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, First Court, Howrah, dated 30th September, 1961 and dismissed the original suit against the contesting defendant Nos. 1 and 2 with costs. The facts in this case are briefly as follows: There is a Cinema House situated at 61 Chintamoni Dey Lane, Howrah, belonging to the respondents Nos. 1 and 2, Sri Santosh Kumar Dutta and Sri Nandalal Dutta. By a registered lease dated nth September, 1948, the said respondents leased out the said premises to the third respondent, Kanti Bhusan Bose, for a period of five years with effect from the 1st September, 1948. This Kanti Bhusan Bose is the Managing Director of the Appellant Company, the Biswabani Private Ltd. By mutual consent the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 accepted the appellant company as their tenant and the said company was paying a rent of Rs. 2,000/- per month. In 1953, disputes and differences arose between the parties. On or about the 5th October, 1963, the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 filed a suit for ejectment against the appellant company and the respondent No. 3 in the Court of the first subordinate Judge, Howrah being T.S No. 68 of 1953. The appellant company filed a case before the Rent Controller, Howrah, against the respondents Nos. 1 and 2, being Rent Control Case No. 114 of 1953. After a protracted litigation, the parties settled their disputes and a compromise petition was filed in the said T.S No. 68 of 1953 on the 26th February, 1955. By the compromise petition the parties agreed that the appellant company was to remain in possession of the said cinema house for five years, beginning from the 1st day of March, 1955 at a rental of Rs. 1,000/- per month, Rs. 500/- being the rent for the cinema house and Rs. 500/- being the rent for the machinery, furniture and fixtures. Over and above the said payment, the appellant was to pay the occupier's shares of municipal taxes for the entire premises. The respondent No. 3 agreed to stand as surety and kept a deposit of Rs. 20,000/- with the respondents Nos. 1 and 2. The licence standing in the name of the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 for running the above cinema was to continue in their names, but they agreed not to surrender the same, except for default in payment of rent for six consecutive months. It was agreed between the parties that a written lease was to be executed and registered, containing all the terms embodied in the solenama. Finally, it was one of the terms of the said compromise decree that there would be no further extension of the lease after expiry of the stipulated period, that is to say, after the expiry of the month of February, 1960; and after that date, the appellant, if it continued possession, was to be treated as a trespasser.

    2. The appellant company continued in possession but it so happened that no lease was executed nor registered by the parties as contemplated by the compromise decree. Even after the expiry of the said term, the appellant company refused to vacate the premises. On the 14th March, 1960 the appellant company filed a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, First Court at Howrah, against the respondents, being title suit No. 10 of 1960, for a declaration of its tenancy right in the said premises, for a permanent injunction restraining the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 from interfering wit its tenancy right; and a mandatory injunction directing the said defendants to remove the locks which the said defendants had put at different parts of the disputed property, and for other reliefs. It was stated in the plaint that inasmuch as no written lease was executed and registered in accordance with the terms of the solenama, the plaintiff had become a tenant from month to month and as this monthly tenancy had not been determined by a proper notice to quit the defendants were not entitled to take khas possession. It was contended that all the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, and the Rent Control Act, 1950, were applicable to the said monthly tenancy. It was then alleged that sometime on the night of the 29th February, 1960, the defendant No. 1 illegally entered into the disputed premises and threatened by force to drive out the agents and employees of the plaintiff company and having failed to do so, forcibly locked the doors of the office room and the operating room and the main entrance of the disputed premises, as a result of which it was impossible for the plaintiff company to run its cinema business in the said premises. The suit was contested by the defendants 1 and 2 who are the respondents 1 and 2 in this appeal. Their case was, that in accordance with the terms of the solenama, the plaintiff company would become a trespasser after the expiry of the month of February, 1960. It was denied that the plaintiff company had ever become a monthly tenant or that it was entitled to any notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act or protection under the Rent Control Act, 1950 and the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. Their further case was that upon the expiry of February, 1960, there was an amicable arrangement and the defendant No. 1 went tee the cinema house and got amicable khas possession as per arrangement. In other words, their case was that the plaintiff company had made over vacant possession in terms of the solenama. Thereafter, there were certain proceedings in the suit namely, proceedings regarding injunction and receiver and for a time Joint Receivers actually took possession. We are, however, not concerned with such details for the purpose of this appeal. It would be sufficient to state that on the 30th September, 1961 the suit was decreed by the learned Subordinate Judge, First Court, Howrah. The learned Subordinate Judge held that inasmuch as there was no written document of lease executed or registered, there was a lease between the parties from month to month, and it did not expire on the expiry of February, 1960 as the monthly tenancy was not determined in accordance with law. Nothing was said about the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 or the Rent Control Act of 1950. The learned Subordinate Judge held that as the plaintiff company was entitled to continue in possession and its possession was disturbed, the suit should be decreed and the plaintiff's tenancy right from month to month declared and a permanent injunction issued restraining the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff in the disputed property. There was also a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to remove the locks put by them in different parts of the cinema house. There was also a mandatory injunction restraining the defendants 1 and 2 from surrendering the cinema licence until determination of the lease in favour of the plaintiff company in accordance with law. Against this judgment and decree the defendants preferred an appeal before the learned District Judge, Howrah. The learned District Judge, by his judgment and decree dated 30th March, 1963 allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the trial Court and dismissing the suit as against the contesting defendants 1 and 2 with costs. Briefly speaking the learned District Judge did not agree with the trial Court that as a result of the non-execution and non-registration of the lease, there arose a monthly tenancy right in the plaintiff company. On the other hand, the learned District Judge held that upon the expiry of the term mentioned in the solenama, the plaintiff company's possession became that of a trespasser and that it was not entitled to any of the reliefs claimed in suit. The learned District Judge held that upon the expiry of the term mentioned in the solenama the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 acquired the right to re-enter the suit property and that nothing had been done by them in violation of law. It is against this judgment that the second appeal has been preferred.

    3. Before us, the learned Advocate General propounded his case very simply and it was this: He admitted that there was a compromise decree and under the terms of that decree it was stipulated that there would be a tenancy for five years and that upon the expiry of February, 1960 there would be no further renewal and the plaintiff company would thereafter become a trespasser. He argued, however, that no agreement was drawn up, executed or registered in terms of the said solenama and the result was that there was no valid lease for five years and the tenancy could at best be one from month to month. Such a tenancy could not be determined except by notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, and indeed, by virtue of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, even such determination would be of no effect, because the plaintiff company would, in that case, become a statutory tenant and be entitled to continue in possession. According to him, the question of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act did not enter into the picture at all and even if it did, the position remained the same. It may be that under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, the defendants could not evict the plaintiff company for a period of five years, but after the expiry of the said five years the plaintiff company is protected from eviction by the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. In other words, as a result of such protection it cannot be evicted at all except in conformity with the provisions of that Act.

    4. The argument advanced by the learned Advocate General seems to be plausible at first sight. In fact, he confessed that there is very little merit in his client's case, but claimed that if the law protects his client, the Court must find in his favour, as indeed it must. If the appellant succeeds, it will be a most unhappy state of affairs. Here is a party, who has solemnly, entered into an agreement, has enjoyed the benefit of it, has committed a flagrant breach of it, and now wishes the law to come to his aid and protect him from the evil consequences. Of course, if the law does allow him protection, there is nothing more to be said. I am glad however, to be able to hold, that such is not the case and the appellant is not protected. The position seems to be as follows: Under the Solenama the parties agreed that the old tenancy would be wiped out and a new tenancy would be created for a period of five years expiring in February, 1960. It was further stipulated that after the expiry of that term, the lease would not be renewed and the appellant, if it refuses to give vacant possession, would be treated as a trespasser. It was contemplated by the Solenama that a formal agreement in writing should be executed by the parties and registered. But no such document was executed by the parties or registered. Since it was a lease of immoveable property for a term exceeding one year Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act applied. Under that provision, such a lease can only be made by a registered instrument. That being so, it cannot be said that there was any contract of lease at all. What then is the position? Since the terms of the lease are in writing and the appellant is in possession, the provisions of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act applies. That provision lays down that where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property, which includes an interest in immovable property like a lease; from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or being already in possession, continues in possession and has done some act in furtherance of the contract, and is willing to perform his part of the contract then, notwithstanding that the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him, any right in respect of the property, of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession. Section, 49 of the Registration Act has been amended and provides that the written document mentioned above, although not registered, would be admissible as evidence for establishing a right under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. There can be no doubt that the provisions of Section 53-A are applicable in the instant case. The principle embodied in Section 53-A is founded on the English rule of equity which provided that, although a contract required by the Statute of Frauds to be in writing, has not been reduced in writing, the Court of Equity would nevertheless direct specific performance of the contract where it has been acted upon or part performed, on the principle that unless this was done the other party would be permitted to perpetrate a fraud. After the passing of the Judicature Act, this doctrine was given further extension in the case of Walsh v. Lonsdale, (1882) 21 Ch D 9. In that case, a party had entered upon the premises under an agreement for a lease but the lease had not been executed. The Court treated the parties on the same footing as if the lease had been executed and gave effect to one of the terms of the contemplated lease, which provided for an advance payment of rent. Section 53-A has an important proviso to the effect that nothing in the said section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration without notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof. This proviso has been explained to mean that the right of the transferee to hold the transferor to the terms of the transfer is not a title or a right in rem. It is a personal and equitable right and is available against the transferor and all those who claim under him, except a transferee for consideration without notice. In other words, the position is this: A lease of more than five years requires registration under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. Without such registration there can be no lease. Where, however, the conditions of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act are satisfied, then the transferee, in this case the lessee, is entitled to continue in possession. In such a case however, what exactly is the title of the transferee? To say that he is a lessee would be erroneous because a lease for five years can only be made by a registered instrument. Where there is no registered instrument there cannot be any such lease at all and a transferee who is continuing in possession and claims the protection of Section 53-A cannot be said to be a lessee. His position is that of a person who has no contractual right, but by virtue of the fact that in equity the transferor is estopped from disturbing his possession in any manner contrary to the terms of the agreement between the parties, his possession is protected by law. This position has been elucidated by a decision of a Division Bench of this Court Ram Pratap Kayan v. National Petroleum Co. Ltd.*, 54 Cal WN 58 : (AIR 1950 Cal 23). The facts in that case were as follows: The National Petroleum Co. Ltd., filed a suit against the appellant Ram Pratap Kayan for ejectment of the latter from a corrugated iron sheet shed and godown forming a part of premises No. P-2, Paharpur Siding Road, belonging to the Port Commissioners of Calcutta and being a part of King George's Dock. The respondent's case was that there was a written agreement whereby the National Petroleum Co. Ltd., agreed to provide for the appellant a suitable shed and godown of which he would remain in occupation for a period of five years and would return vacant possession at the end of the period. It was alleged that in pursuance of the said agreement the company let out the shed and godown to the appellant and the appellant went into possession from the 1st of April, 1939. The period of five years expired on the expiry of the 1st April, 1939 but the appellant refused to vacate the premises and the company brought a suit against the appellant for ejectment of the latter from the shed and godown. The defence taken by the appellant was that the agreement which was unregistered did not and could not create a lease for a term of five years and that as the letting to him was for manufacturing purposes, he had in law a tenancy from year to year terminable by six month's notice to quit ending with the year of the tenancy. As no such notice had been served, he continued to be a tenant and could not be regarded as a trespasser. The learned Subordinate Judge held that after the expiry of five years the defendant was bound to vacate the premises in terms of the agreement. From this the defendant appealed to this Court. Mitra, J., said as follows:—

    “The argument of the appellant with regard to the nature of he tenancy was put in this way. The agreement. Ext. 2, being unregistered, no lease for a term of five years was created, as under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act a lease for a term exceeding one year can be created only by a registered instrument. But there was a letting to the appellant followed up by payment and acceptance of rent, and the letting was for manufacturing purpose. Therefore, under Section 106 of that Act the lease must be deemed to be a lease from year to year terminable by six months' notice to quit ending with the year of the tenancy, there being no contract to the contrary. The only modification that was made by the operation of Section 53-A of the Act in the legal relationship of the parties was that during the continuance of the term of five years the respondent could not eject the appellant from the demised premises by service of six months' notice to quit. But this was really an additional protection afforded to the appellant, which did not fundamentally alter the character of the tenancy as a tenancy from year to year. With the withdrawal of the protection on the expiry of the ten of five years the tenancy again became terminable by service of a six months' notice to quit.”

    This argument was not accepted by the Court but was repelled. It was held that Section 53-A imposes a bar on the transferor when the conditions mentioned in the section have been fulfilled. It debars him from enforcing against the transferee any right in respect of the property other the a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract. He is not allowed to take advantage of the fact that the contract though required to be registered, has not been registered, or where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed by law. In order to obviate any difficulty about the proof of the contract in such a case, supplementary legislation was enacted amending Section 49 of the Registration Act. Mitra, J., proceeds to say as follows:—

    “So far as the transferee is concerned, the section confers a right on him to the extent that it imposes a bar on the transferor. But this is only a right to protect his possession against any challenge to it by the latter contrary to the tenor of the contract or the instrument of contract; Probodh Kumar Das v. Dantamara Tea Co. Ltd., 66 Ind App 293 : (AIR 1940 PC 1). As Lord Atkin observed in S.N Banerjee v. Kuchwar Lime and Stone Co. Ltd., 46 Cal WN 374 : (AIR 1941 PC 128): “………the words of the section make it quite plain that the section does not operate to create a form of transfer of property which is exempt from registration. It creates no real right: it merely creates right of estoppel between the proposed transferee and transferor, which have no operation against third persons no claiming under those persons.”

    5. We agree with the learned Subordinate Judge that the appellant was bound to vacate on the expiry of the period of five years and his position became wrongful thereafter.”

    6. Virtually the same position arises in the instant case. The parties agreed under the solenama that there will be a lease for five years and the appellant continued in possession. As no document was executed and registered, as contemplated by the solenama, no lease was created. This, however, did not mean that the appellant, by virtue of Section 53-A or any other provision of law began to hold the premises as a tenant from month to month. Such a tenancy was neither created by the agreement of parties nor by operation of law. All that happened was that the appellant's possession was protected and the respondents were estopped from disturbing the possession of the appellant for a period of five years as agreed upon by the solenama. During that period, the appellant could put forward the incomplete agreement as a shield to protect him from eviction by the respondents. There was, however, no tenancy created either from month to month or at all. In other words, the right of the appellant to remain in possession did not confer upon it the status of a tenant, but an equitable right was created by Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act to protect its possession. This right came to an end upon the expiry of five years. The estoppel only continued as long as the solenama allowed it to continue. After that the appellant was defenceless. Coming now to the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 we find that a ‘tenant’ has been defined to be a person by whom or on whose account or behalf, the rent of any premises is payable and also any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy. In other words, where there is a contract of tenancy, and after the termination of the tenancy the tenant continues in possession, he acquires the status of a statutory tenant and is protected by the provisions of the said Act. But the continuation of possession after the expiry of the tenancy must be a continuous process. In other words, between the expiry of the tenancy and the continuance of possession, there must be no hiatus, there should be no period during which the tenant lost his possession or was holding possession not as a tenant but under some other right. It must obviously be so, because if there is a hiatus between the point of time when the contractual tenancy terminated and the statutory tenancy commenced, during which the tenant did not occupy the position of a tenant, then he cannot be said to be ‘continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy’ as a tenant, in terms of Section 2(h) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. To put it in another way, a contractual tenant upon the termination of his tenancy becomes a statutory tenant if he continues in possession. But between the contractual tenancy and the statutory tenancy there cannot be a blank period during which he is either not in possession or holds possession in some other right but not as a tenant. Where his right springs from Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, as has been explained above, it is not a tenancy right at all, and even the fact that he has paid rent during the period, does not matter. It does not make him a tenant. His right is merely an equitable right based on estoppel, which prevents the landlord from evicting him. According to the Bench decision cited above, the appellant in this case did not become a tenant from month to month because the agreement contemplated under the solenama was not executed or registered. During the five years contemplated by the solenama, the appellant was in possession neither as a contractual tenant nor as a statutory tenant, but as a person entitled to be protected by the provisions of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act as long as the solenama permitted it. That being so, it must be held that the appellant is not protected by the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. After the expiry of the said term, the position of the appellant was merely that of a trespasser and a trespasser cannot maintain a suit for a declaration of a tenancy right or for an injunction. Reference has been made before us to a Supreme Court in decision Ram Kumar Das v. Jagdish Chandra Deo, AIR 1952 SC 23. In that case, the facts were as follows: The property in suit was a plot of land in village Jugselai in the district Singhbhum. In 1913 the father of the defendant by a registered-Patta took lease of about 31 bighas of land from the Pradhan for purposes of cultivation. Later on, suits were filed claiming title to the estate, in which the land in dispute was situated, and in such proceedings a Receiver was appointed by the High Court at Patna. In December 24, the defendant executed a registered kabuliyat in favour of the Receiver by which he purported to take settlement of the land in suit for a period of ten-years at a rental of Rs. 46/- per annum and a selami of Rs. 250/-. The defendant made two-payments of the annual rent but made no other payments. The plaintiff's title to the entire estate-was declared in 1927 and in April 1937, the plaintiff brought a suit for ejectment after serving 2, notice to quit. This suit ended in 1942 when the High Court declared that the notice to quit was defective and the suit should be dismissed. On 18th July, 1942, the plaintiff again served a notice-to quit on the defendant asking him to vacate the land on the 7th August following. As the defendant refused to give up possession a suit was brought in July, 1943. No question of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act was involved. The only point discussed was as to whether on the facts the-tenancy of the plaintiff was one from month to-month or from year to year, upon an interpretation of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Mukherjea, J., proceeded on the assumption that although the parties might have attempted to create a lease for ten years no operative lease came into existence. It was admitted that the defendant remained in possession of the land belonging to the plaintiff with the permission of the Receiver who represented the plaintiff's estate, and paid rent to the latter. It was further admitted that the plaintiff accepted these payments as rent. The learned Judge held that from these facts a tenancy could be fairly presumed. The only point for determination was as to what was the duration of the tenancy. It is one thing to say that a contract of tenancy having become invalid by reason of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, the tenant was continuing in possession and maintaining his rights by virtue of Section 53-A and it is quite another thing to say that the parties entered into a fresh contract of tenancy. If the parties entered into a fresh, contract of tenancy, there is no scope for the operation of Section 53-A. it was held in the Supreme Court decision that from the admitted facts, the inference was that the parties had entered into a fresh agreement of tenancy. The only question was whether that contractual tenancy was to be deemed as one from month to month or from year to year. It was held that it was a tenancy from month to month.

    7. Therefore, this decision does not affect the problem that arises in the present case, or throw any light thereon.

    8. For the reasons aforesaid we must come to the conclusion that the decision of the learned District Judge was right and the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.

    A.C Sen, J.:— I agree.

    IG/Q/D.V.C

    9. Appeal dismissed.

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