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Summary of the Opinion — Mitter, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application for a certificate for leave to appeal under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution of India against the judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court in appeal from Original Decree No. 424 of 1962.

The factual matrix arises from a Parliamentary election held in February (year indicated in the opinion as 1962). The petitioner was declared elected from the 34 Burdwan Parliamentary constituency (West Bengal). Respondents 1 and 2 presented Election Petition No. 111 of 1962 before the Election Commission seeking to declare the election void on several grounds. Respondent No. 3 was the unsuccessful candidate.

The petition alleged that the petitioner (a partner in Messrs G. Basu & Co.) held several "offices of profit" under the Government of India and the Government of West Bengal. Specific offices alleged were:

  • Auditor of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (appointed by the Corporation with previous approval of the Central Government).
  • Auditor of Durgapur Projects Limited and Hindustan Steel Limited (described as "Government Companies" under the Companies Act, appointment under the Central Government and subject to the control of the Comptroller & Auditor General).
  • Director of the West Bengal Finance Corporation, nominated by the State Government and in receipt of remuneration and fees as such director.

The relevant constitutional provision raised was Article 102 (disqualification for holding office of profit). Both the election tribunal (trial court) and the Division Bench of the High Court held that the offices in question were offices of profit under the Government of India and the State of West Bengal. The sole question before Mitter, J. was whether a certificate under Article 133(1)(c) should be granted, i.e., whether the case involved a substantial question of law as to interpretation of the Constitution such that an appeal to the Supreme Court would be appropriate.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the proceeding before the High Court (an appeal from an Election Tribunal under the Representation of the People Act, 1951) is a "civil proceeding" within the meaning of Article 133(1) of the Constitution.
  2. Whether the question whether the petitioner held "offices of profit" under the Government of India or the Government of a State (within the meaning of Article 102 of the Constitution) involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution and is therefore fit for appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133(1)(c).
  3. Whether, in the particular factual and statutory context of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, the Companies Act provisions governing government companies, and the State Finance Corporation Act (West Bengal), the offices held by the petitioner amount to offices of profit under the Government for Article 102 purposes.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents argued that the Supreme Court has in earlier decisions already laid down the tests for determining whether an office is held under the Government for the purposes of Article 102, and those tests should be applied to the present facts.
  • The respondents further contended that the proceeding from which an appeal is sought is not a "civil proceeding" within the meaning of Article 133(1) of the Constitution; if it is not a civil proceeding, no certificate can be given under Article 133(1).

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the appellant's (petitioner's) specific legal arguments seeking the certificate beyond the factual assertions about the offices held and the statutory framework; the primary contested points recorded are those advanced by the respondents.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Budhi Nath Jha v. ??? Jadav, AIR 1960 Pat 361 The right to stand for election and related disputes were treated as raising civil rights and an election petition was regarded as raising issues relating to civil rights between parties. Cited in support of the view that proceedings challenging an election can be treated as civil proceedings (the court relied on this as an authority in discussing the civil nature of election appeals).
Sriramarao v. Suryanarayanamurthi, AIR 1954 Mad 340 Courts deciding disputed rights between subjects (or between a subject and the State) should be considered civil courts, even if constituted by a special statute. Referred to as authority for the proposition that special statutory courts deciding private rights can be civil in character.
Kishore Chandra Deo v. Raghunath Misra, AIR 1960 Orissa 1 The Division Bench entertained doubts about whether proceedings to set aside an election were civil proceedings, in view of earlier Supreme Court observations. Cited as a case where doubts were expressed; the High Court's approach and subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court (see K.C Deo Bhanj) were noted by the Court in its analysis.
N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakhal Constituency, AIR 1952 SC 64 Held that the right to vote or stand as a candidate is not a civil right in the common law sense but a creature of statute; disputes may be vested in a special tribunal and its jurisdiction should be exercised according to the law that creates it. Referred to by the Orissa division bench and considered in the Court's discussion of whether election proceedings are civil proceedings.
K.C. Deo Bhanj v. Raghunath Misra, AIR 1959 SC 589 The Supreme Court did not decide whether proceedings were civil proceedings but noted the case raised a point of law of considerable public importance and would have warranted special leave under Article 136. Noted as precedent where the Supreme Court declined to decide the civil-proceeding issue but recognised the public importance of election law questions.
Rangoon Botatoung Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Rangoon, 39 Ind App 197 (PC) Principle that an appeal is a creature of statute and no appeal lies unless statute confers it. Cited to support the general proposition that appellate rights depend on statute; used in discussion whether appeal to the Supreme Court required statutory authority.
Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax Commissioner, Delhi, 54 Ind App 421 (PC) Similar principle that petitioners had no statutory power of appeal to His Majesty in Council (appealability depends on statute). Referred to as an authority for the statutory nature of appeal rights.
M.S. Krishnaswami v. Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, AIR 1953 Mad 79 Held that disciplinary jurisdiction under a statute (Section 21 of the Chartered Accountants Act) was not a civil proceeding. Cited by respondents to argue that certain statutory tribunals/proceedings may not be civil proceedings; the court distinguished this case on grounds that the High Court's jurisdiction there was not the same as an appeal from an original civil decree.
Hanskumar Kishan Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 947 Decision under Defence of India Act: reference to arbitrator resulted in an award and that award was not appealable under Sections 109 and 110 CPC. Cited and distinguished by the Court because, in that case, the High Court's function did not equate to that of hearing appeals from original civil decrees, whereas Section 116A of the Representation of the People Act equated the High Court's appellate jurisdiction to appeals from original civil decrees.
Abdul Shakoor v. Rikhab Chand, AIR 1958 SC 52 Principles: (a) factors relevant to whether a person holds an office of profit include appointment by government, removability by government, control and whether payment is made from government revenues; (b) mere removal power or appointment by government is not alone decisive. Cited as an exposition of factors relevant to office-of-profit analysis; used by the Court in considering how those principles apply to the petitioner’s various offices.
Ramappa v. Sangappa & Ors, AIR 1958 SC 937 Principles: an office may be held by reason of appointment by the Government; payment to holders may be regarded as paid by Government even if routed through other statutory mechanisms (and government control/appointment/dismissal powers are significant). Referred to for the principles that appointment by Government and Governmental control/dismissal power are important considerations in deciding whether an office is one under the Government.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court divided its analysis into two principal stages: (1) whether the High Court proceeding was a "civil proceeding" within Article 133(1), and (2) whether a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution was involved so as to justify a certificate under Article 133(1)(c).

1. Whether the proceedings are "civil proceedings" for Article 133(1)

- The Court noted the governing constitutional provisions concerning appeals to the Supreme Court: Articles 132, 133, 134 and 136. Article 133 restricts appeals to the Supreme Court to those arising from judgments, decrees or final orders in a civil proceeding of a High Court in India (subject to certification requirements). The Constitution does not define "civil proceedings".

- The Court articulated a test: a proceeding is civil if it is "in and of establishing a civil right or for disputing one." More concretely, if, but for statutory provisions, the right claimed or denied could be established in a civil Court, the proceeding is civil. Broad categories of civil rights include rights to property, reputation, status and office — even where such rights are created by statute.

- The Court examined the Representation of the People Act, 1951, noting that:

  • Election rights (to vote and to be chosen) are creatures of statute and Part VI of the Act prescribes how elections may be questioned (consistent with Article 329).
  • Section 80 onwards prescribes election petitions and their contents; Section 86 refers petitions to an Election Tribunal for trial.
  • Section 90(1) makes the procedure of the Tribunal conform to the Code of Civil Procedure for trial of suits; sub-section (2) applies the Indian Evidence Act in full; Section 92 vests the Tribunal with powers like a civil Court under the CPC; Section 98 requires the Tribunal to dismiss or declare the election void at trial conclusion.
  • Section 116A gives a right of appeal from Tribunal orders under Section 98/99 to the High Court; Section 116A(2) specifies that the High Court, "subject to the provisions of this Act," shall exercise the same powers, jurisdiction and authority and follow the same procedure with respect to such appeals "as if the appeal were an appeal from an original decree passed by a civil Court."
  • Section 116B declares the High Court's decision final and conclusive subject to that decision.

- The Court concluded that because Section 116A equates the High Court's appellate jurisdiction on election appeals to that in appeals from original decrees passed by a civil Court, the provisions of Section 109 CPC and Article 133(1) are attracted. On that basis—and after considering authorities both supporting and questioning the civil nature of election disputes—the Court held that the High Court proceeding should be treated as a civil proceeding within the meaning of Article 133(1).

2. Whether a substantial question of law as to interpretation of the Constitution arises

- The Court observed there was no earlier Supreme Court decision directly on the particular offices the appellant held, in relation to whether they are "offices of profit" under the Government for Article 102 purposes. The issues involve statutory interpretation of several statutes governing auditors and directors (Life Insurance Corporation Act, Companies Act provisions for government companies, State Finance Corporation Act) and therefore raise questions of law of some importance.

- The respondents argued that existing Supreme Court tests for determining "office of profit" should be sufficient and, if readily applicable to the facts, no certificate should be granted. The Court reviewed the statutes and facts relevant to each office:

  • Life Insurance Corporation (LIC): Under Section 25 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, auditors are to be appointed by the Corporation with previous approval of the Central Government and receive remuneration as fixed by the Central Government; capital of the Corporation provided by Central Government; Corporation is a body corporate with perpetual succession. The Division Bench had held that by virtue of Section 25 the appointment and remuneration were effectively controlled by the Government.
  • Durgapur Projects Limited and Hindustan Steel Limited (Government Companies): These are government companies under the Companies Act. Under Section 619(2) the auditor of a government company shall be appointed by the Central Government on the advice of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG), who under sub-sec. (3) can direct audit manner and give instructions to auditors. The CAG (appointed under Article 148(1)) has wide powers of control over auditors of government companies.
  • West Bengal Finance Corporation: A body corporate under the State Finance Corporation Act; the appellant was nominated as a Director by the State Government under Section 10A and the Division Bench held he held office at the pleasure of the State Government under Section 11(1), meaning appointment, nomination and dismissal powers rested with the State Government.

- The Court reviewed key Supreme Court authorities on the office-of-profit question (Abdul Shakoor v. Rikhab Chand and Ramappa v. Sangappa) which emphasize factors such as appointment by the Government, removability by the Government, source of remuneration and Government control. The Court applied these principles to the factual matrix and statutory provisions regarding the several offices held by the appellant:

  • LIC: appointment requires previous approval of Central Government and remuneration fixed by Central Government; however, remuneration did not come out of Government revenues and Act did not contain express provision for dismissal by Government.
  • Government companies: auditor appointed by Central Government on advice of CAG; remuneration paid out of the company's funds; no express provision for dismissal by Government though CAG has directions and control in audit matters.
  • West Bengal Finance Corporation: appointment and dismissal powers were vested in the State Government (clearer case for being an office under the State Government).

- Given (a) the lack of a directly applicable Supreme Court decision on the precise combination of statutory features present in this case, (b) the statutory frameworks that affect auditors and nominated directors, and (c) the public importance and general nature of the question whether such offices amount to offices of profit under Article 102, the Court concluded that a substantial question of law as to interpretation of the Constitution was raised and the matter was fit for appeal to the Supreme Court.

Holding and Implications

CERTIFICATE GRANTED

Holding (direct effect):

  • The Court held that the proceeding before the High Court is a "civil proceeding" within the meaning of Article 133(1) of the Constitution.
  • The Court granted a certificate under Article 133(1)(c) that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution and is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court.
  • The Court ordered that a certificate under Article 133(1)(c) be drawn up and issued expeditiously.
  • Costs of this application were ordered to be costs in the Supreme Court appeal, and the hearing fee was assessed at five gold mohurs.

Implications:

  • The practical consequence is that the petitioner has permission to appeal to the Supreme Court on the substantial constitutional question identified (office-of-profit and the related statutory interpretation issues).
  • The Court's order does not resolve the substantive question whether the specific offices held by the petitioner are offices of profit under Article 102; it grants leave to pursue that question before the Supreme Court.
  • The opinion emphasises the public importance of the legal question and relies on statutory provisions (notably Sections 116A and 116B of the Representation of the People Act, 1951) and prior authorities in deciding that certification was appropriate. The opinion itself does not announce a definitive new rule on the office-of-profit question but recognises that established factors (appointment/removal by Government, control and source of remuneration) must be applied to the facts in deciding the substantive issue on appeal.

Signed: Mitter, J. (with concurrence of Bose, C.J.)

    Guru Gobinda Basu v. Sankari Prosad Ghosal And Others

    Mitter, J.:— This is an application for a certificate for leave to appeal under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution of India against the judgment of a division bench of this Court in appeal from Original Decree No. 424 of 1962.

    2. The matter arises out of a Parliamentary election held in February last. The petitioner was a candidate for a Parliamentary seat from 34 Burdwan Parliamentary constituency in West Bengal and was declared to have Been elected as a member as a result of the election having polled the largest number of votes. The respondents 1 and 2 before us presented an election petition No. 111 of 1962 before the Election Commission challenging the election of the petitioner as void on several grounds. The respondent No. 3 before us is the unsuccessful candidate, it was alleged by the respondent that the petitioner, a partner of the firm of Messrs G. Basu and Co., held several “offices of profit”, under the Government of India and the Government of West Bengal. The complaint is that the firm of Messrs G. Basu and Co. are auditors appointed by the Life Insurance Corporation of India with the previous approval of the Central Government which has overall powers of control and management of the Corporation. The said firm are also auditors of Durgapur Projects Limited and Hindustan Steel Limited, two “Government Companies” within the meaning of the expression in the Companies Act of 1956 the appointment being under the Central Government. The petitioner was also nominated by the Government of West Bengal to be a member of the Board of Directors of the West Bengal Finance Corporation and was in receipt of remuneration and fees as such director. The relevant provision of the Constitution is Article 102 which provides, inter alia, that a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being a member of either House of Parliament, if he holds any office of profit under the Government of India or the Government of any State, other than an office declared by Parliament by law not to disqualify its holder. It is not the appellant's case that any of the offices held by him have Been declared by Parliament not to disqualify the holder thereof from being chosen as a member of either House. Both the trial Court i.e the election tribunal, and a division bench of this Court in appeal, have held that the offices held by the appellant are offices of profit under the Government of India and the Government of the State of West Bengal. No certificate was asked for from the division Bench of this Court that the case involved a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India and the only question before us is whether we can grant a certificate under Article 133(1)(c) that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court as involving a substantial question of law.

    3. There is no decided case of the Supreme court which has dealt with the offices held by the appellant, in relation to the question as to whether they are “offices or profit under the Government of India or the Government of any State.” The question which engages our attention in this case may fall to be answered in the future as well Besides it involves the interpretation of several Statutes bearing on the position of auditors like the appellant before us. To that extent certainly a question of law of some importance arises in this case. But it was argued on behalf of the respondents that the Supreme court has in more than one case laid down the test for determining whether an office is one held under a Government for the purpose of Article 102 of the Constitution, there being no dispute that the office of a director of the West Bengal State Finance Corporation and the office of an auditor of the other bodies are offices of profit. The respondents took further objection that the proceeding is not a “civil proceeding” within the meaning of Article 133(1) of the Constitution and as such no certificate can be given thereunder.

    4. The second point should be taken up first because if the proceeding from which an appeal is sought to be preferred was not a civil proceeding within the meaning of Article 133(1) of the Constitution, the other question hardly arises. Appeals to the Supreme Court are governed by Articles. 132, 133, 134 and 136 of the Constitution. Under Article 132 an appeal lies to the Supreme Court from any Judgment, decree or final order of a High Court in India whether in a civil, criminal or other proceeding, if the Court certifies that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, under Article 133 appeals are restricted only to those from judgments, decrees or final orders in a civil proceeding of a High Court in India. Article 134 gives a right of appeal in criminal matters within the limits therein specified. Article 136 gives the Supreme Court very wide powers to entertain appeals in civil, criminal or other causes or matters if it thinks fit to grant special leave for the purpose on the facts of the case. The Constitution nowhere defines what “civil proceedings” are and, therefore, we must examine the nature of the proceedings to find out whether it can be called a civil proceeding or not. In my view, if the proceeding is in and of establishing a civil right or for disputing one, it would be a evil proceeding. The test, in my view, would be whether but for the provision of any Statute the right claimed or denied could be established in a civil Court. Broadly speaking, if the proceedings taken establish or negative a man's office or status or would affect his right to property of any kind, it will be a civil proceeding. For instance, joint stock companies are creatures of Statutes so far as India is concerned. The Companies Act clothe the shareholders with certain rights and obligations. Apart from some substantial grievances which can only be agitated in the manner laid down in the Companies Act a shareholder is free to file a suit in a civil Court for establishing his rights. It can hardly be disputed that rights of shareholders are civil rights which can be agitated in a civil Court.

    5. Before I discuss the cases cited at the bar it would be useful to note the relevant provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The right to vote at a Parliamentary election and the right to be chosen as a member of either House at an election are creatures or Statute. The Act prescribes who can vote and who an be elected. More than that it also lays down how an election can be questioned. This is in accordance with Article 329 of the Constitution. Under Section 80 of the Act, an election can only be called in question by an election petition, presented in accordance with the provisions of part VI of the Act. Secs. 82, 83 and 84 lay down who should be Joined as respondents, what averments the election petition should contain and what reliefs may be claimed by the petitioner. Under Sec. 86 the petition has to be referred to an election Tribunal for trial. Under Sec. 90(1) the procedure to be followed by the Election Tribunal is to be in accordance with that applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure to the trial of suits. By sub-sec. (2) the Indian Evidence Act is made applicable in all respects to the trial of an election petition. Under sec. 92 the Tribunal is vested with the powers possessed by a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure when trying a suit, in respect of matters like discovery and inspection, enforcing the attendance of witnesses, compelling the production of documents, examining witnesses on oath, granting adjournments, reception of evidence taken on affidavit and issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses. After the conclusion of the trial the Tribunal has to make an order under Section 98 of the Act dismissing the election petition or declaring the election to be void and granting other reliefs.

    6. Sections 108 to 116 contain provisions for withdrawal and abatement of election petitions. Under Sec. 116-A (1) “an appeal shall lie from every order made by a Tribunal under Sec. 98 or Sec. 99 to the High Court of the State, in which the Tribunal is situated.” under sub-sec. (2) “the High Court shall, subject to the provisions, of this Act, have the same powers, jurisdiction and authority, and follow the same procedure, with respect to an appeal under this Chapter as if the appeal were an appeal from an original decree passed by a civil Court situated within, the local limits of its civil appellate jurisdiction. Sub-sec. (3) specifies the time within which an appeal can be filed and sub-sec. (4) gives the High Court, on sufficient cause being shown, power to stay operation of the order appealed from. Under sub-sec. (6) the High Court must intimate the substance of the decision to the section Commission and the Speaker or Chairman, as the case may be, of the House of Parliament or of the State Legislature concerned. Section 116B provides that “the decision of the High Court on appeal under this chapter and subject only to such decision the order of the Tribunal under Sec. 98 or Sec. 99 shall be final and conclusive.” Secs. 117 to 120 make provisions for costs and security, for costs. Reliance was placed on Sec. 1168 of the Act to show that the legislature did not contemplate any further appeal from the decision of the High Court on art-election petition. The two important sections for our present purpose are Sections 116A and 116B of the Act. Under the former the jurisdiction and authority of the High Court, with respect to an appeal from a decision by an Election Tribunal, are the same as in the case of an appeal from an original decree passed by a Civil court. In my view this leads to the corollary that a decision of the High Court in appeal is to have the same effect as an appellate decree, with the necessary result that an appeal therefrom may be preferred to the Supreme Court, if the other conditions as to such appeals are fulfilled. Sec. 116B is aimed at putting a stop to other proceedings with respect to the decision of the Election Tribunal or of the High Court in appeal therefrom. Under Section 109 of the CPC an appeal shall lie from any judgment, decree or final order passed on appeal, by a High Court or by any other Court or appellate final jurisdiction to the Supreme Court or from any judgment, decree or order which is certified to be a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. In my view, the effect of Section 116A of the Representation of the People Act of 1951 is to attract the provisions of Section 109 of the CPC and Article 133(1) of the Constitution of India with regard to appeal ability to the Supreme Court.

    7. The point came up for consideration before a tun Bench of the Patna High Court in Budhi Nath Jha v. ??? Jadav, AIR 1960 Pat 361. There the proceeding before the High Court arose out of an application to it under the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution, by which art election petition was ordered to be dismissed. The learned Chief Justice of the Patna High Court went elaborately Into the question and took the view that the right of a person to stand for election was a civil right and art election petition challenging the election of a successful-candidate raised an issue relating to a civil right between the parties. He referred to the judgment of the Madras High Court in Sriramarao v. Suryanarayanamurthi, AIR 1954, Mad 340 where Vehkaiarama Aiyar, J., had pointed out that “the Courts which decided disputed rights between subjects or between a subject and the State, would be civil Courts as opposed to criminal Courts, where the State vindicates wrongs committed against the public, and that Courts constituted for deciding on purely civil questions between persons seeking their civil rights must be considered to be civil Courts, notwithstanding that they are created by a special statute and are mentioned in that statute as distinct from civil Courts.” Reliance was also placed on the definition of a ‘Civil Proceeding’ given Stroud's Judicial Dictionary as a “process for the recovery of individual right or redress of individual wrong; inclusive in its proper legal sense of suits by the Crown.” The learned Chief Justice noted the distinction between an ordinary civil Court and a Court constituted by statute for special purposes and observed

    “in respect of the class of suits actually entrusted to the jurisdiction of special Courts they perform in relation to them functions which but for the special Act would have been performed by civil Courts and to that extent the special Courts can be said to be civil Courts in the different attire.”

    8. Our attention was also drawn to the judgment of the Orissa High Court in the case of Kishore Chandra Deo v. Raghunath Misra, AIR 1960 Orissa 1 where although both the Judges constituting the Division Bench agreed to grant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, one of them entertained grave doubts as to whether the proceeding to set aside an election was a civil proceeding, specially in view of the observation of the Supreme Court in N.P Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakhal Constituency, AIR 1952 SC 64 at p. 71 that

    “the fight to vote or stand as a candidate for election is not a civil right but is a creature of statute or special law and must be subject to the limitations imposed by it and it is the sole right of the legislature to examine end determine all matters relating to the election of its own members, and if the legislature takes it out of its hands and vests in a special Tribunal, an entirely new and unknown jurisdiction, that special jurisdiction should be exercised in accordance with the law which creates it.”

    9. It may be pointed out however that although the right to vote or stand at an election may not be a civil right as known to the common law and although the legislature may in its wisdom have thought it best to refer the disputes in connexion with an election to a special Tribunal by enacting Section 116A the legislature laid down that in hearing appeals from Election Tribunals the High Court was to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it in hearing appeals from the original decrees passed by civil Courts and to that extent desired that the decision of the High Court on appeal should be treated as a decree in appeal from an original decree passed by a Civil Court. Incidentally, it may be noted that the Orissa case went up to the supreme Court and is reported in K.C Deo Bhanj v. Raghunatn Misra, AIR 1959 SC 589. The Supreme Court did not decide whether the proceedings were civil proceedings but held that

    “this was just the kind of case where the court would have granted special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution, because it raised a point of law of considerable public importance.”

    10. It is difficult to give a comprehensive definition or “civil rights”. In my view, they are not limited to corn-own law rights only and would include inter alia any right to property, reputation, status and office of a person, though these may be creatures of statutes.

    11. Our attention was drawn by the learned advocate for the respondents to various judgments, wherein it has been laid down that an appeal is a creature of statute and no appeal would lie to the Privy Council or the Supreme Court unless the statutes give a right of appeal. The first case cited was Rangooon Botatoung Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Rangoon, 39 Ind App 197 (PC) which arose out of land acquisition proceedings and an appeal was preferred from an award made by the Rangoon High Court on a reference from the Collector of Rangoon under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894. In Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax Commissioner, Delhi, 54 Ind App 421 (PC) the Judicial Committee pointed out that the petitioners before His Majesty in Council for special leave to appeal, had no statutory power of appeal from the decision of the High Court. Reference was also, made to the judgment of the Madras High Court in M.S Krishnaswami v. Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, AIR 1953 Mad 79 where the Court, held that the jurisdiction conferred by Section 21 of the. Chartered Accountants Act was in the nature of disciplinary jurisdiction and a proceeding thereunder was not a civil proceeding.

    12. Our attention was drawn to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Hanskumar Kishan Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 947, where it was pointed out that a reference, under Section 19(1)(b) of the Defence of India, Act, was to an arbitrator and although appeals from awards, were provided for under Section 19(1)(f), the decision or the High Court in appeal was really an award and consequently not appealable under Sections 109 and 110 of the CPC. In my view, these judgments can be distinguished on the ground that in none of these cases was the jurisdiction of the High Court the same as in the case of an appeal from an original decree passed by Civil Court.

    13. In the result, I hold that the proceeding before, the High Court should be treated as a civil proceeding within the meaning of Article 133(1) of the Constitution.

    14. The question then arises as to whether there is a substantial question of law involved to render the appeal a fit one for hearing by the Supreme Court. As already noted, it was not disputed that the point is one of considerable public importance and the only argument advanced was that as the Supreme Court has already laid down tests to determine whether an office is an office of profits under the Government, these tests must be applied to the facts of the present case. If the facts of this case present no difficulty in the application of the principles, laid down by the Supreme Court, no certificate ought to be granted.

    15. With regard to the Life Insurance Corporation, the position is that under Section 25 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act of 1956 — “the accounts of the corporation shall be audited by auditors duly qualified ****** and the auditors shall be appointed by the Corporation with the previous approval of the Central Government and ??? receive such remuneration from the Corporation as the Central Government may fix.” The capital of the Corporation was, under Section 5 of the Act, provided by the central Government. Under Sec. 3 the Corporation was to be a body corporate having a perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to hold and dispose of property ind sue or be sued in its corporate name. The Division Bench of this Court has held that by virtue of Sec. 25, the appointment of auditors rests with the Government and his remuneration also is to be fixed by the Government.

    16. Durgapur Projects Limited and Hindustan steel Limited are “Government Companies” within the meaning of Section 2(18) read with Section 617 of the Indian Companies Act, 1956. Under Section 619(2) of the Act, the auditor or a Government company shall be appointed by the Central Government on the advice of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, who under sub-sec. (3) shall have power to direct the manner in which the accounts shall be audited and to give such auditor instructions in regard to any matter relating to the performance of his functions as such. In this case, the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, who is himself an officer appointed by the President of India under Article 148(1) of the Constitution, is given wide powers to control the auditors of Government Companies.

    17. The West Bengal Finance Corporation is a body corporate established under Section 3 read with Section 2(D) of the State Finance Corporation Act, 1951, having perpetual succession and a common seal. The appellant was nominated as a Director by the State Government under Section 10A of the Act and the Division Bench has held that the appellant held this office at the pleasure of the State Government under Section 11(1) of the Act. Thus, according to, the Division Bench the power of appointment or of nomination and the dismissal were vested in the State Government and this was sufficient to make the appellant the holder of an office under the State Government.

    18. Two Supreme Court cases were cited before us as laying down the principles which ought to be applied in finding out whether an office is one under. We Government within the meaning of the expression used in Article 102 of the Constitution. In Abdul Shakoor v. Rikhab Chand 13 Elen. LR 149 : (AIR 1958 SC 52) the question was whether the appellant was holding an office of profit under the Government having been appointed as mohatmin (manager) of a School by the Administrator of Durgah Khwaja sahib. He was being paid Rs. 100/- per month variously described as salary and honorarium. The Supreme Court examined various Acts beignning from the Durgah Khwaja Sahib Act (Act 23 of 1936) ending with an Act similarly intituled and passed in the year 1955. Under the last mentioned Act, the administration, control and management of the Durgah Endowment came to be vested in a committee which was a body corporate, laving perpetual succession and a common seal and which could sue and be sued through its president. Under Section 5 of the Act the committee was to consist of not less than 5 and not more than 9 members to be appointed by the Central Government. Sec. 8 gave power to the Central Government to supersede the committee. Under Sec. 9 the Central Government in consultation with the committee, could appoint a Nazim (administrator) of the Durgah whose salary was to be fixed by the Central Government but was to be paid out of the revenues of the Durgah Endowment Funds. Under Section 11 of the Act the powers and duties of the committee included the power to appoint, suspend or dismiss servants of the Durgah Endowment. Under Sec. 20 the committee had power to make bye laws to carry out the purpose of the Act. Under cl. (i) of sub-sec. (2) of the section such bye-laws could provide for the duties and powers of the employees of the Durgah and under sub-sec. (5) the Central Government was empowered to cancel any bye-law. The Supreme Court observed

    “No doubt the committee of the Durgah Endowment is to be appointed by the Government of India but it is a body corporate with perpetual succession acting within the four corners of the Act. Merely because the committee or the members of the committee are removable by the Government of India or the committee can make bye laws prescribing the duties and powers of its employees (sic) cannot, in our opinion, convert the servants of the committee into holders of office of profit under the Government of India. The appellant is neither appointed by the Government of India nor is removable by the Government of India nor is he paid out of the revenues of India. The power of the Government to appoint a person to an office of profit or to continue him in that office or revoke his appointment at their discretion and payment from out of Government revenues are important factors in determining whether that person is holding an office of profit under the Government, though payment from a source other than Government revenue is not always a decisive factor.” The court went on to add “the power of appointment and dismissal by the” Government or control exercised by the Government is as important consideration which determines in favour of the person holding an office of profit under the Government, but the fact that he is not paid from out of the State revenue is by itself a neutral factor.”

    19. The other Supreme Court case is that of Ramappa v. Sangappa & Ors, 15 Ele. LR 475 : (AIR 1958 SC 937) There the question was whether Patels and Shanbhogs were offices of profit under the Mysore Government, mere was no dispute there that Patels and Shanbhogs were, village offices within the Mysore Village Offices Act of 1908 which recognised a hereditary right to these offices to some extent. Sec. 8 of the Act provided that filling up a vacancy occurring in the office of a Patel and Shannnog by enacting that certain person were not to be eligible for the office and laying down that succession in the case of a permanent vacancy would be regulated by the ordinary provisions of the personal law applicable to the last holder. Sarkar, J., who delivered the judgment of the Supreme Court, observed that the heir of the last holder did not get the office till he was appointed to it by the Government and it was the appointment by the Government that perfected his right to the office “though it may be that the Government has under the statute no option but to appoint the heir to the office if he has fulfilled the statutory requirements.” The learned Judge went on to add “the office is therefore held by reason of the appointment by the Government and not simply because of a hereditary right to it.” With regard to the power of dismissal Section 7 of the Act provided that a prescribed officer of the Government would have power to suspend, dismiss or remove any holder of a village office on any of the grounds mentioned therein. With regard to the payment of remuneration the Court found that

    “Government lands are allotted by it to the officers by way of emoluments for services to be rendered and the cash allowances are also fixed by the Government, it is true that under the rules cash allowances are not paid directly by the Government to the officers but the latter are authorised to deduct the amounts thereof from the revenue collected by them. This does not show that the cash remuneration is not paid by the Government.”

    20. So far as Life Insurance Corporation Act of 1956 is concerned, the appointment of the auditor has to be by the approval of the Central Government and the remuneration also was fixed by the Government. The Act does not contain any special provision for dismissal of the officers by the Government and the remuneration, though fixed by the Government, does not come out of Government revenues.

    21. In the case of the Government Companies, the auditor is appointed by the Central Government directly on the advice of the Comptroller and Auditor General. Again, there is no express provision for dismissal and the remuneration comes out of the till of the company, which is a separate legal entity by itself.

    22. With regard to the West Bengal Finance corporation the position is certainly clearer in that the powers of appointment and dismissal were vested in the State Government although the Supreme Court cases mentioned above contain exposition of the relevant principles, the legal position of the appellant with regard to the different companies and corporation bearing on the question as to whether it amounts to an office of profit within the meaning of Article 102 of the Constitution, is one of general public Importance and, as such, we feel that it would be Just and proper to grant the appellant a certificate to the effect that the case involves a substantial question of law and is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133(1) of the Constitution of India.

    23. Let a certificate under Article 133(1)(c) be drawn up and issued expeditiosuly. Costs of this application will be costs in the Supreme Court appeal. The hearing fee is assessed at five gold mohurs.

    Bose, C.J:— I agree.

    BG/K.S.B

    24. Certificate granted.

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