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Case Number

Case No. 1 of 1960

Advocates

S.C. Jana and Arun Kumar Jana
D.K. Ghosh
for Bar Council; M.M. Sen
for Advocate-General

Judges

G.K Mitter
S.K Datta
S.P Mitra, JJ.

Acts

Section 10(2) of the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926.
SECTION 10 BAR COUNCILS ACT

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (as delivered by G. K. Mitter, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from a reference under Section 10(2) of the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926, made in March 1960 to the District Judge, Howrah, for inquiry into alleged professional misconduct by an Advocate.

The core factual matrix concerns a long-running dispute (since August 1955) over a cinema house in Shyampur involving Suresh Chandra Bera and Bejoy Kumar Mondal. Proceedings under Section 145 CrPC were conducted; interim attachment and receiver orders were made; appeals/revision to the High Court followed; the matter was remanded and later transferred to Magistrate R. B. Saha of Howrah. Various interlocutory applications, including one by Paresh Kumar Mondal (allegedly benami purchaser for Bejoy Mondal), and a petition under Section 528 CrPC for transfer, occupied the parties.

The specific incident investigated occurred on 24 September 1959. The Magistrate (Mr. Saha) reported that Advocate Provash (P. C.) Mallick, a senior advocate who had represented one party over several years, used derogatory words toward the Magistrate in court, which the Magistrate treated as amounting to contempt of court. The District Judge, after recording oral evidence, found the Advocate guilty of using words constituting contempt; that finding was accepted by the High Court.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Advocate's spoken words in the Magistrate's courtroom on 24 September 1959 amounted to contempt of court and professional misconduct within the meaning of Section 10 of the Bar Councils Act.
Whether the Magistrate, who said he was engaged in administrative business and not "doing judicial work" at that precise time, was nevertheless acting in a judicial capacity for purposes of contempt.
Whether the charge of professional misconduct and contempt was proved satisfactorily in light of the conflicting oral testimony and absence of contemporaneous verbatim record of the utterances.

Arguments of the Parties

Advocate's Arguments

There was a direct conflict of testimony between the Magistrate and the Advocate; three lawyers and a litigant gave evidence for the Advocate while two Magistrates testified against him, creating reasonable doubt about exact words used.
The charge of professional misconduct must be clearly proved (relying on A, a Pleader v. Judges of High Court of Madras, AIR 1930 PC 144).
The Magistrate was not performing judicial work that day but was engaged in departmental/administrative duties; therefore anything said could not amount to contempt of court (relying on the Orissa High Court decision in Puma Chandra Majhi v. State, AIR 1956 Orissa 28).
Counsel contended that it was not possible to hold the Advocate used all words imputed in the Magistrate's report and that the matter was therefore not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Magistrate's Position

The Magistrate reported that the Advocate used insulting and contumacious expressions towards him (including calling him "spiteful", accusing him of disobliging lawyers, threatening publicity, and other disparaging remarks).
The Magistrate filed a type-written report dated 24 September 1959 to the District Magistrate describing the incident and stated he could not take immediate action under Section 480 CrPC because the Advocate left the courtroom at once.
The Magistrate's report and record of the remarks were relied upon in the inquiry and in the order recorded on the court's order-sheet.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
A, a Pleader v. Judges of High Court of Madras, AIR 1930 PC 144	That charges of professional misconduct must be clearly proved and not merely inferred.	The Advocate relied on this authority to argue the matter was not proved beyond doubt due to conflicting oral testimony and absence of contemporaneous record. The Court considered the point but concluded that, notwithstanding some inability to show the exact sequence or every word, the essential contumacious expressions were established.
Brahma Prokash v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 10	Defines public injury from imputations against judicial officers: statements tending to create apprehension about a judge's integrity, ability or fairness can amount to contempt even without proof of actual interference with administration of justice.	The Court invoked Mukherjea, J.'s pronouncement (as reported in this case) to show that statements which tend to lower confidence in a Judge or interfere with administration of justice are contumacious; it applied this principle to hold the Advocate's remarks were calculated to lower the Magistrate's authority.
R. v. Grav, (1900) 2 QB 36	Any act or publication calculated to bring a court or judge into contempt or lower their authority, or to obstruct due course of justice, is contempt; but reasonable criticism is permissible.	The Court cited this authority to reinforce that words calculated to lower a judicial officer's authority constitute contempt, and to distinguish between permissible criticism and contumacious conduct. It used the rule to support the finding that calling the Magistrate "spiteful" and accusing him of disobliging lawyers crossed the permissible line.
Puma (Purna) Chandra Majhi v. State, AIR 1956 Orissa 28	Held in that case that after pronouncing an order a Magistrate ceased to function as a judicial officer with respect to that matter, and therefore certain remarks thereafter were not contempt of court.	The Court considered and distinguished this authority on the facts: here the Magistrate was approached to entertain a petition and pass an order (administration of justice), and he declined to do so as a Court; therefore the Orissa decision was found inapplicable to absolve the Advocate.
G, a senior Advocate of Supreme Court, AIR 1954 SC 557	Authoritative statement that a legal practitioner must conduct himself to high professional standards and is liable to disciplinary action for departure.	The Court cited this case for the general proposition that members of the Bar owe duties to clients and to the Court and may be disciplined for misconduct; it supported the imposition of professional discipline (reprimand) on the Advocate.
In re: M, an advocate, AIR 1957 SC 149	Another Supreme Court authority concerning standards of professional conduct and disciplinary action.	Referenced for the same general disciplinary principle that advocates must uphold dignity and decorum; used to justify disciplinary response in this case.
Lalit Mohan Das v. Advocate General, Orissa, AIR 1957 SC 250	Describes that an advocate must uphold dignity and decorum of the Court and must not make imputations which scandalize or pollute administration of justice.	The Court quoted and relied upon this passage to show that imputations of partiality and unfairness against judicial officers in open court can bring the administration of justice into disrepute; applied to conclude the Advocate had "grossly overstepped the limits of propriety."

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds in these principal steps, following only what is recorded in the opinion:

Assessment of Evidence and Credibility:
- The Court acknowledged a direct conflict of testimony between the Magistrate and the Advocate and therefore reviewed the history and circumstances (long-running litigation, dates of records, transfer proceedings) to test plausibility and chronology.
- The District Judge's factual finding (after recording oral evidence) that the Advocate used words constituting contempt was accepted by the Court. The High Court expressly states it accepts the finding of the District Judge (para 8).
Chronology and Documentary Context:
- The Court examined the timing of events: records were received by the Magistrate on 23 September 1959; the alleged incident occurred 24 September 1959; the Magistrate reported the matter in a type-written report dated 24 September; the District Magistrate made a note dated 6 November 1959; and the transfer application under Section 528 was heard on 5 November and the case transferred. The Court used these dates to reject a suggestion (made on behalf of the Advocate) that the Magistrate could not have complained prior to the transfer.
Evaluation of What Was Said and Whether It Was Proven:
- The Court recognized that it was not possible to hold the Advocate used every word in the exact sequence contained in the Magistrate's report and that one or two expressions might be omitted or added. Nonetheless the Court concluded the essential insulting expressions — that the Magistrate was "spiteful", disobliging to lawyers, would not accommodate lawyers, and that the matter would be circulated — had been made and were proved in substance.
- The Court applied the standard (cited cases) that professional misconduct must be clearly proved but found that the proof in this case sufficed to establish the contumacious nature of the remarks.
Application of Legal Principles on Contempt:
- The Court relied on authorities (e.g., Brahma Prokash and R. v. Grav) to articulate the principle that statements calculated to lower the authority of a judge or tend to interfere with administration of justice amount to contempt, even without proof of actual interference.
- Using this standard, the Court held the Advocate's words were calculated to lower the Magistrate's authority and interfere with administration of justice, and therefore amounted to contempt and misconduct under Section 10 of the Bar Councils Act.
Distinguishing Authorities Cited in Defence:
- The Court considered the Orissa decision (Puma Chandra Majhi) relied on by the Advocate, which held that remarks after a magistrate ceased to function as a judicial officer might not amount to contempt. The Court distinguished that case on the facts — here the Magistrate was approached to entertain a petition and pass an order (i.e., he was acting in connection with the administration of justice) and he declined to make the order as a Court.
Conclusion and Disciplinary Consideration:
- On the basis of the accepted findings and application of the cited principles, the Court concluded the Advocate was guilty of misconduct amounting to contempt.
- The Court noted the Advocate's seniority, age and standing and, though stating a more severe punishment might have been open on the facts, concurred with the order made by the Bench (a reprimand rather than a harsher penalty).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that the remarks made by Shri Provash Chandra Mallick on 24 September 1959 amounted to professional misconduct constituting a contempt of court, and disciplinary action in the form of a reprimand was imposed.

Implications:

The direct consequence for the advocate was formal censure (a reprimand) for misconduct amounting to contempt; the Court expressly noted it could have imposed a more severe punishment but chose a milder course in view of the advocate's age, standing and surrounding circumstances.
The Court reiterated established principles: an advocate is an officer of the Court and must uphold dignity and decorum; imputations of partiality or spite against a judicial officer in open court can scandalize and undermine confidence in the administration of justice and therefore attract disciplinary consequences.
The opinion does not purport to establish a new legal precedent; it applies and cites existing authorities to the facts and records that the Court's order is a disciplinary resolution based on the particular facts before it.

This summary is confined strictly to the facts, arguments, authorities and reasoning as reported in the provided opinion and does not add or infer material beyond the text of the judgment.

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Provash Chandra Mallick, In Re

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

G.K Mitter, J.:— This matter arises out of a reference made by this Court for inquiry under Section 10(2) of the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926. In consultation with the Bar Council the reference was made in March 1960 to the District Judge, Howrah, who after recording oral evidence, found the Advocate concerned to have used some words towards a Magistrate, constituting a contempt of Court.

2. As there is a direct conflict of testimony between that of the Advocate and the Magistrate, it is necessary to refer in brief to the history of the litigation and the circumstances in which the words complained of are alleged to have been uttered. As early as August 1955 there were disputes between one Suresh Chandra Bera and one Bejoy Kumar Mondal with regard to a cinema house in village Shyampur within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Court of Uluberia in the district of Howrah. There were proceedings under section 145 of the Cr PC in the Court of the Second Officer, Ulberia, in which the said Suresh Chandra Bera was the first party, Bejoy Kumar Mondal was the second party No. 1 and one Jnanendra Nath Bera was second party No. 2. An interim order of attachment of the Cinema house was made on August 5, 1955 accompanied by an order for appointment of a Receiver. On an application for revision to the High Court preferred by Bejoy Mondal the order for appointment of the Receiver was set aside and the case was sent back for trial. The Magistrate of Uluberia after recording evidence decided the issue of possession in favour of Bejoy Mondal and lifted the attachment. On February 12, 1957 possession of the cinema house was delivered to Bejoy Mondal. Suresh Chandra Bera then moved the High Court. The Rule obtained by him was finally disposed of on August 19, 1958 and the case was remanded for trial by a Magistrate at Howrah. It was then transferred to the file of R.B Saha, a Magistrate of Howrah, the complainant in this case. On December 20, 1958 one Rabindra Nath Bera filed an application for attachment of the Cinema house. Objection thereto was preferred by Bejoy Mondal. The Magistrate Mr. Saha ultimately made an order for attachment. January 13, 1959 was one of the dates fixed for hearing of the application. It is alleged that an advocate of this Court Chinta Haran Roy had been briefed for Rabindra Nath Bera on that day. As Mr. Roy failed to turn up, when the matter was called on, a request was made by a Muktear Benoy Banerjee to the Magistrate to wait for a little while to allow Mr. Roy to come. The Magistrate agreed to do so and as there did not happen to be any other work on the hand of the Magistrate at that time, some conversation is alleged to have taken place between him and the lawyers of the parties in course of which the Magistrate is said to have remarked that he was well acquainted with Mr. Roy as a neighbour and had social inter-course with him. On this Bejoy Mondal became apprehensive about a fair deal from the Magistrate and instructed his lawyer to move the Sessions Judge of Howrah under Section 528 of the Cr PC for transfer of the case to the file of some other Magistrate. On January 27, 1959 an application was made to the High Court by Bejoy Mondal against the order for attachment issued by the Magistrate. A Rule was obtained by the applicant and stay of proceedings granted. The High Court also called for the records of the case. On September 4, 1959 the said Rule was discharged. It is alleged that in the mean time Suresh Chandra Bera had sold his interest in the cinema house to Bejoy Mondal who purchased it benami in the name of his brother Paresh Kumar Mondal. On September 9, 1959 Paresh Kumar Mondal filed an application before the Magistrate Mr. Saha for inclusion of his name in place of Suresh Bera and for cancellation of the order of attachment on the ground that there was no longer any dispute pending between the parties. The Magistrate ordered the application to be put up with the records when received. As the cinema house had been closed for some time Bejoy Mondal was naturally anxious to bring the proceedings to an end and caused a watch to be kept for the arrival of the records from the High Court. It is not disputed that the records were sent down from the High Court and received in the court of the Magistrate on September 23, 1959. The incident leading to the inquiry is said to have happened on the day following. Mr. P.C Malick the advocate whose conduct has been taken exception to had appeared for Bejoy Mondal in the proceedings which were spread over three or four years. It is his evidence that he had appeared both in the court at Uluberia and before the Magistrate at Howrah. A senior advocate and the Government Pleader for Howrah for many years he was also President of the Howrah Bar Association. The Magistrate concerned was also a very senior Magistrate and as a matter of fact he retired from service early in February 1961. He was not doing any judicial work on September 24, 1959 but had reserved the day for administrative business. It is not disputed that Mr. Mallick with his juniors appeared, before the Magistrate on two occasions on that date. According to the Magistrate the incident is alleged to have taken place on the second occasion while according to the advocate concerned, although he was not satisfied with the conduct of the Magistrate he did not utter the words which are imputed to him.

3. According to the explanation of the Advocate he approached the Magistrate with his juniors and one Mr. Surhid Biswas, lawyer for Paresh Mondal, and prayed for the proceedings being dropped in view of the compromise between the parties when the Magistrate told him that as the records had been called for by the Sessions Judge. In the proceedings under section 528 of the Cr PC he could not do anything on that date. The records were thereafter sent up to the court of the Sessions Judge on the very same day and an application was moved before the Sessions Judge by the junior lawyers that the matter having been compromised between the parties a mere forma order was necessary to be recorded and the records of the case might be sent back to the trial Magistrate. The Sessions Judge ordered the return of the records to the Magistrate with a direction that they should be sent back to his Court by November 4, 1959 as the day following, namely November 5, 1959, had been fixed for the hearing of the case under section 528 of the Cr PC. The records were then sent back to the Magistrate and Mr. Mallick with his juniors and the lawyers for Paresh Mondal appeared before the Magistrate again at about 4 p.m on the same day. The Magistrate was alone in the room when Mr. Mallick prayed for disposal of the matter or for fixing a date prior to November 5, 1959. The Magistrate after hearing the submissions made told Mr. Mallick that he was not at that time functioning as a Court but was engaged in departmental work. Mr. Mallick then pointed out to the Magistrate that a formal order was all that was necessary and not more than a couple of minutes of the Magistrate's time would be taken up. At this the Magistrate asked Mr. Mallick not to disturb him and told him further that he would fix a date for hearing the matter. Mr. Mallick then urged before the Magistrate that the parties had come from a long distance with their witnesses to prove the sale deed, if necessary, and if the Magistrate could spare only a few minutes the parties would be saved from much trouble, harassment and unnecessary expenses. Mr. Mallick further asked the Magistrate to put himself in the position of the litigant and to consider whether or not he would feel that trouble and harassment would be saved by passing an order on that very day. The Magistrate felt greatly disgusted and asked the parties peremptorily to leave the room.

4. According to the report of Mr. Saha to the District Magistrate bearing date September 24, 1959, he had perused the order of the High Court and looked into the petition of Paresh Kumar Mondal after the records were received back on September 23, 1959 and put up before him. On September 24, Mr. Mallick appearing before him with his juniors requested him to proceed with the case on the prayer of Paresh Kumar Mondal. The Magistrate told the Advocate that as the application under section 528 of the Cr PC was still pending before the Sessions Judge he could not take up the matter. Mr. Mallick and his assistants left the Magistrate's room but re-appeared at about 4.30 p.m and stated that the records had been sent back by the Sessions Judge with a direction that the same should be before him on November 4, 1959 and the Magistrate could therefore pass an order on the petition of Paresh Kumar Mondal. The Magistrate said that he had nothing more to add to what had been stated by him before. This infuriated the Advocate who made the following remarks in an angry tone:

“Mr. Saha, you are going to retire soon from service, you should not disoblige lawyers as you will have to join the lawyers after your retirement. The Sessions Judge, Howrah accommodated me but you are not doing the same. You think your position to be too important. But it is not so. You will not be able to retain this position for long. You are spiteful. You are not going to accommodate lawyers. This matter will be circulated. You are a public servant and you are working in this way.”

5. As Mr. Mallick left the court room immediately after making the above remarks, the Magistrate could not take action against him under Section 480 of the Cr PC.

6. The following is the text of the order recorded on the order-sheet dated September 24, 1959:

“I perused the petition of Paresh Kumar Mondal who is neither 1st party nor 2nd party in this case. In the petition he prayed for inclusion of his name in place of 1st party and to cancel the order made under Section 145(1) of the Cr PC. I heard his lawyers.

An application for transfer under Section 528 of the Cr PC has been filed in the court of the S.J Howrah, in respect of this case. I think I should not proceed with this case before the disposal of that application by the Sessions Judge. Send the record to the Sessions Judge on 4-11-1959 as directed.

Put up the petition of Paresh Kumar Mondal after the decision of the Sessions Judge in respect of the application under Section 528 of the Cr PC is received.

Paresh Kumar Mondal was represented by Sri Provash Chandra Mallick, Advocate and three assistants (lawyers). Sri Mallick made certain remarks while I was considering the petition of Paresh Kumar Mondal. His remarks and his conduct amount to a contempt of Court. Before I could take action as laid down under Section 480 of the Cr PC against Sri Provash Mallick, he hurriedly left my Court room with his assistants.

I am submitting a separate report to the District Magistrate in this matter.”

7. The Magistrate had no stenographer and was alone in the room when the above derogative remarks about him are said to have been made. He reported the matter in writing to the District Magistrate. The report bears the date September 24, 1959. It was argued on behalf of the Advocate that the report was not made on that date but much later. The report consists of two type-written pages giving a short history of the case and the circumstances in which the remarks against him were made. There is no thing to show when the report was received by the District Magistrate who was examined before the District Judge, Howrah in the enquiry stage. In his evidence before the District Judge, the District Magistrate stated that he passed an order on the report and made some marks thereon in red pencil. But as no date was given by him it was not possible to say when he had made his comments. His practice generally was to put some marks on documents when he wanted to dictate notes to his stenographer. In the last week of September and throughout October, 1959, he was preoccupied with flood relief and he could not remember when exactly he first saw the report of Mr. Saha. The note of the District Magistrate, Howrah, that complaint ought to be made against the behaviour of Mr. Mallick bears the date November 6, 1959. The transfer application under Section 528 of the Cr PC was heard by the Sessions Judge on November 5, 1959, when an order was made transferring the case from the file of Mr. Saha. The happenings on the two last mentioned dates will show that the Magistrate, Mr. Saha, could not possibly have complained to the District Magistrate, after the case was transferred from his file, a suggestion which seems to have been made on behalf of the Advocate Mr. Mallick at the enquiry stage.

8. The question then arises as to whose version of the incident should be accepted. (After considering the evidence His Lordship concluded:) I, therefore, accept the finding of the District Judge and conclude that the accusation of the Magistrate is true in substance.

9. There can be little doubt that the words mentioned in Mr. Saha's report undoubtedly are contumacious in their nature when addressed to a judicial officer and amount to a contempt of Court.

10. Reliance was placed on the case of, A, a Pleader v. Judges of High Court of Madras, AIR 1930 PC 144, in support of the contention that the charge of professional misconduct must be clearly proved and not merely inferred. It was argued at the bar that this was a case of oral testimony of two Magistrates against that of three lawyers and a litigant and no contemporaneous records having been kept of the exact utterances made by Mr. Mallick, the matter was not beyond doubt and that it cannot be said that Mr. Mallick had uttered the very words which are to be found in the complaint of the Magistrate. While it is not Possible to hold that Mr. Mallick used all the words imputed to him in the order in which they find a place in the report and while it cannot be said that he might have said something more or might not have used one or two of the expressions therein contained, I have no doubt in upholding that Mr. Mallick called the Magistrate ‘spiteful’, admonished him for being disobliging to lawyers and warned him that the matter would be given publicity. In my opinion the use of the words imputed to Mr. Mallick has been established in this case.

11. Various cases were cited at the Bar containing dicta as to what would or would not, amount to a contempt of court. It would be sufficient to refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court where the pronouncement of Mukherjea, J., was made in very clear terms. The matter arose out of a resolution passed by the executive committee of the District Bar Association at Muzatiarnagar imputing incompetency and lack of courtesy to a judicial officer. Referring to the resolution and the publication thereof Mukherjea, J., said:

‘It will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the mind of the people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the Judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance up on the Court's administration of justice, or, if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the Judge himself in the discharge of judicial duties. It is well established that it is not necessary to prove affirmatively that there has been an actual interference with the administration of justice by reason of such defamatory statement; it is enough if it is likely, or tends in any way, to interfere with the proper administration of law’. See Brahma Prokash v. State of U.P, AIR 1954 SC 10 at p. 14.

12. In R. v. Grav, (1900) 2 QB 36, Lord Russel of Killowen, C.J, pointed out that

“any act done or writing published calculated to bring a Court or a Judge of the court into contempt, or to lower his authority, is a contempt of Court *** ** *** Further, any act done or writing published calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the courts is a contempt of Court. ** ** ** Judges and Courts are alike open to criticism, and if reasonable argument or expostulation is offered against any judicial act as contrary to law or the public good, no Court could or would treat that as contempt of Court.” (page 40).

13. Judged in the light of the above, the utterance of Mr. Mallick on September 24, 1959, must be held to be calculated to lower the authority of the Magistrate and interfere with the administration of justice. To say of a Judge in his court that his conduct is ‘spiteful’ and to take him to task for being disobliging to lawyers is, in my opinion, enough to constitute a contempt of court and as such be misconduct within the meaning of Section 10 of the Bar Councils Act.

14. Lastly it was argued that the Magistrate was not doing any judicial work on that date but was busy with the administrative work. As such he was not acting as a Court and anything said to him cannot amount to a contempt of court. For this purpose reliance was placed on a judgment of Orissa High Court in the case of Puma Chandra Majhi v. State, AIR 1956 Orissa 28. In that case Purna Chandra Majhi had filed a complainant against a Sub-Divisional Magistrate under S. 504 of the Indian Penal Code. He was examined by a Magistrate, Mr. Hota, and his statement on oath was recorded. The Magistrate felt that the complaint was not maintainable for want of sanction under Section 197 of the Cr PC and dismissed the complaint under Section 203 of the Cr PC. After passing the order the Magistrate directed the complainant to bring his lawyer so that he might go through the order passed by him. The complainant expressed surprise at this, and enquired how his complaint could be dismissed without any examination of his witnesses. According to the Magistrate, the complainant repeated this several times with the deliberate intention of insulting him. The Sessions Judge who made a reference to the High Court held that after pronouncing his order of dismissal the Magistrate ceased to function as a judicial officer and consequently there was no Court in the view of which the offence of contempt can be said to have been committed. The learned Judge of the Orissa High Court observed that after having pronounced the order of dismissal the Magistrate lost seisin of the matter and his direction to the complainant to bring his Vakil could not be regarded as an order of the Court trying the matter. In my opinion, the facts of this case are very different from those before the Orissa High Court. True it is that the Magistrate said that he was not doing any judicial work on that date but it was in connection with the administration of justice viz. entertaining a petition and passing an order regarding the proceedings that the utterances were made. He was approached as a Court to make an order and it was as a Court that he declined to make it.

15. In the result, I hold that in making the utterances contained in the report of the Magistrate, Mr. Mallick was guilty of misconduct amounting to a contempt of court. It is highly regrettable that there should have been such lapse on the part of a very senior advocate who has held high position for many years. In moments of anger a person is apt to say tilings which he would regret afterwards. One feels reluctant to censure an advocate of Mr. Mallick's standing and position but in upholding the law and administering justice Mr. Mallick must be reprimanded for his misconduct.

Datta, J.:— I agree.

S.P Mitra, J.:— I agree. Upon going through the evidence recorded by the District Judge I have no doubt that the allegations of the Magistrate against Shri Provash Chandra Mallick are substantially correct.

16. I intend to emphasise that, a legal practitioner is bound to conduct himself in a manner befitting the high and honourable profession to whose privileges he has been admitted; and if he departs from the high standards which that profession has set for itself and demands of him in professional matters, he is liable to disciplinary action: vide in the matter of G, a senior Advocate of Supreme Court, AIR 1954 SC 557 and In re: M, an advocate, (S) AIR 1957 SC 149.

17. In Lalit Mohan Das v. Advocate General, Orissa, (S) AIR 1957 SC 250, it is observed as follows:

“A member of the Bar undoubtedly owes a duty to his client and must place before the Court all that can fairly and reasonably be submitted on behalf of his client. He may even submit that a particular order is not correct and may ask for a review of that order. At the same time, a member of the Bar is an officer of the Court and owes a duty to the Court in which he is appearing. He must uphold the dignity and decorum of the Court and must not do anything to bring the Court itself into disrepute. The appellant before us grossly overstepped the limits of propriety when he made imputations of partiality and unfairness against the Munsiff in open court. In suggesting that the Munsiff followed no principle in his orders, the appellant was adding insult to injury; because the Munsiff had merely upheld the order of his predecessor on the preliminary point of jurisdiction and court-fees, which order had been upheld by the High Court in revision. Scandalising the Court in such manner is really polluting the very fount of justice: such conduct as the appellant indulged in was not a matter between an individual member of the Bar and a member of the Judicial Service; it brought into disrepute the whole administration of justice.”

18. It was open to this Court on the facts of the case to impose a more severe punishment on Shri Provash Chandra Mallick. But having regard to his age and status and the surrounding circumstances, I concur with the Order My Lord has made.

EE/A.

19. Ordered accordingly.

Provash Chandra Mallick, In Re

Structured Summary of the Opinion (as delivered by G. K. Mitter, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Advocate's Arguments

Magistrate's Position

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Provash Chandra Mallick, In Re

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