Banerjee, J.:— This is a reference to a Special Division Bench under the second proviso to Rule 1, Chapter 11 of the High Court Appellate Side Rules. The particular question of law referred for determination by the Special Bench is:
“What is the proper valuation of a suit for ejectment of a licensee upon revocation or termination of his licence for purposes of (i) Court-fees and (ii) jurisdiction? Is there any difference in the matter between a case of revocation of licence and a case of termination as distinguished from revocation of licence?”
2. Facts, in so far as they are material for determination of this Reference, lie within a short compass and are hereinbelow stated. The plaintiffs, who are the petitioners filed a suit for eviction of the defendant opposite party, whom they described as a licensee, on the ground that the licence in favour of the defendant had been revoked. There were also certain other reliefs claimed by the plaintiffs, for example, mesne profits, but with those other reliefs I am not concerned at this stage. The relief, in so far as ejectment was concerned, was valued at Rs. 100/-, which according to the plaintiffs was the value of the said relief and Court-fee was paid accordingly.
3. The defendant in his written statement objected to the valuation of the relief as to ejectment and also objected to the Court-fee paid thereon. He contended that the suit had not been properly valued and the Court-fee paid was insufficient.
4. On the pleadings, an issue, amongst others, as to valuation of the suit, for the purposes of Court-fees, was framed.
5. The learned Munsif heard the issue as a preliminary issue in the suit and decided against the plaintiffs. An extract from the order of the learned Munsif is set out below:—
“In view of the decision reported in A.I.R 1949 Cal. 621 the valuation for the purpose of Court fees in such a suit is governed by section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act and the plaintiff is not entitled to put his own valuation on the suit. Relying on a case reported in 59 C.W.N 606 the learned lawyer for the plaintiff argues that the subject matter of the suit is not the properties in respect of which the plaintiff claims relief but the relief itself. This would appear from the above decision itself find in the above case their Lordships were concerned with the valuation of the suit only for the purpose of jurisdiction and not for the purpose of Court-fees. That apart, the above decision did not disturb the previous decision or valuation for the purpose of Court-fees and that decision was not overlooked. The learned lawyer for the plaintiff has also referred to a case reported in 99 C.L.J 138 but this does not relate to Court-fee matter. He has next urged that that valuation of the suit property cannot be ascertained in this case as the plaintiff has a very limited interest of tenancy therein. This contention has some legs to stand upon; but I find from the plaint itself that license fee of Rs. 40/- p.m was payable by the defendant to the plaintiff in respect of the suit property and on this basis I value the suit property at Rs. 7200/- under section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act.”
6. So far as the valuation of the suit at Rs. 100/-, for the purposes of jurisdiction was concerned the learned Munsif, apparently did not disturb the valuation. Aggrieved by this order the plaintiffs moved this Court.
7. P.N Mookerjee and Niyogi, JJ., who recommended the Reference to a Special Division Bench, made the following observation:—
“This has resulted in a very unsatisfactory state of things and the position has become somewhat anomalous, the suit, so far as ejectment is concerned being valued at Rs. 100/- for the purpose of jurisdiction and at Rs. 7200/- for the purpose of Court fees.”
8. Their Lordships further observed that in view of several unalike decisions and the chaotic state of the law, on the point, as a result thereof, a reference to a Special Division Bench was plainly necessary and eminently desirable for an authoritative pronouncement of the law on the point.
9. It is necessary for me, therefore, to examine, in the first place, the catena of case law on the point, in order to find out the guidance they may offer or the conflict of opinion they may raise. I shall first of all examine the reported decisions of this Court, in order of chronology:
(i) (1920) 24 C.W.N 167 (notes) (1) (Basiram Christian v. Ganesh Chandra Das Gupta). In that case the plaintiff, inter alia, prayed that upon a finding that he was in possession of the disputed property on the strength of a Mirash Karshapatta and adverse possession and upon a finding that the principal defendant was a licensee, whose licence was put an end to, a permanent injunction might be granted against the defendant restraining him from coming upon the land after having removed him therefrom. The plaintiff also claimed damages. The plaintiff valued the suit both for the purposes of Court-fees and jurisdiction at Rs. 146/- — Rs. 100/- being the value of ejectment and injunction and Rs. 46/- being the value of damages. The defendant disputed the valuation as arbitrary and contended that the value of the suit would be the value of the land, which was much more than Rs. 100/-. The learned Munsif upheld the plaintiff's valuation on the ground that the value of the subject matter of the litigation was the value of the right of a licensee in the land and that right, according to law, had no value. Even if it be looked upon as a suit for recovery of possession, the learned Munsif observed, the possession of the licensee was the subject matter of litigation, which the plaintiff wanted to recover from the licensee and such possession had little or no value. On the matter being taken by the defendant, to the High Court, under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Newbould, J. discharged the Rule, with the observation that in revision he was not prepared to say that the decision was wrong.
(ii) A.I.R 1949 Calcutta 621 (2) (Satish Kumar v. Sailabasini Devi). This was a case of recovery of possession of a house from a licensee, whose license had been revoked. The plaintiff had put his own valuation to the relief claimed and paid Court-fees thereon. A.N Sen, J. dissented from the decision in (1) 24 C.W.N 187 (notes) and also a Patna High Court decision, reported in (3) I.L.R 5 Patna 631 which had taken a similar view. He cared to follow a decision of the Bombay High Court reported in (4) A.I.R 1947 Bombay 482 and observed:—
“After a licence has been revoked all that the plaintiff requires is the recovery of the premises and that it seems to me would be the subject-matter of the suit. The plaintiff in the present case seems (seeks?) for nothing more and I hold that the subject-matter of the suit is the premises sought to be recovered. In this connection I would refer to the provisions of S. 7(xi)(cc), Court-fees Act. There a special provision has been made for the recovery of immovable property by a landlord from his tenant including a tenant holding over after the determination of the tenancy. Now, if this provision had not been there, a suit by a landlord for recovery of possession of land from a tenant holding over after the tenancy had been determined would have been governed by cl. (v) of s. 7. The Legislature thought fit to provide that such a case will not be governed by cl (v) and it made a provision in cl. (xi) regarding Court-fees payable in such a case. There is no corresponding provision made by the Legislature in respect of a licensee whose licence has been revoked. It seems therefore, that the Legislature intended that in the case of a licensee the valuation of the suit should be governed by the provisions of cl. (v) of S. 7, Court-fees Act.”
(iii) (1954) 59 C.W.N 606, (5) (Chandi Charan Das v. Sushilabala Dasi). This was also a case of recovery of possession from a licensee, whose license had been revoked. The suit was valued for the purpose of jurisdiction at Rs. 110/-. Objection was raised to the effect that the Munsif's Court had no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. The objection succeeded. Before this Court both parties agreed that the Court-fee payable on the plaint should be in accordance with the provisions of section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act ‘according to the value of the subject matter.’ It was not also disputed that taking the subject matter to be the property, the value would be, for the purpose of court-fee, well beyond the jurisdiction of the learned Munsif. The dispute centred round the point as to what would be the basis of valuation of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction.
Das Gupta, J. (sitting with Debabrata Mookerjee, J.) before whom the case came up for hearing held that for the purposes of jurisdiction the subject matter of the suit was not the property in respect of which the plaintiffs claimed relief but the relief itself, which was that the licensee should leave the land and the structures thereon.
His Lordship gave several reasons for his conclusion; (a) Sec. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act (an Act passed to prescribe the mode of valuing certain suits for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of Courts with respect thereto) provided that in suits other than those referred to in the Court-fees Act, 1870, section 7, paragraphs v, vi and ix and paragraph x, clause (d) Court-fees were payable ad valorem under the Court-fees Act, 1870, the value as determinable for the computation of Court-fees and the value for the purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. But in determining the value of a suit in which, like the suit before their Lordships, Court-fees were payable under section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act, no assistance was to be had from the Court-fees Act, because section 8 deliberately excluded it from the application of the rule that the value as determinable for the purposes of Court-fees and the value for the purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same it was, therefore, necessary, his Lordship said, to ascertain the value for the purposes of jurisdiction without the assistance from the Court-fees Act but bearing in mind the language of section 6 of the Civil Procedure Code that ‘in so far as otherwise expressly provided nothing herein contained shall operate to give any Court jurisdiction over suits the amount or value of the subject-matter of which exceeds the pecuniary limits (if any) of its ordinary jurisdiction’; (b) His Lord-ship did not fully agree with the view of the Bombay High Court (4) (reported in A.I.R 1947 Bom. 182) in which Macklin, J. held that, in plain English the subject matter of a suit under section 7(v) was what the suit was about; it was not the same thing as the object of the suit—the object of the suit being the claim, in other words possession of the house. Macklin, J. held that where the suit was for possession of land, houses or garden the suit was to be valued according to the subject matter and where the subject matter was land the value was to be determined according to clauses (a), (b), (c) or (d) of section 7(v) and where the subject matter was a house or garden the value was to be deemed to be the market value of the house or garden. Das Gupta, J. found no reason to differ from the view of Macklin, J. in so far as the valuation of such a suit for Court-fees was concerned but disagreed with the interpretation in so far as the valuation of such a suit for jurisdiction was concerned. According to his Lordship the distinction sought to be made between subject and object of the suit was misleading and even if not so his Lordship was unable to see how the fact that the Legislature had used the words in that particular sense in the Court-fees Act would justify the conclusion that in the Civil Procedure Code also the Legislature used the words in the same sense; (c) His Lordship gave certain illustrations. In a lecture on the question whether Shakespeare and Bacon were identical person, the subject-matter was neither Shakespeare nor Bacon but their identity; a club considering the question whether members should come in dhoti, the subject matter was the desirability of the members attending the club in dhoti; also in a suit to enforce a right of irrigation from a tank, the subject matter was neither tank nor the land to be irrigated but the right of irrigation. So also in a suit on a claim of ancient rights enjoyed by a house, the house was not the subject matter but the relief which the plaintiff claimed.
His Lordship hold that as in all cases a suit is brought for a relief the subject matter is the relief. The fact that this relief is asked for in respect of movable or immovable properties does not make the property the subject matter of the relief.
A suit for possession from a licensee on revocation of license, the relief asked for was that the licensee should leave the property—the value of this was obviously less than the value of the property over which the license had been given. On such line of reasoning his Lordship held that the plaintiff's valuation of the suit at Rs. 110/- for the purpose of jurisdiction was not inadequate.
His Lordship distinguished the decision by A.N Sen, J. in (2) A.I.R 1949 Cal. 621, as concerned with the valuation of a suit for Court-fees alone.
(iv) A.I.R (1954) Cal. 101 (6) (Hafiz Mohammed v. Haji Abdur Rub) In that case Lahiri, J. (sitting with Guha Ray, J.) held that a suit by a Mutwalli to recover possession of a Wakf property, alienated by a former mutwalli, where no declaration was prayed, was governed by section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act and must be valued for the purposes of Court-fees accordingly. His Lordship further held that the subject matter of the suit was the interest of the plaintiff in the land or building or garden. Where a plaintiff sought relief only as a mutwalli, his interest in the disputed property would be much narrower than the interest of a full owner and such interest need not be valued at the same figure as his interest as a full owner.
(v) (1958) 63 C.W.N 380 (7) (Birendra Kumar Dutta v. Charu Chandra Dutt). This was a case where the plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession of a masonry building on the allegation that the defendant in possession was a licensee and that the licence had been revoked. The suit was valued at Rs. 100/-; Sen, J. refused to recognise the distinction between valuation for the purposes of Court-fees and valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction in such a suit and held that such a suit was governed by section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act and since the subject-matter was incapable of precise valuation, the plaintiff's valuation must be accepted. His Lordship criticised the decision in 59 C.W.N 606 (5) (supra) in the following language:—
“In that case the Division Bench accepted the valuation put by the plaintiff of Rs. 110/- only although if the market value of the land and the premises were accepted the value would be much more. Mr. Banerjee has sought to distinguish this ruling by pointing out that their Lordships in the Division Bench case just cited were dealing with the valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction and not with the valuation for the purposes of court-fees. I am, however, unable to hold that there can be any distinction between the valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction and the valuation for the purposes of court-fees in such a suit. Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act no doubt refers to suits other than those suits which are governed by section 7, paragraphs (v), (vi) and (ix) and paragraph (x) clause (d). Section 8 lays down that in such suits the value for court-fees and the value for jurisdiction shall be the same. This does not mean that the value for court-fees and for jurisdiction shall be different in a case governed by section 7, paragraphs (v), (vi) and (ix) and paragraph (x) clause (d). These cases are governed by Part I of the Suits Valuation Act. There is nothing in this part to show that the value for the purposes of jurisdiction shall be less than the value as determined for the purposes of court-fees. On the other hand, when the suit is valued according to the subject-matter, it is clear that the same value shall govern the valuation for jurisdiction as well as the valuation for court-fees”.
(vi) (1959) 64 C.W.N 80 (8) (Manik Chand Mondal v. Sudhir Kumar Mondal). This was also a case where the plaintiff claimed khas possession of a premises on eviction of a licensee, whose licence had been revoked. The prayer of declaration of title, originally made, was omitted and, therefore there was no question of application of sec. 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act and section 7(v)(b) was the only provision of the Court-fees Act that was applicable. The trial Court, being of the opinion that advalorem Court-fees was payable on the value of the property in suit, made an enquiry under section 8C of the Court-fees Act and directed the plaintiff to pay Court-fees on Rs. 12,000/-. The order was challenged on the ground that the subject-matter of the litigation was not the property but the right of the plaintiff to eject the licensee. It was contended before this Court that the value of this right must be less than the market value of the property. Das Gupta, J (Guha J. agreeing with him) observed:—
“If the Legislature had contended itself by merely saying that in suits for possession of lands, buildings or gardens the amount of fee payable shall be computed according to the value of the subject matter, there would have been much scope for the argument that the word ‘subject-matter’ should not he taken to be the same as the land, building or garden. The Legislature itself, however, proceeded to add that such value should be deemed to be 15 times the nett profits which have arisen from the land, building or garden during the year next before the date of presenting the plaint, or, if the Court sees reason to think that such profits have been wrongly estimated, fifteen times such amount as the Court may assess as such profits or according to the market value of the land, building or garden, whichever is lower, and then if, in the opinion of the Court, such profits are not readily ascertainable, or assessable, or where there are no such profits, according to the market value of the land, building or garden.”
10. His Lordship referred to the view expressed by A.N Sen, J. in the case reported in (2) A.I.R 1949 Cal. 621 and by Macklin, J. in (4) A.I.R 1947 Bom. 482 (supra) and thereafter further observed:—
“Though the view taken above which, as I have stated earlier, was also the view taken by Sen, J. in this Court, might result in hardship in many cases, I am unable to see how, on an interpretation of the statute according to recognised rules, it is possible to escape the conclusion that this view is right. It is certainly possible to say that the subject-matter of a suit is really the relief for which the suit is brought. It was in that view that this Court held in Chandi Charan Das v. Sushilabala Dasi, 59 C.W.N 606, that the valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction should be made in such cases where a plaintiff asks for possession of the land from a licensee not on the basis of the market-value of the land but on the valuation of the relief he wants to obtain by getting rid of the licensee. As was, however, pointed out in that very case, the interpretation of the word ‘subject-matter’ may well be different when the question of court-fee has to be considered under section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act.”
“I can see nothing that would justify any different conclusion. Reference has been made to a decision of this Court in Hafiz Md. Fatehnasib v. Haji Abdur Rub, A.I.R (1954) Cal. 101, where Lahiri and Guha Ray, JJ. held that in a suit by mutwalli to recover possession of the property it was the interest of the mutwalli in the disputed property which forms the basis of the valuation and not the interest of the full owner. I am unable to see how this decision is of any assistance to the present petitioner. It is certainly true that the marketvalue of anything has to be ascertained in respect of the particular interest. In one case it may be the landlord's interest, in another case it may be the tenant's interest and in another case it may be licensee's interest. So, when the plaintiff comes to Court as a mutwalli and his interest is to be valued, it is only reasonable to say that it is the market-value of the mutwalli's interest which forms the basis. That is what was decided in Hafi Md.'s case [A.I.R(1954) Cal. 101]. Applying that rule to the present case the position is that the plaintiff's case being that of a full owner entitled to obtain possession from the licensee, it is his interest as full owner which is to be calculated.”
11. I need now refer to three unreported decisions of this Court in order of chronology:
(I) Civil Revision Case No., 880 of 1948 (9) (Ratan Lal Goenka v. Krishna Kishore Kapani) decided by R.C Mitter and Roxburgh, JJ. on December 16, 1948. In this matter, the plaintiff instituted a suit to eject the defendant on the allegation that the defendant had been let into the house as a licensee but since then his licence has been revoked. He valued the suit for the purposes of Court-fee at the figure of Rs. 2000/- and paid court-fee on that valuation. An objection was taken that the Court-fee paid was insufficient inasmuch as the value of the house was much more than Rs. 2000/-. The Subordinate Judge directed the plaintiff under section 8A of the Court-fees Act to give a statement of valuation. The plaintiff moved against the order and contended that even though the case came under sec. 7(v).of the Court-fees Act, the plaintiff could be required only to pay Court-fees on the value not of the property, which he sought to recover, but on the value of the licence. The plaintiff relied, in support of his proposition, on the decision reported in (3) I.L.R 5 Patna 631. Their Lordships dissented from the Patna view and observed that the subject-matter of the suit was the house and therefore, the plaintiff must pay Court-fees on the value of the house, that is to say, land and building, in terms of the clause (v) of section 7 i.e, fifteen times the nett profit of the preceding year, or if there was no nett profit, according to the market-value of the house, i.e, the land and building. Although of that opinion, their Lordships observed that it was an anomaly that for the recovery of property from a tenant a lesser amount of Court-fees had to be paid under clause xi(cc) of section 7, viz. one year's rent and for recovery of possession from a licensee, whose right was more precarious than that of a tenant a larger amount of Court-fee must be paid. But in respect of that anomaly, their Lordships observed, the Government alone may give relief under section 35 of the Court-fees Act.
(II) Civil Revision Case No. 233 of 1949 (10) (Benoy Krishna Das v. Mihir Lal Das) decided by K.C Chunder, J. on July 15, 1949. This was also a suit for possession of a house from a licensee, on revocation of licence. The plaintiff valued the suit at Rs. 100/- and the defendant questioned the valuation and contended, the suit must be valued at the value of the property. The trial court negatived the contention of the defendant. Thereupon, the defendant moved the Court in revision. In making the Rule absolute Chunder, J. observed that from general principles it was apparent that after invocation of the license there was a determination of the same and the previous licensee became a trespasser, there can be no question that a suit to eject a trespasser falls within section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act; the case of a tenant was in pari materia; he was also a trespasser after the determination of his tenancy by a notice to quit. But there was a special provision, in section 7(xi)(cc) in case of a tenancy. Where there was a special provision, his Lordship observed, the general provision of section 7(v) would not apply. There was thus an anomaly causing greater hardship to licensors, who had revoked licenses than to landlords, who had determined a tenancy. His Lordship then observed:—
“But the law itself appears to be clear and as far as this Court is concerned now settled. A suit to recover possession from a licensee after revocation and determination of the license is clearly chargeable with court fees under section 7(v). The value will be the subject matter of the suit, that is, the house or portion of the house or land or building of which recovery of possession is sought, and in accordance with the section the valuation will be 15 times the net profit of the preceding year, or if there is no such net profit, then according to the market-value of the house or building or land or portion thereof.”
(III) Civil Revision Case No. 1083 of 1958 (11) (Bidyanand, Surekha v. Budhram Marwari) decided by Sen J., on June 23, 1959. In this case also a plaintiff, who had revoked a licence, sought to recover possession of a house from a licensee and valued the suit at Rs. 210/-. The defence was that the suit must be valued at Rs. 2000/- being the market-value of the house. The trial court upheld the contention of the defendant. The plaintiff moved this Court in revision. His Lordship referred to some of the cases hereinbefore referred to, namely, (5) 59 C.W.N 606, (8) 64 C.W.N 80 and observed:—
“The kind of relief sought being identical, it should make no difference whether the plaintiff seeks declaration of title as well as recovery of possession or seeks recovery of possession only as against a licensee whose license has been revoked, in either case the valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction and Court-fees should be the same.”
12. Lastly, it is necessary for me to refer to two other decisions of this Court, in which the point for my determination collaterally arose, in order to complete the survey.
(a) 98 C.L.J 1 (12) (Kishori Mohan Ghose v. Barada Pada Chakravortti). In this case the plaintiff sued to recover possession of a plot of land from a licensee, whose license had expired. The suit was valued at Rs. 2000/- for value of land. On enquiry under section 8C of the Court-fees Act, it was found that the value of the land was Rs. 65,000/-. On the basis of the license fee, which used to be paid, however, the valuation, under section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act would come up to Rs. 8280/-. The trial Court accepted the latter value. The defendant moved against the order. It was contended that license fee could not be treated as profits “which have arisen from the land”. Chakravartti, C.J, (Lahiri, J. sitting with him) observed:—
“Had it been necessary in this case to decide whether license fees can be properly regarded as “profits which have arisen from the land,” I would be inclined to hold that they could be so regarded. It ought not to be forgotten that the Court-fees Act is looking at the matter from the point of view of the plaintiff in a suit for ejectment and the only profit which it can possibly have in contemplation must be the profit derived by the plaintiff. If rent yielded by a plot of land can be said to be profit arisen from the land, about which I think there can be no dispute, I fail to see why a licence-fee cannot equally be said to be profit arisen from the land.
It is, however, not necessary for me to pursue this point further and come to a final decision, inasmuch as this case may be decided, as I have already said, on its own special facts. The language of clause (a) of section 7(v) is “the nett profits which have arisen from the land * * * during the year next before the date of presenting the plaint.” It is thus clear that in order that the clause may apply, it is necessary that there should be some profit during the year immediately preceding the date on which the plaint was presented. It appears that the plaint in the present suit was filed on the 20th June, 1950, which may be taken to correspond roughly to Ashar, 1357 B.S According to the plaintiff's own case, the licence came to an end in Chaitra, 1354 B.S It is thus clear that between the date on which the licence is said to have expired and the date on which the plaint was presented, there was an interval of about three years. If that was so, the petitioner was clearly a trespasser on the land and not a licensee during the year prior to the date of the presentation of the plaint and, necessarily, there could be no question of the plaintiff having derived any profit from the land by way of a licence-fee paid to him during the previous year. It will be obvious that even assuming that licence-fee is profit arisen from the land within the meaning of clause (a) of section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act, such fee will have to be paid or payable for the year immediately preceding the date on which the plaint is presented. When during the previous year no licence-fee was paid and no amount was claimable as such fee, there was no profit arisen from land and therefore clause (a) of section 7(v) would be clearly excluded. This fact, to my mind, is sufficient to dispose of the case and to enable us to hold in favour of the petitioner.
The question, therefore, is if clause (a) of section 7(v) does not apply, what provision of the Act does. It appears to me that the answer is furnished by clause (b) of the same section. That clause says that if in the opinion of the Court nett profits which have arisen from the land during the year next before the date of presenting the plaint are not readily ascertainable or where there are no such profits, the suit should be valued according to the market value of the land. On the facts I have already stated, the present case is one where there were no profits during the year next before the date on which the plaint was presented. The second part of clause (b) of section 7(v) is thus attracted and, therefore, the suit ought to be valued according to the market value of the land.”
(b) 99 C.L.J 138 (13) (Prabirendra Nath Nandy v. Narendra Nath Nandy). In that case the point arose whether the owner of an immovable property was entitled, on the termination of a license, to bring a suit against his licensee for a mandatory injunction directing him to vacate the property. The trial Court had decreed the suit. The first appellate Court reversed the decree, one of the grounds for reversal being that the plaintiff-appellants were not in possession of the disputed property. On second appeal Renupada Mukherjee, J. held:
“As a licensee, the respondent has got no interest in the disputed house and his possession cannot therefore exclude the possession of the rightful owners, viz. the appellants, in the eye of law. The appellants came into possession of the disputed house as soon as the license was revoked before the institution of the suit. It was not necessary for them to bring a suit for possession upon declaration of their title. The learned Appellate Court referred to a case in support of its view that a suit for injunction is not maintainable like the present because the appellants were not in possession at the date of the suit. This case is reported in Jahar Lal Banduri v. Nanda Lal Chaudhuri, (1913) 18 C.W.N 545. But that case is clearly distinguishable on facts from the present case. In the case cited the plaintiffs brought the suit on the footing that the defendants were trespassers. It was, therefore, held that in such a case the plaintiffs could not sue the defendants simply for an injunction but must sue for recovery of the land in suit. In the present case the plaintiffs alleged and established that the defendant respondent was merely a licensee. That being the case, the possession of the house lay with the appellants through the respondent and not with the respondent who had no independent or separate interest in the house. The lower Appellate Court therefore, committed an error in law in holding that the Appellants were out of possession and so they must sue for recovery of possession.”
13. I have now to consider several decisions of some other High Courts, which have some bearing on the point under consideration.
(a) (1892) I.L.R 15 Allahabad 63 (14) (Ram Raj Tewari v. Gir Nandan Bhagat). This was a suit to eject a tenant at fixed rates. Sir John Edge, C.J, and Ackman, J. held that such a suit was one for possession of land within the meaning of section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act, 1870, and the valuation of such suit for the purposes of Court-fees and of jurisdiction was the value of the subject-matter of the suit, that is to say, of the tenancy right, not of the land itself nor of merely one year's rent.
(b) A.I.R (1927) Patna 140 : I.L.R 5 Patna 631 (3) (Musammat Barkatunnisa Begum v. Kaniza Fatima). In this case the plaintiff filed a suit alleging that she had allowed her daughter and her husband to live in a house belonging to her but later on revoked the permission. On their refusal to vacate she brought a suit for declaration of her proprietary interest and recovery of possession. She valued her suit at Rs. 400/-. The trial Court returned the plaint on the ground that the subject-matter of the suit was beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction. An appeal against the order failed. Thereupon, the plaintiff moved the High Court in revision. Kulawant Sahay, J. (Ross, J. sitting with him) disposed of the Rule with the following observations:—
“The whole question is whether the suit as framed asks for a declaratory decree and for consequential relief. In my opinion the suit as framed is a suit for ejectment. The prayer for determination of the plaintiff's title was only incidentally made in the plaint. It is not denied on behalf of the defendant that at the time they entered the house the plaintiff was the owner of the house. They set up a subsequent gift from the plaintiff. The plaintiff denies that she made any gift to the defendants. If the defendants can succeed in proving the oral gift, the suit will certainly be dismissed; but the valuation of the suit is to be determined not upon the plea taken in the written statement but upon the allegations as made in the plaint. The plaint merely asks for a decree for ejectment of the defendants. The case comes, in my opinion, under S. 7, Cl. (v) of the Court-fees Act and the Court-fee payable is according to the market value of the subject-matter of the suit. The subject-matter of the suit is the right to eject the defendants and the value of that right is the value at which the defendants' right to remain in the house under the licence of the plaintiff may be valued: See Ram-raj Tewari v. Gir Nandan Bhagat (14) (1892) 15 All. 63 : (1892) A.W.N 240. The plaintiff valued it at Rs. 400/-. The Court does not say that this valuation is an unreasonable one. The plaintiff, however, has put in a petition for leave to amend the plaint in order to make her position clear. In my opinion, she ought to be given an opportunity to amend the plaint.”
(c) A.I.R (1934) Madras 714 (15) (Manikkam Pillai v. Nagasami Ayyar). This was a suit by a landlord to eject the defendants, who occupied a holding under him but had encroached upon part of a bed of a tank. Curgenven, J. held that recovery of possession was an essential element of any suit filed to turn out an encroacher. He further held that a tank-bed had no market value because it was unsaleable except as accessory to some other property. No means existed for ascertaining what in the event of such a sale, its value would be. Hence it was impossible to apply the provisions of section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act, because the value of the subject-matter was not determinable. The only course was to assess Court-fees under Schedule II, Art. 17-B of the Court-fees Act (equivalent to Schedule II, Art. 17(vi) of the local amendment applicable to West Bengal).
(d) A.I.R (1944) All. 279 : I.L.R 1944 All. 564 (16) (Sri Sitaramji Mandu v. Rajhunath Das). In that case the dispute was between two rival Sarbarahkars for their right to manage as Sarbarahkar and the beneficial ownership of the temples was not denied. The deity was deemed to be in possession of land, buildings and gardens as required by section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act. Ismail and Malik, JJ. (Malik, J. delivering the judgment) held that the value of the subject-matter should not be the value of the property and it being impossible to estimate at money value the subject matter, Schedule II, Article 17 of the Court-fees Act should apply.
(e) A.I.R (1947) Bombay 482 (4) (Ratilal Manilal v. Chandulal Chhotalal). This was a suit for possession of a house from a defendant, said to be a licensee. Macklin, J. (Bavdekar, J. sitting with him) held that the Court-fee was payable under section 7(v)(e) of the Court-fees Act according to the market-value of the house. His Lordship's reasons are set out below:—
“The High Court of Patna relies upon a decision of the High Court of Allahabad passed in 1892, before the Court-fees Act was amended so as to make special provision for a suit by a landlord against his tenant for possession of property leased on the basis of the lease: See 15 All. 63. Their Lordships agreed unhesitatingly that the case fell within S. 7(v), Court-fees Act, and on the analogy of this case the High Court of Patna also agreed that the case of a licensee suing for possession of immovable property on the basis of the licence also fell under s. 7(v). In each case, as here, the real question for determination was the value of the subject-matter of the suit, and that involves the determination of the subject-matter itself. In the landlord and tenant suit the High Court of Allahabad held that the subject-matter could not be treated as the land itself as the landlord had through his tenants proprietary possession and what was sought in the suit was to free the land from the possession of the tenants holding as tenants at fixed rates, that is, to get rid of the tenants and their tenant-rights. Apparently there the Court thought that the subject-matter of the suit was getting rid of the tenants and their tenant-rights. In the licensee case before the Patna High Court the Court thought that the subject-matter of the suit was the right to eject the defendants and the value of that right was the value at which the defendant's right to remain in the house under the licence of the plaintiff might be valued. In neither case did the Court treat the subject-matter as being the property itself, although it was of the property itself that possession was sought. In defence of the order of the lower Court it is argued that this is the correct way to look at the question, since the subject-matter in a case of this kind ought not to be regarded as the entire house with all the rights involved therein but merely one aspect of the house. But with all respect to the learned Judges who decided the two cases cited, I think that they are entirely wrong. In plain English the subject-matter of a suit is what the suit is about. It is not the same thing as the object of the suit. The object of the suit is the claim, in other words, possession of the house. The subject of the suit is the house. That this is the correct view to take is, I think, clear also from the wording of S. 7(v), itself. The section says that suits for the possession of land, houses or gardens are to be valued according to the subject-matter, and the sub-section goes on to say that where the subject-matter is land, the value shall be determined according to cl. (a), (b), (c) or (d) and where the subject-matter is a house or garden, the value shall be deemed to be the market value of the house or garden. In other words the section contemplates the subject-matter of a suit for the possession of land as being the land and the subject-matter of a suit for the possession of a garden as being the garden and the subject-matter of a suit for the possession of a house as being the house, and there is no suggestion to be derived from the section itself or, so far as I know, from anywhere else that the subject-matter ought to be taken to be anything else. I can imagine hard cases arising out of this provision; I can imagine cases where paying the court-fee on the value of a house might in all the circumstances be an unduly heavy price to pay in the event of the suit being lost. But we cannot do anything about that. The law seems to be as I have said; and if the law is harsh, it can always be amended.”
(f) A.I.R (1950) Nagpur 237 : I.L.R 1950 Nagpur 432 (17) (Gajanan Nanji v. Rajeshwar Krishnaji). This was a suit for possession of a shop in a market building by a permanent lessee thereof. Bose, C.J, held that such a suit was clearly a suit for possession of a house. Therefore, the subject-matter, so far as possession was concerned, was the house and not the possession of the leasehold right which was intangible and not capable of physical possession. The valuation, therefore, depended on the market value of the house and not on the value of the leasehold rights in it. His Lordship observed:—
“The learned counsel for the plaintiffs relies on (3) Mt. Barkatunnisa Begum v. Mt. Kaniza Fatima, 5 Pat. 631 [A.I.R 1927 Pat. 140], where the learned Judges have applied S. 7(v), Court-fees Act. But the learned Judges do not state which part of the section applies. Their reasoning is that the subject-matter of the suit in a case like this is not the house but the leasehold rights in it. If that is so then with the utmost respect I cannot see how S. 7(v) can apply because that is limited to eases where the subject-matter is either a house, garden or land.
Section 7(v) runs:
‘In suits for the possession of….houses….according to the value of the subject-matter and such value shall be deemed to be
(e) Where the subject matter is a house. ….according to the market-value of the house.’
Therefore, the Court is bound to apply the market-value in every case where possession is sought of a house.
Now this suit is clearly for possession of a portion of a house, therefore the subject-matter is, so far as the question of possession is concerned, the house. It does not matter what the interests in the house consist of because the suit is not for possession of the leasehold rights—these are intangible and are not capable of physical possession. The tangible physical object of which possession is sought is the house; therefore the subject-matter of the suit, so far as possession is concerned, is the house. With all respect to the learned Patna Judges, I am unable to agree with their reasoning.”
(g) A.I.R 1952 Madhya Bharat 123 (18) (Martandrao Tatvaji v. Tarabai). This was a suit by a husband to recover possession of a portion of a house from his first wife, whom he described as his licensee. Mehta, J. held that where the suit was for possession of house from a licensee the Court-fee was payable under section 7(v)(e) of the Court-fees Act according to the market-value of the house. His Lordship followed the cases reported in (4) A.I.R 1947 Bombay 482 and (2) A.I.R 1949 Calcutta 621 and dissented from the view expressed in (3) A.I.R 1927 Pat. 140 : I.L.R 5 Pat. 681.
(h) A.I.R 1964 Madras 200 (19) (Nidugonda Rudramani v. Chaduvula Sri Sailam). This was also a suit for ejectment of a licensee from a house, on revocation of license. Chandra Reddy, J. observed that Sec. 7(xi)(cc) cannot have any application to a suit to recover possession of the property from a licensee, because a licensee is not a tenant. His Lordship further observed:—
“Counsel for the petitioners next argued that in any event the case is not governed by S. 7(v)(e) of the Act as the subject-matter in dispute is not the house itself but something less namely the right of the defendants to remain in the house. According to him, S. 7(v)(e) of the Act applies only when the suit is based on title and not to a case like the present where the plaintiffs revoke the licence and the dispute in the suit is only the right of the licensee to remain in the house.
The basis of the argument is — ‘A.I.R 1927 Pat. 140’. No doubt the above case lends support to his argument. The learned Judges took the view that a suit for ejectment of a licensee after the revocation of the licence was under S. 7(v), Court-fees Act and the court-fee payable is according to the market-value of the subject-matter of the suit. According to them, the subject-matter of the suit is the right to eject the defendants and the value of that right is the value at which the defendants' right to remain in the house under the licence of the plaintiff may be valued.
Sub-clause (e) of cl. (v) of S. 7 makes provision for the recovery of possession of garden or house. So a suit for recovery of possession of a house has to be valued under that sub-clause when once it is found to come under S. 7(v), Court-fees Act. Nor am I able to appreciate the force of the observation that the subject-matter of the suit is the right of the licensee to remain in the house. If the basis of the suit is the revocation of the licence I do not see what right the licensee has to remain in the house. He is in the position of a trespasser and he has no right to continue in possession of the house.
In support of their conclusion the learned Judges relied upon a decision of the Allahabad High Court in ‘15 All 63’. That was a suit to eject a tenant at a fixed rate on the allegation that the tenant committed acts inconsistent with the purposes for which the land was let. The question incidentally arose whether the suit should be valued as one for possession of land within the meaning of para 5 of S. 7, Court-fees Act. It was decided that para 5 of S. 7 applied to such a case. It was further observed that
‘the subject-matter cannot be treated as the land itself, as the landlord-plaintiff has through his tenancy, proprietary possession, and what is really sought is to free the land from the possession of the tenants’
that is, to get rid of the tenants. For the reasons mentioned above I find it difficult to agree with the rule stated therein.
Section 7(v) is limited to cases where the subject-matter is either a house, garden or land. If possession of any of them is sought, it must be valued as provided for in that section and possession is made for the recovery of possession of house under sub-cl. (e) requiring computation of court-fee on the basis of the market value.
A Bench of the Bombay High Court in— ‘Ratilal v. Chandulal’, A.I.R 1947 Bom. 482, expressly dissented from— ‘A.I.R 1927 Pat. 140’. The view taken by them was that a suit for possession of a house on the allegation that the defendant was in possession as a licensee has to be valued under S. 7(v)(e), Court-fees Act. Repelling the argument that the subject-matter in a case of this kind ought not to be regarded as the entire house with all the rights involved therein but merely one aspect of the house, the learned Judges observed that ‘the subject-matter of a suit is what the suit is about. It is not the same thing as the object of the suit.’
The same view was taken in a recent case by the Calcutta High Court in ‘Satish Kumar v. Sailabasini Devi’, A.I.R 1949 Cal. 621. In ‘Gajanan v. Bajeswar’, A.I.R 1950 Nag. 237 Bose, J. expressed his disagreement with the principle enunciated in ‘A.I.R 1927 Pat. 140’ and reached the same conclusion as the learned Judges in A.I.R 1947 Bom. 482, though there is no reference to that case.
I express my respectful agreement with the rule stated by the Bombay High Court in A.I.R (1947) Bombay 482, and hold that the present case is governed by S. 7(v)(e), Court-fees Act and Court-fee has to be paid on the market-value of the house.”
14. These are all the cases I need refer to in this context.
15. It appears from the examination of case law that there are five different lines of opinion on this point, namely.
(i) The value of the subject-matter of a suit to eject a licensee is the right of the licensee. Even viewed as a suit for recovery of possession, the possession of the licensee is the subject-matter of the litigation and as such is of lesser value than the value of the property. This is the view to be found in the cases in (1) 24 C.W.N 167, (3) A.I.R 1927 Patna 141 : (I.L.R 5 Patna 631). The decision in (13) 99 C.L.J 138 inclines to this view, though it does not decide the point. I.L.R 15 Allahabad 63 (14) also supports the reasoning behind this view.
(ii) In a suit for possession from a licensee Sec. 7(v) of the Court-fees Act applies and since the subject-matter cannot be valued precisely, the valuation put by the plaintiff must be accepted. Alternatively, if it be held to be governed by Sec. 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act, the plaintiff would be entitled to put his own valuation, because no objective standard of valuation is available. This is the view to be found in (7) 63 C.W.N 380.
(iii) In such a suit Court-fee must be paid on the value of the property which is taken to be the subject-matter. This is the view to be found in (9) Civil Revision Case No. 880 of 1948, (10) Civil Revision Case No. 233 of 1949, (2) A.I.R 1949 Cal. 621, (8) 64 C.W.N 80, (4) A.I.R (1947) Bombay 482, (17) A.I.R 1950 Nagpur 237, (18) A.I.R (1952) Madhya Bharat 123 and (19) A.I.R (1954) Madras 200. The decision in (12) 98 C.L.J 1 also inclines to this view.
(iv) In such a suit the subject-matter of the suit is not the property in respect of which the plaintiff claims relief but the relief itself. The relief is that the licensee should leave the land and structures thereon. The value of this is obviously very less ordinarily than the value of the property over which the licence was said to have been given. For the purposes of jurisdiction, the valuation need not be made on the basis of the market value of the property or the capitalised value of the profit thereof. This is the view we find in the case reported in (5) 59 C.W.N 606.
Sen, J. is the strongest critic of this view point and his Lordship's views are to be found in the cases in (6) A.I.R 1954 Cal. 101 and (11) Civil Revision Case 1083 of 1958.
(v) The remaining point of view is that in such a suit Court-fees must be assessed under Schedule II, Article 17, because the value is indeterminate. This is the view to be found in the cases in (15) A.I.R 1934 Madras 714 and (16) A.I.R 1944 All. 279. With this view I do not agree, because in my opinion such suits are covered by section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act.
16. From the above analysis it appears that there is a preponderance of judicial opinion in favour of the point of view as in number (iii) referred to above.
17. It also appears from the review of case law hereinbefore made that the two decisions reported in (5) 59 C.W.N 606 and (8) 64 C.W.N 80 (both by Das Gupta, J.) are not reconcilable, unless it be held that his Lordship confined his observation in the case, reported in (5) 59 C.W.N 606, only to valuation of a suit for the purpose of jurisdiction.
18. The answer to the question before me ought to be sought, in the first place, in what the position of a licensee is, after his licence is revoked. In my opinion a licensee, whose licence has been revoked, becomes a trespasser, just as a tenant, whose tenancy has been determined becomes a trespasser, unless law makes him a statutory tenant. That a licensee becomes a trespasser, after revocation of his licence finds support from the decision in (12) 98 C.L.J 1 and (10) Civil Revision Case 233 of 1949 (Supra) and also from another decision reported in (20) 1944 K.B 298 (Minister of Health v. Bellotti). In the latter case to house the defendants and others evacuated from Gibralter, during the last Great War large blocks of flats were requisitioned and furnished by the Commissioner of Works and then handed over to the Minister of Health, who granted licences to evacuees to reside in them. Difficulties as to discipline having arisen, letters were sent on behalf of the Minister to the defendants requiring them to leave their rooms together with their dependants taking all their possessions with them, within one week. Attempts to expel them having failed, the Minister commenced proceedings for damages and an injunction. Lord Greene M.R held that although the time given to vacate was unreasonable the letters were valid notices revoking the licenses and as, by the time the proceedings were commenced sufficient time had elapsed for the defendants to vacate their rooms, the Minister was entitled to injunction restraining the defendants from trespassing in the blocks of flat.
19. If a licensee whose licence stands revoked, becomes a trespasser, then a suit for eviction of such a person undoubtedly would be a suit for possession of land, house or garden and must be valued according to the value of the subject-matter under section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act. No body has as yet gone to the length of holding that the subject-matter of a suit for possession against a trespasser is not the property in respect of which the plaintiff claims relief but the relief itself namely, that the trespasser should leave the property. Viewed from this point of view all difficulties, as to the meaning of the word “subject-matter” should disappear.
20. The word “subject-matter” is used in section 6 of the Civil Procedure Code, which is to the following effect:—
“Save in so far as is otherwise expressly provided, nothing herein contained shall operate to give any Court any jurisdiction over suits, the amount or the value of the subject-matter of which exceeds the pecuniary limits (if any) of its ordinary jurisdiction.”
21. Order 7, Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, inter alia, provides:
“The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:—
(a) ***
(b) where the relief claimed is under-valued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so:
(c) ***
(d) ***
22. The words, “value of the subject-matter” in section 6 and the words “value of the relief” in Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure have, in my opinion, been used in identical sense and the value of the subject-matter is, without more, the value of the relief.
23. I have already observed that the subject-matter of a suit for eviction against a licensee whose licence stands revoked and who thereupon becomes a trespasser, is the property which is sought to be recovered. That being so, the value of the relief must be the value of the subject-matter, namely, the property and that must be valued in accordance with section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act.
24. It remains for me now to consider whether for the purpose of jurisdiction, such a suit need be valued differently. That appears to be the view taken in the case reported in (5) 59 C.W.N 606. Das Gupta, J. emphasised on Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, which is to the following effect:—
“Where in suits other than those referred to in the Court-fees Act, section 7, paragraphs v, vi and ix and paragraph x, clause (d), Court-fees are payable advalorem under the Court-fees Act, 1870, the value as determinable for the computation of Court-fees and the value for the purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same.”
25. His Lordship, therefore, observed that in determining the value of a suit, in which Court-fee was payable under section 7(v), no assistance was to be had from the Court-fees Act because section 8 deliberately excluded it from the application of the rule that the value as determinable for the purpose of Court-fees and the value for the purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same.
26. Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act no doubt excludes section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act. But section 8 is in Part II, which deals with “other suits”. Part I of the Suits Valuation Act deals with “suits relating to lands”. The word “land” is defined in section 5 of the Bengal General Clauses Act as follows:—
“In all Bengal Acts made between the first day of June, 1867 and the commencement of this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,—
(1) “land” includes houses and buildings and corporeal here-ditaments and tenements of any tenure, unless where there are words to exclude houses and buildings or to restrict the meaning to tenements of some particular tenure;
(2) ***”
27. In the ordinary legal sense, the word “land” comprehends trees standing on the land and everything else of a fixed and permanent nature thereon. Therefore, in Part I of the Suits Valuation Act, the word “land” may be taken to include houses, garden lands or gardens.
28. Section 3 of the Suits Valuation Act, appearing in Part I, is to the following effect:—
“(1) The ‘Government of a Part A State or a Part C State’ may make rules for determining the value of land for purposes of jurisdiction in the suits mentioned in the Court-fees Act, 1870, section 7, paragraphs (v) and (vi) and paragraph (x), clause (d).
(2) The rules may determine the value of any class of land, or of any interest in land in the whole or any part of a local area, and may prescribe different values for different places within the same local area.”
29. No such rule has, however, as yet been prescribed by the Government.
30. But, Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act provides for no guidance as to how a suit for possession against a licensee, whose licence stands determined, shall be valued for the purposes of jurisdiction — such suits being governed by Part I of the Suits Valuation Act, which does not include Section 8.
31. Then again it is difficult to conceive, that the valuation of such a suit for the purpose of jurisdiction shall be other than what is its valuation for the purpose of Court-fees. The subject-matter being identical for both the purposes, as I have already indicated, the valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction and Court-fees must be the same.
32. I have now to consider whether there is any difference between revocation of a licence and termination of a licence. The word “revocation” means the calling back of a thing granted. The word “termination” or “determination” means not only premature extinction, but the coming to an end, in any way whatever. A ‘termination’ or ‘determination’ may automatically happen because of effluxion of time agreed upon or it may be caused in any other way, as for example, determination of a tenancy by a notice to quit. A revocation of a licence and determination of a licence have the same effect, namely, the licence comes to an end. The only difference that I can visualise between the use of two expressions is that a revocation has to be caused or made by the person revoking it, termination or determination may automatically happen and also may be caused or made by the person desirous of termination or determination. But when the suit is brought for possession against a licensee, either on revocation or on termination of the licence, the suit is, in either case, a suit for eviction of trespasser. They must be valued either for the purposes of Court-fees or for jurisdiction in the same manner.
33. The view which I take must operate harshly on those who may seek eviction of licensees, on determination of their licences. While a landlord who seeks to evict a tenant, on determination of the tenancy, has to pay a lesser amount of Court-fee, calculated on the basis of 7(xi)(cc), an owner shall be required to pay more and larger amount of Court-fees, under section 7(v)(a) of the Court-fees Act, if he wants to evict a licensee, namely,
“(a) according to the value of the subject-matter, and such value shall be deemed to be fifteen times the nett profits which have arisen from the land, building or garden during the year next before the date of presenting the plaint, or if the Court sees reason to think that such profits have been wrongly estimated, fifteen times such amount as the Court may assess as such profits or according to the market-value of the land, building or garden, whichever is lower;”
34. But I am unable to give relief against such hardship. Law is an objective thing and there it stands, whether it entails any hardship or does not.
35. In the view that I take, I answer the questions referred to the Special Bench as follows:—
(1) Valuation of a suit for ejectment of a licensee, upon revocation or termination of his licence, either for the purpose of Court-fees or for the purpose of jurisdiction shall be made under the provisions of section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act.
(2) There is no difference in the manner of such valuation between a case of revocation of licence and a case of termination of licence as distinguished from revocation of licence.
36. Let the case be now placed before the learned Chief Justice, with the answer given to the questions, for necessary direction.
37. There will be no order as to costs in this Reference.
38. Mr. Alok Gupta appeared before the Special Division Bench as a Amicus curie, because there was nobody to represent the opposite-party. Government Pleader also did not appear before the Special Bench. I am thankful to Mr. Gupta for the assistance he gave to me in resolving my doubts.
39. Let a copy of this judgment be forwarded to the Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, Government of West Bengal, so that he may know of our views and take steps under section 3 of the Suits Valuation Act or section 35 of the Court-fees Act so as to remove the hardship which the law causes to the litigant public in such matters.
Guha, J.:— I agree.
P.N Mookerjee, J.:— I agree in the answers, proposed by my Lords.
40. The divergent views have all been carefully collected, neatly analysed and elaborately discussed by my Lord (Banerjee, J.) and I would only refer here to the substance or essence of the matter, which stands as follows:
The license having ended,— and that is how these plaints proceed,— be it by revocation or termination other wise, the licensee has become a trespasser, and the suit against him must, accordingly, be treated on that footing, both for purposes of jurisdiction and court-fee, in the absence, of course,— which is the admitted and obvious position here, as shown by my Lord,— of any effective statutory provision to the contrary.
41. From the above point of view, the true position has been fully discussed and admirably set out by my Lord (Banerjee, J.) and I need only express my respectful concurrence with him on the point.
S.K.B