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  • section 148 or section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • sections 148 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure..13.
  • section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 35 of the Specific Belief Act.12.
  • 9 rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • SECTION 35 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
  • section 151 C.P.C
  • section 148 C.P.C
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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Acts
  • section 148 or section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • sections 148 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure..13.
  • section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 35 of the Specific Belief Act.12.
  • 9 rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • SECTION 35 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
  • section 151 C.P.C
  • section 148 C.P.C
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Das Gupta, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners (Bhutnath Das and others) brought a suit for redemption of a mortgage or, alternatively, for specific performance of an agreement for reconveyance. On 23 August 1957 the trial Judge decreed the plaintiffs' alternative prayer for reconveyance, ordered that the plaintiffs deposit Rs. 14,725 in court within a fortnight, and directed that if the deposit was not made within the specified time the suit would stand dismissed on contest with costs. The order also provided that if deposit was made but the defendant failed to execute the reconveyance deed within one month, the plaintiffs could obtain a reconveyance deed executed by the court.

On 30 August 1957 the plaintiffs filed a petition purportedly under sections 148 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), praying for an extension of time for making the deposit by three months. The Subordinate Judge rejected the application on the ground that the court had finally lost seisin of the suit by the dismissal clause and, even if discretion existed, it would be unreasonable to extend time. A Rule nisi was issued challenging the rejection and the principal question before the Division Bench was whether the trial court had jurisdiction to extend the time after making the conditional decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a trial court, having ordered specific performance on condition that a specified sum be deposited within a stated time and also ordering that if the money is not deposited the suit shall stand dismissed, retains jurisdiction thereafter to enlarge the time for deposit.
  2. Whether, if any jurisdiction exists in such circumstances, it is available under section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  3. Whether, if any jurisdiction exists in such circumstances, it is available under section 151 (inherent jurisdiction) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bajranglala Jhunjhunwalla v. Sm. Solaki Marwarini (54 C.W.N. 933) Example where this Court extended time under section 148 CPC; Roxburgh, J. observed that if the order of dismissal had operated, s.148 would not entitle the court to extend time. Cited to show prior use of s.148 to extend time; distinguished because the present deposit for performance was held not to be an act “prescribed or allowed by this Code,” so s.148 was held inapplicable here.
Kshetra Mohan Ghose v. Gour Mohan Kapali (37 C.W.N. 878) Decision holding that where a court fixes time for taking steps and directs that on failure the case shall stand dismissed, the court has no jurisdiction to extend the time. The Court treated this decision as binding and applied it to hold that the trial court lost jurisdiction as soon as it made the conditional order directing payment and dismissal on default.
Printing and Industrial Machinery Ltd. v. Swatika Press Ltd. (90 C.L.J. 105) Decision holding that extension of time was permissible where, by reason of default, only an application (for stay) was terminated and the main proceedings remained unaffected. Cited and contrasted: the present case differs because the default clause would dismiss the suit itself, whereas in that case default terminated only an interlocutory application, so the decision was not applicable here.
Abdul Shaker Sahib v. Abdul Rahiman Sahib (I.L.R. 46 Mad. 148) Madras decision holding that when time is fixed for payment for specific performance and no dismissal-on-default clause exists, the time fixed is not necessarily a condition and should not be made a condition. Distinguished as inapplicable because there was no dismissal clause in that case; not helpful for the present question where dismissal on default was expressly ordered.
Mahommadalli Sahib v. Abdul Khadir Saheb (59 M.L.J. 351) Madras decision holding that time fixed may be an indication of what is reasonable and not an absolute condition (again in cases without a dismissal clause). Distinguished for the same reason as Abdul Shaker Sahib: absence of a dismissal-on-default clause made those authorities inapposite here.
Gakul Prasad v. Fattelal (I.L.R. 1945 Nag. 924) Nagpur decision holding that even with a dismissal-on-default clause, such a decree may be preliminary and the lower court could extend time. Considered and rejected as unpersuasive: Court explained why the mere preliminary nature of a decree does not keep jurisdiction alive and declined to follow that view.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a focused, stepwise analysis constrained by the text of the trial order and the statutory provisions invoked.

  1. Analysis under section 148 CPC:
    • The Court noted the text of section 148, which permits the court to enlarge a period fixed by it for doing any act "prescribed or allowed by this Code."
    • The Court considered whether the deposit ordered for performance of the contract could be regarded as an act "prescribed or allowed by this Code." The Court concluded that the deposit for performance of the contract could not be so considered and therefore section 148 did not apply to permit enlargement of time in this case.
    • The Court relied on the reasoning in Bajranglala Jhunjhunwalla to explain that s.148 can operate in some cases, but that it would not assist if an order of dismissal had operated; this supported the conclusion that s.148 was inapplicable here.
  2. Analysis under section 151 CPC (inherent jurisdiction):
    • The Court began by emphasizing that section 151 can only operate if the court retains jurisdiction in the litigation; if the court has lost seisin/jurisdiction, inherent jurisdiction cannot be invoked.
    • The decisive question became whether the trial court, by making a conditional decree ordering payment within a specified time and directing that failure to pay would result in dismissal of the suit, retained any jurisdiction thereafter.
    • The Court reasoned that where the court makes the decree for specific performance conditional on payment within a specified time and indicates that the time is intended to be the essence of the order (especially by adding a dismissal-on-default clause), it would be unrealistic and unjust to hold that the court retained jurisdiction.
    • The Court drew a contrast with cases where time is fixed but there is no dismissal clause; in such cases the court might be said to retain jurisdiction because the time may be an indication of reasonableness rather than an essential condition. But where dismissal-on-default is expressly ordered, the judicial determination is complete and only ministerial steps (such as executing a deed if the defendant fails to do so after deposit) remain, which do not amount to retention of jurisdiction in the suit.
    • The Court considered and followed the earlier Division Bench decision in Kshetra Mohan Ghose, treating it as binding authority that a court loses jurisdiction when it directs that on failure to take a step within time the case shall stand dismissed.
  3. Consideration of other authorities and statute:
    • The Court examined other High Court decisions (Madras and Nagpur) and explained why those were not apposite: several decisions lacked a dismissal-on-default clause and thus did not govern the present factual posture; one Nagpur decision that allowed extension despite a dismissal clause was found unconvincing.
    • The Court referred to section 35 of the Specific Relief Act, noting that the statute contemplates rescission by the court where a decree for specific performance is not complied with and that the concluding portion of section 35 allows the court in the suit to rescind the contract "either so far as regards the party in default, or altogether." The Court observed that an order that the suit will stand dismissed in default is, in substance, an order of the type contemplated by that concluding portion of section 35.
  4. Conclusion of analysis:
    • On the combined review of statutes, authorities, and the substance of the trial court's order (including the dismissal-on-default clause), the Court concluded that the trial court did not retain jurisdiction to enlarge the time under section 151 and that section 148 likewise did not apply.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Rule is discharged; the Division Bench held that after making an order directing payment within a specified time and ordering that on failure the suit shall stand dismissed, the trial court does not retain jurisdiction to enlarge the time under section 148 or section 151 CPC.

Immediate consequences:

  • The trial court's order rejecting the plaintiffs' application for extension of time was upheld: the trial court had lost jurisdiction to extend the time after making the conditional decree.
  • The Rule challenging that rejection was discharged with costs.

Broader implications (as addressed in the opinion):

  • The Court explained a general principle: whether a court retains jurisdiction to alter or enlarge a time fixed in a decree depends on the substance of the directions given — particularly whether the court has made time of the essence by expressly providing dismissal on default.
  • The opinion distinguished situations where time is fixed merely as an indication of reasonableness (and no dismissal clause exists) from those where an express dismissal-on-default clause removes the court's judicial jurisdiction once the order is made.

Disposition and Concurrence

The opinion concludes by discharging the Rule with costs. The judgment records that Debabrata Mookerjee, J. agreed with Das Gupta, J.

    Bhutnath Das And Ors. v. Sahodeb Chandra Panja Opposite Party.

    Das Gupta, J.:— This case raises a question of considerable importance and of some difficulty. The question is whether a trial court after it has ordered specific performance of a contract, on a sum of money being put in within a specified time and also ordered that if the money is not put in within that date, the suit would stand dismissed, has jurisdiction thereafter to extend the time.

    2. The petitioner Bhutnath Das and others brought a suit for redemption of a mortgage or alternatively for specific performance for an agreement for re-conveyance. On the 23rd August, 1957 the trial Judge passed the following order:

    “Ordered that the suit be decreed on contest with costs. Plff's alternative prayer for re-conveyance of the property is allowed. Plffs. shall deposit the sum of Rs. 14725/- in favour of the defdt. within a fortnight from to-day in court. If the deposit is made within the specified time the defdt. shall execute a deed of re-conveyance in respect of the suit properties in favour of the plffs. after the plffs. would approve the draft of the deed of re-conveyance. If the defdt. fails to execute the deed of re-conveyance within one month” from to-day after the deposit of the said sum by the plffs. the plffs. will be at liberty to have a deed of re-conveyance executed in their favour by this court. Court fee paid oh the plaint is sufficient. If the plffs. fail to make the deposit within the specified time then the suit shall stand dismissed on contest with costs.”

    3. On the 30th August, 1957 the plaintiffs filed a petition purporting to be under sections 148 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying for extension of time for making the deposit by three months. The learned Subordinate Judge was of opinion that the court had by making the order that the suit shall stand dismissed in the event of the failure of the defendant to deposit the money within the time fixed finally lost seisin of the suit and could not enlarge the time. He was further of the opinion that even if ha had discretion in the matter it would be unreasonable to extend the time Accordingly he rejected the application. This Rule is directed against his order rejecting the application for extension of time. The main question is whether the trial court has in such a case jurisdiction to extend the time. If it has jurisdiction the question whether on the facts of the case an order should have been passed in exercise of that jurisdiction will have to be considered. If the court has any jurisdiction to extend the time it must be either under section 148 or section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that where any period is fixed or granted by the court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this court, the court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period, even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired. Thus where, the court makes an order in an application under order 9 rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure setting aside a decree on terms as to costs or payment into Court of any sum of money by a certain date and fixes for a period for that payment the provisions of this section will apply as the act for the doing of which the period has been fixed is one “prescribed or allowed by this Code.” It was in view of the provisions of this section that this court extended the time in Bajranglala Jhunjhunwalla v. Sm. Solaki Marwarini (1) (54 C.W.N 933). It is to be noticed that Roxburgh. J. there said that if the order of dismissal had operated the provisions of section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure will not entitle the court to extend the time. The extension of time which was granted was, however, under section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the deposit of money that was ordered in this case could be considered to be an act prescribed or allowed by the Code there would be no doubt, in my opinion, that the court had jurisdiction under section 148 C.P.C to extend the time. I cannot see, however, how this deposit of money for the performance of the contract can be considered to be an act either prescribed or allowed by the Code. I have no hesitation therefore, in holding that section 148 C.P.C has no application.

    4. The question whether section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure gives the court jurisdiction to extend the time is more difficult. In the first place we have to remember that if the Court has lost seisin of the case altogether there is no scope for the application of section 151 C.P.C It is only if the court has retained jurisdiction in the litigation that the question of making any order in inherent jurisdiction arises. If jurisdiction had already ceased to exist the scope of making order in the inherent jurisdiction of the court totally disappears. The real question, therefore, is whether in a case like where an order has been made for the payment of certain money within a certain time for the purpose of getting specific performance and at the same time an order has also been made that if the money is not paid the suit will stand dismissed, the court retains jurisdiction. Though not without hesitation, I have reached the conclusion that in such a case it will be unrealistic and unjust to say that the court retains jurisdiction. Whether the court has retained jurisdiction or not will, in my view, depend very much on the substance of the directions given. If in granting a decree for a specific performance the court makes it conditional on the payment being made within a certain time and it appears that the time specified was intended by the Court to be the essence of the order, it would be unreasonable, in my opinion, to hold that the court has still retained jurisdiction. Where a decree for specific performance is made and at the same time a direction is given to the plaintiff to put in the money within a certain time and there is no indication that time is the essence of the order, it might be possible and ordinarily reasonable to say that though a time has been specified for the performance of the act, the court has not finally dealt with the matter and retains jurisdiction to pass such other orders as may appear to it to be reasonable. Where, however, the court makes also an order that if the amount is not deposited within the time specified the suit will stand dismissed, I find it difficult to agree that the court retains any jurisdiction whatsoever. It has been said that if the amount is put in within a certain time and the defendant does not carry out the direction of the court as regards execution of the deed of re-conveyance, the plaintiff will be at liberty to have a deed of reconveyance executed in his favour by the court and so the court retains jurisdiction in the matter It appears to me wrong to say that this is retention of jurisdiction in the judicial determination of the suit. When an order of the nature indicated has been made the judicial determination is complete and there is nothing more to be done by the court in the litigation in its judicial capacity. What has to be done if and when the plaintiffs apply to have a deed of re-conveyance by the court is ministerial work. The fact that the court may, in the case where the deposit is made within the time but still the defendant fails to execute the deed within the time as directed by the court, have to take steps does not, in my opinion, justify the conclusion that the court has retained jurisdiction in the suit.

    5. In our own Court it was decided in Kshetra Mohan Ghose v. Gour Mohan Kapali (2) (37 C.W.N 878) that where a certain time is fixed by a deed of the court for taking some steps and it directs that on failure of doing so within the time limited the case should stand dismissed, the court has no jurisdiction to extend the time limited by the decree. That it is true was not in a case of specific performance. An objection under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure having been rejected an appeal was taken to the court of the Subordinate Judge. The Subordinate Judge made an order that Rs. 30/- should be paid within seven days of the order and further said: “If the payment of Rs. 30/- be not made according to the above direction the appeal shall stand dismissed with costs.” The sum was not paid during the seven days and on the 6th June, 1932, which was the seventh day from the date of the order the judgment-debtor put an application for time, to deposit the amount. The application was allowed by the court below. This court, however, held that the executing court had no jurisdiction to extend the time having lost jurisdiction in the case as soon as it made the order that on failure to deposit the amount within the time limited the case should stand-dismissed.

    6. It seems to me that we are bound by this decision to hold in the present case also that the trial court had lost jurisdiction in the suit as soon as it made the order directing the payment within ascertained time and further directing that on failure of the deposit being made within the time limited the case should stand dismissed.

    7. This, as far as we could discover, is only decision of any Division Bench of this court on this question. Reference has been made to a recent decision of Sarkar. J., sitting singly (Printing and Industrial Machinery Ltd. v. Swatika Press Ltd. (3), 90 C.L.J 105). The facts in that case were that upon defendant's application for stay of execution of a decree on the ground that a suit by the defendant against the plaintiff for a larger sum was pending, it was ordered by the court that execution would be stayed on defendant's furnishing security for the decretal amount within a fortnight and that on defendant's default to furnish security within a fortnight the application for stay would stand dismissed. The defendant failed to furnish security within a fortnight and thereafter applied for extension of time. It was held that the Court had jurisdiction to extend time inasmuch as the order, by reason of the default had only terminated the application for stay and had no effect on the main proceeding. This decision is of no assistance for our present purpose where by the result of the default order the suit itself will stand dismissed.

    8. The Madras High Court had to consider in Abdul Shaker Sahib v. Abdul Rahiman Sahib (4) (I.L.R 46 Mad., 148) whether after the plaintiff had been directed to deposit the money for obtaining a specific performance time could be extended. The order of the trial court that had to be considered in that case was in these orders: “I must therefore find for the plaintiffs and give them decree for specific performance on payment of Rs. 4,000/-. Time for payment two months”. It is to be noticed that there was no direction that on the failure to make payment within the time directed the suit would stand dismissed. The court held that the time fixed was not a condition and further held that if the correct interpretation of the words used by the trial Judge was that the time fixed was a condition the order should be varied so that the time should not be made a condition. Reference was made to the different forms in use in decree for specific performance in England and it was said that the time fixed should not be made a condition for the purpose of the decree. In a later case before the same High Court (Mahommadalli Sahib v. Abdul Khadir Saheb, (5) 59 M.L.J 351) Jackson and Thiruvenkata Achariar, JJ. held that the time fixed may be taken as a general indication what is reasonable and is not absolute condition. It has to be noticed that in that case also there was no default clause and the order made was “that on the appellant (plaintiff) depositing Rs. 800 in three weeks from this date in the lower court, the respondent do execute a sale deed to the appellant in respect of the scheduled site and do put him in possession of the same.” These decisions are, therefore, of no assistance to us for our present purpose. For, as I have stated earlier, the decision of the question whether the court has retained jurisdiction, or not will depend on the substance of the direction it has given.

    9. There is however a decision of the Nagpur High Court in Gakul Prasad v. Fattelal (6) (I.L.R 1945 Nag. 924) where even though the order itself stated that if the plaintiff failed to deposit the amount in court in time his suit would stand dismissed with costs, Niyogi, J. sitting singly held relying, it appears on the decision of (4) I.L.R 46 Mad. 148, already referred to, that such a decree is in the nature of a preliminary decree and it was open to the lower court to extend the time fixed. I find it difficult to understand why the mere fact that it is a preliminary decree, that is after the amount has been paid something more has to be done is a reason that keeps the jurisdiction of the court alive. If that were so, it might well be argued that after a preliminary decree for partition has been made determining the shares of the parties the court has still jurisdiction to make further order as regards the matter of shares or that where in a suit for specific performance the court has said that specific performance will be granted on payment of, say, Rs. 60,000/- the court retains jurisdiction to alter that order and fix either higher or lower sum for the purpose.

    10. That, in my opinion, is quite out of the question. Having dealt with the matter judicially for the purpose of preliminary decree it has lost jurisdiction for making any order in connection with the preliminary decree. The only way the preliminary decree can be varied is either by way of appeal or by review. The fact that the order made in specific performance fixing the time for deposit of money can be held to be of the nature of a preliminary decree is, in my opinion, no reason to think that the court retains jurisdiction in the matter.

    11. Reference has been made also to section 35 of the Specific Relief Act. It is said that the contract is alive until a suit for recission of the contract under section 35 is brought. Section 35 provides, inter alia, that any person interested in a contract (in writing) may sue to have it rescinded, and such rescission may be adjudged by the court in any case where the decree for specific performance of the contract of sale, or of a contract to take a lease, has been made, and the purchaser or lessee makes default in payment of the purchase money or other sums which the court has ordered him to pay. The argument is that the mere fact that the purchaser had made default in the payment of the purchase money does not result in the contract coming to an end. It is not necessary for our present purpose to consider this question. It is to be noticed, however, that in the very same section the Legislature has further provided that “in the same case, the court may, by order in the suit in which the decree has been made and not complied with, rescind the contract, either so far as regards the party in default, or altogether as the justice of the case may require.” It seems to me that when the court makes an order that in default of the deposit being made within the time as directed, the suit will stand dismissed the court is in substance making an order as contemplated under the concluding portion of section 35 of the Specific Belief Act.

    12. For all these reasons, I have come to the conclusion that the proper view to take is that the court after making an order in the form in which it has made in the present case, does not retain any jurisdiction in the litigation and subsequently cannot make any order under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure..

    13. I would accordingly discharge the Rule with costs.

    Debabrata Mookerjee, J.:— I agree.

    S.K.B

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    Comments

    Bhutnath Das And Ors. v. Sahodeb Chandra Panja Opposite Party.
    (Sep 16, 1958)